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vForeword
The papers in the present Review are based on lectures given during the eighth Uni-
versity of Eastern Finland1 – UNEP Course on International Environmental Agree-
ments. It was held from 4 to 16 September 2011 at the Asian Institute of Technol-
ogy, Bangkok, Thailand. 
Previous courses have been held in Joensuu (2004, 2005, 2007, 2010), in South 
Africa (2006, 2008), and at the UNEP headquarters in Kenya (2009). The proceed-
ings of those courses have been published in the previous Course Reviews.2
The aim of the Course is to equip present and future negotiators of multilateral en-
vironmental agreements with the information and experiences of others in the area 
of international environmental law-making in order to improve the impact and 
implementation of these key treaties.
In addition, others such as representatives of non-governmental organizations and 
the private sector may apply and be selected to attend the Course. Researchers and 
academics in the field are also eligible. Altogether 33 participants from 29 developed 
and developing countries and with due respect to gender participated in the eighth 
Course. 
The Course also serves as a forum for fostering cooperation between developed and 
developing country negotiators; and for taking stock of recent developments in the 
negotiation and implementation of multilateral environmental agreements and dip-
lomatic practices in this field. The ultimate aim of the Course is to improve environ-
mental negotiation capacity and governance worldwide.
We would like to express our thanks to all of those who contributed to the successful 
outcome of the eighth Course including the lecturers and authors who converted 
their presentation into paper form in order to compile the Review. In addition, we 
would like to thank Tuula Honkonen and Ed Couzens for the skilful and dedicated 
editing of the Review, and the members of the Editorial Board for providing guidance 
throughout this process.
Professor Perttu Vartiainen  Achim Steiner
Rector of the University of  UN Under Secretary General and
Eastern Finland UNEP Executive Director
1 Please note that the University of Joensuu is now the University of Eastern Finland.
2 For electronic versions of the 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 Reviews please see the 





The lectures given on the eighth annual University of Eastern Finland3 – United Na-
tions Environment Programme (UNEP) Course on Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements, from which most of the papers in the present Review	originate, were 
delivered by experienced diplomats, government officials and members of academia.4 
One of the main purposes of the Course is to take advantage of the practical experi-
ences of experts working in international environmental law-making and diplomacy 
– both to educate the participants on each Course and to contribute to knowledge 
and research through publication in the present Review. As such, the papers in this 
Review	and the different approaches taken by the authors reflect the diverse profes-
sional backgrounds of the lecturers, resource persons and participants (some of whom 
are experienced diplomats in their own right). Overall, the papers in the Review, 
while generally focused on a particular theme,	represent various aspects of the broad 
and complex field of international environmental law-making and diplomacy.
The current Review	is intended to provide practical guidance, professional perspective 
and historical background to decision-makers, diplomats, negotiators, practitioners, 
researchers and stakeholders working in the area of international environmental law-
making and diplomacy specifically related to environmental governance. The Review	
aims to elucidate different approaches, doctrines and techniques in the field, includ-
ing international environmental compliance and enforcement, international envi-
ronmental governance, international environmental law-making, environmental 
empowerment, and the enhancement of sustainable development generally. 
The first, second, fourth and seventh Courses were hosted by the University of East-
ern Finland, in Joensuu, Finland – an area in which forests and water provide abiding 
and dominant images, and in which dramatic seasonal changes provide an ever-
present reminder of how dominant an aspect of life climate can be. The special 
themes of the first two Courses were ‘Water’ and ‘Forests’. The third Course was 
hosted by the University of KwaZulu-Natal, on its Pietermaritzburg campus in Kwa-
Zulu-Natal, South Africa. KwaZulu-Natal is an extremely biodiversity-rich area, 
both in natural and cultural terms, and the chosen special theme was therefore ‘Bio-
diversity’. The fourth Course, which returned to Finland, had ‘Chemicals’ as its 
special theme. The chosen focus was appropriate considering the important role 
Finland has played in international chemicals management. The fifth course focused 
on ‘Oceans’ as its special theme, and was again held in the coastal province of Kwa-
3 It is to be noted that the University of Joensuu merged with the University of Kuopio on 1 January 2010 
to constitute the University of Eastern Finland. Consequently, the University of Joensuu – UNEP Course 
has been renamed the University of Eastern Finland – UNEP Course. The Course activities concentrate 
on the Joensuu campus of the new university.
4 General information on the University of Eastern Finland – UNEP Course on International Environ-
mental Law-making and Diplomacy is available at <http://www.uef.fi/unep>.
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Zulu-Natal in South Africa, on the Pietermaritzburg campus of the University of 
KwaZulu-Natal. The sixth Course was held in Nairobi and at Lake Naivasha in 
Kenya – with UNEP as the host, it was fitting to have ‘Environmental Governance’ 
as the special theme. The seventh Course returned to Finland with ‘Climate Change’ 
as its special focus, or theme. The eighth Course was held in Bangkok, Thailand,5 
and its focused theme – which is therefore the subject of the present Review – was 
‘Synergies Among the Biodiversity-Related Conventions’. 
The organizers of the Course, and the editorial board and editors of this Review, 
believe that the ultimate value of the Review	 lies in its making a contribution to 
knowledge and learning in the field of international environmental negotiation and 
diplomacy. The papers contained in the Review	are in most cases based on lectures 
or presentations given during the Course, but take their subject matters further as 
the authors explore their ideas. In particular, the Review	has been proud to receive 
ongoing contributions through the various editions – meaning that the same writer 
has contributed several papers and, in many cases, thereby been able to focus and 
develop their own ideas – of persons who have been involved in some of the most 
important environmental negotiations in the past several decades. Publication of 
these contributions means that the experiences, insights and reflections of these en-
vironmental leaders and insightful analysts are now recorded and disseminated, 
where they might not otherwise have been committed to print. The value of these 
contributions cannot be overstated. In addition, an ongoing feature of the Review 
has been the publication of papers by Course participants – these papers undergo the 
same editorial process as do the papers by lecturers (which process includes careful 
scrutiny and research by the editors, numerous rewrites, and approval for publication 
only after consideration by the Board).
How many environmental agreements there are is uncertain. The International En-
vironmental Agreements Database Project run by the University of Oregon6 suggests 
that, as at February 2012, there are over 1  100 multilateral environmental agree-
ments (MEAs); over 1  500 bilateral environmental agreements (BEAs); and over 250 
‘other’ environmental agreements (OEAs). Broken down further, the Database 
Project suggests that there are 1  154 MEAs, 1  573 BEAs and 247 OEAs; and also 
209 multilateral environmental non-binding agreements, 204 bilateral environmen-
tal non-binding agreements and 98 other (non-multi, non-bi) environmental non-
binding agreements.7 
The potential difficulties caused by this profusion are multiple – and perhaps even 
exponential – in nature; and are significantly exacerbated by certain of the ways in 
5 The Course was held on the Bangkok campus of the Asian Institute of Technology (AIT).
6 See IEA Database Project, available at <http://iea.uoregon.edu/page.php?file=home.htm&query=static> 
(visited 6 October 2012). 
7 See IEA Database Project, ‘Environmental instruments currently in the database’, 1 February 2012, avail-
able at <http://iea.uoregon.edu/page.php?query=home-contents.php> (visited 6 October 2012).
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which the nature of international environmental agreements have changed in recent 
decades. In respect of this change, Bodansky has written that the ‘most recent phase 
in international environmental law … involves much more complex environmental 
problems such as dealing with the impacts of climate change and protecting bio-
logical diversity, whose solutions may require fundamental economic and social 
changes rather than relatively simple pollution-prevention fixes’.8 
Strongly arguably, there has also been a concomitant change in states’ collective un-
derstanding of how the fundamental principle of state sovereignty operates in inter-
national law. In this regard, while states continue to iterate the position reflected in 
Principle 219 of the Stockholm Declaration10 it has become apparent that the posi-
tion of insisting on autonomy and complete rights of sovereignty is simply unwork-
able in an increasingly interconnected world. This shift is reflected in the difference 
between older MEAs, such as the 1971 Ramsar Convention,11 which leaves imple-
mentation entirely to state Parties, requires very little by way of monitoring and re-
porting, and has only the most rudimentary compliance measures to offer,12 and 
more recent MEAs with sophisticated monitoring and compliance mechanisms.13 
For further contrast, vide the International Convention for the Regulation of Whal-
ing (ICRW)14 of 1946, which elderly agreement contains no dispute-breaching 
mechanism whatsoever. Possibly this is because the Parties to the original agreement 
simply did not foresee any possibility of their being in major disagreement in the 
future; more likely the state of development of international agreements at the time15 
was not conducive to anything but exaggerated respect for state sovereignty.
Party practice certainly seems to be changing in this regard, consider for example the 
actions of the Chair of the 16th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations 
8 Daniel Bodansky, The	Art	and	Craft	of	International	Environmental	Law (Harvard University Press, 2010) 31.
9 Principle 21 reads:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the 
sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibil-
ity to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of 
other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
10 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE), Stockholm, 
16 June 1972, UN Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (1973), 11 International	Legal	Materials (1972) 1416.
11 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, Ramsar, 2 February 1971, in force 21 December 
1975, 11 International Legal	Materials (1972), 963, <http://www.ramsar.org>.
12 Such as listing on the Montreaux Record of Wetlands in Danger, as a means of embarrassing Parties into 
compliance.
13 Such as those under the Climate Change regime: the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, New York, 9 May 1992, in force 21 March 1994, 31 International	Legal	Materials (1992) 849, 
<http://unfccc.int>; and the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Kyoto, 11 December 1997, in force 16 February 2005, 37 International	Legal	Materials (1998) 
22. 
14 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Washington D.C., 2 December 1946, in force 
10 November 1948, 161 United	Nations	Treaty	Series 72.
15 The Convention was in fact based on earlier regulatory efforts from 1931 and 1937.
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Framework Convention on Climate Change16 who in December 2010 refused to 
allow the clear objection of a single state Party, Bolivia, to prevent her from declaring 
that there was consensus on a decision.17 This would have been unimaginable in 
1946. 
It seems that states Parties are now realizing that there must be more control by the 
whole over the process, and that individual states consequently should have less in-
dividual powers. That this still requires individual states to choose to give these pow-
ers over to the whole is probably less and less true, as states become ever more bound 
to each other and their affairs become ever more interconnected.
Not only are the issues more complex, there are also many more parties now than 
ever before. States are still the primary actors, but there are many more actors than 
there ever used to be. Significant actors include, in no particular order, intergovern-
mental organizations, civil society, multinational corporations/big business, academ-
ics and social commentators, nongovernmental organizations in multiple guises, 
indigenous peoples, and so forth. Even within states themselves, there is even now a 
quite bewildering array of negotiating alliances and voting blocks with regional or 
economic or common interest ties – many of these have overlapping mandates and 
many states belong to more than one.18 
One significant response, from the drafters of MEAs, to these changes has been to 
move away from single-issue treaties and from the expectation that the mere fact of 
the creation of an agreement will have the desired impact on the problem concerned. 
Rather, such negotiating parties are now building into agreement texts requirements 
for ongoing monitoring and regular, and detailed, reporting commitments. Togeth-
er with these come necessary and varied commitments for states, ranging from duties 
regularly to collect and collate often highly technical information on multifarious 
aspects of their environmental performances for report-backs to ever more numerous 
MEA Secretariats; to duties to appoint trained and skilled officials to perform various 
technical duties required by MEA texts; to obligations to attend ever more and more 
international meetings, with corollary expenses and the need for more and more 
trained representatives. 
Along with these issues would seem to be increasing understanding that attempting 
to protect biological diversity through stand-alone, single-issue conventions is 
16 And the 6th COP/MOP to the Kyoto Protocol.
17 See, for instance, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, ‘Summary of the Cancun Climate Change Conference: 
29 November to 11 December 2010’, 13 December 2010, available at <http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/en-
b12498e.html> (visited 6 October 2012). Bolivia objected, but has not since taken the matter further and 
participated in the next COP, in November–December 2011. 
18 On the proliferation of actors, see, for instance, Elizabeth Mrema and Kilaparti Ramakrishna, ‘The Im-
portance of Alliances, Groups and Partnerships in International Environmental Negotiations’ in Tuula 
Honkonen and Ed Couzens (eds), International	Environmental	Law-making	and	Diplomacy	Review	2009 
(University of Eastern Finland – UNEP Course Series 9, 2010) 183–193.
xdoomed to failure – the Convention on Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora (CITES),19 for example, deals only with a single aspect of management of 
biological diversity (ie: trade in endangered species) and it cannot be hoped that on 
its own it can offer complete protection.20 The treaty needs to have the support of 
other treaties, particularly those designed to be protective of habitats and ecosystems 
within national borders, if it is to be effective.
Putting these imperatives together, it appears that current thinking in international 
environmental circles is that a process of ‘synergizing’ through both formal and in-
formal linkages between MEAs will go at least some of the way toward solving these 
– and other – problems. To date, the most advanced ‘formal synergy regime’ is un-
doubtedly that created within the chemicals and wastes cluster of MEAs – particu-
larly through the linkages21 amongst the Basel Convention on the Control of Trans-
boundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal,22 the Rotterdam 
Convention on Prior Informed Consent23 and the Stockholm Convention on Persist-
ent Organic Pollutants.24 
It may be hoped that bringing different MEAs together, even if not formally merging 
them, will cut down on the expense entailed in attending stand-alone meetings – and 
ideally also cut down on the expenses incurred by onerous data-gathering and report-
ing commitments. The reduction of costs is an important factor in the current par-
lous condition of most economies – many states find it difficult, due to financial 
constraints, to participate as fully in international law-making and enforcement as 
they would like to.
Within the field of ‘biodiversity-related’ MEAs, it appears that there is now general 
acceptance that synergies provide more advantages than they do disadvantages, and 
19 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Washington DC, 
3 March 1973, in force 1 July 1975, 993 United	Nations	Treaty	Series 243, <http://www.cites.org>.
20 See, for instance, Ed Couzens, ‘The Problem that Categorization of Species in MEAs Poses for the Protec-
tion of Biodiversity’ in Ed Couzens and Tuula Kolari (eds), International	Environmental	Law-making	and	
Diplomacy	Review	2006 (University of Joensuu (Eastern Finland) – UNEP Course Series 4, 2007) 185–
216.
21 See, generally, Kerstin Stendahl, ‘Enhancing Cooperation and Coordiantion Among the Basel, Rotterdam 
and Stockholm Conventions’ in Tuula Kolari and Ed Couzens (eds), International	Environmental	Law-
making	and	Diplomacy	Review	2007 (University of Joensuu (Eastern Finland) – UNEP Course Series 7, 
2007) 127–141; and Cam Carruthers and Kerstin Stendahl, ‘The Naivasha Ex-COP: A Multilateral 
Simulation Exercise of a Joint Extraordinary Conference of the Parties to the Basel, Rotterdam and Stock-
holm Conventions’ in Tuula Honkonen and Ed Couzens (eds), International	Environmental	Law-making	
and	Diplomacy	Review	2009 (University of Eastern Finland – UNEP Course Series 9, 2010) 195–217.
22 Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Basel, 
22 March 1989, in force 5 May 1992, 28 International	Legal	Materials (1989) 657, <http://www.basel.
int>.
23 Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides 
in International Trade, Rotterdam, 11 September, 1998, in force 24 February, 38 International	Legal	
Materials (1999) 1, <http://www.pic.int>.
24 Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, Stockholm, 22 May 2001, in force 17 May 2004, 40 In-
ternational	Legal	Materials (2001) 532, <http://www.pops.int>.
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that the creation of significant linkages is underway – at least in respect of the MEAs 
which are known as the ‘Big Six’. These are CITES,25 Ramsar,26 the World Heritage 
Convention (WHC),27 the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species 
of Wild Animals (CMS),28 the Convention on Biological Diversity29 and the Inter-
national Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture.30 
Although the momentum is now with the forging of greater synergies and it appears 
that there are many more advantages to this than there are disadvantages, with the 
main focus appearing to be on how	best to foster synergies rather than whether to 
create them at all, it must not be forgotten that there will be disadvantages too. 
Amongst these, for instance, might be included the argument that where an MEA 
was originally tailored specifically to cater for a particular environmental problem, 
clustering with other MEAs might see a loss of useful emphasis. 
In the papers collected in the present Review there is considerable evaluation of, and 
recommendation for, different considerations which the various writers suggest 
might enhance synergies in the biodiversity-related cluster. It is the hope of the edi-
tors, the editorial board, and all involved with this Review that its publication will 
contribute to the body of research in the area of synergies amongst biodiversity-re-
lated conventions; and, indeed, to the development of international environmental 
law and diplomacy generally.
The present Review	is divided into four Parts. Part I contains papers which address 
general issues related to synergies in international environmental law. The first paper 
in the 2011 Review, by Sylvia Bankobeza, lays the foundation for the papers on law-
making and diplomacy by presenting the nature of multilateral environmental ne-
gotiation and diplomacy, which derives from international action taken by three or 
more parties. The writer explains that many of the issues currently being negotiated 
by states at various international environmental meetings are both complex and 
technical in nature. The number of institutions, the numbers of meetings being 
convened, and the amount of documentation involved in multilateral environmental 
negotiation and diplomacy have also grown over the years, creating a maze of issues 
and processes which governments need to be aware of, and need to be prepared to 
deliberate on. This paper gives consideration to how processes and mechanisms have 
25 See supra note 19.
26 See supra note 11.
27 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Paris, 16 November 
1972, in force 17 December 1975, 11 International	Legal	Materials (1972) 1358, <http://whc.unesco.
org>.
28 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, Bonn, 23 June 1979, in force 
1 November 1983, 19 International	Legal	Materials (1980) 15, <http://www.cms.int>.
29 Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993, 31 Inter-
national	Legal	Materials (1992) 822, <http://www.biodiv.org>.
30 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, Rome, 3 November 2001, into 
force 29 June 2004, <http://www.planttreaty.org/>.
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evolved over the years and how lessons learned from these can be used to enhance 
synergies.
The second of the two papers in Part I, by Tuomas Kuokkanen, assists with establish-
ing the theoretical basis for the Review theme, by considering relationships between 
multilateral environmental agreements and other agreements. Through discussion of 
areas such as trade and the environment, the law of the sea and the environment, and 
relationships and conflict in general, the importance is shown of understanding the 
close relationship between a framework agreement and protocols and other instru-
ments relating thereto. It is important also to recognize the cooperative relationship 
that usually persists between environmental regimes; to acknowledge both bounda-
ries and relationships between environmental and other relationships; and to remem-
ber that the general principles and methods of international law remain available 
when conflicts between international agreements arise.
Part II considers the state of biological diversity governance and synergies. The first 
paper in Part II, by Marko Berglund and Wanhua Yang, considers compliance with 
and potential for synergies within biodiversity-related multilateral environmental 
agreements. It is argued that in addition to translating treaty provisions into na-
tional actions, in order to be successful MEAs also require collective action by their 
Parties to implement the treaty obligations at the international level. These joint ac-
tions include mandating Conferences of the Parties (COPs) to establish or improve 
compliance procedures/processes; to establishing financial mechanisms; and to re-
quire the treaty Secretariats to undertake certain administrative functions for facili-
tating compliance.
The second paper in Part II, by Kerstin Stendahl, focuses on enhancing cooperation 
and coordination of multilateral environmental agreements as a means of strengthen-
ing international environmental governance (IEG). This is a topical issue and re-
cently featured as part of the Rio+20 negotiations on the institutional framework for 
sustainable development (IFSD). This paper canvasses the main messages to come 
out of IEG debates over recent decades, relating hopes and prospects to practical 
experience by considering how synergies have been achieved in the chemicals and 
waste cluster. It is suggested that past successful endeavours could assist in setting the 
stage for other MEA clusters, such as amongst the biodiversity-related agreements.
The third and final paper in Part II, by Erie Tamale, considers global trends – includ-
ing both current pressures and future scenarios. Biological diversity continues to 
decline globally at unprecedented rates with the decline being more rapid in the past 
50 years than at any other time in human history; and being expected to continue 
at the same pace or even to accelerate as the drivers of biodiversity loss increase in 
intensity. The paper then offers some possible synergistic strategic policy responses 
to these. 
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Part III of the Review concerns specific issues related to synergies in international 
environmental law. The first paper in this Part, by Peter Herkenrath, concerns how 
biodiversity-related synergies can be used to support and facilitate the implementa-
tion within national legal systems of multilateral environmental agreements aimed 
at halting loss of biodiversity. It is pointed out that there is a plethora of multilateral 
environmental agreements, with many of these being of global nature and a specific 
subset of these addressing biological diversity. It is argued that the extent to which 
these MEAs have been effective in curbing the loss of biodiversity is uncertain; and 
that improved cooperation, coordination and synergies are required for improving 
the overall performance of MEAs. The paper considers new opportunities for syner-
gies and makes recommendations as to how the most appropriate of these might be 
selected.
The second paper in Part III, by Melissa Lewis, deals with synergies within the inter-
national regime on access and benefit-sharing with a specific focus on cooperation 
between the Nagoya Protocol31 and the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Re-
sources for Forestry and Agriculture. The paper highlights that modern technology 
enables plant genetic resources to be used in the development of a wide spectrum of 
commercial products, the combined markets for which are worth hundreds of bil-
lions of dollars annually. The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), 
which includes the fair and equitable sharing of benefits from the utilization of ge-
netic resources as one of its three core objectives, and contains a number of broadly-
phrased provisions on access and benefit-sharing (ABS), has seen only limited 
progress made toward achieving this objective. However, it is argued that recent steps 
have made considerably more progress and that there is much potential to be found 
in possible synergies between the Protocol and the International Treaty.
The third paper in Part III, by Marina von Weissenberg, concerns opportunities and 
challenges that exist for establishing synergies, and generally enhancing cooperation, 
within the biodiversity-related cluster of MEAs. The latest international reports con-
firm that the loss of biological diversity continues generally all over the world, and 
this means that additional work and efforts need to be taken to enable the biodiver-
sity-related multilateral environmental agreements fully to deliver their intended 
objectives and our common goal of halting biodiversity loss by 2020. The paper 
considers the importance of both national and international action, and concludes 
with recommendations on synergistic planning.
The fourth and final paper in Part III, by Marceil Yeater, deals with the CITES Sec-
retariat and synergies based on species-level conservation with trade implications. 
The paper considers existing synergies and cooperative relationships which CITES 
31 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising 
from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Nagoya, 29 October 2010, <http://www.
cbd.int/abs/>.
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has with other agreements; and then various possible elements of such relationships 
in general. In conclusion, challenges are identified and recommendations made. 
Part IV of the Review	reflects the interactive nature of the Course. During the Course 
negotiation simulation exercises were organized to introduce the participants to the 
real-life challenges facing negotiators of international environmental agreements. In 
the two main simulation exercises, participants were given individual instructions 
and a hypothetical, sometimes country-specific, negotiating mandate and were guid-
ed by international environmental negotiators. Excerpts from, and explanations of, 
the exercises are included in Part IV.
The first paper in Part IV explains a drafting exercise conducted by Sylvia Bankobe-
za. The exercise provided an introduction to a negotiation session where participants 
could gain a general understanding of issues relating to multilateral negotiations and 
the related processes. This was regarded as an important way to improve the partici-
pants’ general understanding of the processes before entering into the close detail 
required of the two main negotiation simulation exercises which focused on the 
theme of the Course. In the drafting exercise, each of three drafting groups was 
given a sample decision and general guidance information to assist in its work. The 
decisions were retrieved, modified or crafted (either with brackets, blanks or op-
tional words) from previous decisions of the Conferences of the Parties relating to 
MEA synergies: two were posited as being from the Convention on Biological Di-
versity (CBD) and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) decisions respectively, and the third was crafted as a 
UNEP Governing Council decision.
Similarly, the second paper in Part IV, by Haruko Okusu, explains a group work 
exercise which was based on the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020 and the 
Aichi Targets32 and synergies. The exercise was developed as a skills development 
aspect within the Course’s special theme, and focused on considering how synergies 
might be operationalized by collaboration around the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, and 
the possible roles that different biodiversity-related conventions could play.
In 2011 there were two main negotiation exercises, each involving issues of both 
procedure and substance. The third paper in Part IV explains the first simulation 
exercise, which was devised and run by Cam Carruthers and Niko Urho, with sup-
port on both aspects from Marko Berglund and Simone Schiele. 
The scenario for the negotiation simulation focused on synergies among biodiversity-
related MEAs, and involved both substantive and structural/procedural issues. The 
exercise included negotiations in an Ad Hoc Joint Working Group (AHJWG) on the 
32 The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–202 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets’, CBD decision X/2 
(2010).
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following four issues: joint programmatic activities; a joint work plan for national 
implementation; a joint review mechanism; and the establishment of a group on 
Rules of Procedure. While hypothetical, the negotiation simulation scenario was 
based on recent real-life discussions on enhancing synergies amongst key biodiversi-
ty-related conventions. The scenario was chosen because clustering of MEAs to im-
prove coordination and efficiency is of current interest and is an area where much 
progress is being made and many countries have voiced interest in pursuing further. 
A supplementary objective of this exercise was that it would produce discussion and 
results, including this paper, which could be of interest particularly for participants 
in the related meetings of the governing bodies of the biodiversity-related conven-
tions. The theme also provided an opportunity for participants to gain perspective 
on the complexity of international environmental law-making in the current inter-
national environmental governance (IEG) system. 
While describing the course of the exercise, the paper goes further and makes sub-
stantive comment on the nature of international environmental law, the desirability 
of enhancing synergies, and the importance of streamlining rules of procedure and 
increasing understanding thereof.
The fourth paper in Part IV, the thirteenth and final paper in the 2011 Review, by 
Ed Couzens, explains the second major negotiation exercise run on the 2011 Course. 
Based on the International Whaling Commission (IWC) in the context of synergies 
between biodiversity-related MEAs, the paper presents a description of a multilat-
eral simulation exercise designed to foster negotiation skills by simulating the experi-
ence of debating and drafting legal text, in an unusually hostile atmosphere. The 
setting chosen was the International Whaling Commission (IWC); a body which is 
often depicted as struggling to fulfil its mandate, given the bitter disputes which have 
characterized it for decades and which have concerned both substantive and proce-
dural issues. 
The paper presents a substantive argument as much as it reflects an exercise, and 
identifies a particular problem relating to species that are only partly regulated in 
international law, suggests reasons for this, and locates the IWC as a multilateral 
agreement which has particularly problematic aspects in respect of synergies with 
biodiversity-related MEAs. Interestingly, although the exercise was based on a ficti-
tious scenario, the problem which it considers was subsequently taken up as an issue 
in 2012 at the 64th annual meeting of the International Whaling Commission – and 
is expected to be on the agenda again at future meetings.
While the majority of the papers in the present Review	deal with specific environ-
mental issues, or aspects of specific multilateral environmental agreements, and 
thereby provide a written memorial for the future; the negotiation exercises provide, 
in a sense, the core of each Course. This is because each Course is structured around 
the practical negotiation exercises which the participants undertake; and it is sug-
xvi
gested that the papers explaining the exercises provide insights into the interna-
tional law-making process. The inclusion of the simulation exercises has been a fea-
ture of every Review	published to date, and the editorial board, editors and course 
organizers believe that the collection of these exercises (which now spans eight years, 
and is moving into its ninth) has significant potential value as a teaching tool for the 
reader or student seeking to understand international environmental negotiation. It 
does need to be understood, of course, that not all of the material used in each ne-
gotiation exercise is distributed in the Review. This is indeed a downside, but the 
material is often so large in volume that it cannot be reproduced in the Course pub-
lication.
Generally, it is the hope of the editors that the various papers in the present Review	
will not be considered in isolation. Rather, it is suggested that the reader should make 
use of all of the Reviews	(spanning the years 2004 to 2011 to date), all of which are 
easily accessible on the internet through a website provided by the University of 
Eastern Finland,33 to gain a broad understanding of international environmental 
law-making and diplomacy.
To give an example of this, in the 2006 Review, which had the theme ‘Biodiversity’, 
there are 18 papers – many of which will provide a reader of the present Review with 
important complementary material. Inclusive of the present volume, in the first eight 
volumes of the Review (spanning the years 2004 to 2011 of the Course from which 
the papers in each Review emanate) 106 authors have contributed to 130 papers. 
Work is already underway on the 2012 Review, to be published in 2013, which it is 
anticipated will add approximately 12 papers to this total – under the theme of 
‘Oceans Governance’.
Tuula Honkonen34   Ed Couzens35
33 See <http://www.uef.fi/unep>; link to ‘Publications and Materials’.
34 LLM (London School of Economics and Political Science) D.Sc (Environmental Law) (University of 
Joensuu); e-mail: tuula.h.honkonen@gmail.com.
35 BA Hons LLB (Wits) LLM Environmental Law (Natal & Nottingham) Ph.D. (KwaZulu-Natal); Attor-
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Multilateral environmental negotiation and diplomacy derives from international 
action taken by three or more states to develop standards for, or to address and/or 
deliberate on, environmental issues through international negotiations. Many of the 
current issues that are being negotiated by states at various international environ-
mental meetings, including in multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) proc-
esses, are complex and technical in nature. The number of institutions, the number 
of meetings being convened, and the amount of documentation involved in multi-
lateral environmental negotiation and diplomacy have also grown over the years, 
creating a maze of issues and processes which governments need to be apprised of, 
and need to be prepared to deliberate on. 
This paper provides a general introduction to multilateral environmental negotiation 
and diplomacy. The paper does not include bilateral negotiations that take place 
between two countries; nor, because they are organized in a different way, does it 
address processes of negotiations under the framework of individual country proc-
esses, or sub-regional and regional organizations processes and meeting formats.
2 Overview of the system of multilateral environmental 
negotiation and diplomacy
Multilateral environmental diplomacy and negotiation takes place through a variety 
of frameworks and meetings. These include meetings and conferences convened 
under the framework of the United Nations, including the United Nations Environ-
1 Legal Officer, Division of Environmental Law and Conventions, UNEP; e-mail: Sylvia.Bankobeza@unep.org.
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ment Programme (UNEP)2 Governing Council3 Sessions, Conferences and Meetings 
of the Parties (COPs/MOPs) of various multilateral environmental agreements, and 
other meetings and conferences relating to the environment. Opportunities for mul-
tilateral environmental negotiations and diplomacy are also available when three or 
more countries meet to deliberate on environmental issues of concern among them; 
or when they meet under sub-regional or regional institutions to address environ-
mental issues. Negotiation processes for developing new environmental legal instru-
ments at the global, regional and sub-regional levels, or between three or more coun-
tries also provide an opportunity for multilateral environmental negotiations and 
diplomacy. 
Major environmental conferences organized under the framework of the United 
Nations have over the years played an important role in directing the environmental 
agenda. These have included the United Nations Conference on the Human Envi-
ronment (UNCHE), also referred to as the Stockholm Conference, which was held 
in 1972;4 the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED), known as the Rio Conference or the Earth Summit, held in 1992;5 the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) held in Johannesburg in 
2002;6 and the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (the 
‘Rio+20’ Conference), held in 2012 in Brazil.7 
In particular, multilateral environmental negotiations take place in the following four 
instances. Firstly, when issues of a transboundary nature arise and need to be resolved 
through notification, consultations and negotiations between more than two coun-
tries, at the sub-regional level, or the regional level, or between countries with trans-
boundary issues, or those sharing a natural resource, or having like-minded environ-
mental interests. Secondly, when agreements, treaties, or specific MEAs are being 
negotiated; thirdly, when conferences and meetings of the parties for various MEAs 
and their technical and working groups negotiate the further development or the 
implementation of MEAs; and, finally, when the United Nations or its organs – such 
as the United Nations General Assembly,8 the UNEP Governing Council, the Inter-
national Labour Organization (ILO),9 the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO),10 and other UN fora such as the Commission on Sustainable Development11 
– meet or organize environment-related summits or conferences.
2 See, generally, <http://www.unep.org>.
3 See <http://www.unep.org/resources/gov/overview.asp>.
4 See, generally, <http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=97> (visited 
1 January 2013).
5 See, generally, <http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html> (visited 1 January 2013).
6 See, generally, <http://www.un.org/jsummit/html/basic_info/basicinfo.html> (visited 1 January 2013).
7 See, generally, <http://www.uncsd2012.org/rio20/index.html>.
8 See, generally, <http://www.un.org/en/ga/>.
9 See, generally, <http://www.ilo.org>.
10 See, generally, <http://www.imo.org>.
11 See, generally, <http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/>. 
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Over the years, many environment-related meetings have been convened to deliber-
ate on environmental issues and to develop and further implement MEAs; and a 
good number of legal instruments have been negotiated and subsequently adopted.12 
Although the actions required to implement any MEA will depend on the provisions 
of the MEA and on the specific issue or issues which they intend to regulate, some 
MEAs have established formal mechanisms to monitor their implementation. Fur-
thermore, institutions in the form of convention secretariats convene Conferences 
and Meetings of the Parties and organize related meetings of scientific bodies, stand-
ing committees, or working groups to deliberate on MEAs. The Conferences and 
Meetings of the parties of MEAs are institutions that also provide an opportunity for 
parties to negotiate and decide on issues under the MEA on a regular basis in the 
course of the implementation of the MEA. These have, under some MEAs, included 
processes for the development of additional legal instruments, such as protocols to 
an original MEA.
Multilateral environmental agreements are negotiated and adopted with a global, 
regional or sub-regional coverage depending on the purpose of the negotiations, the 
scope envisaged by negotiators and on the intentions of the parties at the time of 
negotiation. In preparing for any negotiations for a new MEA, it is important for 
negotiators to understand the issues necessitating the negotiation of this new agree-
ment. To enable the negotiators to understand the technical and legal issues, for 
example, studies are usually undertaken and the required legal analysis provided as 
background materials to assist negotiators. 
It is also important to understand any actions taken before negotiating the MEA, 
possible synergies with related MEAs, and the mandate for negotiating the particular 
MEA. If the negotiations have started, then a negotiator is expected to familiarize 
himself with the ongoing work of the intergovernmental negotiating committee 
(INC) for that particular MEA’s negotiating text. 
When the negotiations are completed and a text is adopted and opened for signature, 
one can look out for the final act of negotiations. The terms agreed upon to bring 
into effect the MEA can either be by signature followed by ratification or accession 
depending on the terms agreed to in the MEA. Bilateral agreements of countries that 
share a resource jointly for example come into effect upon signature. Non-binding 
agreements mainly come into effect by adoption as an outcome of a meeting or by 
signature, i.e. soft law instruments, in the form of codes of conduct, decisions, 
12 The numbers involved are high. It has been estimated, in a database project run by the University of 
Oregon, that there are more than 1 500 bilateral, more than 1 000 multilateral, and more than 250 
‘other’, international environmental agreements. See University of Oregon, International Environmental 
Agreements (IEA) Database Project, <http://iea.uoregon.edu/page.php?file=home.htm&query=static> 
(visited 20 February 2012). 
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declarations, environmental action plans, guidelines, outcomes, principles, recom-
mendations, resolutions, and so forth.13 
3 Evolution of the system, institutions and instruments
The evolution of multilateral environmental negotiations and diplomacy can be 
traced from the early 1900s, when the first MEAs to manage natural resources and 
wildlife conservation were adopted by colonial powers in 1900 and 1933 respective-
ly.14 At that time the issues addressed in the international conventions mainly con-
cerned the establishing of national parks and nature conservation areas and issues of 
overexploitation of natural resources. 
In the 1940s and 1950s, several conventions were negotiated and adopted on issues 
relating to the law of the sea15 and the regulation of whaling which was adopted as a 
convention in 1946.16 In 1971, the Convention of Wetlands of International Impor-
tance (the Ramsar Convention)17 was adopted. In 1972, the United Nations Confer-
ence on the Human Environment, also referred to as the Stockholm Conference, was 
convened. The main outcome of the Conference was a set of recommendations in-
cluding for establishing the United Nations Environment Programme, which was 
established in the same year. In 1973, the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES)18 was adopted. The Conven-
tion on Migratory Species19 was adopted in 1979. In 1982, the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea20 was created, regulating marine and coastal pol-
lution. A number of Regional Seas Conventions were subsequently added to the list 
of those already negotiated and adopted.
13 On ‘soft law’ and the weight which can be given to these various instruments, see ‘2.2 Soft law and hard 
law’ in Cam Carruthers (ed.), Multilateral	Environmental	Agreement	Negotiator’s	Handbook,	University of 
Joensuu – UNEP Course Series 5 (2nd ed., University of Joensuu, 2007) 2.2–2.3.
14 These being the Convention on the Preservation of Wild Animals, Birds and Fish in Africa, London, 19 
May 1900, which never came into force; and the Convention Relative to the Preservation of Fauna and 
Flora in their Natural State, 8 November 1933, in force 14 January 1936.
15 For instance, the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Geneva, 29 April 1958, 
into force 10 September 1964, 516 United	Nations	Treaty	Series 205 ; Convention on the High Seas, 
Geneva, 29 April 1958, into force 30 September 1962, 450 United	Nations	Treaty	Series 11, 169; Conven-
tion on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas, Geneva, 29 April 1958, into force 
20 March 1966, 559 United	Nations	Treaty	Series	285; Convention on the Continental Shelf Geneva, 
Geneva, 29 April 1958, into force 10 June 1964, 499 United	Nations	Treaty	Series 311.
16 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Washington D.C., 2 December 1946, in force 
10 November 1948, 161 United	Nations	Treaty	Series 72.
17 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat, Ramsar, 2 February 
1971, in force 21 December 1975, 11 International Legal	Materials (1972), 963, <http://www.ramsar.org>.
18 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Washington DC, 
3 March 1973, in force 1 July 1975, 993 United	Nations	Treaty	Series 243, <http://www.cites.org>.
19 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, Bonn, 23 June 1979, in force 
1 November 1983, 19 International	Legal	Materials (1980) 15, <http://www.cms.int>.
20 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, in 
force 16 November 1994, 21 International	Legal	Materials (1982) 1261.
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In 1985, the Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer,21 which has 
an active 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,22 was 
negotiated and adopted. In 1989, the Basel Convention on the Control of Trans-
boundary Movement of Hazardous Waste23 was negotiated and adopted. In 1992, 
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development took place and 
adopted the Rio Declaration24 and the Agenda 2125 Action Plan. At the same Confer-
ence, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),26 which now has three proto-
cols, was adopted; along with the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change (UNFCCC),27 which later adopted the Kyoto Protocol.28 Two years 
later, the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD)29 was 
adopted in 1994. 
In 1998, the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedures for 
Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade30 was adopted. 
The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants31 was adopted in 2001, 
just before the World Summit on Sustainable Development which was held in Johan-
nesburg in 2002. A specific declaration32 and action plan33 resulted from that Sum-
mit. 
The Rio +20 adopted an outcome document called ‘The Future We Want’ in June 
2012. The negotiation processes that were currently underway at the time this review 
21 Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Vienna, 22 March 1985, in force 22 September 1988, 
26 International	Legal	Materials (1985) 1529.
22 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Montreal, 16 September 1987, in force 
1 January 1989, 26 International	Legal	Materials (1987) 154, <http://www.unep.org/ozone/>.
23 Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Basel, 
22 March 1989, in force 5 May 1992, 28 International	Legal	Materials (1989) 657, <http://www.basel.
int>.
24 UN Declaration on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 14 June 1992, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (1992), 31 International	Legal	Materials (1992) 876.
25 Agenda 21, UN Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 13 June 1992, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (1992), available at <http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/agenda21/>.
26 Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993, 31 Inter-
national	Legal	Materials (1992) 822, <http://www.biodiv.org>.
27 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 9 May 1992, in force 21 March 
1994, 31 International	Legal	Materials (1992) 849, <http://unfccc.int>.
28 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto, 11 December 
1997, in force 16 February 2005, 37 International	Legal	Materials (1998) 22.
29 UN Convention to Combat Desertification in Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and or Deserti-
fication, Particularly in Africa, Paris, 17 June 1994, in force 26 December 1996, 33 International	Legal	
Materials (1994) 1309, <http://www.unccd.int>.
30 Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides 
in International Trade, Rotterdam, 11 September, 1998, in force 24 February, 38 International	Legal	
Materials (1999) 1, <http://www.pic.int>.
31 Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, Stockholm, 22 May 2001, in force 17 May 2004, 40 In-
ternational	Legal	Materials (2001) 532, <http://www.pops.int>.
32 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development ‘From our origins to the future’, Johannesburg, 
South Africa, 4 September 2011, available at <http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_
PD/English/POI_PD.htm>.
33 Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.199/20 
(2002).
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was being printed include a legally binding instrument on mercury34 and the nego-
tiations of the renewal of the Kyoto protocol of the UNFCCC which was mandated 
by COP17. 
4 Processes and mechanisms
4.1 Introduction
Multilateral environmental negotiations can take place in one setting or be convened 
in various segments or phases. The differences of a multilateral environmental nego-
tiation are determined by the size and type of the meeting. Also important are certain 
characteristics commonly found where progress is made, including evaluation of the 
strengths and weaknesses of holding particular negotiation issues in one setting or in 
different segments and settings. These settings may be, for example, that the first part 
consists of a meeting of technical officials who deliberate on all the issues in the 
agenda items, and, secondly, there is a high level/ministerial segment where decisions 
are taken. In meetings addressing scientific issues, meetings of scientists and techni-
cal experts in the field could be organized before the main session to feed into the 
upcoming meetings. In some meetings, however, differentiation of the sessions is not 
made. 
The mechanics of multilateral environmental conferences and meetings under the 
framework of MEAs have other features that contribute to the deliberations of the 
main meeting. For example, they can have both plenaries and break out meetings, 
such as working group meetings on various issues; contact groups; preparatory re-
gional meetings for consultations and agreeing on common positions; meetings for 
scientific and technical bodies; and meetings of implementation committees.
4.2 Managing synergies among instruments and processes
Although MEAs have generally been adopted separately, they still fall within different 
clusters or categories depending on their relationships with each other. Consideration 
of synergies amongst MEAs related to biological diversity, for example, requires 
governments to have a clear understanding of MEAs which fall within the biodiver-
sity cluster and of how they relate to each other, of their inter-linkages, coordination 
and areas of cooperation. Biodiversity-related MEAs include, inter alia, CITES, 
CMS, CBD, the Ramsar Convention, and the UNCCD. One can also add the 
UNFCCC to the list because among its activities the regime has programs for miti-
34 On the process, see UNEP, ‘Mercury; the Negotiation Process’, available at <http://www.unep.org/haz-
ardoussubstances/Mercury/Negotiations/tabid/3320/Default.aspx> (visited 30 January 2012). See also 
Sheila Logan, Brenda Koekkoek, Desiree Narvaez and Maged Younes: ‘Mercury – Searching for Solutions 
to a Global Problem’, in Tuula Kolari and Ed Couzens (eds), International	Environmental	Lawmaking	and	
Diplomacy	Review	2007, University of Joensuu – UNEP Course Series 7 (University of Joensuu, 2008) 
205–212.
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gating climate change by reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degrada-
tion (REDD) which fall under the biodiversity cluster. The understanding necessary 
for taking synergies into account can also add value to a negotiator in various proc-
esses of negotiations when issues addressed in other MEAs in the cluster are raised 
or referred to. 
In developing a new instrument or deliberating on MEAs, it is important for a ne-
gotiator to have a clear understanding of the agreements that relate to each other, in 
terms of understanding the similarities, links in their mandates and the cross-cutting 
areas. This is important when considering issues relating to the need to cooperate 
and coordinate some of their work and if a negotiator is to be able to manage the 
complexity, inter-linkages and synergies among the instruments and processes. To 
obtain a clear perspective, one can do an analysis of MEAs in a cluster to understand 
the current similarities, links, and cross-cutting areas in a particular cluster and seek 
to know the areas of cooperation, joint working arrangements, if any, and/or coor-
dination among MEAs in a cluster. This information can also be important when 
determining a suitable instrument to be developed to address a particular issue, as 
the best way to proceed might not always be by developing a new legal instrument.
In this regard, there are chemicals and waste-related MEAs in one cluster; these in-
clude the POPs, PIC and the Basel Convention.35 Those who are presently negotiat-
ing for a legally binding instrument on mercury, for example, are expected – if the 
negotiations are to be effective – to have a clear idea of how the instrument relates 
to the other chemical and waste related MEAs for them to have mutual cooperation 
and coordination of their activities. Other clusters include the biodiversity cluster 
and the freshwater and oceans clusters, for example. In negotiating toward MEAs, it 
is important to understand how to manage synergies among instruments and proc-
esses. 
4.3 MEA negotiating formats
There are various negotiations formats depending on the type, size and the organ-
izers of a meeting. For example, in large intergovernmental meetings organized by 
the United Nations, there will normally be plenary sessions where general debates 
take place and decisions are taken. In the same meetings, opportunities are often 
given – through bloc negotiations – for countries in a particular bloc to converge 
with like-minded countries to deliberate on their positions which are then fed to the 
plenary. In this regard, the role of the Chair of the plenary is very important in con-
ducting such meetings, in identifying the areas of convergence and diversion within 
these meetings, as well as in calling for the establishment of different working groups 
35 On synergies in this cluster, see Kerstin Stendahl, ‘Enhancing Cooperation and Coordination among the 
Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions’, in Tuula Kolari and Ed Couzens (eds), International	
Environmental	Law-making	and	Diplomacy	Review	2007, University of Joensuu-UNEP Course Series 7 
(University of Joensuu, 2008) 127–141.
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(of open/selected countries). Such break-away groups may include, inter alia, contact 
groups, Friends of the Chair consultations, formal and informal consultations, re-
gional group consultations; like-minded group consultations; Small Island Develop-
ing States (SIDS) and Least Developing Countries (LDCs). A legal group and various 
drafting groups can be set up to draft clauses and harmonize agreed texts and deci-
sions. These and other types of groups not mentioned here are established with de-
fined mandates and limited working time, especially when the plenary cannot ad-
dress all issues in detail in view of time, or needs to address unresolved issues in 
different sections of the agenda items/revised text, or when there is a need to address 
divergent views of some delegates. The results are normally presented back to the 
plenary for consideration. 
 
4.4 Understanding terms referring to common UN documents
In multilateral environmental negotiations convened under the framework of the 
United Nations, a negotiator will come across terms which refer to common UN 
documents. These include, inter alia, documents such as in-session documents that 
are distributed during a meeting. This is a category of documents containing new 
proposals or outcomes of in-session work and is for use only during the sessions 
concerned. Examples include conference room papers (CRPs) and limited/draft dis-
tribution documents (L docs), which may include draft decisions (documents pre-
pared at the pre-session or in-session stage of the meeting to be considered by dele-
gates as to whether they will become decisions of the meeting). 
Informal documents include a working paper and a non-paper. A working paper is 
more substantive and less ephemeral than a CRP and less specific to a particular 
delegation than a non-paper. The distribution of this paper is normally limited to 
participants in the conference. On the other hand, a non-paper is an informal text 
that is distributed on an informal basis to facilitate the process of negotiating an 
agreement; it is not a formal proposal nor does it engage its author in multilateral 
environmental negotiations. 
Other types of documents which a negotiator might come across during multilat-
eral environmental negotiations meetings include a draft negotiation text which is 
the main document which is being negotiated. A chair’s summary is a draft text in-
troduced by the presiding officer in an attempt to help the conference towards agree-
ment. It can include some words or text in square brackets, indicating that the issues 
to which they relate are for later resolution. A chairman’s draft is often an attempt at 
a final text that might secure consensus; it is a proposal prepared by the presiding 
officer of a meeting to assist in reaching consensus. A compilation text is a chairman’s 
compilation which puts together a number of competing proposals submitted by 
delegates; it is a text that lays out proposals made by delegations. An outcome docu-
ment includes decisions, a set of recommendations or a plan of action adopted at 
major United Nations conferences and international agreements meetings. A Decla-
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ration, which is not normally binding, is a formal statement of aspirations issued by 
a meeting.36
4.5 Framework for effective MEA negotiations
The framework conditions needed for effective MEA negotiations to take place in-
clude clear rules of procedures which are agreed upon early on by negotiators; and 
negotiators/parties who are willing to participate, ready to negotiate, and who have 
the necessary resources to negotiate. Desirable framework conditions also include 
experienced chairs who are skilled in the art of conducting negotiations; and nego-
tiation blocs that can produce articulated, coherent and effective group positions. In 
addition, it is important that there be a sense of urgency in the process; and that 
deadlines are taken note of as the negotiations proceed. All negotiators also ought to 
have the ability and willingness to consult, bargain and compromise; and to also have 
a means of influence and leverage. The latter is most likely to be present when there 
is a level playing field between the negotiators in interacting and consulting con-
tinuously and when the parties accept the moral authority of the chair. 
5 Effective participation and negotiation in environmental 
conferences
5.1 Introduction
Effective participation in, and negotiations at, environmental conferences require 
that one understands the issues being addressed and the nature of the phases of ne-
gotiation. In addition, it is important to understand the role and effect of language 
in negotiation; and the nature of the processes in negotiations such as adversarial and 
problem-solving orientations, including strategies, tactics and techniques. In assess-
ing the performance of a negotiation process, one can review the characteristics of 
the processes and outcomes and seek to understand the power of negotiation and the 
lessons learned for the perceived weak negotiators, and those responding to com-
petitive negotiators. Managing competing interests in a give and take manner is 
important as one gets involved in exchanging views with other delegates in both 
formal and informal consultations, as well as resolving arguments and listening ac-
tively so that the negotiator is ready when there is a need to intervene and possibly 
change the course of a negotiation. 
36 For further information on these documents, visit the treaty reference guide available at <http://untreaty.
un.org/ola-internet/Assistance/Guide.htm> (visited 26 March 2012). Other useful information sources 
include UNITAR: A Glossary of Terms for UN delegates (2009), available at <http://www.unitar.org/
mdp/training-tools/terms-for-un-delegates> and UNEP, A Glossary of Terms for Negotiators of Multilat-
eral Environmental Agreements (2007), available at <http://www.unep.org/pdf/delc/Glossary_final.pdf> 
(both visited 26 March 2012).
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5.2 Preparing and planning for negotiations
Preparation and planning for multilateral environmental negotiations requires one 
to know his or her role in the negotiations; and the roles that might be played by 
other negotiators. Furthermore, it includes having objectives and setting goals; creat-
ing, accessing, analysing and sharing information, engaging in consultation; and 
choosing a negotiation strategy and defining options. In addition, good preparation 
also includes itemizing and prioritizing issues, formulating positions based on pri-
orities, and choosing the appropriate composition of the delegation. In planning and 
organizing effectively for negotiation, one can prepare a checklist and delegate brief 
articulating the issues to be deliberated on and a possible position. 
In current multilateral environmental negotiations processes, regional group meet-
ings are normally convened before the session to articulate their positions as soon as 
the documents of the meeting are posted on the website. These pre-consultation 
processes provide a forum for preparation of a common position on areas of interest 
for a regional group, but also for preparation of the negotiators to understand and 
consult with national stakeholders on the issues before the meeting is convened. 
In preparing and planning for negotiations, it is important for government delegates 
to have inter-ministerial coordination or a national stakeholder consultation where 
approaches and mechanisms can be determined and managed. The need for and 
benefits of inter-ministerial coordination is in having a clear perspective of the gov-
ernment position, taking into account the role of other ministries and other relevant 
stakeholders such as non-governmental organizations, industry, etc in the area that 
is being negotiated. 
There may be coordination challenges, either vertical or horizontal, that need to be 
managed when handling issues which cut across the work and mandate of different 
government departments. Institutional, legislative and administrative conflicts may also 
need to be addressed where they arise. Issues relating to MEA focal points consulta-
tions, the role of the environment ministry versus other ministries in managing aspects 
of the environment may arise when dealing with environmental issues. For example, 
with regard to an issue such as biosafety, the MEA focal point of the CBD at the na-
tional level, who follows up on MEA meetings, is normally based in the ministry re-
sponsible for the environment, while biosafety experts may be based in the ministry of 
agriculture. Consequently, the issue may arise as to who will take the lead in biosafety 
related meetings. In the same way, there may be issues raised regarding policy-making 
versus implementing agencies: which department/ministry should be assigned the lead 
agency role with regard to a particular environmental issue. Furthermore, questions 
regarding defining the negotiation mandate and identification of the relevant tasks and 
deadlines may also need to be addressed. Consultation and coordination with minis-
tries and embassies abroad, and with other interested parties such as national regula-
tory authorities and related national institution in the field, are important. 
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5.3 General challenges and hindrances to negotiations
5.3.1 Delegation-specific challenges 
Insufficient or deficient expertise regarding the substance, process, and institutional 
dimensions of the issue under negotiation is the main challenge for effective MEA 
negotiations. Other delegation-specific challenges can include last-minute decisions 
on the composition of delegations resulting to inadequate time for preparation and 
national consultation; unclear negotiating instructions from national capitals; and 
lack of political support therein. Undue influence by other government delegations 
and specific national interest groups sometimes introduces additional challenges for 
negotiators. 
Most developing countries receive support to attend major multilateral environmen-
tal negotiation meetings and can only afford to send one representative who cannot 
divide himself/herself during complex negotiations which are organized in parallel 
sessions and various breakaway groups. When these small delegations are given an 
opportunity to preside over a session or to stir a group or serve as a chair of a meeting, 
for example, they end up losing the opportunity of participating as representatives 
of their countries.
5.3.2 Procedure-specific challenges
Inability to reach agreement on important rules of procedure, or having long debates 
regarding procedure which overwhelm the substantive negotiations, are the main 
challenges relating to procedures in multilateral environmental negotiations. A ne-
gotiator can also be challenged by his/her inability or lack of understanding on how 
to use the rules of procedure in tactical ways in the course of representing his/her 
country in a meeting. 
Most negotiators are technical experts in the field who may understand the substan-
tive issues being discussed and articulate their interventions skilfully, but some do 
not take interest in understanding the rules of procedure. The lack of understanding 
of the rules of procedure can hinder even an experienced negotiator in the process of 
negotiations when whatever point he/she wants to put across can be rejected because 
it was not presented properly according to the rules of procedure. It is, therefore, 
important for negotiators to take time to read the rules of procedure, if they are not 
aware of them, and to contact the secretariat or visit the website to access the rules 
of procedure online. An example is when a negotiator attempts to make an interven-
tion on an agenda item which has already been decided according to the rules of 
procedure, he/she may not be permitted to go on and re-open the discussion of the 
agenda item in that case. 
5.3.3 Challenges specific to the negotiations bloc
There are various types of negotiation blocs: some are large while others are small. A 
good example of a large negotiations bloc is the G77 and China with more than one 
14
Multilateral Environmental Diplomacy and Negotiations
hundred countries being represented during consultations in multilateral environ-
mental negotiations. 
Negotiation blocs that are too large to ensure meaningful and coherent group posi-
tions are the main challenge in this category. These large groups have sub-groups 
within them who in some issues have differing interests and are in various levels of 
development that can pose a challenge when trying to filter in the positions/views of 
each country and group in the position that is to be presented for the negotiation 
bloc. Other challenges include a polarized negotiating climate within a bloc and 
between blocs, which can hinder progress in building consensus at the plenary. Un-
due influence of certain actors who dominate the discussion at the expense of other 
negotiators is another challenge. A bloc decision-making machinery that is inefficient 
also poses challenges specific to a negotiations bloc. 
5.3.4 Problems inherent in the plenary/contact process
In the plenary or contact group process, when options are not well articulated to 
assist in brokering compromise and facilitating bargaining in the tough phases, they 
become the main challenge. Other problems include excessively exercising political 
influence or leverage by certain parties in the course of negotiations instead of focus-
ing on the resolving of pending issues. Other challenges are lack of a sense of ur-
gency and deadlines as well as a lack of political will to settle the tough issues in the 
eleventh hour; and psychological barriers to final settlement which can all be an 
hindrance to progress in multilateral environmental negotiations. 
Subject to the mandate of the intergovernmental body within the United Nations 
and its rules of procedure, the support to the president/chairperson in plenary or in 
a contact group could entail providing continuous guidance and advice to the chair-
person and the bureau concerning:
 
• the organization of work;
• the status of negotiations;
• the conducting of business, including interpretation of the rules of procedure; 
and
• taking note of all aspects in sessions and being able to provide guidance when/
where necessary.
Where the Secretariat does not provide adequate guidance and support, the work of 
the plenary or contact group may not be accomplished on time.
 
5.5.5 Problems with the Secretariat
Secretariats are expected to service the meeting and support the negotiations, ensur-
ing that the necessary and relevant documentation is prepared for the meetings/
sessions in line with the decisions of the inter-governmental body for discussion and 
decisions by the body. The Secretariat is also expected to provide guidance on the 
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format, content and political sensitivities of the documents as well as to monitor their 
timeliness and ensure their availability and accessibility. The main challenge relating 
to the Secretariat in multilateral environmental negotiations is their lacking support. 
The main role of the Secretariat is to prepare and provide proper guidance without 
having inappropriate political influence of imposing their views on the deliberations 
or outcome of the meeting. Other relevant problems include inadequate guidance 
for member states regarding the rules of procedure and practices that govern inter-
governmental negotiations. The key role of the Secretariat in supporting multilat-
eral environmental negotiations processes is making adequate preparation and pro-
viding proper guidance in meetings. This includes the preparation of proper briefing 
notes and speaking notes (scripts) for the chair/president; and, where possible, pro-
viding an opportunity in advance of the meeting for full consultations in which the 
Secretariat can warn the chair or president of matters to watch out for, which may 
not be reflected in any formal document, and provide a background to any particu-
lar negotiation. The briefing notes or the script for the chair/presiding officer may 
summarize some background information, main issues, potential areas of concern, 
key players and desired outcomes (from the Secretariat’s perspective). When the 
Secretariat does not play its role appropriately in preparing the ground work for 
negotiations and monitoring the process, this becomes a significant reason why some 
conferences fail.
6 General guidance for negotiators
Before becoming involved in any negotiation, a negotiator is expected to have a clear 
brief outlining what deliverables his/her government expects. In this regard, one is 
expected to know his/her government’s interest and bottom-line, and to prepare both 
his/her aspirations and reserve positions accordingly. Having reviewed the documents 
of the meeting one can prepare scenarios and options to guide his/her interventions. 
In preparing for a position or intervention, it is important for a negotiator to under-
stand and influence his/her own group’s position, especially in respect of the coun-
tries within his/her bloc which are not in line with his/her position. This contributes 
to the knowledge of a negotiator of the strengths and weaknesses of his/her position, 
and to maximizing his/her options during the negotiation process. The negotiator’s 
bloc must consider the possible targets and goals of other negotiating groups and 
consider bloc-specific aspiration and reserve positions. 
It may be important to find out where a negotiator can agree or make concessions 
with others. Once a negotiator understands others’ positions, he or she can ask him-
self or herself: What can I do all by myself to pursue my interests? What can I do 
directly to influence the other side to make them respect my interests? How can I 
bring a third party into the situation in order to further my interests? In this regard, 
16
Multilateral Environmental Diplomacy and Negotiations
the negotiator may need to inform other blocs of his/her interest as he/she justifies 
the importance of his/her position.
When other negotiating blocs present their own positions, the negotiator can trans-
late them in terms of concrete interests. To avoid unnecessary conflicts, however, 
there may be a need to depersonalize interventions where possible to prevent escala-
tion of tensions and creation of an adversarial negotiating environment. 
If the negotiator wants to object that the text proposed by other parties is unaccept-
able, he/she is expected to justify his/her position with solid reasons, to defend it with 
the key points contained in his proposal, and to seek support from others. In this 
regard, a negotiator will have to listen carefully to the objections of others and to 
identify his/her potential issue-related allies. As a negotiator tracks the convergence 
of views, not all negotiators from the other side may differ with his/her position; and 
he/she might be able to identify potential like-minded governments with whom is-
sue-specific alliances or coalitions could be forged.
Once negotiations devolve into smaller groups, such as contact groups, a negotiator 
can advance his/her position there aggressively, considering his/her position as the 
negotiations progress. One can then prepare the strategy and possible concessions, 
be prepared for tactical retreats, and change course toward his/her goal. If the nego-
tiations do not go as planned and desired, the negotiator is not expected to over-
defend his/her position, or to corner himself/herself. There is always an option of 
asking the meeting to reflect his/her view in the report of the meeting, which may 
not change the outcome of the meeting but could be a source of explanation in the 
future when the same issue arises. In a contact group, one can frame a problem into 
a ‘win–win’ solution by addressing all interests of the parties, and by identifying the 
general criteria that must be respected in an acceptable result. Working towards a 
‘win–win’ solution means that all sides must present multiple proposals. This will 
require developing more than one proposal in an effort to reach common ground as 
the group works towards consensus. 
7 Conclusion
Although multilateral environmental negotiations differ from one MEA or UN 
meeting to another, depending on the size and objective of the meeting, there are 
clear features that one can identify that cut across MEA processes and meetings. This 
paper was an attempt to elaborate processes in major multilateral environmental 
negotiations which are not necessarily followed to the letter in smaller meetings of 
MEAs but can guide those who attend such meetings on understanding the proc-
esses and the role of the actors. The information provided in this paper can also assist 
those who wish to organize major UN conferences to understand the role of the 
various phases in meetings and players and what they seek to accomplish. 
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To be effective, a negotiator is expected to understand MEAs, the principles of envi-
ronmental law, and the synergies and inter-linkages of various MEAs because these 
issues regularly surface and can be of added value to a negotiator when deliberating 
on MEAs. When negotiators understand the various formats of the sessions and 
strategies and actively participate, it levels the playing field in multilateral environ-
mental negotiation by actively involving negotiators in the whole process of nego-
tiation. 
The current multilateral environmental negotiation processes are increasingly being 
negotiated through blocs. Information and materials for meetings are currently being 
provided online through websites. The era of paperless meetings and preference for 
bloc negotiations is here and will be the way to go in the future. A true victory in 
multilateral environmental negotiations is one where all blocs regard the outcome as 
fair and equitable with all interests having been addressed in some way. 
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In his book on the law of treaties, Reuter notes that a treaty ‘does not produce its 
effects in a legal vacuum’, but that surrounding each treaty ‘there is an intricate web 
made up of all the treaties in force, of customary rules, and acts of international or-
ganizations’.2 He underlines that ‘a number of treaties may be linked among them-
selves, as well as with other acts and sources of international law, with differing de-
grees of closeness and varying effects’.3
Reuter’s point applies to recent developments in respect of multilateral environmen-
tal agreements (MEAs). Indeed, agreements have various relationships between oth-
er agreements and decisions made by international bodies. For example, one of the 
most difficult negotiating issues in the recently concluded Nagoya Protocol4 was the 
determination of the relationship the Protocol would have with other international 
instruments.5
1 Professor of International Environmental Law, University of Eastern Finland; Counsellor, Ministry of the 
Environment of Finland; e-mail: Tuomas.Kuokkanen@uef.fi. The author has participated in the COOL-
project of the Climate Change Research Programme financed by the Academy of Finland.
2 Paul Reuter,	Introduction	to	the	Law	of	Treaties,	translated by José Mico and Peter Haggenmacher (2nd 
ed., Kegan Paul International, 1995) 129.
3 Ibid. at 130–131.
4 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising 
from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Nagoya, 29 October 2010, <http://www.
cbd.int/abs/>.
5 See Matthias Buck and Clare Hamilton, ‘The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the 
Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity’, 20 Review	of	European	Community	&	International	Environmental	Law (2011) 47–61 at 58.
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Moreover, the proliferation of treaties may lead to fragmentation which in turn can 
produce inefficient and even conflicting results.6 For this reason, the identification 
and proper management of the relationships between MEAs has recently become an 
important theme both in MEA negotiations and writings on international environ-
mental law.7
Relationships between international agreements may be dealt with in a number of 
ways. As most international agreements operate as parts of specific regimes, this 
paper will focus both on treaty relationships and on interactions between treaty re-
gimes. The paper will examine the following relationships: relationships within en-
vironmental regimes; relationships between environmental regimes; and relation-
ships between environmental regimes and other regimes. The paper considers 
particularly issues in respect of biodiversity-related agreements.
2 Multilateral environmental agreements and relationships
2.1 Relationships within environmental regimes
Since the 1970s, a number of international environmental agreements have been 
concluded whereby several frameworks and environmental bodies have been estab-
lished. These arrangements8 are usually characterized by referring to them as ‘re-
gimes’.9 They operate as frameworks under which specific regulations can be elabo-
rated through cooperation between policy and science. 
6 For a comprehensive discussion, see ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law’, Report of the Study Group of the International Law 
Commission, finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, The Erik Castrén Institute Reports 21/2007. The report 
discusses four types of relationships in normative conflicts: a) relations between special and general law; 
b) relations between prior and subsequent law; c) relations between laws at different hierarchical levels; 
and d) relations of law to its ‘normative environment’ more generally. This publication contains the final 
report of the International Law Commission’s Study Group on Fragmentation.
7 For instance, this aspect was highlighted in the UNEP Governing Council decision, giving a mandate to 
prepare a global legally binding instrument on mercury, in the following way: ‘Need to achieve coopera-
tion and coordination and to avoid the unnecessary duplication of proposed actions with relevant provi-
sions contained in other international agreements and processes’. See ‘Chemicals management, including 
mercury’, UNEP Governing Council Decision 25/5 (2008), para. 28(d).
8 Institutional arrangements for these agreements comprise usually a meeting of the parties, a secretariat, 
and one or more specialist subsidiary bodies. See Robin R. Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, ‘Autonomous 
Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in 
International Law’, 94 American	Journal	of	International	Law (2000) 623–659 at 623. See also Martin 
List and Volker Rittberger, ‘Regime Theory and International Environmental Management’ in Andrew 
Hurrel and Benedict Kingsbury (eds), The	International	Politics	of	the	Environment.	Actors,	Interests,	and	
Institutions (Clarendon Press, 1992) 85–109.
9 See Peter M. Haas, ‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control’, 
43 International	Organization	 (1992) 1–35; Thomas Gehring, ‘International Environmental Regimes: 
Dynamic Sectoral Legal Regimes’, 1 Yearbook	of	 International	Environmental	Law	 (1990) 35–56. For 
discussion, see also Tuomas Kuokkanen, International	Law	and	the	Environment:	Variations	on	a	Theme 
(Kluwer Law International, 2002) 269–278.
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Beyerlin and Marauhn describe the framework convention and protocol approach 
by noting that the purpose of an international framework convention is to establish 
‘a rudimentary treaty relationship’ which will enable parties to take a subsequent 
course of action in due course, usually through a protocol or protocols.10 Haas de-
scribes regimes as being learning processes instead of being ‘simply static summaries 
of rules and norms’.11 In the same vein, Sjöstedt, Spector and Zartman note that a 
post-agreement negotiation process involves ‘a continual process of management, 
monitoring, adjustment, and continued negotiation as the effects of the negotiated 
provisions are fed back to enhance policy learning’.12 
Environmental regimes began to develop in connection with pollution control and 
nature conservation as a flexible framework approach enabled further regulatory and 
policy developments to advance in a dynamic way. In pursuit of their ultimate goals, 
negotiators began to design environmental regimes with built-in, step-by-step in-
terim objectives, often through the use of separate protocols or annexes and their 
regular amendments. The control of transboundary air pollution under the auspices 
of the 1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution and its spe-
cific protocols,13 the 1985 Vienna Convention and the 1987 Montreal Protocol,14 
and the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change15 and the 
1997 Kyoto Protocol relating thereto provide examples of regime-building. 
Turning to the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),16 it can be noted 
that its drafters already envisaged that one or more subsequent protocols would be 
added to the Convention. According to Article 28, the contracting parties are re-
quired to cooperate in the formulation and adoption of protocols to the Convention. 
10 Ulrich Beyerlin and Thilo Marauhn, International	Environmental	Law (Hart Publishing Ltd, 2011) 271. 
11 Peter M. Haas, ‘Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control’, 
43 International	Organization (1989) 377–403 at 377, where he states that ‘[r]egimes are not simply 
static summaries of rules and norms; they may also serve as important vehicles for international learning 
that produce convergent state policies’.
12 Gunnar Sjöstedt, Bertram I. Spector and I. William Zartman, ‘Looking Ahead’ in Bertram I. Spector, 
Gunnar Sjöstedt and I. William Zartman (eds), Negotiating	International	Regimes.	Lessons	Learned	from	
the	United	Nations	Conference	on	Environment	and	Development	(UNCED) (Graham & Trotman/Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1994) 233–249 at 241.
13 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Geneva, November 13 1979, in force 16 March 
1983, 18 International	Legal	Materials (1979) 1442, <http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/>. The Convention 
was established as a framework within which parties can identify concerns posed by transboundary air 
pollution, and under which they can then elaborate more specific protocols. So far, eight protocols have 
been adopted under the Convention.
14 Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Vienna, 22 March 1985, in force 22 September 1988, 
26 International	Legal	Materials (1985) 1529; Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer, Montreal, 16 September 1987, in force 1 January 1989, 26 International	Legal	Materials (1987) 
154, <http://www.unep.org/ozone/>.
15 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 9 May 1992, in force 21 March 
1994, 31 International	Legal	Materials (1992) 849, Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto, 11 December 1997, in force 16 February 2005, 37 Interna-
tional	Legal	Materials (1998) 22, <http://unfccc.int/2860.php> (visited 26 July 2012).
16 Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993, 31 Inter-
national	Legal	Materials (1992) 822, <http://www.cbd.int> (visited 26 July 2012).
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The final provisions (Articles 29–31, 34 and 35) are drafted in such a way that they 
take into account subsequent protocols as well. Moreover, Article 32 deals with the 
relationship between the Convention and its protocols.17 
As a first step, in January 2000 the parties to the CBD adopted the Cartagena Pro-
tocol on Biosafety.18 The Protocol supplements the Convention by seeking to protect 
biological diversity from the potential risks posed by living modified organisms 
(LMOs)19 resulting from modern biotechnology, with the protections offered focus-
ing on transboundary movements. In 2010, the meeting of the Conference of the 
Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol (COP/MOP) adopted 
the Nagoya – Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress.20 The 
Supplementary Protocol provides for international rules and a procedure on liability 
and redress for damage to biodiversity resulting from LMOs. In the same year, the 
Nagoya Protocol on access and benefit-sharing was adopted under the CBD.21 
2.2 MEA – MEA relationships
In recent years, regime interaction has gained more and more both in practice and 
in theory.22 It is common, for instance, that multilateral environmental agreements 
interact with agreements that are operating in the same field. Usually, this is done 
through cooperation between such agreements or regimes. 
The CBD has a wide range of cooperative activities with other conventions and 
bodies.23 With regard to environmental agreements, such activities include coopera-
tion with the two other Rio Conventions, these being the United Nations Frame-
17 According to Art. 32, a state or a regional economic integration organization may not become a party to 
a protocol unless it is, or becomes at the same time, a contracting party to the convention. In addition, 
the Article states that decisions under any protocol shall be taken only by the parties to the protocol 
concerned.
18 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, Montreal, 29 January 2000, in force 11 September 2003, 39 Interna-
tional	Legal	Materials (2000) 1027.
19 According to the CBD’s website, a ‘Living Modified Organism (LMO)’ is defined in the Cartagena Pro-
tocol on Biosafety as ‘any living organism that possesses a novel combination of genetic material obtained 
through the use of modern biotechnology. … In everyday usage LMOs are usually considered to be the 
same as GMOs (Genetically Modified Organisms), but definitions and interpretations of the term GMO 
vary widely. Common LMOs include agricultural crops that have been genetically modified for greater 
productivity or for resistance to pests or diseases.’ See cbd.int, ‘Frequently Asked Questions: 3. What is a 
Living Modified Organism (LMO)?’, available at <http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/cpb_faq.shtml#faq3> (vis-
ited 31 March 2012). 
20 Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety, Nagoya, 15 October 2010, <http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/supplementary/>. The Supplementary 
Protocol will enter into force 90 days after its 40th ratification by a Party to the Cartagena Protocol. As 
at the beginning of April 2012, that Supplementary Protocol had 51 signatories – but only two ratifica-
tions. See CBD, ‘Parties to the Protocol and Signature and Ratification of the Supplementaty Protocol’, 
available at <http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/parties/#tab=1> (visited 2 April 2012).
21 See supra note 4.
22 For a comprehensive discussion, see Margaret A. Young (ed.), Regime	Interaction	in	International	Law.	
Facing	Fragmentation	(Cambridge University Press, 2012).
23 For a comprehensive discussion, see ‘Cooperation with other conventions and international organizations 
and initiatives’, Note by the Executive Director, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/10/17 (2010).
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work Convention on Climate Change and the United Nations Convention to Com-
bat Desertification.24 In addition, the CBD cooperates with the five other 
biodiversity-related conventions25 through the Liaison Group of Biodiversity-related 
Conventions.26 The object of the Liaison Group is to explore options for enhancing 
synergies, avoid duplication of efforts and improve the coherent implementation of 
the biodiversity-related conventions. Moreover, the CBD has cooperation with oth-
er relevant conventions and agreements. Such cooperation includes, for example, 
cooperation with the UNEP Regional Seas Conventions27 in connection with the 
work on marine and coastal biodiversity. 
As to the regulatory links between MEAs, it might be rational that in certain in-
stances an MEA refers to specific provisions in another MEA. Some regional marine 
protection conventions may, for instance, refer to provisions of a global MEA. For 
example, the Baltic Marine Protection Convention refers to the provisions of the 
MARPOL 73/78 Convention in connection with the prevention of pollution from 
ships.28 
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change does not 
regulate greenhouse gases controlled by the Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer, but refers to the latter in this regard. In fact, the Montreal 
Protocol has been effective not only in phasing-out ozone depleting substances but 
also in reducing greenhouse gases. The Montreal Protocol has even been called as 
‘world’s most effective climate treaty’ as it has managed to ‘reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions by the equivalent of approximately 11 gigatons of carbon dioxide a year 
between 1990 and 2010’.29
24 UN Convention to Combat Desertification in Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and or Deserti-
fication, Particularly in Africa, Paris, 17 June 1994, in force 26 December 1996, 33 International	Legal	
Materials (1994) 1309, <http://www.unccd.int>.
25 The CMS (Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, Bonn, 23 June 1979, 
in force 1 November 1983, 19 International	Legal	Materials (1980) 15, <http://www.cms.int>); the CITES 
(Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Washington DC, 3 
March 1973, in force 1 July 1975, 993 United	Nations	Treaty	Series 243, <http://www.cites.org>); the 
Ramsar Convention (Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, Ramsar, 2 February 1971, 
in force 21 December 1975, 11 International Legal	Materials (1972), 963, <http://www.ramsar.org>); the 
World Heritage Convention (Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural 
Heritage, Paris, 16 November 1972, in force 17 December 1975, 11 International	Legal	Materials (1972) 
1358, <http://whc.unesco.org>); and the ITPGRFA (International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for 
Food and Agriculture, Rome, 3 November 2001, in force 29 June 2004, <http://www.planttreaty.org/>).
26 See <http://www.cbd.int/blg/>.
27 For more information on the UNEP Regional Seas Programme, see <http://www.unep.org/regionalseas> 
(visited 21 July 2012).
28 See, for instance, annex IV of the 1992 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the 
Baltic Sea Area (Helsinki, 22 March 1974, in force 3 May 1980, 13 International	Legal	Materials (1974) 
546, <http://www.helcom.fi>).
29 Our Planet Magazine. Celebrating 20 years of the Montreal Protocol, available at <http://new.unep.org/
PDF/OurPlanet/2007/sept/EN/ARTICLE7.pdf> (visited 24 July 2012).
24
Relationships between Multilateral Environmental Agreements and Other Agreements
One topical problem, however, in relation to the ozone and climate regime is how 
to regulate hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) in a synergic manner.30 While the HFCs are 
produced as substitutes for ozone-depleting substances they are, nevertheless, green-
house gases. Thus, the problem solving under one MEA appears to have led to a 
problem under another MEA. Currently, the HFCs are regulated by the Kyoto Pro-
tocol31 but not by the Montreal Protocol. So far, parties have not been able to agree 
how to regulate the HFCs in coherent and consistent manner.32 
2.3 Relationships between environmental and other agreements
2.3.1 Introduction
The Study Group of the International Law Commission noted in its report the emer-
gence of new and special types of law or regimes, such as ‘environmental law’, ‘trade 
law’ and ‘human rights law’. The group points out that ‘[e]ach rule-complex and 
“regime” comes with its own principles, its own form of expertise and its own “ethos”, 
not necessarily identical to the ethos of neighbouring specialization’.33
 
Along these lines, various relationships between an environmental regime and its 
neighboring regimes can be identified. By way of an example, the relationship be-
tween the environment and trade as well as the environment and the law of the sea 
are discussed in the present section. Other examples could include, for instance, re-
lationships to intellectual property rights, investment law, finance, and armed con-
flicts.
2.3.2 Trade and the environment
Loibl characterizes the interaction between trade and environment as a ‘difficult 
relationship’.34 Indeed, the relationship between multilateral environmental agree-
ments and trade agreements has been under intensive discussion for years. 
30 For discussion, see Tadanori Inomata, ‘Building Institutional and Managerial Foundations for Environ-
mental Governance with the United Nations System – Towards a New Governance Structure for Environ-
ment Protection and Sustainable Development’ in Ed Couzens and Tuula Honkonen (eds), International	
Environmental	Lawmaking	and	Diplomacy	Review 2009, University of Eastern Finland – UNEP Course 
Series 9 (University of Eastern Finland, 2010) 45–64, at 59.
31 See Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol.
32 The issue was discussed in the ninth meeting of the Montreal Protocol on the basis of the proposals to 
amend the Montreal Protocol. While there was an ‘agreement that in phasing out ozone-depleting sub-
stances it was preferable to adopt alternatives with low or zero global-warming potential rather than high 
global-warming potential’, parties were not able to agree whether the Montreal Protocol should be amend-
ed. See Report of the combined ninth meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Vienna Convention 
on the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the Twenty-Third Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Pro-
tocol on Substance that Deplete the Ozone Layer, UN Doc. UNEP/OzL.Conv.9/7-UNEP/OzL.Pro.23/11 
(2011) paras 103–119, at 111.
33 Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, supra note 6.
34 Gerhard Loibl, ‘Trade and Environment – A difficult relationship?’ in Tuula Kolari and Ed Couzens (eds), 
International	Environmental	Lawmaking	and	Diplomacy	Review	2007, University of Joensuu – UNEP 
Course Series 7 (University of Joensuu, 2008) 277–283.
25
Tuomas Kuokkanen
A need to regulate economic activities was already recognized, albeit in limited form, 
in connection with early conservation agreements concluded at the beginning of the 
19th century. It was deemed necessary to control trade because, in many instances, 
foreign demand motivated the over exploitation of wildlife35 and endangered spe-
cies.36 After the Second World War, trade related measures were first extended to 
regulate international move ments of plants in order to control pests and diseases.37 
The process of regulating the trade in wildlife led eventually to the conclusion of the 
1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora (CITES).38
Trade restrictions in environmental agreements raised new issues concerning the 
relationship between trade and environmental agreements.39 The collision between 
the trade and environment sectors resulted mainly from the fact that the two regimes 
were based on different starting points.40 As environmental law aimed to protect the 
35 For agreements including trade restrictions, see Migratory Birds Convention between the United States 
and Great Britain (for Canada), Washington D.C., 16 August 1916 (amended in 1979 and 1995), 221 
Consolidated	Treaty	Series, 408, Art. VI; Convention Relative to the Preservation of Fauna and Flora in 
Their Natural State, London, 8 November 1933, in force 14 January 1936, available at <http://www.
ecolex.org/server2.php/libcat/docs/TRE/Multilateral/En/TRE000069.txt> (visited 22 March 2012), 
Art. 9.
36 See the 1940 Western Hemisphere Convention (Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preserva-
tion in the Western Hemisphere, Washington D.C., 12 October 1940, in force 1 May 1942, available at 
<http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/c-8.html> (visited 22 March 2012)), Art. IX; the 1950 
International Convention for the Protection of Birds (Paris, 18 October 1950, in force 17 January 1963, 
638 United	Nations	Treaty	Series 185), Arts 3, 4, 6, 7 and 9(2); the 1968 African Convention (African 
Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, Algiers, 15 September 1968, in force 
16 June 1969, available at <http://www.ecolex.org/server2.php/libcat/docs/TRE/Multilateral/En/
TRE000492.txt> (visited 22 March 2012), Art. IX; the European Convention for the Protection of Ani-
mals during International Transport (Paris, 13 December 1968, into force 20 February 1971, available at 
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/065.htm> (visited 22 March 2012), Art. 1(2); the 
1970 Benelux Convention Concerning Hunting and the Protection of Birds, Brussels, 10 June 1970, into 
force 1 July 1972, 847 United	Nations	Treaty	Series 255, Arts 6 and 9; and the 1973 Agreement on Con-
servation of Polar Bears, Oslo, 15 November 1973, into force 26 May 1976, 13 International	Legal	Ma-
terials	(1974) 13, Art. V.
37 International Plant Protection Convention, Rome, 6 December 1951, into force 3 April 1952, 150 
United	Nations	Treaty	Series 67, Art. VI; Plant Protection Agreement for the South East Asia and Pacific 
Region, Rome, 27 February 1956, into force 2 July 1956, 247 United	Nations	Treaty	Series 400, Art. III; 
Agreement Concerning Co-Operation in the Quarantine of Plants and Their Protection Against Pests and 
Diseases, Sofia, 14 December 1959, into force 19 October 1960, available at <http://www.whatconven-
tion.org/en/convention/1095> (visited 22 March 2012).
38 See the 1973 CITES Convention. Aiming to protect endangered species against over-exploitation through 
international trade, the Convention classifies species into three categories and regulates their trade accord-
ingly. Using trade as a sanction, such parties began to ban trade with non-parties unless they complied de 
facto with protection measures imposed by those agreements. See CITES Convention, Art. X: 
Where export or re-export is to, or import is from, a State not a Party to the present Convention, comparable 
documentation issued by the competent authorities in that State which substantially conforms with the require-
ments of the present Convention for permits and certificates may be accepted in lieu thereof by any Party.
39 See Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle and Catherine Regdwell, International	Law	&	the	Environment (3rd ed., 
Oxford University Press, 2009) 766–769.
40 For example, the GATT is based on three main principles. First, according to the most-favoured-nation 
treatment, parties are required to ensure that products imported from the territory of one member receive 
treatment no less favourable than like products imported from any other member. Second, pursuant to 
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environment though a regulatory approach, trade law purported to free trade through 
a deregulatory approach. 
Sampson notes that despite hesitation on the part of WTO governments to extend 
their agenda to environment related issues, they have nevertheless gravitated towards 
it. According to him, ‘[o]ne reason is that with its creation, the reach of trade policy 
has greatly expanded, sometimes on a de facto basis with resort to its dispute settle-
ment process’.41 So far, there has nevertheless been no major GATT/WTO dispute 
specifically on the relationship between trade rules and an MEA. This does not, 
however, mean that this could not occur in the near future.42
The relationship between trade and environment was one of the most difficult issues 
in elaborating the 1992 Rio Declaration.43 According to Principle 12 of the declara-
tion, ‘trade policy measures for environmental purposes should not constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on inter-
national trade’. Moreover, ‘[u]nilateral actions to deal with environmental challeng-
es outside the jurisdiction of the importing country should be avoided’.44
Parties to a trade agreement or an MEA might agree upfront on how to resolve a 
potential conflict between trade rules and an MEA. For instance, the relationship 
between international environmental agreements and free trade agreements is deter-
mined in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) by giving an ex-
plicit supremacy to certain environmental agreements, provided that where a party 
has a choice among equally effective and reasonably available means of complying 
with such obligations, the party chooses the alternative that is least inconsistent with 
the other provisions of the NAFTA.45
the national treatment rule, parties shall treat imported goods like nationally produced goods. Third, the 
non-discrimination rule requires parties to apply such restrictions to all like goods and not just to goods 
from a specific member country. See the GATT (The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Mar-
rakech, 15 April 1994, available at <http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_01_e.htm>), Arts 
I, III and XIII.
41 Gary P. Sampson, ‘The Green Economy and International Governance’, Paper prepared for the First 
Preparatory Meeting of the World Congress on Justice, Governance and Law for Environmental Sustain-
ability, 12–13 October 2011, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, available at <http://www.unep.org/delc/Por-
tals/24151/GreenEconomyInternationalEG.pdf> (visited 21 July 2012).
42 See Loibl, ‘Trade and Environment’ supra note 34, at 282.
43 UN Declaration on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 14 June 1992, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (1992), 31 International	Legal	Materials (1992) 876.
44 For example, in the ‘Shrimp’ case the GATT panel rejected an import ban on shrimp and shrimp products 
that had been applied by the United States, where this ban had been imposed in order to conserve sea 
turtles. The panel found that the United States had adopted measures that were clearly a threat to the 
multilateral trade system and were applied without any serious attempt to reach, beforehand, a negoti-
ated solution. Without excluding a possibility to have recourse to unilateral measures, the panel noted 
that environmental matters of mutual interest should nevertheless be primarily addressed through inter-
national cooperation. See World Trade Organization: Report of the Panel on United States – Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 37 International	Legal	Materials	(1998) 832.
45 See Art. 104 of the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement, Ottawa, 11 and 17 December 1992; 
Mexico D.F., 14 and 17 December 1992; Washington D.C., 8 and 17 December 1992, in force 1 Janu-
ary 1994, available at <http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/en/view.aspx?conID=590> (visited 22 March 
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Alternatively, the issue could be left in the open to be solved at a later stage through 
general interpretation methods.46 For example, in the Cartagena Protocol negotia-
tions, a compromise formula laying down neutral language was placed in the pream-
ble of the Protocol in the following three paragraphs: 
Recognizing that trade and environment agreements should be mutually sup-
portive with a view to achieve sustainable development,
Emphasizing that this Protocol shall not be interpreted as implying any change 
in the rights and obligations of a party under any existing international agree-
ments,
Understanding	that the above recital is not intended to subordinate this Protocol 
to other international agreements.
Despite the attempts for a mutually supportive approach, the cooperation between 
the trade and the environment sectors has not amounted to a harmony of interests. 
It appears rather, as Schoenbaum notes, that ‘there will be no grand synthesis of the 
trade and environment conflict’, and that ‘the process of accommodation will be 
ongoing, demanding continual attention and work’.47 
2.3.3 The Law of the Sea and the environment
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)48 was con-
cluded in December 1982 and entered into force in 1994. So far, the Convention 
has been complemented by two implementing agreements: the 1994 Agreement on 
the Implementation of Part XI49 and the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement.50 To underline 
the importance of the UNCLOS, Koh, the President of the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, has called the Convention ‘a constitution for the 
oceans which will stand the test of time’.51 
2012)). In paragraph 1, the CITES, the 1987 Montreal Protocol and the 1989 Basel Convention (Con-
vention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Basel, 
22 March 1989, in force 5 May 1992, 28 International	Legal	Materials (1989) 657, http://www.basel.int) 
are listed. Furthermore, the paragraph provides a mechanism to add other conventions by listing them in 
Annex 104(1). For discussion, see Paul Demaret, ‘TREMs, Multilateralism, Unilateralism and the GATT’’ 
in James Cameron, Paul Demarat and Damien Geradin (eds), Trade	&	the	Environment:	The	Search	for	
Balance (Cameron May, 1994) 52–68.
46 See infra part 2.4.; Loibl, ‘Trade and Environment’, supra note 34, at 280.
47 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, ‘International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Search 
for Reconciliation’, 91 American	Journal	of	International	Law (1997) 268–313 at 312–313. 
48 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, in 
force 16 November 1994, 21 International	Legal	Materials (1982) 1261.
49 Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea of 10 December 1982, New York, 28 July 1994, in force 28 July 1996, 33 International	Legal	
Materials (1994) 1309.
50 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 
10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and High-
ly Migratory Fish Stocks, New York, 4 August 1995, in force 11 December 2001, 34 International	Legal	
Materials (1995) 1542, <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/fish_stocks_agree-
ment/CONF164_37.htm> (visited 22 March 2012).
51 Remarks by T. B. Koh, reproduced in UN, The	Law	of	the	Sea:	Official	Text	of	the	UNCLOS	with	Annexes	
and	Index (United Nations, 1983) xxxiii.
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The UNCLOS is not, however, a similar regime or framework to the environ-
mental regimes discussed above in section 2.2 of this paper. The Convention is 
not structured, as Boyle notes, ‘for the adoption of further protocols and an-
nexes as a means of developing the legal regime to meet new priorities and prob-
lems’.52 Rather, its framework nature means that the UNCLOS includes general 
principles and requires further elaboration of substantive provisions. For in-
stance, Part XII dealing with the protection and preservation of the marine en-
vironment requires parties to establish further rules, regulations and procedures 
on the protection of the marine environment.53 De La Fayette characterizes this 
aspect as the ‘dynamism of the convention’.54 A large number of complementary 
agreements contain more specific substantive provisions on marine issues.55
The relationship between the UNCLOS and other international agreements is, as 
Redgwell puts it, ‘a symbiotic one’.56 On the other hand, the UNCLOS regulates the 
relationship between special agreements and their future development. This is done 
through Article 23757 which regulates obligations under other conventions on the 
protection and preservation of the marine environment; and through Article 311, 
which includes general provisions on the relation to other conventions and interna-
tional agreements. On the other hand, special agreements contain provisions on their 
relationship to the UNCLOS. While special conventions concluded before the con-
clusion of the UNCLOS include a savings clause to prevent any prejudice to the 
codification of the law of the sea, special conventions concluded after the conclusion 
of the UNCLOS provide language to take into account the UNCLOS.58
The relationship between the CBD and the UNCLOS is a good example of the need 
52 Alan Boyle, ‘Further Development of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea: Mechanism for 
Change’ in David Freestone, Richard Barnes and David M Ong, The	Law	of	the	Sea.	Progress	and	Prospects	
(Oxford University Press, 2009) 40–62 at 41.
53 See Part XII (Arts 192–237). 
54 See also Louise de La Fayette, ‘The Role of the United Nations in International Oceans Governance’ in 
The	Law	of	the	Sea, supra note 52, 63–74 at 65–66. 
55 See UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, Obligations	of	States	
Parties	under	the	United	Nations	Convention	on	the	Law	of	the	Sea	and	Complementary	Instruments, United 
Nations, 2004), available at <http://www.un.org/depts/los/doalos_publications/publicationstexts/ 
E.04.V.5.pdf> (visited 22 March 2012).
56 Catherine Redgwell, ‘From Permission to Prohibition: The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea and 
Protection of the Marine Environment’ in The	Law	of	the	Sea, supra note 52, 180–191, at 191. 
57 Art. 237 reads as follows: 
1. The provisions of this Part are without prejudice to the specific obligations assumed by States 
under special conventions and agreements concluded previously which relate to the protection 
and preservation of the marine environment and to agreements which may be concluded in 
furtherance of the general principles set forth in this Convention. 2. Specific obligations as-
sumed by States under special conventions, with respect to the protection and preservation of 
the marine environment, should be carried out in a manner consistent with the general prin-
ciples and objectives of this Convention.
58 Redgwell, supra note 56, at 184. See also Nele Matz, ‘The Interaction between the Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea’ in Peter Ehlers, Elisabeth Mann-Borgese 
and Rûdiger Wolfrum (eds), Marine	Issues	from	a	Scientific,	Political	and	Legal	Perspectives (Kluwer Law 
International, 2002) 203–220 at 216–219.
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for a coherent approach. According to Article 22(2) of the CBD, parties shall imple-
ment the CBD ‘with respect to the marine environment consistently with the rights 
and obligations of States under the law of the sea’. While this could suggest that the 
UNCLOS would prevail, it is important to note that Article 237(2) of the UNCLOS 
provides some flexibility as it only requires that special conventions ‘should be carried 
out in a manner consistent with the general principles and objectives’ of the Conven-
tion. Discussing this relatively complex relationship, Boyle comes to the conclusion 
that the relationship between the two treaties ‘is not the exclusive preserve of either 
treaty’, and that ‘[a] coherent and comprehensive understanding of the present law 
of the sea requires consideration of both treaties’.59 
2.4 Relationships and conflicts in general
International law has various methods and techniques for dealing with the relation-
ships amongst international agreements. To begin with, there is a general assumption 
that states are acting in good faith and aiming for a consistent and rational approach 
rather than for an approach that is inconsistent and irrational.60 However, as Jenks 
put it, ‘the presumption against conflict may eliminate certain potential conflicts; it 
cannot eliminate the problem of conflict’.61 For this reason, there is a need either to 
include express provisions on treaty relationships, or to interpret, according to inter-
national law, various relationships and possible conflicts between international agree-
ments.
59 Boyle, ‘Further Development’, supra note 52, at 58.
60 See Lassa Oppenheim, International	Law,	vol.	I (7th ed. by Lauterpachts, 1948) at 858–859:
It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend something reasonable, something adequate to the 
purpose of the treaty; and something not inconsistent with generally recognized principles of International Law, 
nor with generally recognized principles of International Law, nor with previous treaty obligations towards third 
States. If, therefore, the meaning of a stipulation is ambiguous, the reasonable meaning is to preferred to the 
unreasonable, the more reasonable to the less reasonable, …the consistent meaning to the meaning inconsistent 
with generally recognized principles of International Law and with previous treaty obligations towards third 
States.
 Quoted in Wilfred Jenks, ‘The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties’, 13 The	British	Year	Book	of	Interna-
tional	Law (1953) 401–453 at 428.
61 Ibid. at 429. See also at 402:
The international legislative process has many imperfections, some of which can be eliminated by forethought 
and prudence, whereas others, being inherent in the nature of the process, give rise to problems for which ap-
propriate solutions must be found on the assumption that the imperfection itself cannot be whole eliminated. 
…It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend something reasonable, something adequate to the 
purpose of the treaty; and something not inconsistent with generally recognized principles of International Law, 
nor with generally recognized principles of International Law, nor with previous treaty obligations towards third 
States. If, therefore, the meaning of a stipulation is ambiguous, the reasonable meaning is to preferred to the 
unreasonable, the more reasonable to the less reasonable,…the consistent meaning to the meaning inconsistent 
with generally recognized principles of International Law and with previous treaty obligations towards third 
States.
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Aust underlines that, when drafting the final clauses of a multilateral treaty, it is 
important ‘to consider whether anything might be said about the relationship be-
tween it and existing or future treaties dealing with the same subject matter’.62 He 
lists recent examples of such express provisions: the treaty prevails over all other past 
and future treaties; the treaty is subordinate to an earlier one; the parties shall not 
enter into later inconsistent treaties; an existing treaty shall not be affected; for parties 
to the treaty it prevails over earlier treaties; compatible supplementary treaties are 
permitted; and inclusion of comprehensive provisions, the best of both worlds and 
neutral provisions.63
Even though an international agreement would not include any express provisions 
on treaty relationships, a professional toolbox for international law is available. The 
study group of the International Law Group reminded us that international law is 
not a random collection of norms but that there are ‘meaningful relationships be-
tween them’. The group noted norms may exist at ‘higher and lower hierarchical 
levels, their formulations may involve greater or lesser generality and specificity and 
their validity may date back to earlier or later in time’.64
With regard to hierarchy in international law, one can first refer to peremptory norms 
of general international law (jus	cogens) from which ‘no derogation is permitted’,65 
and to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter66 according to which the Charter 
will prevail in the event of a conflict between obligations under the Charter and 
under any other obligations.67 As to conflicts between successive norms, the residual 
norm of international law is provided in Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties,68 according to which a later treaty supersedes an earlier treaty (lex	
posterior	derogat	legi	priori). 
62 Anthony Aust, Modern	Treaty	Law	and	Practice	(2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 216. He 
reminds us that, essentially, the issue is about ‘which obligations have priority’.
63 Ibid. at	219–227. See also Jenks, ‘The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties’, supra note 60, at 436–450.
64 Aust, Modern	Treaty	Law, supra	note 62, at 263.
65 See Art. 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna, 22 May 1969, in force 27 January 
1980, 1155 United	Nations	Treaty	Series 331): 
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international 
law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm 
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no deroga-
tion is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having 
the same character.
66 Charter of the United Nations (26 June 1945, available at <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/
index.shtml>.
67 See Art. 103 of the Charter: ‘In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the 
United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, 
their obligations under present Charter shall prevail’.
68 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties has been in force since 27 January 1980 and has 111 par-
ties (as of 25 July 2012). Its provisions arguably reflect customary international law. See, for instance, the 
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros	Project	case in which the Court stated: ‘[The Court] needs only to be mindful of 
the fact that it has several times had occasion to hold that some of the rules laid down in that Convention 
might be considered as a codification of existing customary law’ (I.C.J.	Reports	1997, 38, para. 46).
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In conflicts between special and general law, the generally accepted method is that 
priority should be given to the treaty that is more specific (lex	specialis	derogate	legi	
generali). Moreover, Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention provides that ‘any 
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’ shall 
be taken into account, together with the context. Yet, it should be recalled that the 
applicability of the above principles will depend on context; and that none of them 
have absolute meanings.69
3 Conclusions
The relationships between multilateral environmental agreements and other agree-
ments provide important managerial tasks within contemporary international envi-
ronmental law-making. Indeed, it is important for lawyers and environmental poli-
cy-makers to understand how specialized environmental, and other, regimes operate 
and could interact.70
The present paper has examined the relationships between international agreements 
with a special focus on treaty regimes. First, with regard to environmental regimes as 
such, there is a close relationship between a framework agreement and protocols and 
other instruments relating thereto. This is understandable as the dynamic develop-
ment of the secondary instruments under the framework agreement is the crucial 
purpose of the environmental regimes. Second, there is usually a cooperative relation-
ship between environmental regimes. In certain instances, however, there could be 
inconsistent or even conflicting approaches. Third, it is important to acknowledge 
boundaries and relationships71 between environmental and other regimes. In prac-
tice, however, conflicts between such regimes have been rare.72 Fourth, the general 
principles and methods of international law are available in case of possible conflicts 
between international agreements.
Overall, the issue appears to boil down to striking a balance between specialization 
and coherence.73 Indeed, specific environmental issues require contextual problem-
69 See Jenks, ‘The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties’, supra note 60, at 453.
70 In his seminal article on the conflict of law-making treaties, Wilfred Jenks noted in 1953 that the ‘world 
community still has no legislature and it seems improbable that anything comparable to a national legis-
lature can be developed on a world scale in the foreseeable future’. See supra note 60, at 402. 
71 See Margaret A. Young, ‘Introduction: the Productive Friction between Regimes’ in Young (ed.), Regime	
Interaction	in	International	Law, supra	note 22, 1–19, at 1.
72 See the Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, supra	note 6, at 248–249: ‘One 
principal conclusion of this report has been that the emergence of special treaty-regimes (which should 
not be called “self-contained”) has not seriously undermined legal security, predictability or the equality 
of legal subjects’.
73 See Nele Matz-Lück, ‘Norm Interpretation across International Regimes: Competences and Legitimacy’, 
in Young (ed.), Regime	Interaction	in	International	Law, supra	note 22, 201–234, at 205–209.
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-solving through environmental regulations and regimes. At the same time, it is 
important to seek to preserve coherence74 of the legal system by enhancing synergies 
and by avoiding ineffective fragmentation. 
74 See United Nations Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Global Sustainability, Resilient	People,	Resilient	
Planet:	A	Future	worth	Choosing (United Nations, 2012), available at <http://www.un.org/gsp/report> 
(visited 11 March 2012), para 220: ‘Accountability and coherence at the international level are also indis-
pensible for advancing sustainable development’. 
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Multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) are agreements among states com-
mitting to achieve specific environmental goals. MEAs are often agreed at the global 
or regional levels, but sub-regional MEAs also exist. MEAs are complemented by 
bilateral agreements related to the environment. MEAs are usually agreed in the form 
of an international treaty or protocol3 which is legally binding on the participating 
states. 
MEAs are the result of international action by governments which often, over time, 
develop into so called regimes, with both ‘hard-law’ and ‘soft-law’ elements.4 ‘Hard-
law’ specifies legally-binding action to be taken at the national level to achieve the 
environmental objective prescribed in the treaty, while ‘soft-law’ usually sets out non-
legally binding principles, guidelines, programmes, activities, etc. for Parties to re-
spect when taking actions that involve particular environmental issues.5 MEAs cover 
1 Marko Berglund is a Chief Administrator in the International Environmental Policy Unit of the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs of Finland. During the 2011 UEF- UNEP MEA Course he was a Programme Officer 
at the United Nations Environment Programme, based in Nairobi; e-mail: marko.berglund@formin.fi.
2 Wanhua Yang is Legal Officer of UNEP’s Division of Environmental Law and Conventions based at the 
Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific in Bangkok. She holds a Doctor of Juridical Science (SJD, 2002) 
and a LL.M (1994) from Indiana University Law School in US, and a LL.M. (1988) from China Univer-
sity of Political Science and Law. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect the 
views of the United Nations or the views of UNEP; e-mail: wanhua.yang@unep.org.
3 A protocol is a treaty, but is not free-standing – being concluded under an existing treaty.
4 UNEP, Training	Manual	on	International	Environmental	Law (UNEP, 2006),	Chapter 4 ‘Compliance and 
Enforcement of Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ at 39.
5 Ibid.
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a wide range of global environmental issues, including, for example biodiversity, 
chemical substances, climate change, land degradation, sea and marine resources, and 
waste. 
MEAs contain obligations for governments to undertake, either individually or as 
joint actions at the international level, to implement these legal instruments. Once 
a state ratifies, accedes to or adheres to a treaty, that state is usually6 required to im-
plement the treaty at the national level by adopting appropriate national measures 
to meet its obligations under the treaty. These measures might include the strength-
ening of state policies, legislation, institutional arrangements, monitoring and report-
ing, committing financial resources, engaging in awareness-raising, training, public 
education, and other activities. 
In addition to translating treaty provisions into national actions, as outlined above, 
MEAs may also require collective action by their Parties to implement the treaty 
obligations at the international level. These joint actions include mandating the 
Conference of the Parties (COP) further to establish or improve compliance proce-
dures/processes; to establish financial mechanisms; and to require the treaty Secre-
tariats to undertake certain administrative functions for facilitating compliance. 
This paper focuses on biodiversity-related MEAs and their compliance mechanisms 
at the international level. An overview of MEA compliance mechanisms is provided 
as well as some examples mechanisms under selected biodiversity-related MEAs. The 
paper concludes by suggesting possible areas for synergies and coherence among the 
compliance regimes of those biodiversity-related MEAs. 
2 Overview of compliance mechanisms of MEAs
2.1 Introduction
MEAs have emerged as one of the favoured means, in the environmental arena, for 
promoting international cooperation requiring both international and national ac-
tion to protect both human health and the environment.7 MEAs establish standards, 
policies and guidelines for the stewardship of the global environment. With the 
proliferation of MEAs, however, there has been a growing ‘implementation gap’ 
where institutional, legislative and policy measures, and the capacity to implement 
a large number of MEAs, as well as compliance processes, substantially lag behind 
the development and ratification of MEAs. Recently, the focus on MEAs has shifted 
6 A treaty might, unusually, contain self-executing provisions; or a state with a monist approach to the inclu-
sion of international law might not require separate national measures to implement it.
7 UNEP Division of Environmental Law and Conventions, ‘The Environmental Dimension of IFSD: 
Fragmentation of Environmental Pillar and its Impact of Efficiency and Effectiveness’ Issues Brief #2 
(2011), available at <http://www.unep.org/environmentalgovernance/Portals/8/InstitutionalFramework-
forSustainabledevPAPER2.pdf> (visited 12 June 2012) at 3.
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from negotiating new treaties to promoting compliance with existing environmental 
conventions.8 Insufficient and weak implementation of internationally agreed envi-
ronmental goals, including those set out in MEAs, was one of the major concerns in 
the preparation process for the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Develop-
ment (Rio+20) held on 20–22 June 2012 in Rio de Janeiro.9 
To begin the discussion, it is important to distinguish a few key terms. ‘Compliance’ 
is taken to mean ‘the fulfilment by the contracting parties of their obligations under 
a MEA and any amendments to the MEA’;10 and ‘implementation’ to refer to ‘all 
relevant laws, regulations, policies and other measures and initiatives that contracting 
Parties take or adopt to meet their obligation under a MEA and its amendments’.11 
Thus, compliance and implementation are related, but distinct. Compliance meas-
ures are essential to implementation processes.12 
The common mechanisms for compliance with MEAs can be grouped into four 
categories: (a) reporting and performance review; (b) multilateral non-compliance 
procedures; (c) non-compliance response measures; and (d) dispute resolution.13 
2.2 Reporting and performance review
Most MEAs require their Parties to report on the measures they have taken to imple-
ment a particular MEA, usually by submitting annual reports on their relevant laws 
or policies. Some MEAs provide for the Secretariat, or a third party, to monitor or 
verify the performance and require the Parties to cooperate with such monitoring or 
8 UNEP, Training	Manual, supra note 4; and UNEP and IUCN, Course	on	Compliance	with	and	Enforce-
ment	 of	 MEAs: Lecturer’s	 Manual, Unit 1, available at <http://www.iucnael.org/en/home/latest-
news/176/153-compliance-and-enforcement-of-multilateral-environmental-agreements.html> (visited 
12 June 2012) at 15. It should be noted, however, that new MEAs are still being negotiated. For 
example, the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of 
Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity (Nagoya, 29 October 
2010, <http://www.cbd.int/abs/>) was adopted in 2011. In 2009 UNEP’s Governing Council requested 
UNEP’s Executive Director to convene an intergovernmental negotiating committee with the mandate 
to prepare a global legally binding instrument on mercury by 2013. In Durban in December 2011 a 
process under the UNFCCC was launched to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed 
outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties to be completed no later than 
2015, in order for it to come into effect and be implemented from 2020.
9 Chapter I, para. 12 of The	Future	We	Want, Rio+20 outcome document (available at <http://www.unc-
sd2012.org/content/documents/727The%20Future%20We%20Want%2019%20June%201230pm.
pdf> (visited 2 November 2012)), stresses the need for assessing the gaps in the implementation of inter-
nationally agreed commitments. Also see UNEP DELC IFSD Issues Brief #3 – Country Responsiveness: 
Implementation of Capacity Support for the Environmental Pillar of IFSD, stating that the implementa-
tion of MEAs has been less successful than their acceptance and ratification, at 1, para. 2, available at: 
<http://www.unep.org/environmentalgovernance/Portals/8/InstitutionalFrameworkforSustainabledevPA-
PER3.pdf> (visited 1 October 2012).
10 ‘Guidelines on Compliance with and Enforcement of Multilateral Environmental Agreements’, UNEP 
Governing Council Decision SS.VII/4. (2002), at 2, para. 9(a).
11 Ibid. at 2, para. 9(b).
12 UNEP and IUCN, Course	on	Compliance, supra note 8, at Unit 4, Slide 3.
13 UNEP, Comparative	Analysis	of	Compliance	Mechanisms	under	Selected	Multilateral	Environmental	Agree-
ments (UNEP, 2005), 24.
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verification of their performance. Thus, reporting and performance review is neces-
sary to determine a Party’s compliance situation.14
2.3 Non-compliance procedures
Most MEAs establish a formal, multilateral procedure to deal with non-compliance 
(non-compliance procedures) in the form of an elected committee, often called the 
‘Implementation Committee’ or the ‘Compliance Committee’. Non-compliance 
procedures differ from traditional dispute resolution and aim to identify Parties’ 
compliance difficulties and to facilitate better compliance in a non-adversarial man-
ner. A Party’s alleged non-compliance may be referred for consideration to the Com-
mittee, which can make a recommendation on the matter to the Conference of the 
Parties of the MEA in question, as the COP is the supreme decision-making body 
of a specific MEA. Usually the final output is a decision by the COP.15
2.4 Non-compliance response measures
Once a case of non-compliance is identified under an MEA’s non-compliance pro-
cedure, response measures tailored to the particular circumstances are needed to 
address the alleged non-compliance at the multilateral level. Given that cases of non-
compliance are usually due to lack of human, material and financial resources and/
or, in some cases, lack of political will, both incentives and disincentives have been 
developed as response measures to address the issues.
Incentives are most often used as response measures, and include enhanced interna-
tional cooperation with the non-compliant Party in support of its implementation. 
These measures can include the provision of financial and/or technical assistance. 
Financial assistance often comes in the form of a Trust Fund or a financial mechanism 
from which the Parties provide funding for relevant projects. Technical assistance 
may include: (a) capacity-building in the form of training and workshops to address 
issues of lack of human resources and know-how; and (b) technology transfers and 
exchange of information to address issues of lack of materials. However, this non-
compliance assistance may be conditional so that, for instance, a requirement for the 
Party to adopt a national program of implementation actions which aim to address 
the situation of non-compliance must be put into place.16
Disincentives	are measures that may be imposed on non-compliant Parties. These 
can include a COP decision to impose additional stringent and specific performance 
review information obligations (additional to the regular performance review infor-
mation) subject to verification; to recommend conditional assistance measures; as 
well as to impose liabilities and/or the suspension of a Party’s rights under the con-
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid. at 26.
16 Ibid. at 26–27.
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vention.17 In MEAs which regulate trade, for example, the suspension of rights, viz. 
the right to trade, can have far-reaching economic impacts.
Table 1 below lists an overview of the compliance mechanisms of nine biodiversity-
related MEAs. 









Ramsar19 √ √   √   
World Heritage20 √   √   √   
CITES21 √   √   √   
CMS22 √   √   
CBD23 √   
UNCCD24 √   Pending
Biosafety25 √   √   √   
ITPGRFA26 √ 27 √   √   
Nagoya √ 28  Pending Pending
 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
17 Ibid. at 27–28.
18 Modified from UNEP, Comparative	Analysis, supra note 13, at, 104.
19 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, Ramsar, 2 February 1971, in force 21 December 
1975, 11 International Legal	Materials (1972), 963, <http://www.ramsar.org>.
20 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Paris, 16 November 
1972, in force 17 December 1975, 11 International	Legal	Materials (1972) 1358, <http://whc.unesco.
org>.
21 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Washington DC, 
3 March 1973, in force 1 July 1975, 993 United	Nations	Treaty	Series 243, <http://www.cites.org>.
22 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, Bonn, 23 June 1979, in force 
1 November 1983, 19 International	Legal	Materials (1980) 15, <http://www.cms.int>.
23 Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993, 31 Inter-
national	Legal	Materials (1992) 822, <http://www.biodiv.org>.
24 UN Convention to Combat Desertification in Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and or Deserti-
fication, Particularly in Africa, Paris, 17 June 1994, in force 26 December 1996, 33 International	Legal	
Materials (1994) 1309, <http://www.unccd.int>.
25 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, Montreal, 29 January 2000, in force 11 September 2003, 39 Interna-
tional	Legal	Materials (2000) 1027.
26 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, Rome, 3 November 2001, into 
force 29 June 2004, <http://www.planttreaty.org/>.
27 Section V of the ITPGRFA Procedures and Operational Mechanisms to Promote Compliance and 
Address Issues of Non-compliance provides that the Committee shall develop a reporting format.
28 Under Art. 29 of the Nagoya Protocol Parties shall report to the COP/MOP on measures taken to imple-
ment the Protocol. The reporting format and timetable will be decided by the COP/MOP.
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3 Compliance mechanisms of selected biodiversity-related 
MEAs
This section examines the compliance mechanisms of six major biodiversity-related 
MEAs: Ramsar, CITES, CBD, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, the Interna-
tional Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA) and 
the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing. 
3.1 Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance 
3.1.1 Introduction
The Ramsar Convention, which entered into force on 21 December 1975, provides 
a framework for national action and international cooperation for the conservation 
and wise use of wetlands and their resources.  It requires that Parties designate at least 
one wetland to be included in the ‘List of Wetlands of International Importance’: 
wetlands are chosen according to their international significance in terms of botany, 
ecology, hydrology, limnology or zoology.29 Parties are obliged to promote the con-
servation of the listed wetland by formulating and implementing appropriate poli-
cies, legislation and planning;30 as well as promoting the conservation of wetlands 
and waterfowl by establishing nature reserves on wetlands regardless of whether they 
are listed or not.31
3.1.2 Performance review information
The Ramsar Convention requires Parties to report as soon as possible a change in the 
ecological character of any wetland in its territory included in the Ramsar List.32 Such 
reports are often referred to as Article 3(2) reports. COP-2 (1984) urged Parties to 
submit National Reports (NRs) on implementation of the Convention to the Secre-
tariat at least six months before each ordinary meeting of the Conference.33 Na-
tional Reports provide a valuable overview of national experiences; continuous mon-
itoring of the implementation of the Convention; and a means of sharing information 
relating to wetland conservation measures that have been taken, any problems that 
may have arisen, and appropriate solutions to such problems.34 National Reports are 
structured according to the current Strategic Plan35 and seek information on each 
Party’s success in progress towards the Operational Objectives and their respective 





33 ‘Submission of national reports’, Recommendation 2.1 (1984).
34 See Ramsar Convention, ‘National Reports submitted to the Conference of the Contracting Parties’, 
available at <http://www.ramsar.org/cda/en/ramsar-documents-natl-rpts/main/ramsar/1-31-121_4000_0__> 
(visited 12 June 2012). 
35 The Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009–2015 adopted by COP10 in Resolution X.1 in 2008.
41
Marko Berglund and Wanhua Yang
Ramsar Convention36 adopts a ‘National Report Format’ to guide the Parties on 
reporting on past achievements as well as to assist the Parties in structuring their 
activities within the framework of the Strategic Plan. 
The Ramsar Convention’s performance review information is supplemented by a 
national inventory of wetlands.37 COP-1 (1980) recognized the importance of na-
tional inventories as the basis for developing comprehensive national policies on the 
wise use of wetlands.38 COP-7 (1999) adopted Resolution VII.20 which urges the 
Parties to develop a comprehensive wetland inventory.39 In response, the ‘Framework 
for Wetland Inventory’ was developed to guide Parties on developing their wetland 
inventory programs and conducting the associated identification, monitoring and 
implementation activities.40 
3.1.3 Non-compliance procedure
A non-compliance procedure, the Montreux Record, was established at COP-4 
(1990) and formalized at COP-5 (1993).41 The Record focuses on threatened Ram-
sar sites listed on the ‘Record of Ramsar sites where changes in ecological character 
have occurred, are occurring or are likely to occur’. When it comes to the attention 
of the Bureau of the Convention,42 after a Monitoring Procedure finding that a 
Ramsar-listed site within a Party’s jurisdiction is likely to be degraded due to anthro-
pogenic interference, the Bureau can consult with the Party concerned and invite it 
to submit additional reports, monitor the site or negotiate a solution. The Bureau 
may bring the matter to the attention of the Standing Committee, which can bring 
the issue to the COP.43 A site can only be included in the Record with the approval 
of the Contracting Party concerned.44 
36 The Standing Committee of the Ramsar Convention consists of representatives of 6 regional groups 
(Africa, Asia, Neotropics, Europe, North America and Oceania). The criteria for regional nominations 
are: (1) one representative for regional groups with 1 to 12 Contracting Parties; (2) two representatives 
for regional groups with 13 to 24 Contracting Parties; (3) three representatives for regional groups with 
25 to 36 Contracting Parties; (4) four representatives for regional groups with 37 to 48 Contracting Par-
ties; and (5) five representatives for regional groups with 49 to 60 Contracting Parties. See Resolution 
XI.19 (2012).
37 UNEP, Comparative	Analysis	of	Compliance	Mechanisms, supra note 13, at	34.
38 ‘National wetlands inventories’, Recommendation 1.5 (1980).
39 ‘Priorities for wetland inventory’, Resolution 7.20 (1999), para. 11.
40 ‘Partnerships and synergies with Multilateral Environmental Agreements and other institutions’, Resolu-
tion 8.6 (2002). 
41 ‘The record of Ramsar sites where changes in ecological character have occurred, are occurring, or are 
likely to occur (“Montreux Record”)’, Resolution 5.4 (1993); and ‘Change in ecological character of 
Ramsar sites [and establishment of the Montreux Record]’, Recommendation 4.8 (1990).
42 The Bureau of the Ramsar Convention, or the Secretariat, handles day-to-day work of the Convention 
and reports to the Standing Committee. Its responsibilities are set forth in Article 8 of the Convention 
(1971). 
43 ‘Mechanisms for improved application of the Ramsar Convention’, Recommendation 4.7 (1990).
44 See Guidelines for operation of the Montreux Record adopted by COP-6 in Resolution VI.1 in 1996.
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3.1.4 Non-compliance response mechanisms
Recommendation 2.3 (1984)45 outlines the framework for implementing the Ramsar 
Convention. It calls for the provision of special assistance to developing countries in 
the elaboration of their national wetlands policies, in conservation and management 
of listed wetlands and other aspects of wetland conservation including data collec-
tion, education and training, monitoring, public awareness, and research. The frame-
work also requires ensuring that conservation measures are included in development 
projects of bilateral or multilateral aid programmes that affect wetlands in developing 
countries. Resolution 8.8 (2002) also recognizes several response options and mech-
anisms for the Parties concerned to consider when addressing and resolving identified 
negative changes or likely changes in the ecological character of the sites on the List. 
These mechanisms include technical assistance and financial assistance.	
With regard to technical assistance,	the Parties concerned can seek the advice of the 
Scientific and Technical Review Panel (STRP)46 on appropriate issues to take into 
account in addressing the matter. This can be done through requesting the Bureau 
to circulate their Article 3(2) reports to the STRP for comments; and/or through 
requesting a Ramsar Advisory Mission (RAM)47 in order to bring international ex-
pertise providing advice on appropriate actions.48 The Ramsar Advisory Mission 
mechanism was formerly known as the Monitoring Procedure and the Management 
Guidance Procedure to provide technical assistance to the Parties.49
Financial assistance can be realized by developing country Parties and Parties with 
economies in transition requesting resources to implement management action. This 
can be done through the emergency assistance category of the Ramsar Small Grants 
Fund50 or by seeking resources from other relevant sources.51 
45 ‘Action points for priority attention’, Resolution 2.3 (1984).
46 The Scientific and Technical Review Panel of the Ramsar Convention is a subsidiary body of the Conven-
tion to provide scientific and technical guidance to the Conference of the Parties, the Standing Commit-
tee, and the Ramsar Secretariat. It was established by Resolution 5.5 by COP-5 (1993). 
47 Ramsar Advisory Mission is a technical assistance mechanism formally adopted by Recommendation 4.7 
at COP4 in 1990. The main objective of this mechanism is to provide assistance to developed and devel-
oping countries alike in solving the problems or threats that make inclusion in the Montreux Record 
necessary.
48 ‘Assessing and reporting the status and trends of wetlands, and the implementation of Article 3.2 of the 
Convention’, Resolution 8.8 (2002), paras 19b and 19d.
49 See Ramsar website at <http://www.ramsar.org/cda/en/ramsar-documents-rams/main/ramsar/1-31-112_
4000_0> (visited 2 November 2012).
50 The application for the Small Grants Fund will be reviewed and approved by the Standing Committee. 
See Resolution 4.3 (1990), Resolution 5.8 (1993) and Resolution 6.6 (1996).
51 Resolution 8.8, para. 19c. 
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3.2 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora 
and Fauna (CITES)
3.2.1 Introduction
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and 
Fauna (CITES) entered into force on 1 July 1975. It aims to ensure that interna-
tional trade in wild animals and plants does not threaten their survival. The Conven-
tion has established a permit system to control imports and exports of wild fauna 
and flora. 
The species covered by CITES are listed in three Appendices depending on the degree 
of protection they are perceived by the COP to need. Appendix I includes species 
threatened with extinction, in which trade is permitted only in exceptional circum-
stances. Appendix II lists species not necessarily threatened with extinction, but in 
which trade must be controlled in order to avoid utilization incompatible with their 
survival. Appendix III contains species that any Party has identified as being subject 
to national regulation for the purpose of preventing or restricting exploitation that 
require the cooperation with other Parties to control trade. CITES requires Parties 
to establish national Scientific Authorities to advise on the effects of trade on the 
status of the species, and Management Authorities to administer the licencing sys-
tem.52 
3.2.2 Performance review information
CITES Parties are required to maintain records of trade in species listed in Appen-
dices I, II and III.53 They must also prepare periodic reports on their implementation 
of the Convention, including:
(a) an annual report containing a summary of the information specified in 
Article 6(b); and
(b)  a biennial report on legislative, regulatory and administrative measures 
taken to enforce the provisions of the Convention.54
 
Guidelines on reporting were introduced in 1982 following Resolution 3.10, which 
was revised and updated in 2002.55 Resolution 11.1756 consolidates all reporting 
resolutions and decisions.
52 See CITES, ‘How CITES works’, available at <http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/how.php> (visited 13 June 
2012).
53 Art. VIII.6. 
54 Art. VIII.7.
55 See ‘Guidelines for the preparation of annual reports’, Doc 13.2, 45th Meeting of the Standing Commit-
tee (2001).
56 ’National reports’, Resolution 11.17 (Rev. COP14) (2000).
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3.2.3 Non-compliance procedure
Pursuant to Article XIII, if the Secretariat is satisfied that any species in Appendices 
I or II is being adversely affected, or that the Convention is not being effectively 
implemented, it will communicate this issue to the relevant Party’s Management 
Authority. The Party must propose remedial action.57 
A formal non-compliance procedure was adopted at COP-11 (2000);58 the Guide-
lines on Compliance with the Convention were discussed, but not agreed, at the 50th 
meeting of the Standing Committee (2004);59 and the ‘Guide to CITES Compliance 
Procedures’ was taken note of at COP-14 (2007).60 According to the Guide, there 
are several ways to identify potential cases of non-compliance:
• annual and biennial reports, legislative texts as well as other special reports and 
responses to information requests, or review reports, etc. provide the primary, 
but not exclusive, means of monitoring compliance with the obligations under 
the Convention;
• any Party concerned over matters related to trade in CITES-listed species by 
another Party may bring the matter up directly with that Party and/or call upon 
the Secretariat for assistance; and
• Parties themselves are encouraged to give the Secretariat early warning of any 
potential non-compliance of their own.61
If a case of non-compliance is identified, the Party concerned needs to provide to the 
Secretariat as soon as possible any relevant facts and propose remedial action. The 
Secretariat is tasked to provide technical assistance related advice. If the Party fails to 
take sufficient remedial action within a reasonable time limit, the compliance matter 
is brought to the attention of the Standing Committee by the Secretariat, in direct 
contact with the Party concerned.62 
3.2.4 Non-compliance response mechanisms
The Guide to CITES Compliance, taken note of in Resolution 14.3 (2007),63 pro-
vides several alternative non-compliance response measures, if a case of non-compli-
ance is not resolved through the above procedures. The Standing Committee (SC)64 
can decide to take one or more of the following measures:
57 Art. XIII.1.
58 ‘Compliance and enforcement’, Resolution 11.3 (Rev. COP15) (2000).
59 ‘Guidelines on compliance with the Convention’, Doc. 27, 50th Meeting of the Standing Committee 
(2004). The Guidelines were presented at the meeting of the Standing Committee but not agreed. The 
Committee decided to establish an open-ended working group to further discuss the non-compliance 
procedure (NPC) and responses mechanisms.
60 Resolution 14.3 (2007). Annex. The Guide was taken note of by the Parties, and is legally non-binding 
in nature.
61 Ibid. Annex A.
62 Ibid. Annex, B.
63 Resolution 14.2.
64 The Standing Committee provides policy guidance to the Secretariat concerning the implementation of 
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a) provide advice, information and appropriate facilitation of assistance and 
other capacity-building support to the Party concerned;
b)  request special reporting from the Party concerned;
c) issue a written caution, requesting a response and offering assistance;
d)  recommend specific capacity-building actions to be undertaken by the Party 
concerned;
e)  provide in-country assistance, technical assessment and a verification mis-
sion, upon the invitation of the Party concerned;
f )  send a public notification of a compliance matter through the Secretariat to 
all Parties advising that compliance matters have been brought to the atten-
tion of a Party and that, up to that time, there has been no satisfactory re-
sponse or action;
g)  issue a warning to the Party concerned that it is in non-compliance, e.g. in 
relation to national reporting and/or the National Legislation Project; and
h) request a compliance action plan to be submitted to the Standing Committee 
by the Party concerned identifying appropriate steps, a timetable for when 
those steps should be completed and means to assess satisfactory completion.65
In certain cases, the SC can decide to recommend the suspension of commercial or 
all trade in specimens of one or more CITES-listed species consistent with the Con-
vention.66 The Standing Committee, with the assistance of the Secretariat, monitors 
the actions taken by the Party concerned to implement measures taken.67 
Although Resolution 14.3 was only taken note of, the SC has exercised these powers. 
In a recent case concerning Guinea, where significant problems with the implemen-
tation of CITES were found, the Secretariat notified the Parties68 that it could not 
confirm the validity of any permit or other document issued by the authorities in 
Guinea. The Secretariat further advised that no commercial breeding of specimens 
of CITES-listed species had ever occurred in Guinea, despite apparent ‘significant 
exports’ of specimens declared to have been bred in captivity. This illegal trade con-
cern had been reported by the Secretariat to the 61st SC Meeting, whereafter in 
September 2011 the SC sent a verification mission to Guinea. The SC sent a com-
prehensive list of recommendations to the Guinean authorities; and further request-
ed that Guinea report on the progress of the implementation of the recommenda-
tions and indicate areas in which it required assistance.69 The Guinean CITES 
the Convention and oversees the management of the Secretariat’s budget. The composition of the Com-
mittee includes the Party representatives from each of the six major geographical regions (Africa, Asia, 
Europe, North America, Central and South America and the Caribbean, and Oceania), with the number 
of representatives weighted according to the number of Parties within the region. See Resolution Conf. 
11.1 (Rev. CoP15) Annex 1 (1997).
65 Ibid. Annex A, para 29.
66 Ibid. Annex A, para. 30.
67 Ibid. Annex A, para. 33.
68 Notification 2011/040, 26 September 2011.
69 These being guidance to enhance proposed amendments to legislation; assistance with training manage-
ment and enforcement authority staff; and assistance to implement awareness campaigns.
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Management Authority replied, in May 2012, and provided some supporting infor-
mation on the implementation of the recommendations along with a request for 
assistance. After reviewing the information provided by Guinea and a Secretariat 
analysis of feedback received from Guinea on the limited implementation of recom-
mendations, the Committee, in compliance with Resolution 14.3, paragraph 29 g), 
instructed the Secretariat to issue a warning to Guinea to take urgent measures to 
implement the recommendations made during the 2011 mission to Guinea. The 
Committee also instructed the Secretariat to provide Guinea with a clear set of 
minimum actions that should be undertaken. It requested Guinea to implement 
these actions and to provide a report to the Secretariat on progress by 31 December 
2012. Finally, it asked the Secretariat to evaluate that report and to make a recom-
mendation at the 63rd meeting of the Standing Committee.70
3.3 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)
3.3.1 Introduction
The Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) was signed in 1992 and entered into force 
the following year. The CBD has three main objectives: the ‘conservation of biological 
diversity, the sustainable use of its components, and the fair and equitable sharing of 
the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources’.71 The Convention 
translates its objectives into substantive provisions contained in Articles 6 to 20. These 
include identifying and monitoring of the components of biological diversity and of 
the process and activities that threaten those components;72 measures for the conserva-
tion of biological diversity, both in	situ	and ex	situ;73 incentives for the conservation 
and sustainable use of biological diversity; and integrating the conservation and sus-
tainable use of biological resources into national decision-making.74 Other measures 
include research and training; public awareness and education; assessing the impacts 
of projects upon biological diversity; regulating access to genetic resources; access to 
and transfer of technology; and the provision of financial resources. 
The principal instruments for implementing the Convention at the national level are 
the National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAPs) under Article 6. The 
Convention requires countries to prepare a NBSAP (or an equivalent instrument) to 
ensure the Convention’s objectives are mainstreamed into the planning and activities 
of all sectors whose activities can have an impact (positive or negative) on biodiver-
sity. To date, 175 Parties have developed NBSAPs pursuant to Article 6.75 
70 SC, Interpretation and Implementation of the Convention, Compliance and Enforcement: Enforcement 
Matters, SC62 Doc. 29 (2012), and 62 Sum. 5 (2012). See <www.cites.org/eng/com/SC/62/E62-29.pdf> 
(visited 10 November 2012).
71 Art. 1 
72 Art. 7.
73 Arts 9 and 18.
74 Art. 10.
75 See CBD, ‘National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAPs)’, available at <http://www.cbd.
int/nbsap/> (visited 13 June 2012).
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3.3.2 Performance review information
Article 26 calls upon Parties to report upon their measures to implement the CBD 
and the effectiveness of those objectives. COP-2 (1995) decided that the first na-
tional reports should be submitted to COP-4 in 1998 and adopted guidelines for the 
preparation of the reports.76 
The objective of national reporting is to provide information on measures taken for 
the implementation of the Convention and the effectiveness of those measures de-
veloped in light of specific national circumstances in NBSAPs required by Article 6. 
Public availability of national reports also assists relevant actors (for instance, inter-
governmental agencies, specialist non-governmental organizations and scientific bod-
ies) to formulate focused strategies and programmes to assist Parties, individually or 
collectively, with implementation. This also assists individual Parties or groups of 
Parties to identify common issues to be addressed, thus facilitating the development 
of cost-effective and mutually-supportive regional initiatives for implementation. 
The fourth national reports were submitted in 2009.77 They provided essential infor-
mation to assess progress towards the 2010 Biodiversity Target78 at the national 
level, as well to assess progress at the global level. COP-10 (2011) decided that the 
fifth national reports are due in March 2014 and that the reports should focus on 
the implementation of the 2011–2020 Strategic Plan for Biodiversity and progress 
towards the Aichi Biodiversity Targets.79 
3.3.3 Non-compliance procedure
There is no non-compliance procedure under the CBD. However, given that the 
effective implementation of the CBD is clearly an important issue, CBD Decision 
VII/30 established the Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group on Review of Imple-
mentation (WGRI) of the Convention, which was mandated to consider progress in 
the implementation of the Convention, to review the impacts and effectiveness of 
the existing processes under the Convention, and to consider ways and means of 
identifying and overcoming obstacles to the effective implementation of the Con-
vention.80 To date, WGRI has met four times and submitted its review reports and 
recommendations for effective implementation of the Convention. However, its 
recommendations focus on the overall implementation of the Convention, in par-
76 ‘Form and intervals of national reports by Parties’, Decision II/17 (1995).
77 ‘National reporting and the next Global Biodiversity Outlook’, Decision VIII/14 (2006). 
78 The Parties to the Convention committed themselves to achieve by 2010 a significant reduction of the 
current rate of biodiversity loss at the global, regional and national level as a contribution to poverty al-
leviation and to the benefit of all life on Earth. The target was subsequently endorsed by the World Sum-
mit on Sustainable Development and the United Nations General Assembly and was incorporated as a 
new target under the Millennium Development Goals. See CBC website at <https://www.cbd.int/2010-
target/> (visited 2 October 2012).
79 See ‘The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–202 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets’, a revised and up-
dated Strategic Plan and a revised biodiversity target in relation to the 2010 Biodiversity Target in post 
2010, adopted in Decision X/2 at COP-10 in 2010.
80 ‘Strategic Plan: future evaluation of progress’, Decision VII/30 (2004), para 23.
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ticular on a revised and updated Strategic Plan including a revised biodiversity target 
at the request of COP-9 through Decision IX/9. The WGRI, at its third meeting, 
submitted the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity 
Targets, along with the measures for implementation, monitoring, review and evalu-
ation as well as support mechanisms.81 
The Strategic Plan aims to ‘take effective and urgent action’ to halt the loss of and to 
ensure sustainable use of biodiversity, and includes 20 targets for 2015 or 2020 (the 
‘Aichi Biodiversity Targets’ under five strategic goals: (1) to address the underlying 
causes of biodiversity loss; (2) to reduce the direct pressures on biodiversity and 
promote sustainable use; (3) to improve the status of biodiversity by safeguarding 
ecosystems, species and genetic diversity; (4) to enhance the benefits to all from bio-
diversity and ecosystem services; and (5) to enhance implementation through par-
ticipatory planning knowledge management and capacity building.82 
The implementation will be primarily through activities at the national or sub-na-
tional level, with supporting action at the regional and global levels. Parties are in-
vited to set their own targets within the flexible framework of the Strategic Plan for 
2011–2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, taking into account of national needs 
and priorities, while bearing in mind national contributions to the global targets. 
The means of the implementation include the provisional technical rationale, pos-
sible indicators and suggested milestones for the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, with the 
support mechanisms of capacity-building, clearing-house mechanism and technol-
ogy transfer, financial resources and partnerships and initiatives to enhance coopera-
tion.83 
3.4 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
3.4.1 Introduction
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity was 
signed in 2000 and entered into force in 2003. It ‘creates an enabling environment 
for the environmentally sound application of biotechnology, making it possible to 
derive maximum benefit from the potential that biotechnology has to offer, while 
minimizing the possible risks to the environment and to human health’.84 The objec-
tive of the Protocol is to contribute to ensuring an adequate level of protection in the 
field of the safe transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms resulting from 
modern biotechnology that may have adverse effects on the conservation and sustain-
able use of biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human health, and 
specifically focusing on transboundary movements.85 Under the Protocol, Parties 
81 Decision X/2 (2010).
82 Ibid. III and IV. 
83 Ibid. at IV, V and VI.
84 Cartagena	Protocol	on	Biosafety	to	the	Convention	on	Biological	Diversity:	text	and	annexes (Sec-
retariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2000), 1.
85 Art. 1.
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shall ensure that the development, handling, transport, use, transfer and release of 
any living modified organisms are undertaken in a manner that prevents or reduces 
the risks to biological diversity.86 
The Protocol establishes a notification and decision-making procedure with regard 
to the transboundary movement of living modified organisms87 and contains provi-
sions with regard to risk assessment and management88 as well as unintentional 
movements89 and handling transport packaging and identification.90 The Protocol 
also sets up a biosafety ‘clearing house’91 and has provisions, inter alia, on capacity-
building92 and public awareness and participation.93
3.4.2 Performance review information
Under the Protocol, each Party shall monitor the implementation of its obligations 
and shall report to the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties 
on measures that it has taken to implement the Protocol.94 In 2004 the COP/MOP 
decided on a four-year reporting cycle, with interim reports due two years after the 
entry into force of the Protocol.95 In 2006, the COP/MOP adopted the reporting 
format, which includes a section on obligations for the provision of information to 
the Biosafety Clearing-House, as well as on all other major provisions of the Proto-
col.96 The reporting format for the second national reports was adopted in 2010.97
3.4.3 Non-compliance procedure
The Protocol called for the Conference of the Parties, at its first meeting, to con-
sider and approve cooperative procedures and institutional mechanisms to promote 
compliance with the provisions of the Protocol and to address cases of non-compli-
ance. The Protocol further stipulated that these procedures and mechanisms shall 
include provisions to offer advice or assistance, where appropriate.98 The procedures 
and mechanisms on compliance were adopted in 2004 and a Compliance Commit-
tee was established.99 The procedures and mechanisms contain sections on the objec-
tive, nature and underlying principles; institutional mechanisms; functions of the 
86 Art. 2.2.
87 Arts 7 to 13.







95 ‘Monitoring and reporting under the Protocol (Article 33): format and timing for reporting’, Decision 
BS-I/9 (2004).
96 ‘Monitoring and reporting’, Decision BS-III/14 (2006), Annex: ‘Format for the First Regular National 
Report on the Implementation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety’.
97 ‘Monitoring and reporting (Article 33)’, Decision BS-V/14 (2010).
98 Art. 34.
99 ‘Establishment of procedures and mechanisms on compliance under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety’, 
Decision BS-I/7 (2004).
50
Compliance with Biodiversity-related Multilateral Environmental Agreements  
and Potential for Synergies
Committee; procedures; information and consultation; measures to promote compli-
ance and address cases of non-compliance; and review of the procedures and mech-
anisms. 
The compliance procedures and mechanisms were envisaged to be simple, facilitative, 
non-adversarial and cooperative in nature, and their operation is guided by the prin-
ciples of transparency, fairness, expedition and predictability. The mechanism pays 
particular attention to the special needs of developing country Parties, in particular 
the least developed and small island developing states among them, and Parties with 
economies in transition, acknowledging the difficulties they face in the implementa-
tion of the Protocol.100 
The Compliance Committee meets twice a year and it consists of 15 members, three 
from each UN region, with recognized competence in the field of biosafety or other 
relevant fields, including legal or technical expertise, serving objectively and in a 
personal capacity.101 The Committee identifies the specific circumstances and possible 
causes of individual cases of non-compliance referred to it; considers information 
submitted to it regarding matters relating to compliance and cases of non-compli-
ance; provides advice and/or assistance, as appropriate, to the concerned Party, on 
matters relating to compliance with a view to assisting it to comply with its obliga-
tions under the Protocol; reviews general issues of compliance by Parties with their 
obligations under the Protocol, taking into account the information provided in the 
national reports communicated in accordance with Article 33 of the Protocol and 
also through the Biosafety Clearing-House; takes measures, as appropriate, or makes 
recommendations, to the COP/MOP of the Protocol; and carries out any other 
functions as may be assigned to it by the COP/MOP.102 The Committee is to receive, 
through the Secretariat, any submissions relating to compliance from any Party with 
respect to itself; and from any Party, where this Party is affected or likely to be af-
fected, with respect to another Party. The Committee may reject considering such 
latter submissions where these are, ‘bearing in mind the objectives of the Protocol’, 
either de minimis or ill-founded.103
3.4.4 Non-compliance response measures
The Committee may take one or more measures with a view to promoting compli-
ance and addressing cases of non-compliance, taking into account the capacity to 
comply of the Party concerned, especially developing country Parties, in particular 
the least developed and small island developing states amongst them, and Parties with 
economies in transition.. In addition, such factors as the cause, degree, frequency 
and type of non-compliance have to be taken into account in the considerations. 
100 Decision BS-I/7, Annex ‘Procedures and Mechanisms on Compliance under the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety’, Section I.
101 Ibid. Section II.
102 Ibid. Section III.
103 Ibid. Section IV.
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The Committee may provide advice or assistance to the Party concerned, as appropri-
ate; make recommendations to the COP/MOP regarding the provision of financial 
and technical assistance, technology transfer, training and other capacity-building 
measures; request or assist, as appropriate, the Party concerned to develop a compli-
ance action plan regarding the achievement of compliance with the Protocol within 
a timeframe to be agreed upon between the Committee and the Party concerned; 
invite the Party concerned to submit progress reports to the Committee on the efforts 
it is making to comply with its obligations under the Protocol; and report to the 
COP/MOP on efforts made by Parties in non-compliance to return to compliance 
and maintain this as an agenda item of the Committee until adequately resolved.104 
The COP/MOP may take further measures relating to a Party’s non-compliance. On 
the facilitative range of the spectrum the COP/MOP may provide financial and 
technical assistance, technology transfer and training and other capacity-building 
measures. Information can be shared among Parties through publishing cases of non-
compliance in the Biosafety Clearing-House.105 On the more punitive side the COP/
MOP may issue a caution to the concerned Party. To build Parties’ confidence in the 
process, however, the COP/MOP decided that if a Party itself triggers a case of non-
compliance only facilitative and supportive measures should be recommended by the 
Committee and adopted by the COP/MOP.
The Compliance Committee has met nine times since it was established. The first 
meetings focused mostly on procedural matters, such as agreeing on rules of proce-
dure, including conflicts of interest, and identifying the role of the Committee vis-
à-vis other processes under the Convention. The Committee also reviewed lessons 
learned from other MEAs regarding repeated cases of non-compliance. 
Reporting is a time-consuming and challenging issue for many parties: the Commit-
tee raised the importance of the matter in 2007 after only 50 parties had submitted 
their first national reports on time.106 Much progress had been made by 2012, though, 
when the Committee noted that only 17 Parties had not submitted their second 
national reports.107 The Committee has also addressed the need for Parties to comply 
with their substantive provisions under the Protocol. Through decisions adopted by 
the COP/MOP, the Committee has called on Parties to ensure that they have the 
legal and administrative frameworks in place to meet their obligations. The Com-
mittee has also played a facilitative role in requesting Parties to submit information 
on any challenges they face with regard to operationalizing their biosafety frame-
works. With this information the Committee and the COP/MOP would be in a 
stronger position to assist Parties to comply. 
104 Ibid. Section VI.
105 Ibid.
106 Report of the Compliance Committee under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, UN Doc. UNEP/
CBD/BS/COP-MOP/4/2 (2008), 2.
107 Report of the Compliance Committee under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety on the Work of its 
eighth and ninth meetings, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/BS/COP-MOP/6/2 (2012), 4.
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3.5 ITPGRFA
3.5.1 Introduction
The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture was 
concluded in 2001 and entered into force in 2004. The objectives of the Treaty are 
the conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources for food and agricul-
ture and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of their use for 
sustainable agriculture and food security.108 Contracting Parties should promote an 
integrated approach to the exploration, conservation and sustainable use of plant 
genetic resources for food and agriculture, and the Treaty sets out further specific 
obligations to this end,109 including a non-exhaustive range of appropriate policy and 
legal measures to meet the objectives of the Treaty.110 The Treaty also has provisions 
on international cooperation and technical assistance and separate parts on farmer’s 
rights and access and benefit-sharing.
3.5.2 Performance review information
The Treaty itself does not contain monitoring and reporting obligations. Rather, 
these were adopted in 2011 as part of the Procedures and Operational Mechanisms 
to Promote Compliance and Address Issues of Non-compliance.111 Parties submit 
reports on measures taken to implement the International Treaty through the Secre-
tariat to the Compliance Committee. The first reports will be submitted three years 
after the approval of a standard reporting format, which will be developed by the 
Compliance Committee and approved by the Governing Body. Subsequent reports 
are to be submitted every five years thereafter or unless otherwise agreed. The Com-
pliance Committee considers these reports and receives further guidance from the 
Governing Body regarding, for example, priorities for the Committee’s work related 
to monitoring and reporting. 
3.5.3 Non-compliance procedure
According to the Treaty the Governing Body, at its first meeting, should have ap-
proved cooperative and effective procedures and operational mechanisms to promote 
compliance and to address issues of non-compliance, through monitoring, and 
offering advice or assistance, in particular to developing countries and countries with 
economies in transition.112 The Compliance Committee was established at the first 
session of the Governing Body in 2006, but an agreement was reached only on pro-




111 ‘Procedures and operational mechanisms to promote compliance and address issues of non-compliance’, 
Resolution 2/2011.
112 Art. 21.
113 ‘Draft procedures and operational mechanisms to promote compliance and address issues of non-
compliance’, Resolution 3/2006.
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fourth session of the Governing Body in 2011, full procedures and operational mech-
anisms on compliance were adopted.114 The first meeting of the Compliance Com-
mittee is scheduled for February 2013 and due to budgetary prudence meetings shall 
be held as necessary, rather than at preordained intervals.115
The procedures and mechanisms should promote compliance with the Treaty’s provi-
sions and address issues of non-compliance. They include monitoring and facilitative 
measures such as offering advice or assistance when needed and requested.116 The 
procedures and mechanisms are intended to be simple, cost-effective, facilitative, 
non-adversarial, non-judicial, legally non-binding and cooperative in nature. Their 
operation is guided by the principles of transparency, accountability, fairness, expe-
ditiousness, predictability, good faith, and reasonableness, with particular attention 
to the special needs of Parties that are developing countries and Parties with econo-
mies in transition being paid.117 As can be seen, the focus is very much facilitative 
and could be considered a ‘soft compliance mechanism’, rather than a ‘hard’ punitive 
one. This is not to say that the mechanism would be ineffective. Rather, it recog-
nizes that Parties sometimes require assistance to meet the obligations and could do 
so more effectively through support rather than hard sanctions.
The Compliance Committee consists of a maximum of 14 members, up to two from 
each of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) regions, elected by the 
Governing Body. Members of the Committee shall have recognized competence in 
the field of genetic resources or other fields relevant for the International Treaty, in-
cluding legal or technical expertise, and they shall serve objectively and in their in-
dividual capacities. 
The Compliance Committee considers compliance and non-compliance related in-
formation submitted to it. It can offer advice and/or facilitate assistance with a view 
to assisting a Party to comply with its obligations; it can assist the Governing Body 
in its monitoring implementation of Parties’ obligations; and it can promote compli-
ance by addressing statements and questions concerning the implementation of the 
Treaty. When addressing issues of non-compliance it must identify and consider the 
specific circumstances of the matter.118 The mechanism can be triggered by a submis-
sion from a Party with respect to itself; by a Party with respect to another Party; or 
by the Governing Body.119
114 Resolution 2/2011.
115 Ibid. Section III.
116 Ibid. Section I.
117 Ibid. Section II.
118 Ibid. Section IV.
119 Ibid. Section VI.
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3.5.4 Non-compliance response measures
The Procedures and Operational Mechanisms provide for a range of measures. The 
Committee, with a view to promoting compliance and addressing issues of non-
compliance, taking into account such factors as the cause, degree, frequency of, and 
type of non-compliance, may: provide advice or facilitate assistance, including legal 
advice or legal assistance, to the Party concerned, as appropriate; request or assist, as 
appropriate, the Party concerned to develop an action plan, which addresses the issue 
of non-compliance within a timeframe to be agreed upon between the Committee 
and the Party concerned, taking into account its existing capacity to address the issue; 
and invite the Party concerned to submit progress reports to the Committee on the 
efforts it is making to comply with its obligations under the International Treaty. In 
addition, the Governing Body may, upon the recommendations of the Committee, 
decide to provide assistance, including, as appropriate, legal, financial and technical 
assistance, to the Party concerned; and take any other actions it deems appropriate, 
including for capacity-building, in accordance with the International Treaty and for 
the fulfillment of its objectives.120
3.6 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing
3.6.1 Introduction
The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable 
Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity was adopted in 2010. To date the Protocol has been signed by 92 countries 
but ratified, adhered to or acceded to by only eight countries.121 It has not yet entered 
into force. 
The objective of the Protocol is the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising 
from the utilization of genetic resources, including by appropriate access to genetic 
resources and by appropriate transfer of relevant technologies. This objective con-
tributes the objective of the Convention on Biological Diversity of conservation of 
biological diversity and the sustainable use of its components.122 Benefits arising from 
the utilization of genetic resources and their application and commercialization shall 
be shared in a fair and equitable way. Such sharing shall be upon mutually agreed 
terms.123 The Protocol regulates access to genetic resources124 as well as to traditional 
knowledge related to genetic resources125 and established an access and benefit-shar-
ing clearing house.
120 Ibid. Section VII.
121 See ‘Status of Signature, and ratification, acceptance, approval or accession’, available at <http://www.cbd.
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3.6.2 Performance review information
Each Party shall monitor the implementation of its obligations under the Protocol 
and shall report to the COP/MOP on measures that it has taken to implement the 
Protocol.126 More detailed reporting provisions including a reporting format and 
time frame will be adopted by the COP/MOP when the Protocol comes into force 
and the COP/MOP convenes.
3.6.3 Non-compliance procedure
The first meeting of the COP/MOP will consider and approve cooperative proce-
dures and institutional mechanisms to promote compliance with the provisions of 
the Protocol and to address cases of non-compliance. These procedures and mecha-
nisms shall include provisions to offer advice or assistance.127 As the Protocol is not 
in force this Article has not yet been operationalized nor have procedures and insti-
tutional mechanisms been adopted. They have, however, been and continue to be 
discussed under the Open-ended Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Committee for the 
Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing, which is preparing for the entry into 
force of the Protocol. The second meeting of this Committee in July 2012 discussed 
elements of a non-compliance procedure. These elements include objectives, nature 
and underlying principles; institutional mechanism; functions; procedures; informa-
tion for and consultation by the Compliance Committee after the triggering of the 
procedures; measures to promote compliance and address cases of non-compliance; 
and review of procedures and mechanisms.128 It remains to be seen whether interna-
tional negotiations will have concluded on this matter by the time the Protocol enters 
into force.
4 Potential for compliance synergies and coherence 
Synergies among the biodiversity related conventions can be approached from sev-
eral perspectives. As questions related to compliance surface at the end of an imple-
mentation cycle, it at first glance would not seem to be the most effective place to 
start to identify synergies. Indeed, synergies should be sought as much as possible 
upstream, beginning with a Party’s rights and obligations under the various treaties 
in a given cluster, or across clusters. If synergies are considered at the early stages of 
implementation, they could continue to be considered and maintained at the down-
stream compliance end of an implementation cycle. Conversely, if synergistic actions 
are not promoted upstream it will be challenging to construct these synergies down-
stream, at the compliance end. 
126 Art. 29.
127 Art. 30.
128 ‘Report of the expert meeting on cooperative procedures and institutional mechanisms to promote com-
pliance with the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing and to Address Cases of Non-Compli-
ance’, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/ICNP/2/12 (2012).
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Upstream synergies can, for example, be created through joint and common report-
ing formats. These joint reports could then be reviewed by a compliance committee 
that would have a mandate to assess and address compliance issues across all the se-
lected conventions, as identified in the joint reports. Any measures recommended by 
the Committee could then speak to implementation of all of the conventions con-
cerned. Moreover, should synergies be identified with regard to joint action plans 
and work programmes of the biodiversity conventions, a compliance committee 
could be mandated to review Parties’ progress in implementing these plans and work 
programmes, as well as recommending measures to improve or implement them.
Several institutional arrangements could be envisaged to deal with compliance in a 
synergistic manner at the downstream end. Most ambitiously, a compliance super-
committee could be conceived to assess cases of compliance related to all of the 
conventions. The committee would have a similar mandate to the existing commit-
tees but would not limit its review to one convention. The advantage of this approach 
would be the ability to recommend measures that would assist the Party to comply 
with all of the conventions. These measures could include technical assistance and 
capacity-building support, for example. It should be remembered that compliance 
committees rarely adopt measures themselves, however, and often only recommend 
measures for adoption by the governing bodies of the Convention. A super-commit-
tee would therefore only really be effective, and realistic, if the institutional structures 
of the conventions were also otherwise streamlined. 
Should these institutional structures be streamlined, a supra-committee could also 
be considered. This variant would be formed of a main committee that addresses 
systemic and repeated cases of non-compliance, and be assisted by one or several ad 
hoc sub-committees dealing with a specific thematic issue. For example, compliance 
with ITPGRFA and the ABS Protocol could be addressed by one such sub-commit-
tee, as both conventions deal with questions of access and benefit sharing. Another 
sub-committee could be formed to deal with protected areas, and address all related 
obligations stemming from the CBD, Ramsar and CMS Conventions, for example. 
The ad hoc nature of the sub-committees would provide flexibility to deal with spe-
cific cases of non-compliance, as they arise, and only the supra-committee would be 
a permanent body. The sub-committees would also give an opportunity to call on 
individuals with specific expertise in a given field, which would speak to concerns 
about the supra-committee not having enough in-depth knowledge or experience of 
a specific convention.
If streamlining institutional structures between conventions proves too ambitious, 
joint meetings of compliance committees might be an interim step. It would provide 
an opportunity for the committees to share information and learn from each others’ 
procedures and substantive handling of submissions and cases. This would espe-
cially be the case when addressing systemic and repeated cases of non-compliance, 
while large meetings would be less desirable when addressing a specific case. The 
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existing committees do of course already share information with each other both 
formally and informally, and build on each other’s experiences. 
Promoting compliance will only ever be as effective as the provisions that Parties 
must comply with. It would therefore seem to be more effective to address the ques-
tion of synergies at the upstream level first. Once joint provisions are agreed compli-
ance could be reviewed at the downstream end. When such downstream structures 
are created, however, it would be important to maintain focus on facilitative compli-
ance measures that do not punish a Party that is making its best efforts for not com-
plying. Often parties do not lack the will but the means and technical capability to 
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lessons learned, rio+20 and beyond
Kerstin	Stendahl1
1 Introduction
This paper discusses enhancing cooperation and coordination among multilateral en-
vironmental agreements (MEAs) as a means of strengthening international environ-
mental governance (IEG). It is a topical debate, which featured as part of the Rio+202 
negotiations on the Institutional Framework for Sustainable Development (IFSD).3 
This paper considers the main messages to come out of IEG debates over the last decades; 
then moves to discuss a practical example of how synergies have been achieved within 
the chemicals and waste cluster. It is suggested that past successful endeavours could 
set the stage in other MEA clusters, such as among the biodiversity-related agreements. 
2 MEA synergies, international environmental governance 
and sustainable development
2.1 Introduction
At the international level, in multilateral environmental negotiations, there is much 
support, almost uncontested, for synergies among the MEAs at all levels. The request 
1 Kerstin Stendahl, Deputy Executive Secretary, Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions Secretariat. 
Previously Ministerial Adviser, Ministry of the Environment, Finland; former co-chair of the ad hoc joint 
working group on enhancing cooperation and coordination among the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm 
Conventions; e-mail: KStendahl@pic.int. The author would like to thank the editors of the Review, 
Dr Tuula Honkonen and Prof. Ed Couzens, for their invaluable assistance in the drafting of this paper.
2 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio de Janeiro, 20–22 June 2012. The Confer-
ence marked the 20th anniversary of the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development.
3 The Institutional Framework for Sustainable Development aims to enhance the integration of sustainable 
development in the activities of all relevant United Nations agencies, programmes and funds, and the 
international financial institutions, within their mandates. For more information, see <http://www. 
uncsd2012.org/isfd.html>.
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for MEA synergies is a consistent core message from various international environ-
mental governance processes.4 The strengthening of IEG has featured prominently 
as part of the negotiations on the institutional framework for sustainable develop-
ment. The challenge is to place IEG within the IFSD so that system-wide action 
within the United Nations (UN) is achieved in a supportive fashion across the three 
pillars of sustainable development (the economic, social and environmental dimen-
sions). Within this context, the most favorable outcome on IEG in general from the 
Rio+20 Conference, and other such initiatives, would be a firm foundation from 
which to deliver on IEG reform.
2.2 International environmental governance
International environmental governance encompasses all international environmen-
tal instruments, processes, organizations and arrangements within the UN system, 
including at the regional level. It is not restricted to pursuing reform of the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP),5 but takes a wider approach. The 
strengthening of IEG should be evolutionary (step-by-step) in nature. A prudent 
approach (meaning that form follows function, leading to incremental reform) to 
institutional change is required. There is a general preference among governments 
for making better use of existing structures. 
2.3 IEG within the context of sustainable development
In 2002, at UNEP’s Governing Council in Cartagena6 in preparation for the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg 2002,7 a number of core mes-
sages were formulated on IEG8 which, to a large extent, remain valid in respect of 
the outcomes of the 2012 Rio Conference. It was suggested, for instance, that:
reform of international environmental governance is a process that should lead 
to the mainstreaming of environmental concerns into development policy, ensure 
the balanced integration of the pillars of economic growth, social development 
4 See, for instance, the paper by Marceil Yeater in the present Review, which discusses the support for syn-
ergies amongst the major biodiversity-related MEAs. A number of papers on extant and potential syner-
gistic relationships can be found at UNEP/WCMC, ‘Synergies among MEAs - Key Papers’, available at 
<http://www.unep-wcmc.org/synergies-among-meas---key-papers_580.html> (visited 25 November 
2012).
5 See <http://www.unep.org/>.
6 UNEP, ‘The UNEP Governing Council International Environmental Governance Initiative’, Seventh 
Special Session of the Governing Council/Global Ministerial Environment Forum, Cartagena, Colombia, 
13–15 February 2002, <http://www.unep.org/GC/GCSS-VII/Documents/K0260448.doc> (visited 
25 November and 9 December 2012). 
7 World Summit on Sustainable Development, <http://www.johannesburgsummit.org/>.
8 UNEP, Reports of the Seventh Special Sessio006E of the Governing Council, para. 76, ‘B. Contribution 
of the United Nations Environment Programme to the World Summit on Sustainable Development’. 
available at <http://www.unep.org/GC/GCSS-VII/Reports.htm> (visited 25 November 2012).
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and environmental protection and increase the flow of resources, including tech-
nical expertise, technology transfers and capacity building.9
It was suggested also that some IEG issues go beyond the mandates of environmen-
tal ministries alone; and that other branches of government should therefore be in-
volved so as to enhance national level coordination and bring environmental consid-
erations into the mainstream of economic and social decision-making at all levels.10 
Further, that the design and implementation of environmental policy at all levels 
requires a clear link to the sustainable development context as well as greater involve-
ment and engagement of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society and 
the private sector. This allows such groups or sectors to play a meaningful role in 
intergovernmental policy-making; and also requires strengthened national frame-
works of governance.11 
2.4 The science – policy interface 
The increasing complexity of environmental degradation requires an enhanced capac-
ity for scientific assessment and monitoring and for the provision of early warnings 
to governments. This requires IEG to be responsive to country needs. An essential 
complement of international cooperative arrangements is the requirement to 
strengthen the capacity of developing countries actively to participate in interna-
tional environmental policy formulation and implementation. There is a need to 
emphasize and support capacity-building and technology transfer, and arguably to 
enhance the role of UNEP in this regard. The international environmental govern-
ance process should take into account the needs and constraints of developing coun-
tries on the basis of common but differentiated responsibility.12
2.5 The role of UNEP
Few would dispute that the effectiveness of IEG generally should be increased by 
strengthening the main UN environmental body – UNEP.13 Strengthening UNEP 
would thus encompass provisions for a means and measures that would enable it to 
9 Ibid.
10 UNEP, ‘GC IEG Initiative’, supra note 6, ‘Appendix: Report of Open-ended Intergovernmental Group 
of Minister on IEG’ at II.8(d), at 25. 
11 Ibid. at II.8(f ), at 26.
12 Ibid. at II.8(g), at 26. On common but differentiated responsibility generally, see Tuula Kolari, ‘The 
Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility in Multilateral Environmental Agreements’, in 
Tuula Kolari and Ed Couzens (eds), International	Environmental	Lawmaking	and	Diplomacy	Review	2007, 
University of Joensuu – UNEP Course Series 7 (University of Joensuu, 2008) 21–54.
13 As recorded by the UNEP Governing Council, Agenda 21 (the global blueprint for sustainable develop-
ment, which was agreed at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de 
Janeiro, 1992) ‘reaffirmed the role of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) as the prin-
cipal body within the United Nations system in the field of the environment but also added that it should 
take into account the development aspects of environmental questions’. UNEP, ‘GC IEG Initiative’, supra 
note 6, ‘Appendix: Report of OIG on IEG’ at I.2, at 23.
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carry out its mandate, give it a stronger role and authority as well as adequate, stable 
and predictable financing.14 UNEP’s strategies and programmes of work should be 
guided by clear goals and be based on the principles of policy integration, broad-
based participation, transparency and accountability and its responsibilities being 
expanded to include multilateral environmental agreements.15 In this regard a vari-
ety of proposals have been considered, including the proposal to upgrade UNEP to 
a United Nations specialized agency.16 Also the Global Ministerial Environment 
Forum17 – the GMEF – would be placed as the cornerstone of the international in-
stitutional structure of international environmental governance.18 In addition, UN-
EP’s headquarters in Nairobi should be strengthened as a centre for international 
expertise and meetings on the environment.19 
2.6 Synergies 
The proliferation of international instruments and institutional arrangements in 
international environmental law and governance is a good sign. It shows that the 
international community is engaged and committed to solve environmental prob-
lems and that governments also look for tailor-made answers to specific problems. 
However, governments also recognize that the current approach to IEG, while having 
the benefit of specialization, may weaken policy coherence due to lack of resources, 
thus lessening the implementation of existing agreements. Through the ‘clustering 
approach’ to multilateral environmental agreements, governments are trying to re-
verse the trend by attempting to adopt a more coordinated and holistic approach to 
the implementation of MEAs that in one way or another are similar to each other 
and thus benefit from joint action. 
3 IEG on the road to RIO+20
Much effort has been put into the reform of international environmental governance 
over the last decades. Some milestones along the way are: 
 
• the 2002 Cartagena outcome;
• the Bali Strategic Plan for Technology Support and Capacity-building 
(2004/2005);20
14 UNEP, ‘GC IEG Initiative’, supra note 6, ‘Appendix: Report of OIG on IEG’ at II.8(i), at 26.
15 Ibid. at II.8, at 25; and Ch. II,’ Report on international environmental governance’, para. 39, at 11.
16 Ibid. at II.8(j), at 26.
17 See <http://www.unep.org/resources/gov/overview.asp> (visited 20 June 2012).
18 UNEP, ‘GC IEG Initiative’, supra note 6, ‘Appendix: Report of OIG on IEG’ at II.8(k), at 26.
19 Ibid. at II.8(l), at 26.
20 ‘International environmental governance Bali Strategic Plan for Technology Support and Capacity-build-
ing, Note by the Executive Director’, UN Doc. UNEP/GC.23/6/Add.1 (2004). For more information, 
see <http://www.unep.org/dec/onlinemanual/Compliance/NationalImplementation/CapacityBuilding/
Resource/tabid/679/Default.aspx> (visited 20 June 2012). According to UNEP, the Bali Strategic Plan 
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• the System-wide Coherence Report (2006);21
• Switzerland-Mexico IEG consultations (2007);22
• Options paper. UN Joint Inspection Unit Report (2008);23
• the synergies process among the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions 
2007 – 2010;
• two rounds of UNEP-facilitated high level/ministerial consultations: Rome – 
Belgrade (June–October 2009) and Nairobi – Helsinki (July–November 2010);24
• the Intergovernmental Science – Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Services (IPBES);25 and
• incremental reform of UNEP.
The Nairobi–Helsinki outcome concluded that there is a need to strengthen the 
global authoritative voice(s) on the environment, including through: enhancing 
UNEP; or establishing a new umbrella organization for sustainable development; or 
through establishing a specialized agency such as a World Environment Organization 
(WEO); or through reforming the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)26 
and the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD);27 or/and through enhanc-
ing institutional reforms and streamlining existing structures.28
provides a framework for UNEP to strengthen the capacity of governments in developing and transitional 
economy countries to achieve environmentally sustainable outcomes consistent with the programmatic goals 
of the Council’ and ‘mandates UNEP to “develop and keep updated a database giving access to information on 
major existing technology support and capacity-building activities, such as those undertaken by UNEP, with 
links to the programmes of relevant partners; [which] activity should perform a clearing house function. 
 UNEP, ‘BSP Mandate’, available at <http://62.160.8.20/bsp/staticpages/mandate.aspx> (visited 9 De-
cember 2012). 
21 For more information on the proposals to strengthen the UN, see <http://www.centerforunreform.org/
node/33>. In February 2006, the UN Secretary-General created a High Level Panel on UN System-wide 
Coherence in the areas of development, the environmental and humanitarian assistance. The panel carried 
out a study of the UN’s operational activities in which it assessed how to strengthen UN system works, 
comparative advantages, and possible areas in which overlap between UN agencies might be reduced. The 
report, released in November 2006, included extensive recommendations on how to consolidate and 
improve the effectiveness of United Nations operations. UN, ‘System Wide Coherence’, available at 
<http://www.un.org/ga/president/63/issues/swc.shtml> (visited 9 December 2012).
22 During 2007, H.E. Mr. Enrique Berruga (Mexico) and H.E. Mr. Peter Maurer (Switzerland), Co-Chairs 
of the Informal Consultations on environmental activities taking place at the GA, engaged in a consider-
ation process which culminated, in October 2007, in an ‘Options Paper’ by the two Co-Chairs which was 
presented as a ‘flexible “framework for decision-making” in regard to the UN’s environmental activities’. 
The paper presented seven ‘building blocks constituting “ambitious incrementalism” to strengthen inter-
national environmental governance (IEG)’. The Co-Chairs proposed that ‘informal consultations be 
continued and that a decision should be taken no later than by the end of the 62nd session of the Gen-
eral Assembly on the terms of reference for formal negotiations on a broader transformation of the IEG 
system’. Available at Center for UN Reform Education, ‘Informal Consultative Process for the Institu-
tional Framework for the United Nations’ Environmental Activities: Co-Chairs’ Options Paper’, <http://
www.centerforunreform.org/node/265> (visited 20 June and 9 December 2012).
23 See UN, ‘Report of the Joint Inspection Unit for 2008 and programme of work for 2009’, available at 
<https://www.unjiu.org/en/corporate-information/AR%20%20PoW/enAR2008_WP2009.pdf> (visited 
9 December 2012). 
24 For more information on the Helsinki meeting, see <http://www.biodivcluster.fi/>.
25 See <http://www.ipbes.net> (visited 20 June 2012).
26 See <http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/>.
27 See <http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/csd/csd_index.shtml>.
28 See, for instance, UNEP, ‘First meeting of the Consultative Group of Ministers or High-level Repre-
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The core messages of the processes and documents mentioned above were largely 
repeated in the preparations in the run-up to Rio+20; showing, perhaps, how diffi-
cult, and how lengthy a process, international reform is. Some progress had been 
achieved, however – for instance in the form of the establishment of the IPBES, 
through the conduct of UNEP’s incremental reform, and the synergies process 
among the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm conventions. However, by and large the 
same messages that had been voiced over the last decade were being communicated 
to the next round of sustainable development negotiations in Rio 2012. Countries 
prepared through the UNEP’s Governing Council 2011, one of the outcomes of 
which was the adoption of eight paragraphs on strengthening international environ-
mental governance,29 to Rio+20 PREPCOM II30 where IEG forms part of Rio’s 
second theme ‘Institutional Framework on Sustainable Development’.31
4 Lessons learned
The experiences from the process on enhancing synergies among the Basel Conven-
tion on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their 
Disposal,32 Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed Consent33 and Stockholm 
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants34 are useful when devising further strat-
egies on the reform of IEG and when deciding on how to proceed in the clustering 
of MEAs. The synergies process among the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm conven-
tions is also one of the few IEG to have produced results and concrete outcomes.35 
sentatives on International Environmental Governance, Nairobi, Kenya, 7–9 July 2010’, 20 July 2010, 
available at <http://www.rona.unep.org/documents/partnerships/IEG/Co-Chairs_Summary.pdf> (visited 
9 December 2012).
29 UNEP GC, Twenty-sixth session of the Governing Council/Global Ministerial Environment Forum, 
Nairobi, 21–24 February 2011, ‘International Environmental Governance’, available at <http://www.
environmentalgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/UNEPGC.26CWL.4Add.1.pdf> (visited 9 
December 2012). 
30 Three preparatory meetings were held. Prepcom II was held in March 2012. See Rio+20, ‘2nd Prepara-
tory Committee Meeting UN Conference on Sustainable Development, 7 Mar 2011 – 8 Mar 2011, New 
York, USA’, available at <http://www.uncsd2012.org/index.php?page=view&type=13&nr=28&menu=24> 
(visited 9 December 2012).
31 The Conference had two focal themes, these being a green economy in the context of sustainable develop-
ment poverty eradication; and the institutional framework for sustainable development. See Rio+20, 
‘Themes of the Conference’, available at <http://www.uncsd2012.org/about.html> (visited 9 December 
2012).
32 Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Basel, 
22 March 1989, in force 5 May 1992, 28 International	Legal	Materials (1989) 657, <http://www.basel.
int>.
33 Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides 
in International Trade, Rotterdam, 11 September, 1998, in force 24 February, 38 International	Legal	
Materials (1999) 1, <http://www.pic.int>.
34 Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, Stockholm, 22 May 2001, in force 17 May 2004, 40 In-
ternational	Legal	Materials (2001) 532, <http://www.pops.int>.
35 For an earlier consideration of this cluster, see Kerstin Stendahl, ‘Enhancing Cooperation and Coordina-
tion among the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions’ in Tuula Kolari and Ed Couzens (eds), 
International	Environmental	Law-making	and	Diplomacy	Review	2007 University of Joensuu – UNEP 
Course Series 7 (University of Joensuu, 2008) 127–141.
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The process was launched in 2006 at the fourth meeting of the Conference of the 
Parties of the Stockholm convention where a decision was taken to launch a process 
on synergies among the three conventions if the other conventions, Basel and Rot-
terdam, were to agree to such a process.36 The wording of the decision was key and 
much effort went into balancing it in such a way that it would not impinge on the 
autonomous decision-making of the conferences of the parties of the conventions. 
The decision reads:
… [the Conference of the Parties of the Stockholm Conventions] suggests the 
establishment of an ad hoc joint working group as a possible way forward and 
invites the Conferences of the Parties to the Basel and Rotterdam Conventions 
to consider that option and, in the event of their endorsement, agrees to its es-
tablishment. It is suggested that the working group consider the supplementary 
report referred to in paragraph 2 of the present decision and prepare joint recom-
mendations on enhanced cooperation and coordination among the three conven-
tions at the administrative and programmatic levels to be forwarded to the next 
meeting of the Conference of the Parties to each convention.37
The Basel and Rotterdam COPs then passed decisions to the same effect and an ad 
hoc joint working group among the three Conventions was set up to propose options 
for enhancing synergies among the three Conventions.38 The AHJWG met three 
times: in March and December 2007 and in March 2008. The AHJWG recommen-
dations were adopted by the COPs and the extraordinary simultaneous meetings of 
the COPs of the Rotterdam, Basel and Stockholm Conventions in 2009 and 2010.39
An innovation emanating from the AHJWG was the organizing of the ExCOPs, 
extraordinary simultaneous meetings of the COPs of the three Conventions. This 
meant simultaneous plenary sessions; an open-ended joint working group (OEJWG) 
of the three COPs prepared draft decisions on the substantive issues. Contact groups 
on joint activities were set up to deliver on issues such as joint management and the 
review mechanism. 
The result was an omnibus decision adopted simultaneously by the COPs of the 
Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions in plenary, which addressed joint 
activities (national, on the ground), joint services in the secretariats, joint manage-
36 Report of the Conference of the Parties of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants 
on the work of its second meeting, UN Doc. UNEP/POPS/COP.2/30 (2006), Annex I, Decision SC-2/15 
‘Synergies’.
37 Ibid. para. 6.
38 Report of the Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Move-
ments of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal on its eighth meeting, Annex I, Decision VIII/8 (2007); 
Report of the Conference of the Parties to the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent 
Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade on the work of its third 
meeting, Decision RC-3/8 (2006).
39 On the work of the AHJWG, see, for example, Stendahl, ‘Enhancing Cooperation’, supra note 35. 
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ment of the secretariats, synchronization of budget cycles, joint audits and review of 
the synergies arrangements.
The way the omnibus decision was taken – through the convening of three COPs 
simultaneously – and the issues it addressed makes it unique in the history of inter-
national environmental negotiations. There are many factors contributing to this 
success story. Firstly, the process was very much a country-driven process, driven by 
needs identified by countries and with countries in the driver’s seat. The ad hoc joint 
working group had a regionally balanced, convention-specific representation, with 
three government officials per region per convention: 3 x 5 x 3 = 45 members. Also 
the AHJWG Co-Chairs each represented a convention and region – Chile (Stock-
holm), China (Basel), and Finland (Rotterdam). The Co-Chairs were engaged, com-
mitted and took it upon themselves to allocate the time needed for the process to 
succeed. The Convention Secretariats facilitated and serviced the meetings and work 
of the group, but were not members of the group. Neither UNEP nor other UN 
entities were part of the group but served the discussions as experts (resource per-
sons).
It was a trust- and confidence-building process. It showed that any such process 
should be undertaken over a period long enough to establish trust as synergies nego-
tiations are heavily laden with ‘turf-battles’ at all levels, and must deal with inherent 
fears that there will always be ‘someone on the losing side’ when synergies are sought. 
Looking at the process from the level of facilitating national implementation helps. 
The informal (even ‘chatty’) nature of the AHJWG also helped to create a construc-
tive atmosphere. In order to secure trust in the group, there were no negotiations 
before the AHJWG’s third and last meeting. In addition, at the last stretch, the COPs 
trusted the group’s recommendations so that the package was not opened during the 
three specific COPs’ deliberations. Simple logistical facts were also beneficial: all three 
Convention Secretariats were located in the same building in Geneva, except for the 
FAO part of the Rotterdam secretariat which is in Rome. Consequently, it was easi-
er for a joint Executive Secretary to start working with (almost all) staff in the same 
place. An additional beneficial factor was that there were only two host institutions 
involved: UNEP and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).40
Admittedly, the reforms made up to date have been mainly administrative in nature. 
The most concrete outcomes of the process are a joint head, a joint secretariat based 
on a matrix structure servicing the three conventions, joint formats for budgets, and 
joint parts of the budgets henceforth. The next step in the synergies work will need 
to focus on national and regional joint life-cycle implementation; and there already 





A very important part of making this process a success has been the attention paid 
to selling the idea, through outreach and leg-work, talking with the Parties and as-
sessing their needs. Regional workshops and briefings were held on a regular basis in 
Geneva, Nairobi, New York as well as hosted in other places.41
5  IEG in the Rio+20 outcome
The Rio+20 outcome ‘The Future We Want’42 contains a number of paragraphs relat-
ing to the strengthening of IEG in general and the furthering of synergies among 
MEAs specifically. In paragraph 88, the Parties ‘committed’ themselves ‘to strength-
ening the role of the United Nations Environment Programme as the leading global 
environmental authority that sets the global environmental agenda, that promotes 
the coherent implementation of the environmental dimension of sustainable devel-
opment within the United Nations system and that serves as an authoritative advo-
cate for the global environment’; and ‘reaffirm[ed] resolution 2997 (XXVII) of 
15 December 1972 which established UNEP and other relevant resolutions that 
reinforce its mandate, as well as the 1997 Nairobi and 2000 Malmö Ministerial 
Declarations’ and ‘in this regard, [] invite[d] the United Nations General Assembly, 
in its 67th Session, to adopt a Resolution strengthening and upgrading UNEP’.43 
Such ‘strengthening and upgrading’ is to be achieved by ‘establish[ing] universal 
membership in the Governing Council of UNEP, as well as other measures to 
strengthen its governance as well its responsiveness and accountability to Member 
States’;44 ‘hav[ing] secure, stable, adequate and increased financial resources from the 
regular budget of the UN and voluntary contributions to fulfill its mandate’;45 
‘enhanc[ing] UNEP’s voice and ability to fulfill its coordination mandate within the 
UN system by strengthening UNEP engagement in key UN coordination bodies 
and empowering UNEP to lead efforts to formulate UN system-wide strategies on 
the environment’;46 and by ‘promot[ing] a strong science-policy interface, building 
on existing international instruments, assessments, panels and information networks, 
41 As an example of the numerous outreach efforts, which were both formal and semi-formal, there even was 
the 2009 UNEP – University of Eastern Finland Course on Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 
during which a mock simultaneous extraordinary ExCOP of the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm conven-
tions was held! On the negotiation exercise, and for an explanation of some of the complexities involved 
in the process, see Cam Carruthers and Kerstin Stendahl, ‘The Naivasha Ex-COP: A Multilateral Simula-
tion Exercise of a Joint Extraordinary Conference of the Parties to the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm 
Conventions’ in Tuula Honkonen and Ed Couzens (eds), International	Environmental	Lawmaking	and	
Diplomacy	Review	2009, University of Eastern Finland – UNEP Course Series 9 (University of Eastern 
Finland, 2010) 195–217.
42 Rio+20, ‘Report of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 
20–22 June 2012’, available at <http://www.uncsd2012.org/content/documents/814UNCSD%20RE-
PORT%20final%20revs.pdf> (visited 9 December 2012).
43 Ibid. para. 88.
44 Ibid. para. 88(a).
45 Ibid. para. 88(b).
46 Ibid. para. 88(c).
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including the Global Environmental Outlook, as one of the processes aimed at bring-
ing together information and assessment to support informed decision-making’.47 
Such ‘strengthening and upgrading’ is further to be achieved by ‘disseminat[ing] and 
shar[ing] evidence-based environmental information and raise public awareness on 
critical as well as emerging environmental issues’;48 by ‘provid[ing] capacity building 
to countries as well as support[ing] and facilitat[ing] access to technology’;49 by ‘pro-
gressively consolidat[ing] headquarters functions in Nairobi, as well as strengthen[ing] 
its regional presence, in order to assist countries, upon request, in the implementa-
tion of their national environmental policies, collaborating closely with other rele-
vant entities of the UN system’;50 and by ‘ensur[ing] the active participation of all 
relevant stakeholders’ through ‘drawing on best practices and models from relevant 
multilateral institutions and exploring new mechanisms to promote transparency 
and the effective engagement of civil society’.51
Paragraph 89 deals with synergies among MEAs. Governments agreed that they 
‘recognize the significant contributions to sustainable development made by the 
multilateral environmental agreements []’, and ‘acknowledge the work already un-
dertaken to enhance synergies among the three Conventions in the chemicals and 
waste cluster (the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions); and in that light 
‘encourage parties to MEAs to consider further measures, in these and other clusters, 
as appropriate, to promote policy coherence at all relevant levels, improve efficiency, 
reduce unnecessary overlap and duplication, and enhance coordination and co-
operation among MEAs, including the three Rio Conventions as well as with the 
UN system in the field’.52
Obviously, at the time of concluding this paper, it is not possible to know how sig-
nificant the ‘Future We Want’ document will eventually turn out to be, For the 
moment, what can be said is that based on a reading of the above paragraphs, the 
document at the very least gives firm encouragement to clusters of multilateral envi-
ronmental agreements to continue with efforts to create and to foster synergies. This 
might even prove to be one of the most positive outcomes.
At the general SD level, the outcome document reaffirms governments’ commitment 
to ‘strengthening international cooperation to address the persistent challenges re-
lated to sustainable development for all, in particular in developing countries’;53 calls 
for a ‘holistic and integrated approaches to sustainable development which will guide 
humanity to live in harmony with nature and lead to efforts to restore the health and 
47 Ibid. para. 88(d).
48 Ibid. para. 88(e).
49 Ibid. para. 88(f ).
50 Ibid. para. 88(g).
51 Ibid. para. 88(h).
52 Ibid. para. 89.
53 Ibid. para. 11.
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integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem’;54 and ‘underscores the importance of a strength-
ened institutional framework for sustainable development which responds coher-
ently and effectively to current and future challenges and efficiently bridges gaps in 
the implementation of the sustainable development agenda’.55 
The Parties then noted that the ‘strengthening and reform of the institutional frame-
work should not be an end in itself, but a means to achieve sustainable development’ 
and ‘resolve[d] to strengthen the institutional framework for sustainable develop-
ment, which will, inter	 alia: […] (c) underscore the importance of interlinkages 
among key issues and challenges and the need for a systematic approach to them at 
all relevant levels; … (d) enhance coherence, reduce fragmentation and overlap and 
increase effectiveness, efficiency and transparency, while reinforcing coordination and 
cooperation’.56 The Parties then ‘acknowledge[d] the vital importance of an inclusive, 
transparent, reformed and strengthened, and effective multilateral system in order to 
better address the urgent global challenges of sustainable development today, recog-
nizing the universality and central role of the United Nations’, and ‘reaffirming 
[their] commitment to promote and strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the United Nations system’;57 ‘underscore[d] the need to strengthen UN system-wide 
coherence and coordination, while ensuring appropriate accountability to Member 
States, by, inter alia, enhancing coherence in reporting and reinforcing cooperative 
efforts under existing inter-agency mechanisms and strategies to advance the integra-
tion of the three dimensions of sustainable development within the United Nations 
system’, with this to occur through means ‘including [] exchange of information 
among its agencies, funds and programmes, and also with the international financial 
institutions and other relevant organizations such as the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), within their respective mandates’.58 The Parties then ‘emphasize[d] the need 
for an improved and more effective institutional framework for sustainable develop-
ment that should: be guided by the specific functions required and mandates in-
volved; address the shortcomings of the current system; take into account all relevant 
implications; promote synergies and coherence; seek to avoid duplication and elim-
inate unnecessary overlaps within the UN system; and, reduce administrative bur-
dens, and build on existing arrangements’.59
6 Concluding remarks
The jury is still out as to whether the successful synergies process among the Basel, 
Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions will provide a model for synergies among 
MEAs in other clusters, most notably the biodiversity related ones. What can be said, 
54 Ibid. para. 40.
55 Ibid. para. 75.
56 Ibid. para. 76.
57 Ibid. para. 77.
58 Ibid. para. 78.
59 Ibid. para. 79.
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however, is that synergising is a mode of working within the chemicals and waste 
cluster and, as such, is constantly under development and refinement. A second 
round of simultaneous COPs as well as extraordinary meetings of the COPs of the 
three conventions will be held in May 2013. Also, the interim joint administrative 
arrangements of the convention secretariats will be reviewed and decisions on their 
future will be made. 
Steady progress is also being made with respect to international environmental gov-
ernance at large. In December 2012, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution 
to strengthen and upgrade UNEP and establish universal membership of its govern-
ing body.60 The landmark resolution, aimed at increasing the role of UNEP as the 
leading environmental authority that sets the global environmental agenda, was 
adopted 40 years after UNEP was established by the General Assembly, following 
the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment.61
The General Assembly resolution also provides for UNEP to receive secure, stable 
and increased financial resources from the regular budget of the UN, and calls for 
other UNEP donors to increase their voluntary funding. The decision allows full 
participation of all 193 UN member states at the UNEP Governing Council in 
February 2013, and follows commitments by world leaders at the UN Conference 
on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) in June 2012 to improve the institutional 
framework for sustainable development. The provisions contained in the resolution 
are among the first practical steps by the UN General Assembly to implement the 
outcomes of Rio+20.62
In light of the above, synergies among MEAs can most probably be pursued effec-
tively using either route, through negotiations among the MEA governing bodies 
themselves or by addressing the issue in a UNEP setting with universal membership. 
60 See 67th sess. of the UNGA, ‘Sustainable development: report of the Governing Council of the United 
Nations Environment Programme on its twelfth special session. Report of the Second Committee’, 
UN Doc. A/67/437/Add.7 (2012).
61 For more information, see, for instance, UNEP, ‘United Nations Environment Programme Upgraded to 
Universal Membership Following Rio+20. UN General Assembly Strengthens UNEP Role in Addressing 
Global Environmental Challenges. Renewed Focus on Improving Access to Technology and Capacity 
Building (2012)’, available at <http://www.rona.unep.org/documents/news/United%20Nations%20En-
vironment%20Programme%20Upgraded%20to%20Universal%20Membership%20Following%20Rio.
pdf> (visited 2 January 2013).
62 Ibid.
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Biological diversity, the variability among living organisms,2 is under threat. Recent 
reports – including the third Global Biodiversity Outlook,3 the Living Planet Report,4 
the Global Forest Resources Assessment,5 the State of the World’s Plant and Animal 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture,6 the fourth Global Environment 
Outlook,7 and the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment8 – have come to similar con-
clusions. They all indicate that biological diversity continues to decline globally at 
1 Programme Officer at the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity; e-mail: erie.tamale@cbd.
int.
2 Biological diversity, or ‘biodiversity’, is defined in the Convention on Biological Diversity as meaning ‘the 
variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other 
aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within 
species, between species and of ecosystems’. Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 
1992, in force 29 December 1993, 31 International	Legal	Materials (1992) 822, <http://www.biodiv.org>.
3 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Global	Biodiversity	Outlook	3 (CBD, 2010), avail-
able at <http://www.cbd.int/gbo3/> (visited 14 March 2012).
4 WWF, Living	Planet	Report	2010:	Biodiversity,	Biocapacity	&	Development (Global Footprint Network, 
2010), available at <http://awsassets.panda.org/downloads/lpr2010.pdf> (visited 14 March 2012).
5 FAO, Global	Forest	Resources	Assessment	2010:	Main	Report, FAO Forestry Paper No. 163 (FAO, 2010), 
available at <http://www.fao.org/forestry/fra/fra2010/en/> (visited 14 March 2012).
6 FAO. The	Second	Report	on	the	State	of	the	World’s	Plant	Genetic	Resources	for	Food	and	Agriculture	(FAO, 
2010), available at <http://www.fao.org/agriculture/crops/core-themes/theme/seeds-pgr/sow/sow2/en/> 
(visited 14 March 2012).
7 UNEP, Global	Environment	Outlook	(GEO-4):	Environment	for	Development (EarthScan, 2010), available 
at <http://www.maweb.org/documents/document.354.aspx.pdf> (visited 14 March 2012).
8 Millennium	Ecosystem	Assessment. Ecosystems	and	Human	Well-being:	Biodiversity	Synthesis (World Resour-
ces Institute, 2005), available at <http://www.maweb.org/documents/document.354.aspx.pdf> (visited 
14 March 2012).
72
Global Biodiversity Trends and Synergistic Strategic Policy Responses
unprecedented rates. The decline has been more rapid in the past 50 years than at 
any time in human history, and is expected to continue at the same pace or even 
accelerate as the drivers of biodiversity loss increase in intensity.9 The main direct 
pressures driving the decline include climate change, habitat degradation, habitat 
loss, invasive alien species, over-exploitation and unsustainable use and pollution.10 
These, in turn, are driven by a myriad of underlying causes or indirect drivers, includ-
ing: demographic change, economic activities, inequitable resource distribution, 
international trade, policy failures including perverse incentives, scientific and tech-
nological change, socio-cultural change, socio-political factors, and unsustainable 
consumption patterns.11 
This paper discusses the general status and trends of global biodiversity, and the cur-
rent pressures on biodiversity, highlighting some of the strategic policy responses 
taken or proposed under various biodiversity-related multilateral environmental 
agreements. The paper draws mostly from the findings of the third edition of the 
Global Biodiversity Outlook (GBO 3), which was released by the Secretariat of 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in May 2010; and the outcomes 
of the tenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity (COP 10), which took place in October 2010 in Nagoya, Japan. 
2 Current biodiversity status and trends
2.1 Introduction
All recent reports indicate that biodiversity at all its levels – ecosystem, species and 
genetic diversity – continues to decline or disappear at alarming rates.12 For example, 
almost all of the indicators which were used during the preparation of the third 
Global Biodiversity Outlook to assess the status and trends of various components 
of biodiversity (genes, populations, species, ecosystems and habitats) and their integ-
rity, as well as the pressures being imposed upon them, all showed a negative trend 
(see Figure 1).13
9 Ibid.
10 CBD Secretariat, Global	Biodiversity	Outlook	3, supra note 3.
11 Alexander Wood, Pamela Stedman-Edwards and Johanna Mang, The	Root	Causes	 of	Biodiversity	 Loss 
(Earthscan, 2000).
12 Brian Groombridge and Martin D. Jenkins, World	Atlas	of	Biodiversity.	Earth’s	Living	Resources	in	the	21st	
Century (University of California Press, 2002); and Millennium	Ecosystem	Assessment. Ecosystems	and	Hu-
man	Well-being:	Current	State	and	Trends,	Volume	1 (World Resources Institute, 2005), available at <http://
www.maweb.org/en/Condition.aspx> (visited 14 March 2012).
13 Source: CBD Secretariat, Global	Biodiversity	Outlook	3, supra note 3.
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2.2 Ecosystem status and trends
The trends in ecosystem status are quite varied across the world, but reports show 
that virtually all ecosystems around the world have been dramatically transformed 
through human actions.14 According to the GBO 3, many terrestrial ecosystems and 
habitats, including tropical forests, in most parts of the world have become severely 
fragmented and degraded resulting in alarming biodiversity loss.15 Savannas, grass-
lands and tropical dry forests, in particular, are being degraded faster than any other 
biome.16 For example, the cerrado woodland savannah biome of Central Brazil and 
the Miombo woodlands of Southern Africa, which have exceptionally high diversity 
of endemic plant species, are being lost at a rate of 0.7 per cent per year through 
clearing for agriculture (cropland and pasture), extraction of wood for charcoal, and 
uncontrolled bush fires.17
Inland water ecosystems and habitats have also been dramatically altered and de-
graded in recent decades. For example, according to the GBO 3, two-thirds out of 
the 292 large river systems have become moderately or highly fragmented by dams 
and reservoirs. Wetlands (including marshes and swamps) in many parts of the world 
14 Millennium	Ecosystem	Assessment. Ecosystems	and	Human	Well-being:	Current	State	and	Trends,	Volume	1, 
supra note 12.
15 CBD Secretariat, Global	Biodiversity	Outlook	3, supra note 3.
16 See Millennium	Ecosystem	Assessment. Ecosystems	and	Human	Well-being:	Biodiversity	Synthesis, supra note 8.
17 CBD Secretariat, Global	Biodiversity	Outlook	3, supra note 3.
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 Figure 1: Trends as shown by agreed indicators 
Figure	1:	Trends	as	shown	by	agreed	indicators.
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have also been drained and degraded significantly. For example, up to 65 per cent of 
wetlands in Europe and North America and 27 per cent in Asia have been drained 
for use in intensive agriculture. In many freshwater ecosystems, water quality, an 
important biodiversity indicator, also continues to deteriorate due to pollution orig-
inating from non-point sources, including excess fertilizers, herbicides, and insecti-
cides from agricultural lands.18
Marine and coastal ecosystems and habitats also continue to be lost at alarming rates 
as a result of human activities.19 The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, published 
in 2005, revealed that some 35 per cent of mangroves have been lost in the last two 
decades, and that roughly 20 per cent of the world’s coral reefs have been destroyed 
with an additional 20 per cent having been degraded. Mangroves and coral reefs in 
South America and Southeast Asia in particular have had the highest rate of habitat 
loss.20 However, in other regions, although the loss is still disturbingly high the an-
nual rate of mangrove loss has slowed down.21 
Tropical coral reefs have also suffered a significant decline since the 1970s due to 
multiple threats including from ‘bleaching’ from warmer sea temperatures resulting 
from climate change, disease outbreaks, dynamiting of reefs, ocean acidification, 
overfishing, pollution from land-based sources. As well, some 29 per cent of seagrass 
habitats fringing coastlines throughout the world have also disappeared in recent 
decades. Furthermore, it is estimated that 85 per cent of oyster reefs have been lost 
globally and are functionally extinct in 37 per cent of estuaries and in 28 per cent of 
ecoregions.22 The status and trends of biodiversity in deepwater habitats, such as sea 
mounts and cold-water corals, are also a growing concern mainly due to the increase 
in ocean acidification and modern fishing technology, especially bottom-trawling.23
In general, the condition of most ecosystems and habitats around the world is dete-
riorating, thus threatening the long-term viability of many species and the ecosystem 
goods and services.24 However, as indicated above, a few positive trends have been 
noted in some recent reports. As further examples, there has been a significant in-
crease in the coverage of protected areas, both terrestrial and marine, over the past 
decade. More than 12 per cent of the global land surface has been designated as 
18 Ibid.
19 Enric Sala and Nancy Knowlton, ‘Global Marine Biodiversity Trends’, 31 Annual	Review	of	Environment	
and	Resources (2006) 93–122.
20 Rashid Hassan, Robert Scholes and Neville Ash (eds), Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Current State 
and Trends, vol 1. Findings of the Condition and Trends Working Group of the Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment (Island Press, 2005).
21 CBD Secretariat, Global	Biodiversity	Outlook	3, supra note 3.
22 Ibid.
23 Enric Sala and Nancy Knowlton, ‘Global Marine Biodiversity Trends’, supra note 19.
24 Ecosystem services are the benefits that people obtain from ecosystems. These include direct or material 
benefits from products such as food, fuel, and fiber; and indirect benefits from processes such as pollina-
tion, climate regulation, flood control, water purification, pollution control, nutrient recycling, soil forma-
tion, as well as aesthetic, recreational, cultural and spiritual benefits. See	Millennium	Ecosystem	Assessment. 
Ecosystems	and	Human	Well-being:	Biodiversity	Synthesis, supra note 8.
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protected areas to date.25 Inland water ecosystems, although still poorly served by the 
terrestrial protected areas network, are also increasingly being protected. Parties to 
the Ramsar Convention26 have to date committed themselves to conserving more 
than 1 880 wetlands of international importance, covering over 1.8 million square 
kilometres. In addition, steps are also being taken in many countries to restore wet-
lands.27 The coverage of marine and coastal protected areas is also growing rapidly, 
though it still lags far behind the terrestrial protected area network and does not 
adequately include the open ocean as yet.
The management effectiveness of the existing protected areas is quite varied.28 A re-
cent global assessment of management effectiveness has found that of the 3 080 
protected areas surveyed, only 22 per cent were judged ‘sound’, 13 per cent ‘clearly 
inadequate’, and 65 per cent demonstrated ‘basic’ management.29 In general, how-
ever, the trend in respect of both the coverage and the effectiveness of protected ar-
eas is quite positive.
2.3 Trends in species diversity
The last few decades have witnessed significant changes in the status, abundance and 
distribution of species. Recent studies show that many species continue to decline in 
abundance and distribution and several are at increasing risk of extinction. On aver-
age, the global Living Planet Index (LPI)30 has declined by more than 30 per cent 
globally since 1970. The tropical LPI has declined by almost 60 per cent while the 
temperate LPI showed an increase of 15 per cent, reflecting the recovery of some 
species populations in temperate regions.31
Significant declines have been observed in population trends of vertebrates, habitat 
specialist birds and shorebird populations worldwide.32 On average, the population 
of wild vertebrate species fell by nearly one-third (31 per cent) globally between 1970 
and 2006, with the decline being especially severe in the tropics and in freshwater 
25 Ibid.
26 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, Ramsar, 2 February 1971, in force 21 December 
1975, 11 International Legal	Materials (1972), 963, <http://www.ramsar.org>.
27 Millennium	Ecosystem	Assessment.	Ecosystems	and	Human	Well-being:	Wetlands	and	Water	Synthesis (World 
Resources Institute, 2005), available at <http://www.maweb.org/documents/document.358.aspx.pdf> 
(visited 14 March 2012).
28 Fiona Leverington, Marc Hockings, Helena Pavese, Katia Lemos Costa and José Courrau, Management	
Effectiveness	in	Protected	Areas	–	a	Global	Study.	Overview	of	Approaches	and	Methodologies (University of 
Queensland, Gatton, IUCN-WCPA, TNC and WWF, 2008), available at <http://www.wdpa.org/me/
PDF/global_study_methodologies.pdf> (visited 14 March 2012).
29 CBD Secretariat, Global	Biodiversity	Outlook	3, supra note 3.
30 The Living Planet Index (LPI) is an indicator of change in global biodiversity based on change in popula-
tion abundance of vertebrate species from all around the world. L. McRae et al., The	Living	Planet	Index	
–	Guidance	for	National	and	Regional	Use (UNEP-WCMC, 2008), available at <http://www.unep-wcmc.
org/the-living-planet-index-guidance-for-national-and-regional-use_544.html> (visited 12 June 2012).
31 Ibid.
32 Stuart H. M. Butchart et al., ‘Global Biodiversity: Indicators of Recent Declines’, 328 Science (2010) 
1164–1168.
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ecosystems. Amphibians are on average the group most threatened with extinction, 
with more than 42 per cent of all amphibian species declining in population due to 
a combination of habitat modification, changes in climate and the fungal disease 
chytridiomycosis.33 More than 40 per cent of bird species are also declining in popu-
lation.34 In particular, farmland bird populations in Europe have declined by on 
average 50 per cent since 1980, bird populations in North American grasslands have 
declined by nearly 40 per cent, and waterbird populations worldwide have declined 
by 44 per cent.35
The 2010 edition of the Worldwide Fund for Nature’s (WWF)36 Living Planet Re-
port37 also showed that populations of tropical species are plummeting as humanity’s 
demands on natural resources increase. It noted that the biodiversity loss is being 
driven by the consumption of natural resources, which is occurring faster than the 




34 Stuart H. M. Butchart, Alison J. Stattersfield, Leon A. Bennun, Sue M. Shutes, H. Resit Akçakaya et al., 
‘Measuring Global Trends in the Status of Biodiversity: Red List Indices for Birds’, 2 PLoS	Biology (2004) 
2294–2304.
35 CBD Secretariat, Global	Biodiversity	Outlook	3, supra note 3.
36 See, generally, <http://www.worldwildlife.org/home-full.html> or <http://wwf.panda.org>.
37 WWF, Living	Planet	Report	2010, supra note 4.
38 Ibid.




The aggregated species’ extinction risk (i.e., biodiversity loss at the species level) has 
accelerated according to, for example, the International Union for Conservation of 
Nature (IUCN)40 Red List Index.41 The IUCN Red List specifically shows that de-
spite the ongoing conservation efforts, between 12 and 52 per cent of well-studied 
species are threatened with extinction, including approximately 25 per cent of mam-
mals. For example, recent reassessments show that the subspecies of the Black Rhi-
noceros in western Africa, the Western Black Rhinoceros (Diceros	bicornis	longipes) 
has officially been declared extinct; and the subspecies of the White Rhinoceros in 
central Africa, the Northern White Rhinoceros (Ceratotherium	simum	cottoni) is cur-
rently teetering on the brink of extinction.42
The 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment also noted that some 10–30 per cent 
of the mammal, bird and amphibian species were threatened with extinction, due to 
human actions.43 Species of birds and mammals used for food and medicine are on 
average facing a greater extinction risk than species not so used. Mammals have suf-
fered the steepest increase in the risk of extinction in South and South-East Asia, due 
to the combined impact of hunting and loss of habitat. Preliminary assessments also 
suggest that 23 per cent of plant species are threatened, and coral species are also 
moving rapidly towards a greater extinction risk.44
Humans have also directly caused the global declines in marine populations. The 
single most important global indicator of population depletion is the global wild 
fisheries catch, which has been declining since the 1990s. In the United States alone, 
81 out of 304 exploited stocks for which the status is known are considered to be 
overfished; 93 are either overfished or experiencing overfishing; and 65 are experienc-
ing overfishing.45 Disturbances due to non-extractive activities (such as global warm-
ing, ocean acidification, and pollution) have also affected a large number of marine 
species. Furthermore, human activities have led to the extinction of more than 20 
described marine species, including algae, fishes, invertebrates, marine mammals, 
and seabirds. Dramatic examples of human-driven extinction of marine species in-
clude the Steller’s sea cow (Hydrodamalis	gigas), a huge herbivore of the nearshore 
northeast Pacific, and the Caribbean monk seal (Monachus	 tropicalis) which were 
hunted to extinction. It is believed that many small species with localized dispersal 
and limited geographic ranges have also probably gone extinct.46
40 See, generally, <http://www.iucn.org>.
41 See, generally, <http://www.iucnredlist.org/>. The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species is an authorita-
tive global classification of species’ conservation status.
42 IUCN, IUCN	Red	List	of	Threatened	Species, Version 2011.2 (2011), available at <http://www.iucnredlist.
org/apps/redlist/details/6557/0> (Western black rhinoceros) and <http://www.iucnredlist.org/apps/red-
list/details/4185/0> (Northern white rhinoceros) (visited 27 March 2012).
43 Millennium	Ecosystem	Assessment. Ecosystems	and	Human	Well-being:	Biodiversity	Synthesis,	supra	note 8.
44 CBD Secretariat, Global	Biodiversity	Outlook	3, supra note 3.
45 Sala and Knowlton, ‘Global Marine Biodiversity Trends’, supra note 23.
46 Ibid.
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On a more positive note, the latest IUCN Red List highlights some conservation 
successes achieved in recent years. For example, the Southern White Rhino subspe-
cies (Ceratotherium	simum	simum), which probably had a population of less than 100 
at the end of the 19th century has now increased to an estimated wild population of 
over 20  000.47 Another success story is the Przewalski’s Horse (Equus	ferus), which 
was originally listed as extinct, has improved its status from critically endangered to 
endangered.48 Some temperate species populations have also increased on average 
since 1970. For example, there has been an increase in wild animal populations in 
temperate regions which may be linked to widespread afforestation of former crop-
land and pasture, though this may not necessarily reflect increase in species diversity 
richness.49
2.4 Trends in genetic diversity 
While fewer detailed studies and assessments have been conducted at the genetic 
diversity level, as compared to species and ecosystem diversity, the available data 
shows that genetic diversity too is being lost at very alarming rates globally, particu-
larly among domesticated species.50 Trends in genetic diversity of domesticated ani-
mals, cultivated plants, and fish species of major socio-economic importance in 
particular all show a major decline. For example, in China the number of local rice 
varieties being cultivated has declined from 46  000 in the 1950s to about 1 000 in 
2006.51 Globally, the FAO estimates that since the early 1900s, about 75 per cent of 
plant genetic diversity has been lost.52 The main causes of this genetic erosion, as 
reported by almost all countries, are the intensification of agricultural systems cou-
pled with the replacement of local varieties and landraces by improved or exotic 
high-yielding varieties, which have resulted in increasing homogeneity of crops 
worldwide. Currently, only 30 crops provide an estimated 90 per cent of the world 
population’s calorific requirements, with maize, rice and wheat alone providing about 
half of the calories consumed globally.53 Other causes include changing agricultural 
systems, environmental degradation, inappropriate legislation and policies, overex-
ploitation, overgrazing, population pressures, as well as weeds, pests and diseases.54
47 See <http://www.iucnredlist.org/apps/redlist/details/4185/0> (visited 28 March 2012).
48 See <http://www.iucnredlist.org/apps/redlist/details/41763/0> (visited 28 March 2012).
49 CBD Secretariat, Global	Biodiversity	Outlook	3, supra note 3.
50 Millennium	Ecosystem	Assessment. Ecosystems	and	Human	Well-being:	Biodiversity	Synthesis,	supra	note 8; 
Barbara Rischkowsky and Dafydd Pilling (eds), The	State	of	the	World’s	Animal	Genetic	Resources	for	Food	
and	Agriculture (FAO, 2007), available at <ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/010/a1260e/a1260e01.pdf> (vis-
ited 15 March 2012); and FAO, The	Second	Report	on	the	State	of	the	World’s	Plant	Genetic	Resources, supra 
note 6.
51 CBD Secretariat, Global	Biodiversity	Outlook	3, supra note 3.
52 FAO, The	State	of	the	World’s	Plant	Genetic	Resources	for	Food	and	Agriculture (FAO, 1997).
53 FAO, The	State	 of	 Food	 and	Agriculture (FAO, 2004), available at <http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/
Y5160e/Y5160e00.HTM> (visited 15 March 2012); and Millennium	Ecosystem	Assessment. Ecosystems	and	
Human	Well-being:	Biodiversity	Synthesis,	supra	note 8.
54 FAO. The	Second	Report	on	the	State	of	the	World’s	Plant	Genetic	Resources, supra note 6.
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Standardized and high-output systems of animal husbandry have also led to an ero-
sion of the genetic diversity of livestock, especially in developed countries. It is esti-
mated that 21 per cent of the world’s 7 000 domesticated animal species (including 
birds and mammals) are at risk of extinction due to small population size.55 The FAO 
estimates that a total of 1 491 breeds (or 20 per cent), including 881 breeds of mam-
malian species and 610 breeds of avian species are classified as being ‘at risk’, with 
Europe and the Caucasus having the largest number of extinct mammalian and 
avian breeds (16 per cent) and North America with the highest proportion of extinct 
breeds (25 per cent among its recorded breeds).56 Regarding the status of the local 
breeds, a comparison of the data collected in 1999 and 2006 showed a negative trend; 
1.8 per cent had become extinct by 2006.57
The current trends of genetic diversity loss, largely due to the homogenization of 
landscapes and agricultural varieties, raise major concerns especially for rural com-
munities that face greater challenges in adapting to changes and shocks. In particular, 
it is feared that the extinction of plant varieties and animal breeds would limit op-
tions for such communities’ future survival and ability to adapt to the effects of cli-
mate change.58
3 Current pressures on biodiversity
The above-described changes in ecosystem, species and genetic diversity have been, 
and continue to be, driven by several interlinked pressures. The biggest direct pres-
sures are climate change, habitat loss and degradation, invasive alien species, over-
exploitation and unsustainable use of biological resources, pollution through exces-
sive nutrient loads and other forms of pollution.59
Habitat loss is the biggest single pressure on biodiversity worldwide. For terrestrial 
ecosystems, habitat loss is largely due to conversion of wild lands to agriculture, 
which accounts for over 30 per cent of all the land globally. For inland water ecosys-
tems, habitat loss and degradation are largely caused by conversion to other land uses, 
construction of dams and flood levees, and unsustainable water use for irrigated 
agriculture, for example. In coastal ecosystems, habitat loss is largely driven by mari-
culture, coastal developments, dredging and land filling.60 
55 CBD Secretariat, Global	Biodiversity	Outlook	3, supra note 3; and Millennium	Ecosystem	Assessment. Eco-
systems	and	Human	Well-being:	Biodiversity	Synthesis,	supra	note 8.
56 Ibid.
57 Rischkowsky and Pilling, The	State	of	the	World’s	Animal	Genetic	Resources, supra note 50.
58 Millennium	Ecosystem	Assessment. Ecosystems	and	Human	Well-being:	Biodiversity	Synthesis,	supra	note 8.
59 CBD Secretariat, Global	Biodiversity	Outlook	3, supra note 3; and Millennium	Ecosystem	Assessment. Eco-
systems	and	Human	Well-being:	Current	State	and	Trends,	supra	note 12.
60 CBD Secretariat, Global	Biodiversity	Outlook	3, supra note 3.
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Climate change is another major threat to biodiversity and is projected to become 
the most significant threat in the coming decades. The loss of Arctic sea ice is already 
threatening biodiversity across an entire biome and beyond. Arctic and alpine eco-
systems, cloud forests, coral reefs, dry and sub-humid lands, freshwater habitats and 
wetlands, and mangroves are also particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate 
change. Climate change is linked to other related pressures such as ocean acidification 
resulting from higher concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.61 
Pollution from nutrients (in particular nitrogen and phosphorous) and other sourc-
es is also a continuing and growing threat to biodiversity in coastal, inland water and 
terrestrial ecosystems. The build-up of phosphorous and nitrogen, mainly through 
run-off from cropland and sewage pollution, stimulates the growth of algae and some 
forms of bacteria, threatening valuable ecosystem services in systems such as lakes 
and coral reefs, and affecting water quality. Nitrogen deposition is already observed 
to be the major driver of species change in a range of temperate ecosystems, espe-
cially grasslands across Europe and North America, southern China and parts of 
South and Southeast Asia. Large parts of Latin America and Africa, as well as Asia, 
are projected to experience elevated levels of nitrogen deposition in the next two 
decades.62
Overexploitation, destructive harvesting practices and unsustainable use of biological 
resources have emerged in recent years as the biggest threats to the world’s biodiver-
sity and ecosystems. For example, changes to fisheries management in some areas are 
leading to the depletion of fish stocks. Bush meat hunting, which provides a signifi-
cant proportion of protein for many rural households, also appears to be taking place 
at unsustainable levels.63
Invasive alien species continue to be a major threat to all types of ecosystems and 
species. There are no signs of a significant reduction of this pressure on biodiversity; 
instead, there are some indications that it is increasing. Intervention to control alien 
invasive species has been successful in some particular cases, but it is outweighed by 
the threat to biodiversity from new invasions. While other groups have not been 
fully assessed, it is known that invasive species are the second leading cause for extinc-
tion for freshwater mussels and more generally among endemic species. Overall, 
birds, mammals and amphibian species have on average become more threatened 
due to invasive alien species.64
The above-mentioned direct drivers of biodiversity loss are often influenced by deep-
rooted underlying causes, or indirect drivers, that determine the demand for natural 







demographic change, economic activity, international trade, scientific and techno-
logical change, and unsustainable consumption patterns.65 Other root causes include 
inequitable resource distribution, policy failures including perverse incentives, po-
litical factors and social change.66
4 Biodiversity scenarios for the 21st century
Models and extrapolations of global biodiversity change recently drawn by scientists 
present scenarios which differ, but which commonly predict continuing, and in many 
cases accelerating, levels of species extinctions, natural habitat loss and widespread 
shifts in the distribution and abundance of species and biomes throughout the 21st 
century.67 Many scenarios also predict a very high risk of large abrupt shifts in the 
state of species and ecosystems which may result in dramatic and potentially irrevers-
ible changes if the Earth system is pushed beyond certain thresholds, or what are 
referred to as ‘tipping points’.68
Based on the work undertaken by a group of scientists from a wide range of disci-
plines, the GBO 3 predicts that under different scenarios, most ecosystems will 
continue to decline due to various pressures. Inland water ecosystems are predicted 
to be the most affected due to a combination of increasing water demands exacer-
bated by climate change, eutrophication caused by pollution, habitat loss due to 
infrastructure development, and introduction of alien invasive species. Tropical for-
ests will also continue to be cleared to make way for crops and biofuels resulting in 
historic species extinctions. Some tropical forests may also undergo widespread die-
back as deforestation heightens, fires become more frequent and drought more in-
tense. Island ecosystems are also predicted to face species extinctions and instabilities 
due to invasive alien species. Marine and coastal ecosystems will also be under in-
65 Ibid.
66 Wood et al., The	Root	Causes	of	Biodiversity	Loss, supra note 11.
67 Millennium	Ecosystem	Assessment. Ecosystems	and	Human	Well-being:	Current	State	and	Trends,	supra	note 
12; UNEP, Global	Environment	Outlook, supra note 6; Paul Leadley et al., Biodiversity	Scenarios:	Projections	
of	21st	Century	Change	in	Biodiversity	and	Associated	Ecosystem	Services, Secretariat of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity Technical Series no. 50 (CBD Secretariat, 2010), available at <http://www.cbd.int/
doc/publications/cbd-ts-50-en.pdf> (visited 15 March 2012); and CBD Secretariat, Global	Biodiversity	
Outlook	3, supra note 3.
68 Leadley et al., Biodiversity	Scenarios, ibid. A tipping point has been defined as
a situation in which an ecosystem experiences a shift to a new state, with significant changes to biodiversity and 
the ecosystem services it provides to people at a regional or global scale. Tipping points are a major concern for 
scientists, managers and policy–makers because of their potentially large, long-lasting and sometimes irrevers-
ible impacts on biodiversity, ecosystem services and human well-being. It may be extremely difficult for societies 
to adapt to such rapid and potentially irreversible shifts in the character and functioning of ecosystems on which 
they depend. While it is almost certain that tipping points will occur in the future, the dynamics in most cases 
cannot yet be predicted with precision to provide advance warning that would allow for specific and targeted 
actions to avoid them, or to mitigate their impacts. Responsible risk management may therefore require a 
precautionary approach to human activities known to drive biodiversity loss. 
 CBD Secretariat, Global	Biodiversity	Outlook	3, supra note 3.
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creased pressure as demand for seafood grows resulting in loss of fish species exacer-
bated by climate change, ocean acidification, increased nutrient loads and pollution, 
invasive alien species and more sophisticated deep sea fishing gear. 
The GBO 3 warns that the mounting pressure on biodiversity risks pushing some 
ecosystems beyond the ‘tipping points’ which could have severe ramifications for 
human well-being. It further warns that once an ecosystem moves into such new state 
it may be very difficult, if not impossible, to return it to its former state.69 
Figure	3.70
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment scenarios also showed that the conditions of 
many ecosystems and ecosystem services and the pressures on them could be sig-
nificantly worse in the future than they are at present. It predicted that rapid conver-
sion of ecosystems will continue in the first half of the 21st century.71 For example, 
all of the four assessed scenarios projected that habitat loss in terrestrial environments 
would increase and lead to a decline in the diversity of native species by 2050. The 
biomes that were projected to have the fastest rate of habitat and local species loss in 
the next 50 years are savannas, scrub, tropical forests, and tropical woodlands. Land 
use change was projected to remain the dominant driver of biodiversity change in 
69 Ibid.
70 Source: CBD Secretariat, Global	Biodiversity	Outlook	3, supra note 3.
71 Millennium	Ecosystem	Assessment.	Ecosystems	and	Human	Well-Being:	Scenarios,	Volume	2 (World Resources 
Institute, 2005), available at <http://www.maweb.org/en/Scenarios.aspx> (visited 16 March 2012).
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terrestrial ecosystems. Wetland drainage and conversion was also projected to in-
crease, and roughly 10–20 per cent of the current grasslands and forests would be 
converted to other land uses (mainly agriculture, cities and infrastructure) by 2050. 
Other direct drivers may be more important than land-use change in particular bi-
omes; for example, climate change is likely to be the dominant driver of biodiversity 
change in tundra, deserts and dry land regions while invasive alien species and water 
extraction will be major threats to freshwater ecosystems. 
5 Strategic policy responses and synergistic approaches
The current trends and projected scenarios of global biodiversity change call for 
concerted synergistic actions by various stakeholders at different levels. A number of 
reports and documents, including Global Biodiversity Outlook 3,72 the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment,73 the World Conservation Strategy74 and a few others, have 
proposed some concrete actions that could be taken at both the policy and field 
levels.
The GBO 3 noted that global biodiversity loss could be prevented, significantly re-
duced or even reversed if strong and adaptive action, focused on addressing both the 
direct and indirect factors driving biodiversity loss, were applied urgently, compre-
hensively and appropriately, at international, national and local levels. It called for 
well-targeted policies focusing on critical areas, species and ecosystem services that 
are essential to preventing further human-induced biodiversity loss and to avoiding 
pushing ecosystems beyond the ‘tipping points’.75
Addressing biodiversity loss will also require major shifts in perceptions and priorities 
on the part of decision-makers, and the engagement of all sections of society, includ-
ing the private sector.76 The GBO 3 advocates for a future strategy that, among 
other things, urges relevant stakeholders to:
• address both the direct and indirect drivers of biodiversity loss, for example 
through mainstreaming biodiversity across various sectors;
• use pricing, fiscal policies and other mechanisms to reflect the real value of eco-
systems in order to create incentives to reverse the current patterns of destruction;
• foster more efficient use of biological resources to meet existing and future de-
mand and with a view to preventing underlying pressures such as population 
72 CBD Secretariat, Global	Biodiversity	Outlook	3, supra note 3.
73 Millennium	Ecosystem	Assessment.	Ecosystems	and	Human	Well-Being:	Policy	Responses,	Volume	3 (World 
Resources Institute, 2005), available at <http://www.maweb.org/en/Responses.aspx> (visited 16 March 
2012).
74 IUCN, UNEP and WWF. Caring	for	the	Earth:	A	Strategy	for	Sustainable	Living (1991).
75 CBD Secretariat, Global	Biodiversity	Outlook	3, supra note 3.
76 Ibid.
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increase and increased consumption from inevitably leading to pressures such as 
loss of habitat, pollution or over-exploitation;
• find an appropriate level of intensity in the use of resources, for example increas-
ing productivity of agricultural land while maintaining a diverse landscape, and 
reducing fishing intensity below the maximum sustainable yield;
• avoid unnecessary tradeoffs resulting from maximizing one ecosystem service at 
the expense of another;
• continue direct action to conserve biodiversity, targeting vulnerable and cultur-
ally-valued species and habitats, and critical sites for biodiversity;
• increase restoration of terrestrial, inland water and marine ecosystems to re-es-
tablish their ecological functioning and their ability to provide ecosystem serv-
ices;
• create a favourable environment to support effective ‘bottom-up’ initiatives led 
by communities, local authorities, or businesses; and
• strengthen efforts to communicate better the links between biodiversity, ecosys-
tem services, poverty alleviation and climate change adaptation and mitigation 
through education and more effective dissemination of scientific knowledge. 
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment report identified and evaluated the potential 
use and effectiveness of various response options and strategic interventions to ad-
dressing the current and projected global biodiversity loss. It noted that response 
options and strategic interventions can be implemented through a number of mech-
anisms, including international conventions, multilateral and bilateral treaties, na-
tional laws and regulations, institutional change and changes in governance struc-
tures; governmental and industrial policies and contractual agreements, partnerships 
and collaboration; and joint private and public action. It further noted that a major 
challenge now is for decision-making to make effective use of the available informa-
tion and tools in order to improve the decisions intended to provide for a sustainable 
flow of ecosystem services and enhance human well-being.77
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment also identified a number of elements that 
could improve decision-making processes related to ecosystems and their services. 
These include using the best available information; ensuring transparency through 
greater participation of relevant stakeholders; ensuring accountability; striving for 
both efficiency and effectiveness in the decision-making process; considering stake-
holder equity and vulnerabilities; providing for monitoring and evaluation; and 
considering cross-scale effects. It also outlines a range of analytical tools that may be 
useful in choosing responses and the contexts that could help determine the appro-
priate tools to use. It also urged government decision-makers to consider:
• developing institutions that would enable effective coordination of decision-
making at multiple scales and across multiple sectors, and strengthening institu-
77 Millennium	Ecosystem	Assessment.	Ecosystems	and	Human	Well-Being:	Policy	Responses, supra note 73.
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tions at lower levels of governance. It noted that problems of ecosystem manage-
ment are often exacerbated both by overly centralized and overly decentralized 
decision-making;
• increasing transparency and accountability of government decision-making, en-
couraging and supporting independent monitoring and assessment of govern-
ment performance, and securing access to information and justice for all stake-
holders;
• promoting ‘win-win’ solutions by creating an economic framework that supports 
proper management of ecosystem services. This would include eliminating sub-
sidies (for instance, subsidies in agriculture, forestry and fisheries) that lead to 
overproduction and promote overuse of specific ecosystem services that may 
harm other services, correcting market failures exacerbated by harmful subsidies, 
and internalizing negative environmental externalities;
• putting emphasis on actions designed to reduce demand for harmful trade-offs 
rather than actions aimed at further increases in production – for instance, in 
agriculture a focus on reducing post-harvest losses, water pollution associated 
with fertilizer use or increase water use efficiency rather than clearing more land 
for agriculture;
• building human and institutional capacity properly to manage ecosystems and 
to assess the consequences of ecosystem change for human well-being;
• requiring companies publicly to report on their environmental performance; and
• putting more emphasis on adaptive management interventions, which would 
allow greater learning about the consequences of the interventions and improved 
management with time. 
In response to the findings and recommendations of the GBO 3, the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment and other assessment reports, parties to various biodiversity-
related multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), including the Convention 
on Biological Diversity (CBD), the Convention on International Trade in Endan-
gered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES),78 the Convention on the Conserva-
tion of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS),79 the Convention on Wetlands 
(Ramsar Convention),80 the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for 
Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA)81 and the World Heritage Convention (WHC)82 
have taken a number of strategic and synergetic policy measures in the last few years. 
78 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Washington DC, 
3 March 1973, in force 1 July 1975, 993 United	Nations	Treaty	Series 243, <http://www.cites.org>.
79 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, Bonn, 23 June 1979, in force 
1 November 1983, 19 International	Legal	Materials (1980) 15, <http://www.cms.int>.
80 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, Ramsar, 2 February 1971, in force 21 December 
1975, 11 International Legal	Materials (1972), 963, <http://www.ramsar.org>.
81 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, Rome, 3 November 2001, into 
force 29 June 2004, <http://www.planttreaty.org/>.
82 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Paris, 16 November 
1972, in force 17 December 1975, 11 International	Legal	Materials (1972) 1358, <http://whc.unesco.
org>.
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For example, taking into account the findings of the Millennium Ecosystem Assess-
ment, the Parties to the CBD agreed in 2002 on the target ‘to achieve by 2010 a 
significant reduction of the current rate of biodiversity loss at global, regional and 
national level as a contribution to poverty alleviation and to the benefit of all life on 
Earth’.83 The 2010 biodiversity target was subsequently endorsed by the World Sum-
mit on Sustainable Development (WSSD)84 and in 2006 the target was incorpo-
rated in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),85 under Goal 7 on environ-
mental sustainability.86
In 2006, Parties to the CBD initiated a process to assess the progress made towards 
achieving the 2010 Biodiversity Target and develop a post-2010 strategic plan, taking 
into account the findings of the assessment.87 A 2010 Biodiversity Indicators Partner-
ship88 was established, with major support from the Global Environment Facility 
(GEF),89 to develop and promote indicators to assess the progress made towards 
achieving the 2010 Biodiversity Target and, in the long run, to ensure consistent 
monitoring and assessment of biodiversity. This process dovetailed with the develop-
ment of the GBO 3 and helped to inform the development of the post-2010 strate-
gic plan.
Subsequently, in October 2010, the Parties to the CBD, at their tenth meeting held 
in Nagoya, Japan, adopted an ambitious Strategic Plan for Biodiversity (2011–
2020)90 to inspire broad-based action by all countries and stakeholders in support of 
biodiversity, with a view to promoting coherent and effective implementation of the 
objectives of the Convention. It provides an overarching framework not only for the 
biodiversity-related conventions, but for the entire United Nations system. 
The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity comprises a Vision for 2050, a Mission for 2020, 
five Strategic Goals and 20 specific targets, referred to as ‘the Aichi Biodiversity Tar-
gets’ (see Annex 1 of this paper).91 Its vision is a world ‘[l]iving in harmony with 
nature’ where ‘[b]y 2050, biodiversity is valued, conserved, restored and wisely used, 
83 ‘Strategic Plan for the Convention on Biological Diversity’, Decision IV/26 (2002).
84 Report	of	the	World	Summit	on	Sustainable	Development,	Johannesburg,	South Africa, 26 August – 4 Sep-
tember 2002, available at <http://www.johannesburgsummit.org/html/documents/summit_docs/131302_ 
wssd_report_reissued.pdf> (visited 12 June 2012), 33. 
85 See <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/>. 
86 The 2010 biodiversity target was incorporated in the Millennium Development Goal 7 following the 
request contained in the 2006 Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization, UN 
Doc. A/61/1 (2006), available at <http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/61/1(SUPP)> 
(visited 12 June 2012), 6.
87 The processes that contributed to the review and updating the CBD Strategic Plan 2002–2010 are out-
lined at <http://www.cbd.int/sp/inputs/> (visited 12 June 2012).
88 See <http://www.bipindicators.net/>.
89 See <http://www.thegef.org/gef/>.
90 ‘The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets’, Decision X/2, in 
Report of the Tenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 




maintaining ecosystem services, sustaining a healthy planet and delivering benefits 
essential for all people’.92
The mission of the Strategic Plan is to ‘take effective and urgent action to halt the 
loss of biodiversity in order to ensure that by 2020 ecosystems are resilient and con-
tinue to provide essential services, thereby securing the planet’s variety of life, and 
contributing to human well-being, and poverty eradication’.93
In the decision that adopted the Strategic Plan, the Parties agreed to translate the 
Strategic Plan into national biodiversity strategy and action plans (NBSAPs),94 and 
develop national targets within two years, taking into account the Aichi targets and 
the status and trends of biodiversity in their respective countries.95 In the same deci-
sion, other biodiversity-related conventions and relevant agreements were invited to 
consider and take appropriate steps to facilitate coherent and synergistic implemen-
tation of the Strategic Plan and its Aichi Targets at all level, including through col-
laboration in the update and implementation of the NBSAPs.96
In response, two MEAs – the CMS and CITES – have already developed guidelines 
on integration of relevant issues, policy measures and practical actions from their 
respective processes into NBSAPs.97 In addition, the six main biodiversity-related 
conventions, i.e. the CBD, CITES, CMS, ITPGRFA, Ramsar and the WHC, are 
collaborating through the Biodiversity Liaison Group (BCL) comprising the respec-
tive executive heads. Through the BLC, the six MEAs aim to enhance synergies and 
national implementation towards achieving the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, harmo-
nize national reporting processes, develop common approaches to addressing the 
major threats to biodiversity, coordinate requests for scientific assessments, share 
scientific data and expertise, and exchange relevant implementation tools and guide-
lines.98
92 Ibid. para. 11.
93 Ibid. para. 12.
94 NBSAPs are instruments or frameworks developed by countries to guide the implementation of the 
Convention at the national and sub-national levels. An NBSAP can take the form of a single biodiversity-
planning document or a pool of instruments and processes (including laws, policies, projects and pro-
grammes) established to facilitate national implementation of the Convention. See CBD, NBSAP	Train-
ing	Module	1:	An	Introduction	to	National	Biodiversity	Strategies	and	Action	Plans, available at <http://www.
cbd.int/doc/training/nbsap/b1-train-intro-nbsap-revised-en.pdf> (visited 26 July 2012), 5.
95 Ibid. para. 13, Target 17.
96 ‘Implementation of the Convention and the Strategic Plan’, Decision X/5, in Report of the Tenth Meet-
ing of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Nagoya, Japan, 18–29 
October 2010, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27* (2011).
97 The CMS Guidelines on the Integration of Migratory Species into National Biodiversity Strategies and 
Action Plans (NBSAPs) are available at <http://www.cms.int/bodies/COP/cop10/resolutions_adopt-
ed/10_18_nsbaps_e.pdf>. The Draft NBSAP Guide for CITES Parties (April 2011) is available at <http://
www.cites.org/eng/notif/2011/E026A.pdf> (both visited 26 July 2012).
98 See <http://www.cbd.int/blg/>.
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6 Conclusion
Many recent assessments have revealed that biodiversity is declining at a rate faster 
than any previous time in human history and the decline is expected to continue at 
the same pace, or even accelerate, as the drivers of biodiversity loss increase in inten-
sity. However, the responses to date have not been adequate to stem the scale of bio-
diversity loss or to reduce the pressures driving that loss. As stated in the GBO 3, the 
actions taken over the next decade will determine whether the relatively stable envi-
ronmental conditions on which humankind has depended in past years will con-
tinue beyond the present century. 
The synergistic policy responses made by the major biodiversity-related MEAs in the 
last few years, including the recent adoption of the Aichi biodiversity targets and the 
joint efforts underway to achieve those targets, are important steps in the right direc-
tion. All stakeholders need to work together in a concerted, strategic and synergetic 
manner in order to prevent, significantly reduce or reverse the current trend of bio-
diversity loss and to maintain the capacity of ecosystems to provide goods and serv-
ices to meet the needs of present and future generations.
Annex 1: The Aichi Biodiversity Targets
Strategic Goal A - Address the underlying causes of biodiversity loss by 
mainstreaming biodiversity across government and society
Public awareness increased
Target	1: By 2020, at the latest, people are aware of the values of biodiversity and the 
steps they can take to conserve and use it sustainably.	
Values of biodiversity recognized 
Target	2:	By 2020, at the latest, biodiversity values have been integrated into national 
and local development and poverty reduction strategies and planning processes and are 
being incorporated into national accounting, as appropriate, and reporting systems.
Incentives reformed
Target	3: By 2020, at the latest, incentives, including subsidies, harmful to 
biodiversity are eliminated, phased out or reformed in order to minimize or avoid 
negative impacts, and positive incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity are developed and applied, consistent and in harmony with the 
Convention and other relevant international obligations, taking into account 
national socio-economic conditions.
Sustainable production and consumption promoted
Target	4:	By 2020, at the latest, Governments, business and stakeholders at all levels 
have taken steps to achieve or have implemented plans for sustainable production 




Strategic Goal B. Reduce the direct pressures on biodiversity and promote 
sustainable use.
Habitat loss reduced
Target 5: By 2020, the rate of loss of all natural habitats, including forests, is at least 
halved and where feasible brought close to zero, and degradation and fragmentation 
is significantly reduced.
Marine stocks sustainably harvested
Target	6:	By 2020 all fish and invertebrate stocks and aquatic plants are managed 
and harvested sustainably, legally and applying ecosystem based approaches, so that 
overfishing is avoided, recovery plans and measures are in place for all depleted 
species, fisheries have no significant adverse impacts on threatened species and 
vulnerable ecosystems and the impacts of fisheries on stocks, species and ecosystems 
are within safe ecological limits.
Sustainable management increased
Target	7:	By 2020 areas under agriculture, aquaculture and forestry are managed 
sustainably, ensuring conservation of biodiversity.
Pollution reduced
Target	8:	By 2020, pollution, including from excess nutrients, has been brought to 
levels that are not detrimental to ecosystem function and biodiversity.
Invasive alien species combated 
Target	9: By 2020, invasive alien species and pathways are identified and prioritized, 
priority species are controlled or eradicated, and measures are in place to manage 
pathways to prevent their introduction and establishment.
Pressures on vulnerable ecosystems minimized
Target	10: By 2015, the multiple anthropogenic pressures on coral reefs, and other 
vulnerable ecosystems impacted by climate change or ocean acidification are 
minimized, so as to maintain their integrity and functioning.
Strategic goal C: To improve the status of biodiversity by safeguarding 
ecosystems, species and genetic diversity
Protected areas increased
Target	11: By 2020, at least 17 per cent of terrestrial and inland water, and 10 per 
cent of coastal and marine areas, especially areas of particular importance for 
biodiversity and ecosystem services, are conserved through effectively and equitably 
managed, ecologically representative and well connected systems of protected areas 
and other effective area-based conservation measures, and integrated into the wider 
landscape and seascapes.
Strategic Goal A - Address the underlying causes of biodiversity loss by 
mainstreaming biodiversity across government and society
Public awareness increased
Target	1: By 2020, at the latest, people are aware of the values of biodiversity and the 
steps they can take to conserve and use it sustainably.	
Values of biodiversity recognized 
Target	2:	By 2020, at the latest, biodiversity values have been integrated into national 
and local development and poverty reduction strategies and planning processes and are 
being incorporated into national accounting, as appropriate, and reporting systems.
Incentives reformed
Target	3: By 2020, at the latest, incentives, including subsidies, harmful to 
biodiversity are eliminated, phased out or reformed in order to minimize or avoid 
negative impacts, and positive incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity are developed and applied, consistent and in harmony with the 
Convention and other relevant international obligations, taking into account 
national socio-economic conditions.
Sustainable production and consumption promoted
Target	4:	By 2020, at the latest, Governments, business and stakeholders at all levels 
have taken steps to achieve or have implemented plans for sustainable production 
and consumption and have kept the impacts of use of natural resources well within 
safe ecological limits.
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Extinction prevented
Target	12: By 2020 the extinction of known threatened species has been prevented 
and their conservation status, particularly of those most in decline, has been 
improved and sustained.
Genetic diversity maintained
Target	13:	By 2020, the genetic diversity of cultivated plants and farmed and 
domesticated animals and of wild relatives, including other socio-economically as 
well as culturally valuable species, is maintained, and strategies have been developed 
and implemented for minimizing genetic erosion and safeguarding their genetic 
diversity.
Strategic goal D: Enhance the benefits to all from biodiversity and ecosystem 
services.
Ecosystems restored and safeguarded
Target	14:	By 2020, ecosystems that provide essential services, including services 
related to water, and contribute to health, livelihoods and well-being, are restored 
and safeguarded, taking into account the needs of women, indigenous and local 
communities, and the poor and vulnerable.
Ecosystem resilience and carbon stocks enhanced
Target	15:	By 2020, ecosystem resilience and the contribution of biodiversity to 
carbon stocks has been enhanced, through conservation and restoration, including 
restoration of at least 15 per cent of degraded ecosystems, thereby contributing to 
climate change mitigation and adaptation and to combating desertification.
Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable 
Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization is in force. 
Target	16:	By 2015, the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the 
Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization is in force and 
operational, consistent with national legislation.
Strategic goal E. Enhance implementation through participatory planning, 
knowledge management and capacity-building 
National biodiversity strategies and action plans developed
Target	17:	By 2015 each Party has developed, adopted as a policy instrument, and 
has commenced implementing an effective, participatory and updated national 
biodiversity strategy and action plan.
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Traditional knowledge respected and reflected in the implementation of the 
Convention 
Target	18:	By 2020, the traditional knowledge, innovations and practices of 
indigenous and local communities relevant for the conservation and sustainable use 
of biodiversity, and their customary use of biological resources, are respected, subject 
to national legislation and relevant international obligations, and fully integrated 
and reflected in the implementation of the Convention with the full and effective 
participation of indigenous and local communities, at all relevant levels.
Knowledge and technologies improved and shared
Target	19:	By 2020, knowledge, the science base and technologies relating to 
biodiversity, its values, functioning, status and trends, and the consequences of its 
loss, are improved, widely shared and transferred, and applied.
Financial resources increased 
Target	20:	By 2020, at the latest, the mobilization of financial resources for 
effectively implementing the Strategic Plan 2011-2020 from all sources and in 
accordance with the consolidated and agreed process in the Strategy for Resource 
Mobilization should increase substantially from the current levels; subject to changes 
contingent to resources needs assessments to be developed and reported by Parties.
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There is a plethora of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs),2 many of them 
of global nature.3 A specific subset of these MEAs addresses biological diversity.4 It 
has often been asked5 to what extent these MEAs are effective in curbing the loss of 
1 UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, UK; e-mail: peter.herkenrath@unep-wcmc.org. This 
paper draws on a study (in preparation) on synergies between MEAs that the UNEP World Conservation 
Monitoring Centre (UNEP-WCMC) is undertaking under contract with the Ministry of Environment, 
Finland, in following-up on the Nordic Symposium: Synergies in the Biodiversity Cluster, infra note 8. 
The author thanks the Finnish Ministry of Environment for financial support; Niko Urho, Marina von 
Weissenberg, Kerstin Stendahl, Jerry Harrison and Melissa Jaques for discussions and feedback on the 
current paper; and Melissa Jaques for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
2 For an introduction into the plethora of MEAs, see Alexandre Kiss and Dinah Shelton, International	
Environmental	 Law (3rd ed., Transnational Publishers, 2004) at 25–40. See also the introduction to 
Ecolex – the Gateway to Environmental Law, <http://www.ecolex.org/ecolex/ledge/view/About_en_US;
DIDPFDSIjsessionid=555FF3F1BF155B287C58299991E3D52E> (visited 30 March 2012) and the 
University of Oregon database project, which considers there to be more than 1 500 bilateral, more than 
1 100 multilateral, and more than 250 ‘other’ international environmental agreements, ‘International 
Environmental Agreements (IEA) Database Project, <http://iea.uoregon.edu/page.php?file=home.
htm&query=static> (visited 4 March 2012).
3 For definitions of the term ‘multilateral environmental agreement’, see Kiss and Shelton, International	
Environmental	Law, supra note 2, at 1–4; and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Glos-
sary	of	Terms	for	Negotiators	of	Multilateral	Environmental	Agreements (UNEP, 2007) at 63.
4 See Kiss and Shelton, International	Environmental	Law, supra note 2, at 191–241, who demonstrate the 
difficulties in estimating the number of biodiversity-relevant MEAs.
5 For example Karin Baakman, Testing	Times:	The	Effectiveness	 of	 Five	 International	Biodiversity-Related	
Conventions (Wolf Legal Publishers, 2011); Aðalheiður Jóhannsdóttir, Ian Cresswell and Peter Bridgewa-
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biodiversity6 and whether improved cooperation, coordination and synergies are 
required for improving the overall performance of MEAs.7
In April 2010, the Government of Finland and the Nordic Council of Ministers for 
the Environment conducted a Nordic Symposium ‘Synergies in the Biodiversity 
Cluster’,8 which discussed the issue of synergies with representatives of governments, 
MEA secretariats, and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. The 
symposium addressed possible advantages and disadvantages of a synergies process 
for the biodiversity-related MEAs, the composition of a possible biodiversity cluster, 
relevant areas for enhancing cooperation and coordination between biodiversity-re-
lated MEAs, and the structure, timing and form which such a synergies process 
might take.
This paper reviews the existing cooperation and the potential for synergies in four 
key areas for national implementation of biodiversity-related conventions and sug-
gests practical options for moving the synergy agenda forward through these key 
areas. The areas include the science-policy interface; the Strategic Plan for Biodiver-
sity 2011–2020 and National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAPs); 
capacity-building for biodiversity conservation and sustainable use; and national 
reporting. The areas are among the programmatic areas that the Nordic Symposium 
identified as possible areas for joint action among biodiversity-related MEAs.9
The set of biodiversity-related conventions and treaties considered in this paper re-
lates to the members of the Biodiversity Liaison Group (BLG)10 and includes the 
following six agreements: Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),11 Convention 
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES),12 
Convention on Migratory Species (CMS),13 International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
ter, ‘The Current Framework for International Governance of Biodiversity: Is It Doing More Harm Than 
Good?’, 19 Review	of	European	Community	and	International	Environmental	Law (2010) 139–149.
6 For an overview of the extent of the loss of biological diversity at a global scale, see Secretariat of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), Global	Biodiversity	Outlook	3 (Secretariat of the CBD, 2010).
7 United Nations University (UNU), Inter-Linkages.	Synergies	and	Coordination	between	Multilateral	Environ-
mental	Agreements (UNU and Global Environment Information Centre, 1999); UNEP World Conservation 
Monitoring Centre, Synergies	and	Cooperation.	A	Status	Report	on	Activities	Promoting	Synergies	and	Multilat-
eral	Environmental	Agreements (2004), available at <http://www.unep-wcmc.org/medialibrary/2010/11/05/
9339a622/8BackgroundSynergies.pdf> (visited 10 January 2012); Niko Urho, Possibilities	of	Enhancing	Co-
operation	and	Co-ordination	Among	MEAs	in	the	Biodiversity	Cluster (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2009).
8 See, generally, <http://www.biodivcluster.fi> (visited 4 March 2012) for information and material on the 
symposium.
9 Report from a Nordic Symposium: ‘Synergies in the biodiversity cluster’, <www.biodivcluster.fi/pdf/
Synergies%20report%20final.pdf> (visited 10 January 2012) at 6.
10 For more information on this Group operating under the Biodiversity Convention, see <http://www.cbd.
int/blg>.
11 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), Nairobi, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993, Interna-
tional	Legal	Materials	(1992) 822, <www.cbd.int>.
12 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), Washington 
DC, 3 March 1973, in force 1 July 1975, United	Nations	Treaty	Series (1976) 993, <www.cites.org>.
13 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, Bonn, 23 June 1979, in force 1 
November 1983, International	Legal	Materials (1980) 15, <www.cms.int>.
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Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA),14 Ramsar Convention on Wet-
lands15 and World Heritage Convention (WHC).16 These conventions already prac-
tice a wide range of collaborative activities, based on decisions and resolutions of their 
governing bodies, Memoranda of Understanding/ Cooperation and joint work plans 
and programmes.
2 New opportunities for synergies within the biodiversity 
cluster
The discussion on synergies between MEAs in general and the biodiversity-related 
conventions in particular, although having been ongoing for a long time, has re-
cently found more urgency for a number of reasons:
• In 2010, the biodiversity community recognized that the 2010 biodiversity target 
of achieving ‘by 2010 a significant reduction of the current rate of biodiversity 
loss at the global, regional and national level as a contribution to poverty allevia-
tion and to the benefit of all life on Earth’17 was not achieved.18 This finding 
questions the efficiency of conventions in addressing the biodiversity crisis.
• The lack of capacity and resources to implement the range of MEAs in develop-
ing countries is widely recognized19 – strengthened synergies should facilitate 
implementation and streamline the resources required for implementation.
• The discussion on international environmental governance20 is expected to be 
14 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, Rome, 3 November 2001, in 
force 29 June 2004, United	Nations	Treaty	Series (2006) 2400, <www.planttreaty.org>.
15 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, Ramsar, Iran, 2 February 1971, in force 21 De-
cember 1975, United	Nations	Treaty	Series	(1976) 996, <http://www.ramsar.org>.
16 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Paris, 16 November 
1972, in force 17 December 1975, International	Legal	Materials (1972) 1358, <http://whc.unesco.org>.
17 The 2010 biodiversity target was adopted through decision VI/26 as the mission of the CBD Strategic 
Plan by the sixth Conference of the Parties in 2002. See Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Conference 
of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20 (2002), 
decision VI/26 ‘Strategic Plan for the Convention on Biological Diversity’.
18 See Convention on Biological Diversity, Global	Biodiversity	Outlook	3,	supra	note	6. 
19 For example, the Bali Strategic Plan for Technology Support and Capacity-Building, adopted at the 
twenty-third session of the Governing Council/Global Ministerial Environment Forum, Nairobi, 21–25 
February 2005, UN Doc. UNEP/GC.23/6/Add.1 (2004), acknowledges in paragraph 1 ‘the need for 
environment-related technology support and capacity-building in developing countries’. See also the 
frequent calls for provision of financial resources and capacity-building for developing countries in the 
Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (2002), e.g. paragraph 32 
(b): ‘Implement the work programme arising from the Jakarta Mandate on the Conservation and Sustain-
able Use of Marine and Coastal Biological Diversity of the Convention on Biological Diversity, including 
through the urgent mobilization of financial resources and technological assistance and the development 
of human and institutional capacity, particularly in developing countries’.
20 See UNEP, The	Environmental	Dimension	of	IFSD:	Importance	of	Environmental	Pillar	to	IFSD, Issues Brief 
1 (2011), available at <http://www.unep.org/environmentalgovernance/Portals/8/InstitutionalFrame-
workforSustainabledevPAPER1.pdf> (visited 10 January 2012); and UNEP, The	Environmental	Dimension	
of	IFSD:	Fragmentation	of	Environmental	Pillar	and	its	Impact	on	Efficiency	and	Effectiveness. Issues Brief 2 
(2011), available at <http://www.unep.org/environmentalgovernance/Portals/8/InstitutionalFramework-
forSustainabledevPAPER2.pdf> (visited 10 January 2012).
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strengthened by the fact that the United Nations Conference on Sustainable 
Development (‘Rio+20’),21 to be held in June 2012, will consider the institu-
tional framework for sustainable development as one of its two major themes.
• The governing bodies of the six biodiversity-related MEAs as considered in this 
paper have consistently adopted decisions and resolutions asking for strengthen-
ing of synergies.
• The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020,22 adopted by the tenth meeting 
of the Conference of the Parties to the CBD, calls for partnerships, among others 
with the other biodiversity-related conventions, for its effective implementa-
tion.23
• The Intergovernmental Science – Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Services (IPBES),24 which was established at the second IPBES plenary meeting 
in April 2012,25 is expected to address jointly the concerns and roles of the bio-
diversity-related conventions. 
For these reasons the present presents an opportune time to address the issue of 
synergies and, if possible, to find ways of enhancing them, with the ultimate goal 
being the creation of a system of international environmental governance that is bet-
ter equipped to curb the loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services.
3 The science – policy interface
The first key area to be addressed in this paper is the science – policy interface for 
biodiversity. Scientific advice is central to the biodiversity-related conventions, which 
is demonstrated by the existing scientific advisory bodies: the Subsidiary Body on 
Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice (SBSTTA) of the CBD,26 the Animals 
and Plant Committees of CITES,27 the Scientific Council of CMS28 and the Scien-
tific and Technical Review Panel (STRP) of the Ramsar Convention.29 The World 
Heritage Convention draws on external scientific advice provided by the Interna-
21 See, generally, <http://www.uncsd2012.org/rio20/index.html>.
22 See Report of the Tenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diver-
sity, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27 (2010), decision X/2 ‘The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–
202 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets’.
23 Ibid., Annex, paragraph 17: ‘Partnerships at all levels are required for effective implementation of the 
Strategic Plan… to find synergies with national implementation of multilateral environmental agree-
ments… At the international level, this requires partnerships between the Convention and other conven-
tions…’
24 See <http://www.ipbes.net> (visited 28 November 2011). 
25 The second session of the plenary meeting on IPBES, in April 2012 in Panama City, Panama, took a 
decision to establish the IPBES, while a number of institutional and legal issues will be decided at the first 
session of IPBES, which is likely to take place in 2013. See the summary report of the second plenary 
session of IPBES by the Earth Negotiations Bulletin, available at <http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/en-







tional Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property 
(ICCROM),30 the International Council of Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS)31 and 
the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN).32 The ITPGRFA col-
laborates on scientific issues with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO)33 and the Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture.34
The recognition of the need of biodiversity policy for scientific advice is expressed, 
for example, in CBD decision X/11, which in the first preambular paragraph reaf-
firmed ‘that a regular assessment is needed to provide decision-makers with the 
necessary information base for adaptive management and to promote the necessary 
political will for action in addressing biodiversity loss’.
Mandated by the Biodiversity Liaison Group,35 the Chairs of the Scientific Advisory 
Bodies of Biodiversity-related Conventions (CSAB) have, since 2007, discussed areas 
of coordination and collaboration on the scientific issues of the various convention 
processes and their translation into policy.36 
With the establishment of the IPBES,37 several years of discussion on improving the 
science – policy interface for biodiversity have come to fruition. All of CBD, CITES, 
CMS and the Ramsar Convention have passed decisions or resolutions positioning 
themselves toward the emerging IPBES.38
Assessments and indicators are two areas of particular significance at the science – 
policy interface for the biodiversity-related conventions. The conventions have drawn 
on a number of assessments, which include the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment39 
and a range of thematic assessments. Biodiversity indicators have become particu-
larly important for the CBD, in measuring progress toward the 2010 Biodiversity 






35 The Liaison Group of Biodiversity-related Conventions (Biodiversity Liaison Group) comprises the ex-
ecutive heads of the secretariats of the six biodiversity-related conventions; see <http://www.cbd.int/blg> 
(visited 30 March 2012).
36 See the report of the third meeting of CSAB, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/CSAB/3/3 (2009).
37 Supra	note 25.
38 See CBD decisions IX/15 ‘Follow-up to the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment’ (2008) and X/11 ‘Sci-
ence-policy interface on biodiversity, ecosystem services and human well-being and consideration of the 
outcome of the intergovernmental meetings’ (2010); CITES decision 15.12 ‘Intergovernmental Science-
Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES)’ (2010); CMS resolution 10.8 ‘Coop-
eration between Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services 
(IPBES) and CMS’ (2011); and Ramsar Scientific and Technical Review Panel (STRP) decision 16-15 
(2011).
39 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems	and	Human	Well-being:	Biodiversity	Synthesis, (World Re-
sources Institute, 2005).
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Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020. CITES, CMS, Ramsar and World Heritage Con-
vention also make use of indicators or envisage doing so; while several of the conven-
tions cooperate on indicators through the Biodiversity Indicators Partnership.40 In 
addition, traditional knowledge, as recognized by the CBD in Article 8(j)41 and held 
by indigenous peoples and local communities, is an important area offering options 
for collaboration and coordination between the conventions. 
The following are some options for further synergies between the biodiversity-relat-
ed conventions in the area of the science – policy interface:
• While the working arrangements of the IPBES (at the time of writing) are only 
evolving, this body is expected to present an opportunity for MEAs to speak with 
one voice and to develop an integrated, coherent approach to the science – 
policy interface. CSAB could support this approach.
• Through IPBES, the conventions could devise a coordinated mandate for future 
global and regional as well as thematic assessments that could be used to provide 
coherent and coordinated scientific advice to the convention-related decision-
making processes.
• The relevant conventions could also cooperate in taking a joint approach to the 
Regular Process for the Global Reporting and Assessment of the State of the Ma-
rine Environment.42
• An integrated approach to scientific advice at the regional and national level, in 
particular through sub-global assessments, would supplement the global process. 
• With the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020, an opportunity is provided 
better to align indicator development between conventions at the global, but also 
regional and national, level. IPBES could play a supportive role in this regard.
• Another area for collaboration between the conventions lies in recognition and 
involvement of traditional knowledge and the holders of such knowledge, facili-
tated and supported by the work of IPBES.
40 2010 Biodiversity Indicators Partnership, Biodiversity	Indicators	and	the	2010	Biodiversity	Target:	Experi-
ences	and	Lessons	Learned	from	the	2010	Biodiversity	Indicators	Partnership,	(Secretariat of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity, 2010).
41 Article 8(j) provides that: Each contracting Party shall, as far as possible and as appropriate: 
Subject to national legislation, respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indig-
enous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use 
of biological diversity and promote their wider application with the approval and involvement of the holders 
of such knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from 
the utilization of such knowledge innovations and practices.
42 This process, mandated by the United Nations General Assembly is coordinated by the Division for Ocean 
Affairs and the Law of the Sea; see <http://www.un.org/depts/los/global_reporting/global_reporting.htm> 
(visited 10 January 2012).
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4 The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020 and National 
Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans
With the adoption of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020, the Conference 
of the Parties to the CBD reached out to other conventions, inviting them to con-
tribute to the collaborative implementation of the Plan, stressing synergies with 
national implementation of MEAs.43 Other conventions have acknowledged the op-
portunities the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020 offers for enhancing co-
operation and synergies.44 The Strategic Plan has also been acknowledged by the 
United Nations’ Environment Management Group (EMG)45 and the UN General 
Assembly, which have both called for support for the implementation of the Plan.46
Both CITES and CMS have drawn the attention of their Parties to the adoption of 
the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020 and have encouraged their national 
focal points to engage with the process of updating and revision of NBSAPs,47 the 
main mechanisms for national implementation of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 
2011–2020.48 The ITPGRFA has engaged with the updating and revision of NBSAPs 
through a Memorandum of Cooperation with the CBD,49 signed in 2010.
A range of options for further synergies between the biodiversity-related conventions 
in the area of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020 and NBSAPs arise: 
• The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020 offers the chance for all biodiver-
sity-related conventions (and the wider UN system) to collaborate on the Plan’s 
implementation – and even to ‘take ownership’ of the Plan. 
• Conventions can cooperate in the synergistic implementation of NBSAPs, with 
43 Supra note 22. In paragraph 16 (a) of decision X/2, the CBD Conference of the Parties invited ‘Parties 
and other Governments at the forthcoming meetings of the decision-making bodies of the other biodi-
versity-related conventions and other relevant agreements to consider appropriate contributions to the 
collaborative implementation of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 and its Aichi targets’.  
44 See CITES decision 15.10 ‘Post-2010 biodiversity targets’ (2010); CMS resolutions 10.5 ‘CMS Strategic 
Plan 2015–2023’ and 10.18 ‘Guidelines on the integration of migratory species into national biodiversity 
strategies and action plans (NBSAPs) and other outcomes from CBD COP10’ (2011); and ITPGRFA 
resolution 8/2011 entitled, ‘Cooperation with other bodies and international organizations, including 
with the International Agricultural Research Centres of the Consultative Group on International Agri-
cultural Research and other international institutions that signed Agreements under Article 15 of the 
Treaty’.
45 The EMG is a UN system-wide coordination body, established in 2001 and chaired by the Executive 
Director of UNEP.
46 Report of the 17th Senior Officials Meetings of the EMG (2011), available at at <http://www.unemg.org/
MeetingsDocuments/EMGSeniorOfficialsMeetings/2011/tabid/56217/Default.aspx> (visited 30 March 
2012) and United Nations General Assembly resolution 65/161 (11 March 2011).
47 CITES decision 15.10; and CMS resolutions 10.5 and 10.18. 
48 CBD article 6(a) requests parties to ‘develop national strategies, plans or programmes for the conservation 
and sustainable use of biological diversity or to adapt for this purpose existing strategies, plans or pro-
grammes’. As of January 2012, 173 out of 193 parties to the CBD have developed NBSAPs. CBD Parties 
are in the process of updating and revising their NBSAPs to align them with the Strategic Plan.
49 Available at <http://www.planttreaty.org/sites/default/files/Signed_MoU_CBD_ITPGRFA_2010.pdf> 
(visited 8 February 2011).
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the options ranging from collaboration of national focal points on NBSAPs 
through, for example, national biodiversity committees. Other options for col-
laboration with NBSAP national focal points might include integration of con-
vention-specific targets, objectives and commitments into the NBSAPs; nation-
al and local capacity-building for convention implementation through NBSAPs; 
support from non-governmental stakeholders to the conventions via the NBSAPs; 
as well as collaboration of focal points to the biodiversity-related conventions for 
mainstreaming biodiversity.
• Synergistic implementation of NBSAPs by the focal points of the biodiversity-
related conventions and relevant agencies would also assist individual Parties in 
taking consistent positions across the governing bodies of the conventions.
• Cooperation at the national level through the NBSAPs is likely to open up more 
funding opportunities for the implementation of the non-CBD conventions. For 
example, of the six biodiversity-related conventions, only implementation of the 
CBD is eligible for funding from the Global Environment Facility (GEF)50 so 
non-CBD convention activities could benefit from such a funding source if 
undertaken under the umbrella of NBSAP implementation. 
• At the global level, the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020 has the poten-
tial to allow for a better alignment of the strategic documents of various MEAs; 
with CITES, for example, already having established a process for reviewing the 
need for doing so through CITES decision 15.10.51
5 Capacity-building for biodiversity  
conservation and sustainable use
The Bali Strategic Plan for Technology Support and Capacity-Building,52 adopted by 
the UNEP Governing Council in 2005, stressed the need for capacity to implement 
MEAs, in particular for developing countries. Decision X/2 of the CBD Conference 
of the Parties,53 which adopted the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020, placed 
the need for capacity-building in the context of synergies with other conventions. 
Capacity-building for implementation plays a major role in the texts, strategic docu-
ments and work plans of the biodiversity-related conventions, several of which have 
established specific capacity-building programmes or strategies.54 The conventions 
have also developed a range of joint work plans and initiatives in support of collabo-
50 See <http://www.thegef.org>.
51 See supra note 44.
52 Supra note 19.
53 See supra note 22.
54 See the CBD Action Plan on Capacity-building for Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-sharing, 
adopted through decision VII/19 ‘Access and benefit-sharing as related to genetic resources (Article 15)’ 
(2004), section F; the ITPGRFA Joint Capacity-building Programme for Developing Countries with the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and Biodiversity International, available 
at <http://www.planttreaty.org/content/capacity-building-programme-developing-countries-implemen-
tation-treaty-and-its-multilateral-> (visited 30 March 2012); and the World Heritage Capacity Building 
Strategy, adopted through decision 35 COM 9B (2011).  
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rative implementation of the conventions by Parties, such as cooperation on the 2010 
biodiversity target (now superseded by cooperation on the Strategic Plan for Biodi-
versity 2011–2020), the Global Strategy for Plant Conservation,55 the Green Cus-
toms Initiative,56 and on access and benefit-sharing regarding genetic resources.57 
Capacity-building has accordingly been high on the agenda of the Biodiversity Liai-
son Group. Capacity-building has also been recognized as a key element for ensuring 
the credibility and legitimacy of the future IPBES process and its products. 
A range of options for further synergies between the biodiversity-related conventions 
in the area of capacity-building can be identified as follows:
• The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020 offers new opportunities for col-
laboration between the conventions for building Parties’ capacity to implement 
the obligations from the conventions, not least through NBSAPs.
• Building on the existing cooperation between several of the conventions, joint 
initiatives on capacity-building could be further developed by the biodiversity-
related conventions.
• Within the framework of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020, a joint 
capacity-building initiative of all the biodiversity-related conventions could be 
developed, making use of funding opportunities for the implementation of the 
Strategic Plan for Biodiversity.
• The conventions could also cooperate on capacity-building in the area of the 
science – policy interface, working jointly through IPBES.
6 National reporting
National reporting is a key obligation for Parties to the biodiversity-related conven-
tions and treaties, with all of the CBD, CITES, CMS, Ramsar Convention and the 
World Heritage Convention having well-established national reporting systems.58 
Since 1998, a number of pilot projects in developing countries and small island 
developing states have tested approaches to more integrated or harmonized reporting 
to the biodiversity-related conventions as well as to the three Rio Conventions,59 and 
a number of reports have been produced and workshops have taken place.60 Chal-




58 As of May 2012, the ITPGRFA is in the process of establishing a national reporting procedure.
59 CBD; United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD; Paris, 17 June 1994, in force 
26 December 1996, 33 International	Legal	Materials (1994) 1309, <http://www.unccd.int>); and the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC; New York, 9 May 1992, in 
force 21 March 1994, 31 International	Legal	Materials (1992) 849, <http://unfccc.int>).
60 See workshop documents and key papers available at <http://www.unep-wcmc.org/harmonization-of-
reporting_491.html> (visited 10 January 2012).
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national reporting have been identified both at the level of parties nationally as well 
as at the global convention level.61
A range of options for further synergies between the biodiversity-related conventions 
in the area of national reporting can be identified as follows: 
• At the national level, immediate gains can be made through improved commu-
nication, coordination and collaboration between national focal points to the 
biodiversity-related conventions on national reporting and through streamlining 
and integrating the national management of biodiversity information that un-
derlies the reporting processes.
• Experience on approaches to streamlining and harmonizing national reporting 
could be shared between the sets of the biodiversity-related conventions and the 
Rio Conventions.
• Country experience could not only be further tested but also better made avail-
able to the global convention meetings and documentation, supported by re-
gional processes and institutions.
• National efforts in streamlining biodiversity data and information could be sup-
ported through the development and testing of guidelines for strengthening and 
integrating national management of biodiversity information.
• The options for improved collaboration of the biodiversity-related conventions 
at the national level within the framework of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 
2011–2020 and the NBSAPs would also support the promotion of streamlining 
and harmonizing national reporting.
• National experience could result in new insights into what should and what can 
be done at the global level, for example regarding improved reporting formats.
• Key aspects for global-level efforts for streamlining and/or harmonizing national 
reporting between the biodiversity-related conventions range from the identifica-
tion of the conventions’ information needs and an agreement on terms and 
definitions, to the development of joint reporting formats for overlapping and/
or theme-specific information, joint information management systems and on-
line reporting.
• The current efforts for the development of indicators for the Strategic Plan for 
Biodiversity 2011–2020 and its goals and targets could inform efforts for har-
monization of national reporting to the range of the biodiversity-related conven-
tions.
• A technical working group at the global level, consisting of technical staff from 
the different secretariats and experts from governments and relevant organiza-
tions, could take the issue of harmonization of national reporting forward.
61 See UNEP-WCMC, Preconditions	for	Harmonization	of	Reporting	to	Biodiversity-related	Multilateral	En-
vironmental	Agreements (2009), available at <http://www.unep-wcmc.org/medialibrary/2010/11/05/836
847ac/2Preconditions_for_harmonization.pdf> (visited 10 January 2012).
105
Peter Herkenrath
7 The synergies process: benefits and  
lessons from other processes
Key benefits from synergies between the biodiversity-related conventions at the na-
tional level include enhanced cooperation across sectors (e.g. water, agriculture, for-
ests); reduced burdens in respect of national reporting; more efficient use of financial 
resources; more efficient drawing on existing national expertise; and increased con-
sistency between national positions in different fora, for example governing bodies 
of different MEAs. At the global level, benefits from synergies include consistency in 
international commitments; common targets allowing for better identification of 
gaps in addressing global issues; and better targeting of development and environ-
ment funding.62
Synergies processes have taken place in other sets of agreements, including the chem-
icals and waste conventions,63 the Human Rights Treaty System64 and the UN Wom-
en process.65 Some lessons from the experience of those processes include the need 
for synergies to be party-driven and government-owned; follow a step-by-step rather 
than a ‘big jump’ approach; be transparent, allowing for confidence-building for the 
stakeholders involved; and allow for consistent decision-taking by individual parties 
across the conventions involved.
8 Conclusions: options for synergies  
within the biodiversity cluster
Synergies could be implemented through a number of approaches. These approach-
es are not mutually exclusive. The following five options represent a growing level of 
62 The list of benefits is adapted from Jaime Webbe, ‘Synergies within the biodiversity-related MEAs’, pre-
sentation at the Nordic Symposium: Synergies in the Biodiversity Cluster, Helsinki, Finland, April 2010, 
available at <http://www.biodivcluster.fi/pdf/friday/7Webbe_9April2010.pdf> (visited 16 January 2012).
63 These include the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes 
and Their Disposal (Basel, 22 March 1989, in force 5 May 1992, 28 International	Legal	Materials (1989) 
657, <http://www.basel.int>); the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent (PIC) Proce-
dure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade (Rotterdam, 11 September, 
1998, in force 24 February, 38 International	Legal	Materials (1999) 1, <http://www.pic.int>); and the 
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) (, Stockholm, 22 May 2001, in force 17 
May 2004, 40 International	Legal	Materials (2001) 532, <http://www.pops.int>). On the synergies pro-
cess, see Osvaldo Álvarez-Pérez and Kerstin Stendahl, ‘Synergies between the Basel, Rotterdam and Stock-
holm Conventions, from AHJWG to ExCOPs’, presentation at the Nordic Symposium: Synergies in the 
biodiversity cluster, Helsinki, April 2010, available at <http://www.biodivcluster.fi/pdf/thursday/ 
1Stendahl_8April2010.pdf> (visited 10 January 2012); and Kerstin Stendahl, ‘Enhancing Cooperation 
and Coordination among the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions’, in Tuula Kolari and Ed 
Couzens (eds), International	Environmental	Law-making	and	Diplomacy	Review	2007, University of Joen-
suu – UNEP Course Series 7 (University of Joensuu, 2008), 127–141.
64 See Eléonore Dziurzynski, Meghna Abraham, Alison Graham Gareth and Gareth Sweeney (eds), Human	
Rights	Monitor, International Service for Human Rights no. 64 (Médecine & Hygiène, 2006); Eléonore 
Dziurzynski, Katrine Thomasen, and Gareth Sweeney (eds), Human	Rights	Monitor, International Service 
for Human Rights no. 65 (Médecine & Hygiène, 2007).
65 See <http://www.unwomen.org/about-us/about-un-women> (visited 10 January 2012).
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ambition: (1) maintaining the existing secretariat level cooperation (business as usu-
al); (2) enhancing secretariat initiatives as well as synergies at the national level, 
building on existing collaboration and making use of lessons learned through projects 
and initiatives; (3) increasing clustering of the biodiversity-related conventions, 
which could involve joint administrative functions, secretariats, budgets and com-
munication functions, following the example of the chemicals and waste conven-
tions; (4) merging conventions as protocols under the CBD; and (5) conducting 
fundamental reorganization of MEAs in the framework of the discussions on the 
proposed World Environment Organization (WEO) or United Nations Environ-
ment Organization (UNEO).66
A step-by-step approach to building synergies, following option (2) above (while not 
excluding following options (3) to (5) at a later stage), would make the biodiversity-
related conventions more efficient in contributing to the overarching goal of conserv-
ing biodiversity and using natural resources sustainably. It should be stressed that the 
process would need to be party-driven whilst simultaneously respecting the autono-
my of individual conventions, with form following function and synergies serving 
the purpose of enhancing convention implementation. 
The synergies process for the biodiversity-related conventions can build on the wide 
range of existing initiatives for cooperation; as well as make use of the options for 
collaboration and coordination at the global, regional and national levels provided 
by the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020.
Key elements for such an approach to synergies at the national level, in particular for 
the four key areas considered above, would include the following:
• collaboration of national focal points on NBSAP implementation, aided by ap-
propriate mechanisms such as national biodiversity committees;
• the inclusion of the objectives of other conventions in NBSAPs;
• alignment of national policies and strategies for the non-CBD conventions with 
the NBSAP;
• joint development of national indicators for convention implementation;
• joint use of funding, in particular for national capacity-building for convention 
implementation;
• collaboration of national focal points and relevant agencies on national reporting 
to the biodiversity-related conventions and integrated management of national 
66 For the discussion of the potential advantages and disadvantages of a World Environment or United Na-
tions Environment Organization and the complexities of its establishment, see, for example, Alejo Etchart, 
Lessons	from	GATT/WTO	for	enhancing	UNEP (Stakeholder Forum, London), available at <http://www.
stakeholderforum.org/fileadmin/files/Lessons%20from%20GATT-WTO%20for%20enhancing%20
UNEP.pdf> (visited 30 March 2012); UNEP, The	Environmental	Dimension	of	IFSD:	Importance	of	Envi-
ronmental	Pillar	to	IFSD, supra note 20; and UNEP, The	Environmental	Dimension	of	IFSD:	Fragmentation	
of	Environmental	Pillar	and	its	Impact	on	Efficiency	and	Effectiveness,	supra note 20.  
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biodiversity data and information in support of reporting to, and implementa-
tion of, all the biodiversity-related conventions;
• making available to the global convention processes the experience on synergies 
at the national level; and
• providing support to national synergy efforts by the UNEP Regional Offices and 
other regional and national UN offices and other institutions (e.g. the Food and 
Agricultural Organisation (FAO),67 the International Union for Conservation of 
Nature (IUCN),68 the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),69 and 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO).70
Regional and subregional cooperation mechanisms and processes, assisted by the 
UNEP Regional Offices and other regional and national institutions, could provide 
support to the integrated implementation of NBSAPs across the conventions at the 
national level, could establish or host regional hubs for IPBES, and could assist par-
ties in testing national approaches to streamlining and better integrating reporting 
to the biodiversity-related conventions.
The global synergies process could further evolve through the following elements:
• alignment of the strategic planning documents of the biodiversity-related con-
ventions in the light of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020;
• joint interaction of the conventions with IPBES, facilitated by the BLG and 
advised by CSAB;
• joint approval and use by the conventions of global and sub-global biodiversity 
assessments as well as of biodiversity indicators;
• joint addressing of key thematic areas, such as water, forests, agriculture, marine 
biodiversity, invasive alien species, bushmeat71 or protected areas, among others;
• further harmonization of national reporting;
• a joint capacity-building initiative of the biodiversity-related conventions for 
convention implementation;
• joint provision of guidance to national-level implementation of conventions in 
a synergistic manner, supported by the UNEP Regional Offices and other re-
gional and national UN offices;
• extension of synergy efforts to other MEAs such as the other Rio Conventions, 
supported by UN-wide efforts facilitated by the EMG; and






71 Wild, often endangered, animals caught for food (both subsistence and to satisfy a growing urban restau-
rant market for exotic foods), particularly in Central, East and West Africa. 
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9 Recommended next steps for synergies between the 
biodiversity-related conventions
The activities described in the previous chapter would all support enhanced coop-
eration and coordination between the biodiversity-related conventions at the global 
and national level. For taking a wider and coordinated approach to taking the syn-
ergy process forward, it is suggested that the UNEP Governing Council72 estab-
lishes a party-driven Intergovernmental Working Group on Synergies between the 
biodiversity-related conventions and invites the bureaus of the governing bodies of 
the conventions to nominate party and secretariat representatives. The group would 
review the synergies process, develop recommendations and prepare for consistent 
decisions for the conventions’ governing bodies. Strong party representation should 
assist in increasing the acceptance of the work and recommendations of the group 
by the governing bodies of the MEAs.
The work of the group, which would report to the UNEP Governing Council and 
the governing bodies of the conventions, could be supported by the BLG, which, 
backed by the governing bodies of the conventions, could help with getting some of 
the options at the global level outlined above underway. Global bodies such as the 
Environment Management Group (EMG)73 and, in terms of funding, the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF), could support the synergies process, and the emerging 
process should be considered at the follow-up process to the 2012 United Nations 
Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20).
The party-driven character of the synergies process would ensure that synergies are 
not pursued as goals in and of themselves, but rather that the capacity of parties is 
built more efficiently and effectively to implement the objectives of the participating 
conventions.
72 See <http://www.unep.org/resources/gov/overview.asp>.
73 Supra note 44.
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1 Introduction
Modern technology enables plant genetic resources to be used in the development 
of a wide spectrum of commercial products,2 the combined markets for which are 
worth hundreds of billions of US dollars annually.3 Historically, the international 
community subscribed to the principle that plant genetic resources should be freely 
available to all countries for all purposes.4 This is well illustrated by the 1983 Inter-
national Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, which was based on the principle 
that such resources were ‘a heritage of mankind and consequently should be available 
without restriction’.5 
Unrestricted access, while favoured by developed countries, was increasingly resisted 
1 LLB LLM (Rhodes) LLM (Lewis & Clark); Lecturer, School of Law, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Dur-
ban, South Africa; e-mail: lewism@ukzn.ac.za.
2 See generally Kerry ten Kate and Sarah A. Laird, The	Commercial	Use	of	Biodiversity:	Access	 to	Genetic	
Resources	and	Benefit-sharing	(Earthscan, 1999); Carmen Richerzhagen, Protecting	Biodiversity:	The	Ef-
fectiveness	of	Access	and	Benefit-sharing	Regimes	(Routledge, 2010) at 26–36.
3 Even as far back as 1999, ten Kate and Laird estimated that the value of the combined annual global 
markets for products derived from genetic resources was between USD 500 billion and USD 800 billion. 
ten Kate and Laird, supra	note 2, at 1.
4 Lyle Glowka, Françoise Burhenne-Guilmin and Hugh Synge, A	Guide	to	 the	Convention	on	Biological	
Diversity, IUCN Environmental Law and Policy Paper No. 30 (1998) at 5 and 76–78.
5 International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, Article 1. This Undertaking (although not le-
gally binding) was the first international instrument to deal with the conservation and sustainable use of 
plant genetic resources for food and agriculture (Gerald Moore and Witold Tymowski, Explanatory	Guide	
to	the	International	Treaty	on	Plant	Genetic	Resources	for	Food	and	Agriculture,	IUCN Environmental Pol-
icy and Law Paper No. 57 (2005) at 6). It was adopted through FAO Resolution 8/83.
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by developing nations which, during the negotiations toward the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD),6 insisted that new international principles be designed 
to enable biologically wealthy countries to control access to their genetic resources 
and to share in any benefits arising from the commercialization of such resources.7 
The CBD consequently attempts to strike a balance between the interests of devel-
oped and developing nations by requiring provider countries (whose sovereignty over 
genetic resources is now recognized8) to facilitate access to genetic resources9 in return 
for a share in any benefits that may result from the utilization thereof.10 While the 
Convention contains provisions on both access and benefit-sharing (ABS), particular 
emphasis is placed on the latter by including the fair and equitable sharing of ben-
efits from the utilization of genetic resources as one of the Convention’s three central 
objectives.11 
Unfortunately, the decade following the CBD’s adoption saw limited progress made 
towards achieving the Convention’s benefit-sharing objective.12 Developing countries 
thus began calling for the development and adoption of a comprehensive interna-
tional regime to promote and safeguard the fair and equitable sharing of benefits 
arising out of the use of genetic resources13 and, in 2002, participants at the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD)14 committed themselves to negotiat-
6 Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993, 1760 
UNTS 79, <http://www.biodiv.org>. See Art. 15(1).
7 ten Kate and Laird, supra	note 2, at 4; Glowka, supra	note 4, at 5.
8 See Art. 15(1). The Convention additionally requires that access occur on mutually agreed terms and be 
subject to the prior informed consent of the Party providing the resources, unless otherwise determined 
by that Party (Art. 15(4)–(5)).
9 Parties are directed to ‘endeavour to create conditions to facilitate access to genetic resources for environ-
mentally sound uses by other Contracting Parties and not to impose restrictions that run counter to the 
objectives of [the CBD]’ (Art. 15(2)).
10 See Arts 15(6)–(7), 16(3) and 19(1)–(2). See also Art. 8(j) (requiring Parties to encourage benefit-sharing 
with indigenous and local communities whose traditional knowledge has been utilized).
11 Art. 1. The CBD’s approach, while certainly a significant improvement upon that taken by the Interna-
tional Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, does not completely resolve the tension between achiev-
ing continued access, on the one hand, and ensuring benefit-sharing, on the other. In the context of plant 
genetic resources for food and agriculture, for example, requiring (as the CBD does) that prior informed 
consent be obtained and mutually agreed terms negotiated on a case-by-case basis would be unduly oner-
ous and potentially frustrate the exchange of the plant genetic resources on which modern agriculture 
relies (see Moore and Tymowski supra	note 5, at 10). It is for this reason that the Contracting Parties to 
the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (Rome, 3 November 2001, 
in force 29 June 2004, 2400 UNTS 303,  <http://www.planttreaty.org/>) agreed, in exercise of their 
sovereign rights, to establish a multilateral system to facilitate access and benefit-sharing in this context 
(see Art. 10(2); W. Bradnee Chambers, Interlinkages	and	Effectiveness	of	Multilateral	Environmental	Agree-
ments	(United Nations University Press, 2008) at 183–184).
12 It has been estimated that ten years after the adoption of the CBD, fewer than ten per cent of Parties had 
adopted ABS legislation. Morten Walløe Tvedt and Tomme Young, Beyond	Access:	Exploring	Implementa-
tion	of	the	Fair	and	Equitable	Sharing	Commitment	in	the	CBD, IUCN Environmental Policy and Law 
Paper No. 67/2 (2007) at 1.
13 The creation of such a regime was, in particular, advocated by the group of Like-Minded Megadiverse 
Countries. See, for instance, Cancun Declaration of Like-Minded Megadiverse Countries (18 February 
2002) available at <http://chmguatemala.gob.gt/Members/esolorzano/documentos/paises-megadiversos-
lmmc/Declaration%20Cancun%20del%20LMMC.pdf> (visited 17 October 2012).




ing such a regime within the framework of the CBD.15 This commitment was even-
tually to lead, in 2010, to the adoption of the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Ge-
netic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their 
Utilization to the CBD (Nagoya Protocol).16 
Utilization of genetic resources raises issues concerning not only benefit-sharing but 
also food security, public health, and intellectual property. The use of these resourc-
es is thus addressed by a variety of international instruments17 and organizations18 
outside of the CBD framework, and the need for harmony with these fora was repeat-
edly emphasized in the negotiations toward the Nagoya Protocol.19 Negotiators were 
divided as to whether the Protocol should constitute the overarching ABS instrument 
in international law, or should instead simply be one component of a broader inter-
national regime on ABS, ‘with it being the default instrument, augmented by other 
specialized regimes’.20 Ultimately, the latter view prevailed, with the decision through 
which the Nagoya Protocol was adopted recognizing that the international regime is 
constituted of a suite of complementary instruments.21 The Protocol itself preserves 
the ongoing work and practices under other international fora and contains an ex-
15 Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.199/20 
(2002), para. 44(o). 
16 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising 
from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Nagoya, 29 October 2010, <http://www.
cbd.int/abs/>. Following the WSSD, the United Nations General Assembly invited the CBD’s Conference 
of the Parties (COP) to take steps towards meeting the commitment to negotiate an international regime 
on ABS (UN General Assembly Resolution 57/260 (2003), para 8). The COP responded (in Decision 
VII/19, section D, para 1) by mandating the negotiation of the regime to the (already established) Ad 
Hoc Open-ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-sharing, which was subsequently instructed (in 
Decision VIII/4, para 6) to have completed work on this issue at the earliest possible time before the tenth 
COP to the CBD (COP10). The final outcome of the work of this Working Group was a draft of the 
Nagoya Protocol (Report of the Third Part of the Ninth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Working 
Group on Access and Benefit-sharing, UNEP/CBD/COP/10/5/Add.5), which was presented to COP10 
where the Protocol for further negotiation and eventual adoption.
17 For instance the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (found in Annex 1C 
of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Marrakesh, 15 April 1994, in force 1 
January 1995, see <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/t_agm0_e.htm>) and the International Treaty 
on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. Indeed, Raustiala and Victor observe that ‘[r]ather 
than a single, discreet regime governing [plant genetic resources], the relevant rules are found in at least 
five clusters of international agreements’ which, while overlapping, are ‘created and maintained in distinct 
fora with participation of different sets of actors’. Kal Raustiala and David G. Victor, ‘The Regime Com-
plex for Plant Genetic Resources’ 58 International	Organization	(2004) 277–309 at 279.
18 Such as the World Trade Organization, see <http://www.wto.org>; World Health Organization, see 
<http://www.who.int/>; World Intellectual Property Organization, see <http://www.wipo.int/>; and the 
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, see <http://www.fao.org/>.
19 See, for instance, Report of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-sharing on 
the Work of its Third Meeting, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/3/7 (2005), para. 28; and Report of 
the Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-sharing on the Work of its Ninth Meet-
ing, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/9/3 (2010), paras 39, 52, 57 and 62.
20 Matthias Buck and Clare Hamilton, ‘The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair 
and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diver-
sity’ 20 Review	of	European	and	International	Environmental	Law	(2011) 47–61 at 58.
21 ‘Access to genetic resources and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from their utilization’, 
CBD Decision X/1 (2010)
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emption for specialized ABS agreements.22 One such agreement with which the CBD 
already has a history of cooperation is the International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture (the ITPGRFA or ‘Plant Treaty’),23 which pro-
vides an international framework for the conservation and sustainable use of plant 
genetic resources for food and agriculture and the fair and equitable sharing of ben-
efits arising out of the use of such resources.24 
This paper provides a brief examination of the relationship between the ITPGRFA 
and the Nagoya Protocol; considers opportunities for future linkages between these 
two instruments; and canvasses the collaboration that is already occurring between 
the Plant Treaty and the CBD in preparation for the Protocol’s entry into force. The 
paper concludes with comment on the significance of the relationship and collabora-
tion, and of the proposed linkages.
2 Overview of the ITPGRFA and its cooperation with the 
CBD
It has long been recognized that plant genetic resources for food and agriculture 
(PGRFA) have special importance for human well-being due to the role that they 
play in improving crops, thereby helping to achieve food security.25 The adoption of 
the ITPGRFA in 2001 was the result of a process to revise the International Under-
taking on Plant Genetic Resources so as to harmonize this instrument with the 
CBD.26 Indeed, the Plant Treaty articulates its central objective as being:
the conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources for food and ag-
riculture and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of their use, in 
harmony with the Convention on Biological Diversity, for sustainable agriculture 
and food security.27
One of the ITPGRFA’s core features is the creation of a Multilateral System, which 
is designed to (i) facilitate access28 to the crops most essential to food security (these 
crops are listed in Annex I of the Treaty29 and are transferred under a Standard Mate-
22 Art. 4(3)–(4).
23 See supra	note 11.
24 Art. 1(1).
25 See, for example, Agenda 21 (UN Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 13 
June 1992, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (1992), available at <http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/agen-
da21/>), paras 14.54–14.56. See also discussion in Moore and Tymowski, supra	note 5, at 2–3 and 5.
26 FAO Resolution 7/93. See also Nairobi Final Act of the Conference for the Adoption of the Agreed Text 
of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Resolution 3 ‘The Interrelationship Between the Convention 
on Biological Diversity and the Promotion of Sustainable Agriculture’ (1992). 
27 Art. 1(1).
28 Art. 10(2). Through the Multilateral System access is provided to Contracting Parties, as well as legal and 
natural persons under the jurisdiction of Contracting Parties, in accordance with conditions prescribed 
by the Plant Treaty. See Art. 12(2)–(3).
29 Art. 11. The Multilateral System includes those Annex I resources that are ‘under the management and 
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rial Transfer Agreement30); and (ii) share benefits arising from the utilization of such 
resources31 (not only through the sharing of monetary benefits from commercializa-
tion, but also the exchange of information, access to and transfer of technology, and 
capacity-building32). Other issues addressed by the Plant Treaty include ABS relating 
to certain ex	situ	collections of PGRFA;33 farmers’ rights (including the protection of 
traditional knowledge and participation in the sharing of benefits from the utilization 
of PGRFA);34 the development of a global information system to facilitate the ex-
change of information on matters related to PGRFA;35 and compliance.36
The ITPGRFA has a lengthy history of cooperation with the CBD. Not only does 
the Plant Treaty provide that its objectives are to be achieved in harmony with, and 
by closely linking to, the Convention;37 but Articles 19(3)(g) and 20(5) call upon the 
ITPGRFA’s Governing Body and Secretary to cooperate with the Convention’s Con-
ference of the Parties (COP) and Secretariat.38 Since the Plant Treaty’s entry into 
force, its Governing Body has repeatedly emphasized the need to continue to en-
hance collaboration with the CBD.39 Commitments to cooperate have likewise been 
made by the CBD’s COP.40 Indeed, there has been close cooperation between the 
Plant Treaty and the Convention with regard to such issues as exchange of informa-
control of Contracting Parties and in the public domain’, as well as those that are held in the ex	situ	col-
lections of the International Agricultural Research Centres of the Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research and other international institutions (Arts 11(2) and 11(5)). Parties further agree to 
take measures to encourage natural and legal persons within their jurisdictions who hold Annex I PGRFA 
to include these in the Multilateral System (Art. 11(3)).
30 Art. 12(4); Resolution 2/2006.
31 Art. 10(2). See also Art. 13. Benefits are to be directed primarily towards farmers in developing countries 
and countries with economies in transition (Art. 13(3)).
32 Art. 13(2). Obligations concerning technical assistance, information exchange, and financial resources are 
also included in Arts 8, 17 and 18.
33 Those held by the International Agricultural Research Centres of the Consultative Group on Interna-
tional Agricultural Research and other international institutions. See Art. 15.
34 Art. 9.
35 Art. 17. The Treaty also includes provisions on the conservation and sustainable use of PGRFA. Arts 5–6.
36 Art. 21.
37 Art. 1. 
38 The functions of the ITPGRFA’s Governing Body further include taking note of relevant decisions of the 
CBD COP and other relevant international organizations and treaty bodies (Art. 19(3)(l)), and informing 
such organizations and treaty bodies of matters regarding the implementation of the ITPGRFA (Art. 19(3)
(m)). 
39 Report of the First Session of the Governing Body of the ITPGRFA, Doc. IT/GB-1/06/Report (2006) at 
para. 49; Report of the Second Session of the Governing Body of the ITPGRFA, Doc. IT/GB-2/07/
Report (2007) at para. 85; ‘Cooperation With Other International Organizations, Including Agreements 
Between The Governing Body And The International Agricultural Research Centres Of The Consultative 
Group on International Agricultural Research And Other Relevant International Institutions’, Resolution 
8/2009 at para 1; ‘Cooperation with other bodies and international organizations, including with the 
International Agricultural Research Centres of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research and other international institutions that signed agreements under Article 15 of the Treaty’, 
Resolution 8/2011. 
40 In Decision VI/6 (‘The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture’, 2002) 
(at para. 4), the CBD’s COP decided to establish and maintain close cooperation with the Plant Treaty’s 
Governing Body, and requested the CBD’s Executive Secretary to develop cooperation with the Plant 
Treaty’s Secretariat. See also Decision VIII/16 (‘Cooperation with other conventions and international 
organizations and initiatives’, 2006) at paras 9 and 15.
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tion, participation in the Liaison Group of Biodiversity-related Conventions,41 and 
participation in relevant meetings and processes,42 including the negotiation of the 
Nagoya Protocol.43
3 Overview of the Nagoya Protocol and its application to 
PGRFA
The Nagoya Protocol was adopted in 2010, at the CBD’s tenth COP,44 and will enter 
into force 90 days after being ratified by 50 Parties to the Convention.45 The Proto-
col’s objective is: 
[t]he fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of genetic 
resources, including by appropriate access to genetic resources and by appropri-
ate transfer of relevant technologies, taking into account all rights over those 
resources and to technologies, and by appropriate funding, thereby contributing 
to the conservation of biological diversity and the sustainable use of its compo-
nents.46
Building upon the CBD’s ABS provisions, the Protocol requires that access to ge-
netic resources for their utilization shall be subject to the prior informed consent of 
the Party providing the resources (unless that Party determines otherwise).47 Any 
benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources are to be shared with the 
Party that has provided the resources in a fair and equitable manner and in accord-
ance with mutually agreed terms.48 The Protocol thus envisages ABS being negoti-
41 Liaison Group of Biodiversity-related Conventions, <http://www.cbd.int/blg/>.
42 See generally Progress Report on Partnerships, Synergies and Cooperation with Other Organizations, 
Doc. IT/GB-3/09/18 (2009); and Relationship with the Convention on Biological Diversity, Doc. IT/
GB-4/11/22 (2011), paras 15, 17 and 32. 
43 Report of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-sharing on the Work of its 
Fifth Meeting, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/5/8 (2007), para. 3; Report of the Ad Hoc Open-
ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-sharing on the Work of its Sixth Meeting, UN Doc. UNEP/
CBD/COP/9/6 (2008), para. 3; Report of the Seventh Meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Working 
Group on Access and Benefit-sharing, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/7/8 (2009), para. 3; Report of 
the Eighth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-sharing, UN Doc. 
UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/8/8 (2009), para. 3; Report of the First Part of the Ninth Meeting of the Ad Hoc 
Open-ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-sharing, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/9/3 
(2010), para. 3; Report of the Second Part of the Ninth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Working 
Group on Access and Benefit-sharing, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/10/5/Add.4 (2010), para. 3. For a 
discussion of interlinkages between the CBD and the ITPGRFA, and how these have improved the ef-
fectiveness of both instruments, see Chambers, supra	note 11, at chapter 6.
44 Decision X/1, supra note 21.
45 Art. 33. As at mid-January 2013, the Protocol had 92 signatories but had been ratified by only twelve 
states (these being Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, India, Jordan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Panama, Rwanda, the Seychelles and South Africa). See ‘Nagoya Protocol: Status’ at <http://www.
cbd.int/abs/nagoya-protocol/signatories/> (visited 18 January 2013).
46 Art. 1.
47 Art. 6(1).
48 Art. 5(1). 
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ated between users and providers on a case-by-case basis. Parties requiring prior in-
formed consent are obliged to take various measures to provide for fairness, legal 
certainty, clarity and transparency in their laws and procedures for accessing genetic 
resources and establishing mutually agreed terms to access,49 and the Protocol con-
tains several provisions aimed at ensuring compliance with the ABS laws of provider 
countries50 (though it does also envisage the possible development of a global mul-
tilateral benefit-sharing mechanism to facilitate the sharing of benefits in certain 
instances51). The Protocol further contains ABS requirements for those instances in 
which genetic resources or traditional knowledge have been provided by indigenous 
and local communities,52 as well as provisions on such issues as information-sharing,53 
capacity-building,54 technology transfer,55 and awareness-raising.56 
While there is certainly overlap between the objectives of, and issues dealt with by 
the Nagoya Protocol and the ITPGRFA, it is also clear that the two instruments, 
employ very different mechanisms to achieve ABS: the Plant Treaty (insofar as Annex 
I resources are concerned) facilitates access and shares benefits through a multilat-
eral tool, while the Protocol requires that ABS arrangements generally be made bi-
laterally. During the negotiation of the Nagoya Protocol, concerns were raised that 
the introduction of a new legal instrument that covered all genetic resources (includ-
ing those of relevance for food and agriculture) would be problematic if it called for 
ABS arrangements that were inconsistent with those under the ITPGRFA (in par-
ticular, the Treaty’s Multilateral System for Annex I resources).57 Negotiators thus 
carefully considered the relationship between the Plant Treaty and the international 
regime on ABS, and debated various options for restricting the Nagoya Protocol’s 
scope with regard to those resources to which the Plant Treaty applies.58
The decision through which the Nagoya Protocol was eventually adopted describes 
the ITPGRFA as a component of the international regime on ABS.59 Even with the 
49 Art. 6(3).
50 Arts 15, 17 and 18. 
51 Article 10 of the Protocol requires Parties to ‘consider the need for and modalities of a global multilat-
eral benefit-sharing mechanism to address the fair and equitable sharing of benefits derived from the 
utilization of genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources that occur in 
transboundary situations or for which it is not possible to grant prior informed consent’. 





57 Jane Bulmer, ‘Study on the relationship between an international regime on access and benefit-sharing 
and other international instruments and forums that govern the use of genetic resources’, UN Doc. 
UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/7/INF/3/Part.1 (2009) 14–15.
58 See Report of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-sharing on the Work of 
its Fourth Meeting, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/8/6 (2006) 23; UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/9/6, 
supra	note 43, at 15–16; UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/7/8, supra	note 43, at 22–23; UN Doc. 
UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/8/8, supra	note 43, at 22–23; UNEP/CBD/COP/10/5/Add.4, supra	note 43, at 
19–20; UNEP/CBD/COP/10/5/Add.5, supra	note 16, at 10.
59 Decision X/1, supra note 21.
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Protocol’s adoption, the CBD’s COP thus continues to view the ITPGRFA as having 
a significant role to play in achieving the Convention’s benefit-sharing objective.60 
Indeed, the preamble to the Protocol recognizes the special nature and importance 
of PGRFA, acknowledges the fundamental role played by the ITPGRFA in this re-
gard, and recalls the Plant Treaty’s Multilateral System of ABS. In terms of Article 4, 
the Protocol’s provisions shall not affect Parties’ rights and obligations arising from 
existing international agreements, (except where this would cause serious damage or 
threat to biodiversity),61 and the Protocol is to be implemented in a mutually sup-
portive manner with other relevant international instruments, with due regard being 
paid to the ongoing work or practices under these instruments and relevant interna-
tional organizations.62 Article 4(4) is particularly significant, as it provides that
[w]here a specialized international access and benefit-sharing instrument applies 
that is consistent with, and does not run counter to the objectives of the [CBD] 
and this Protocol, this Protocol does not apply for the Party or Parties to the 
specialized instrument in respect of the specific genetic resources covered by and 
for the purpose of the specialized instrument.
The result is that, (at least insofar as countries that have ratified both the Nagoya 
Protocol and the ITPGRFA are concerned63) the Protocol’s provisions will not apply 
to PGRFA that are covered by the Plant Treaty unless these are used for purposes 
unrelated to the Treaty64 (for instance, if an Annex I-listed crop were used in the 
development of a cosmetic or pharmaceutical product, its use for this purpose would 
be governed by the Nagoya Protocol rather than the ITPGRFA65). In this way, the 
60 Since COP10, the CBD’s Executive Secretary has also highlighted that, as part of the international regime 
on ABS, the Plant Treaty plays a central role in regulating access to PGRFA. Report of the Second High-
level Roundtable on the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture on the 
Occasion of the United Nations Conference of Sustainable Development (2012), available at <http://
www.planttreaty.org/sites/default/files/HLRT2_Final_Report_1.pdf> (visited 1 August 2012) at 2.
61 This provision is not, however, intended to create a hierarchy between the Protocol and other interna-
tional instruments (Art. 4(1)). The Protocol’s provisions also shall not prevent the development and imple-
mentation of further international agreements, provided that these do not run counter the objectives of 
the CBD and the Protocol (Art. 4(2)).  
62 Provided that such work or practices are supportive of, and do not run counter to, the objectives of the 
CBD and the Protocol (Art. 4(3)).
63 72 of the 92 countries that have thus far signed the Nagoya Protocol, and five out of the six that have 
ratified or accepted the Protocol (Mexico being the exception), are Contracting Parties to the ITPGRFA 
(Nagoya Protocol website, ‘Status of signature, and ratification, acceptance, approval or accession’, avail-
able at <http://www.cbd.int/abs/nagoya-protocol/signatories/>, read with ITPGRFA website, ‘List of 
countries’, available at <http://www.planttreaty.org/list_of_countries> (both visited 30 September 2012)).
64 Insofar as the Nagoya Protocol does apply to PGRFA, the Protocol recognizes that such resources should 
be subject to special considerations: Art. 8(c) requires that Parties, in the development of their ABS leg-
islation or regulatory requirements, ‘[c]onsider the importance of genetic resources for food and agricul-
ture and their special role for food security’.
65 Buck and Hamilton, supra	note 20, at 58. See also Art. 12(3)(a) of the Plant Treaty, which provides that 
access via the Multilateral System of ABS ‘shall be provided solely for the purpose of utilization and con-




two instruments’ divergent approaches to ABS have been harmonized, and the au-
tonomy of the ITPGRFA respected.66 
Although the Nagoya Protocol was drafted in such a way that its provisions do not 
directly conflict with the ITPGRFA, there remains significant overlap in the issues 
covered by these two instruments (both, for instance, seek to protect traditional 
knowledge and both apply to ABS relating to Annex I crops, depending on the pur-
pose for which such crops are being accessed). It is thus desirable that the Protocol 
and the Plant Treaty, rather than following entirely independent (and potentially 
inconsistent) paths in addressing such issues, coordinate their approaches and ac-
tivities where possible. Such coordination could reduce the burden on Parties to both 
instruments (by avoiding the development of fragmented approaches in respect of 
the same or similar issues), and would have the added advantage of allowing the 
instruments to pool resources and avoid duplication of efforts in measures aimed at 
supporting the implementation of their respective ABS provisions.
 
4 Future cooperation between the Nagoya Protocol and 
ITPGRFA
Following COP10, the Executive Secretary of the CBD stated that ‘with the adop-
tion of the Nagoya Protocol a new era of cooperation between the Convention and 
the ITPGRFA was born’.67 The ITPGRFA’s Governing Body has likewise recognized 
the potential of the Protocol to enhance synergies between the Plant Treaty and the 
CBD, and has appealed to Contracting Parties and other States to consider signing 
and ratifying the Protocol. It has further decided to cooperate with the Open-ended 
Ad Hoc	Intergovernmental Committee for the Nagoya Protocol (which was estab-
lished to undertake the preparations necessary for the first meeting of the Conference 
of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Protocol (COP-MOP)68) 
and, upon the Protocol’s entry into force, the COP-MOP itself.69 Indeed, repre-
sentatives from the ITPGRFA have thus far participated in all meetings of the Inter-
governmental Committee for the Nagoya Protocol,70 as well as other meetings aimed 
66 See also Chambers (supra	note 11, at 189), who (in commenting on an early draft of this provision) ex-
plains that ‘[t]his type of explicit cross-referencing gives more predictability and certainty to the regime 
as has proven to be the case in other instances where this technique has been employed, such as between 
the UNFCCC and Ozone Convention concerning the coverage of common greenhouse gases and ozone-
depleting substances’.
67 Report of the Fourth Session of the Governing Body of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Re-
sources for Food and Agriculture, Doc. IT/GB-4/11/Report (2011), Appendix F.3. The same sentiments 
have been expressed by the Secretary of the ITPGRFA (Outcomes of the Capacity-building Workshop 
on Access and Benefit-sharing, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/ICNP/1/INF/6 (2011) at 3).
68 See CBD COP Decision X/1, supra note 21.
69 ITPGRFA Governing Body Resolution 8/2011, supra note 39.
70 Report of the First Meeting of the Open-Ended Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Committee for the Nagoya 
Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their 
Utilization, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/ICNP/8 (2011), para. 3; Report of the Second Meeting of the Open-
Ended Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Committee for the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources 
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at the expedited ratification of the Protocol.71 In considering elements of the Nagoya 
Protocol which have yet to be finalized (such as the Protocol’s compliance mechanism 
and potential global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism) these meetings have 
considered lessons learned from the Plant Treaty’s approach to such issues.72
Commitments to future cooperation with the Nagoya Protocol have not only come 
from the ITPGRFA’s Governing Body. In June 2012, at the Second High-level 
Round Table on the ITPGRFA (which was held at the Rio +20 Summit), the Plant 
Treaty’s Secretariat signed and launched a Joint Initiative on Sustainable Develop-
ment, Technology Transfer and Capacity-building with the Secretariat of the CBD73 
(which will also serve as the Secretariat to the Nagoya Protocol74). As part of this 
Initiative, the Secretariats agree to cooperate in further activities to support the rati-
fication of the Nagoya Protocol and its harmonious implementation with the ITP-
GRFA (including the Treaty’s Multilateral System of ABS).75
Even prior to this agreement the Secretariats had, pursuant to a 2010 Memorandum 
of Cooperation,76 begun to organize jointly a series of capacity-building workshops 
to assist the early ratification of the Nagoya Protocol and its implementation.77 The 
capacity-building needs identified by the workshops include measures related to 
mutual supportiveness of the Nagoya Protocol and the ITPGRFA, such as sensitizing 
policy-makers to the distinct approaches that each instrument takes to ABS, and 
building understanding of the relationship between the Protocol’s provisions on 
traditional knowledge and the Treaty’s provisions on farmers’ rights.78 Capacity-
and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization, UNEP/CBD/COP/11/6 
(2012), para 3.
71 Such as meetings concerning the Nagoya Protocol’s ABS Clearing House (Report of the Expert Meeting 
on the Modalities of Operation of the Access and Benefit-sharing Clearing-house, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/
ICNP/1/2 (2011), para. 8) and compliance mechanism (Report of the Expert Meeting on Cooperative 
Procedures and Institutional Mechanisms to Promote Compliance with the Nagoya Protocol on Access 
and Benefit-sharing and to Address Cases of Non-compliance, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/ICNP/2/12 
(2012), para. 9).
72 See, for instance, Overview of Compliance Procedures and Mechanisms Established under Other Multi-
lateral Environmental Agreements, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/ICNP/1/INF/1 (2011), paras 108–123; UN 
Doc. UNEP/CBD/ICNP/2/12, supra	note 71, at para. 20; Morten Walløe Tvedt, A	Report	from	the	First	
Reflection	Meeting	on	the	Global	Multilateral	Benefit-sharing	Mechanism (2011), available at <http://www.
fni.no/publ/biodiversity.html#abs_meeting_report> (visited 27 July 2012) at 13–15.
73 Joint Initiative of the Secretariats of the Convention on Biological Diversity and the International Treaty 
on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture Under the Memorandum of Cooperation Between 
Them (Report of the Second High-level Roundtable on the ITPGRFA, supra	note 60, Annex 2). 
74 Art. 28(1) of the Nagoya Protocol.
75 Joint Initiative, supra	note 73, at para. 1.
76 Memorandum of Cooperation between the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity and the 
Secretariat of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (2010), avail-
able at <http://www.cbd.int/doc/agreements/agmt-itpgrfa-2010-10-28-moc-en.pdf> (visited 27 July 
2012).
77 See UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/ICNP/1/INF/6, supra	note 67; Outcomes of the Second Capacity-building 
Workshop on Access and Benefit-sharing, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/ICNP/2/INF/1 (2011); Outcomes of 
the Third Capacity-building Workshop on Access and Benefit-sharing, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/INCP/2/
INF/9 (2012).
78 UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/ICNP/1/INF/6, supra	note 67, at 6. 
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building is thus an area in which future collaboration between the Treaty and the 
Protocol will be particularly appropriate. It is also an area in which the Nagoya Pro-
tocol has an opportunity to learn from the experiences of the ITPGRFA, as has al-
ready been demonstrated during the various joint capacity-building workshops.79  
Another area of future collaboration that is already being considered is that of infor-
mation sharing. Under the Nagoya Protocol, information is to be shared through an 
ABS Clearing House, established under the CBD’s existing clearing house mecha-
nism.80 In preparation for the Nagoya Protocol’s first COP-MOP,81 the Intergovern-
mental Committee on the Nagoya Protocol has discussed the Clearing House and 
recommended that it be implemented in a phased manner, beginning with a pilot 
phase. The Committee has suggested that the development of the pilot phase could 
include an investigation of partnership opportunities with other data providers, in-
cluding the ITPGRFA.82 Indeed, the Treaty’s Secretariat is already active in the de-
velopment of information systems and tools,83 and is establishing strategic partner-
ships in this regard – including with the CBD’s clearing house mechanism.84 
As part of their Joint Initiative, the Secretariats of the CBD and the ITPGRFA have 
agreed to continue their coordination and sharing of expertise on information man-
agement for ABS ‘as far as useful for implementation of [the Nagoya Protocol’s] 
79 This point has additionally been recognized by the Intergovernmental Committee on the Nagoya Proto-
col, which, in recommending the development of a strategic framework on capacity-building under the 
Protocol, has highlighted the importance of lessons learned from previous and ongoing capacity-building 
initiatives, such as those under the Plant Treaty. See Recommendations 1/2 and 2/5 on ‘Measures to assist 
in capacity-building, capacity development and strengthening of human resources and institutional ca-
pacities in developing countries and Parties with economies in transition’.
80 Art. 14(1). Within this context, the term ‘clearing house’ can be broadly defined as an information-
sharing mechanism. The CBD’s current clearing house mechanism (under which the Nagoya Protocol’s 
Clearing House is to be established) is made up of the CBD website, a network of national clearing house 
mechanisms (websites that provide information on the CBD in a particular country) and a variety of 
partner institutions (see generally <http://www.cbd.int/chm>). It is intended that the Clearing House to 
be established in terms of the Nagoya Protocol will serve as a means for sharing information relating to 
ABS, particularly information that is made available by Parties concerning their implementation of the 
Protocol (Art. 14(1)). To this end, the Nagoya Protocol requires Parties to make certain information avail-
able to the ABS Clearing House, including for instance any legislative, administrative or policy measures 
on ABS and any permits authorizing access to genetic resources (see generally Art. 15(2)–(3)).  
81 Art. 14(4) of the Protocol directs the first COP-MOP to consider and decide upon the modalities of the 
operation of the ABS Clearing House.
82 ‘Modalities of operation of the Access and Benefit-sharing Clearing house’, Recommendation 1/1 of the 
Intergovernmental Committee on the Nagoya Protocol. See also Report on Progress and Next Steps in 
the Implementation of the Pilot Phase of the Access and Benefit-sharing Clearing-house, UN Doc. 
UNEP/CBD/ICNP/2/8 (2012).
83 The Secretariat has, for example, developed an information technology system to support users of the 
Multilateral System of ABS (<http://mls.planttreaty.org/itt/>) and participated in the development of a 
global portal to information about PGRFA (GENESYS: Gateway to Genetic Resources <http://www.
genesys-pgr.org>).
84 See ITPGRFA website, ‘Global Information System on PGRFA’, available at <http://www.planttreaty.
org/content/gis> (visited 27 July 2012). Many of these activities are aimed at furthering development of 
a global information system on PGRFA, as required by Art. 17 of the Plant Treaty. The ITPGRFA itself 
requires that cooperation be sought with the CBD’s clearing house mechanism in the development of this 
system. 
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Clearing House’.85 Specific areas of cooperation that have already been suggested in 
this regard include the hyperlinking of portals of the ABS systems developed under 
the two instruments, the synchronization of data formats, controlled vocabularies 
and metadata, and the development of data exchange formats and protocols.86 
Other areas in which the Secretariats of the CBD and ITPGRFA are either already 
cooperating or planning to cooperate include the coordination of technical 
assistance,87 activities on traditional knowledge, joint awareness-raising, joint pro-
motional material, and joint communication work.88 It can thus be expected that, 
once the Nagoya Protocol enters into force, the cooperative relationship in these 
areas that has developed between the Convention and the Plant Treaty will expand 
so as to include activities under the Protocol.
Coherent implementation of the ITPGRFA and the Nagoya Protocol will, of course, 
also require coordination at the national level – national laws and policies developed 
to implement the two instruments will need to be harmonized, and their national 
focal points will need to collaborate so as to optimize synergies and efficiency. This 
too is a point that has already been recognized by the Governing Body of the ITP-
GRFA.89 
5 Conclusion
As the number of multilateral environmental agreements has increased, so the need 
for coordination between such instruments (as a means of improving the coherence 
and efficiency of international environmental law) has gradually been recognized.90 
Given the diverse range of issues that stem from the utilization of genetic resources 
(and the fact that such utilization is consequently addressed by a variety of interna-
tional instruments and organizations), the recent negotiation of the Nagoya Protocol 
provides a good example of how treaty text can be crafted in a manner that avoids 
85 Joint Initiative, supra	note 73, at para. 1.
86 Letter from Shakeel Batti (Secretary of ITPGRFA) to Ahmed Djoughlaf (CBD Executive Secretary), 7 
June 2011 (available in Excerpt from Resolution 8/2011 of the Governing Body of the International 
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/INCP/1/INF/8 
(2011)). 
87 Memorandum of Cooperation, supra	note 76, at Art. 2(b).
88 Joint Initiative, supra	note 73, at paras 2–3.
89 The ITPGRFA’s Governing Body has called upon Contracting Parties to ‘ensure that any legislative, ad-
ministrative or policy measures taken for the implementation of both the Treaty and the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (or its Nagoya Protocol), are consistent and mutually supportive’, and has requested 
national focal points of the Plant Treaty to enhance collaboration and coordination with CBD focal points 
‘on all relevant processes, in particular on the Nagoya Protocol’ (Resolution 8/2011, paras 7–8). The CBD 
COP has also encouraged such coordination in the national implementation of biodiversity-related MEAs 
generally (see, for instance, ‘Cooperation with other organizations, initiatives and conventions’, Decision 
VI/20 (2002), para. 8; ‘Cooperation among multilateral environmental agreements and other organiza-
tions’, Decision IX/27 (2008), para. 12).
90 Chambers, supra	note 11, at 6–9.
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conflict with other fora. As merely one component of the international regime on 
ABS, the Protocol is also an instrument for which future synergies are likely to be 
particularly relevant. 
The ITPGRFA and the Nagoya Protocol are the only two global international agree-
ments that provide detailed ABS arrangements concerning genetic resources.91 The 
two instruments do, of course, differ in scope: while the Plant Treaty’s application is 
restricted to genetic resources for food and agriculture,92 the scope of the Nagoya 
Protocol is far broader, essentially extending to all genetic resources (including plant 
genetic resources for food and agriculture) to the extent that such resources (and the 
uses thereof ) are not covered by specialized ABS instruments.93 They also employ 
different methods to facilitate access and ensure benefit-sharing: the Plant Treaty 
(insofar as Appendix I crops are concerned) provides for a multilateral approach, 
while the Nagoya Protocol follows the bilateral approach of its parent Convention, 
and thus includes detailed provisions on prior informed consent, mutually agreed 
terms and the legal measures required to support implementation at national level.
Despite their differences, however, both the ITPGRFA and the Nagoya Protocol 
ultimately seek to achieve a common objective: the fair and equitable sharing of 
benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources. There is also significant 
overlap between their provisions on the protection of traditional knowledge and 
indigenous and local communities, as well as many of their supporting provisions, 
such as those on information-sharing, technology transfer, capacity-building and 
awareness-raising. These overlaps present opportunities for the Nagoya Protocol to 
learn from the experiences of the Plant Treaty and for the two instruments to col-
laborate in areas of mutual interest, thereby avoiding duplication of efforts, improv-
ing efficiency and, promoting the coherent implementation of the international re-
gime on ABS.94 The Plant Treaty’s lengthy history of cooperation with the CBD 
provides a firm foundation on which to build such synergies.
91 The only other global instrument to contain provisions on ABS is the CBD, though these are very 
broadly-phrased. Both the Nagoya Protocol and the ITPGRFA can be viewed as instruments for imple-
menting the CBD’s benefit-sharing objective.
92 Art. 3. The Plant Treaty also does not focus solely on benefit-sharing, but additionally aims to achieve the 
conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture (Art. 1(1)). In contrast, 
the Nagoya Protocol focuses purely on ABS (although it does recognize that the fair and equitable sharing 
of benefits from the utilization of genetic resources is meant to contribute to conservation and sustainable 
use; see Art. 1). 
93 Art. 3, read with Art. 4(1).
94 There is also some potential for the implementation of the Nagoya Protocol’s supporting provisions to be 
aligned with (or to learn from) activities under other biodiversity-related treaties. For instance, a number 
of capacity-building activities have been conducted under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (Cartagena, 29 January 2000, in force 11 September 2003, 2226 
UNTS 208, <http://bch.cbd.int/protocol>) concerning the implementation of the Protocol’s Biosafety 
Clearing House. It might be appropriate for similar, or joint, initiatives to build capacity for the imple-
mentation of the Nagoya Protocol’s ABS Clearing House (UNEP/CBD/ICNP/1/2, supra	note 71, at para. 
52). Indeed, this may be particularly appropriate in light of the fact that the pilot phase of the ABS Clear-
ing House is being largely modeled on the Biosafety example (see UNEP/CBD/ICNP/2/8 , supra	note 
82; UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/ICNP/1/2, supra	note 71, at paras 3, 12, 16–17, 32 and 69). 
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What is perhaps more interesting, however, than the potential for future synergies in 
the implementation of the ITPGRFA and the Nagoya Protocol is the role that the 
Plant Treaty has played in the lead-up to the Protocol’s entry into force. The ITP-
GRFA’s Secretariat was actively involved in the negotiation of the Nagoya Protocol, 
and its Governing Body has, since the Protocol’s adoption, assisted in building sup-
port for the Protocol by encouraging countries to consider signature and ratification. 
The Plant Treaty’s Secretariat has further cooperated in capacity-building initiatives 
which (particularly in light of the Nagoya Protocol’s bilateral approach to ABS) are 
essential in supporting the Protocol’s early ratification and future implementation.95 
Finally, various procedures and mechanisms that have been developed under the 
Plant Treaty (as well as those developed under a number of other multilateral envi-
ronmental agreements96) have provided the Intergovernmental Committee on the 
Nagoya Protocol with guidance in formulating its recommendations on certain un-
resolved aspects of the Protocol which need to be decided on at the first COP-MOP 
if the Protocol is to function effectively.97 These contributions by the ITPGRFA 
demonstrate that synergies have an important role to play not only in improving the 
efficiency of existing international instruments, but also in the development of new 
instruments and the preparation for their entry into force. 
95 Indeed, the CBD COP has directed the Intergovernmental Committee on the Nagoya Protocol to con-
sider measures to assist capacity-building (as well as measures to raise awareness of the importance of 
genetic resources, traditional knowledge, and related ABS measures) in preparation for the Protocol’s first 
COP-MOP (see Annex II of Decision X/1, supra	note 21).
96 The clearing house developed under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety has, for example, been heavily 
relied upon in developing a pilot phase for the ABS Clearing House, (see note 94 above), while the com-
pliance procedures and mechanisms developed under the Biosafety Protocol and various other MEAs have 
been considered in discussions of the development of such procedures and mechanisms under the Nagoya 
Protocol (see generally UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/ICNP/2/12, supra	note 71). It has further been suggested 
that the work that has been conducted under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Spe-
cies of Wild Fauna and Flora (Washington DC, 3 March 1973, in force 1 July 1975, 993 UNTS 243, 
<http://www.cites.org/>) on the issuing of electronic permits might benefit the development of the inter-
nationally recognized certificate of compliance provided for in Article 17(2) of the Nagoya Protocol 
(UNEP/CBD/ICNP/2/8, supra	note 82, at para’s 52–53).
97 The Nagoya Protocol directs the COP-MOP to, at its first meeting, consider and decide upon the mo-
dalities of operation of the ABS Clearing House (Art. 14(4)), as well as cooperative procedures and insti-
tutional mechanisms to promote compliance with the Protocol and address cases of non-compliance (Art. 
30). The COP-MOP is further directed to consider the need for and modalities of a global multilateral 
benefit sharing mechanism to facilitate the sharing of benefits in certain instances (see note 51 above).
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Recent international reports confirm that the loss of biological diversity continues 
generally all over the world.2 This means that additional work and efforts must be 
taken to enable the biodiversity-related multilateral environmental agreements 
(MEAs) fully to deliver their intended objectives and achieve our common goal of 
halting biodiversity loss by 2020.3 
The loss of biodiversity probably costs the world over USD 750-billion annually in 
lost ecosystem services.4 These services are vital to our economies and our well-being 
and include climate regulation, rainfall provision, watershed protection and liveli-
hoods for local and indigenous peoples. Whilst the science is unclear about how 
1 Ministerial Adviser, Ministry of the Environment, Finland: e-mail: Marina.VonWeissenberg@ymparisto.fi.
2 See, for instance, the third Global Biodiversity Outlook, the Living Planet Report, the Global Forest 
Resources Assessment, the State of the World’s Plant and Animal Genetic Resources for Food and Agri-
culture, the fourth Global Environment Outlook, and the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment – cited in 
full in footnotes 3–8 (inclusive) in the paper by Erie Tamale, ‘Global Biodiversity Trends and Synergistic 
Strategic Policy Responses’, in Part II of the present Review. 
3 See, for instance, the ‘Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020’ discussed in footnotes 49 and 50 of the 
paper by Marceil Yeater in Part III of the present Review.
4 See, for instance, Charlie Parker and Matthew Cranford, Little	Biodiversity	Finance	Book (3rd ed., Global 
Canopy Programme, 2012), available at <http://www.globalcanopy.org/sites/default/files/LittleBiodivers
ityFinanceBook_3rd%20edition.pdf> (visited 13 December 2012). The term ‘ecosystem services’ might 
be defined as a way to accord commercial value to natural resources for the ‘service’ these give to the sup-
port of life. For a description of the concept within the present Review series, see Leila Suvantola, ‘Eco-
system Services and Climate Change’ in Ed Couzens and Tuula Honkonen (eds), International	Environ-
mental	Law-making	and	Diplomacy	Review	2010, University of Eastern Finland – UNEP Course Series 
10 (University of Eastern Finland, 2011) 245–254. 
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much is required to protect biodiversity and ecosystems, it is probable that the cost 
of doing nothing will be far higher. Ecosystems provide goods and services that sus-
tain all life on Earth, including human life. If extensively damaged, we can probably 
never fully restore these no matter how much money we spend trying to do so.
Ecosystems and ecosystem services are constantly changing, which in the end influ-
ences the demand for goods and services and the ways in which we manage our 
natural resources. The benefits that we derive from the natural world and its con-
stituent ecosystems are important to human wellbeing and economic prosperity, yet 
are consistently undervalued in economic analyses and in the decision-making of 
today. Growing populations and the increasing impacts of human beings on environ-
ments mean that the future is likely to bring more challenges to ecosystem functions.
Synergies and strengthened cooperation on different levels are required to conserve 
and maintain ecosystem services. Many global environmental agreements and con-
ventions have integrated relevant targets into their strategies and planning. Among 
these, the most important from the biodiversity perspective is the 2020 Aichi Biodi-
versity Targets.5
2 National governance systems for the management of 
biodiversity
2.1 Introduction
Sound policies and legislative frameworks are essential for good governance at na-
tional level and thereby for mainstreaming biodiversity into different sectors of soci-
eties. From the late 1940s onwards, emphasis has been placed on maximizing the 
production of goods to meet human needs for food, timber, energy and water – with-
out there being commensurate protection accorded to the environment. However, 
relatively recent changes in national policy and legislation, along with technological 
developments and changing attitudes and behavior, have led to some improvements 
in this respect. 
The preparation of National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAPs) has 
recently been seen as useful in successfully managing biodiversity. These Plans are in 
line with Article 6 of the Convention on Biological Diversity.6 To give effect to Ar-
ticle 6, needs assessments should be conducted and gaps should be identified to-
gether with positive achievements at the national level.7 In addition, the nomination 
5 ‘The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–202 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets’, CBD decision X/2 
(2010). See Yeater, supra note 3.
6 Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993, 31 Inter-
national	Legal	Materials (1992) 822, <http://www.biodiv.org>.
7 The obligations contained in Art. 6 include that each Contracting Party ‘shall, in accordance with its 
particular conditions and capabilities … Develop national strategies, plans or programmes for the con-
125
Marina von Weissenberg
of National Focal Points (NFP) is important for identifying who is in charge of in-
formation-sharing and the submissions of the notifications received by convention 
Secretariats, for instance.
Regarding National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans, a recent study8 con-
cluded	that	 few	countries	had	time-bound	and	measurable	targets	or	a	mechanism	in	
place	for	monitoring	and	review	of	biodiversity	loss.	There	is	also	a	general	lack	of	strate-
gies	for	communication	and	financing. Additionally, the poor design and content of 
many NBSAPs act as impediments to their effective implementation. However, ‘sec-
ond generation’ NBSAPs have been better prepared and have focused more on main-
streaming and on self-reliance.9
The negative effects of the main drivers of biodiversity loss have not, unfortunately, been 
significantly ameliorated by NBSAPs.10 The main factor currently driving biodiversity 
loss is habitat destruction – mostly on land but also in streams, rivers, lakes and the 
oceans. Human activities such as deforestation; bottom trawling in the oceans; the 
damming and the draining and degradation of wetlands; and removal of mangroves are 
responsible for the development. On the other hand, much biodiversity remains and 
humankind has probably identified not more than one in ten of all species on Earth.11
As states engage with global-scale initiatives such as the Rio+20 Conference12 held 
in Brazil in 2012, it is important to signal emerging challenges that could undermine 
sustainable development and biodiversity efforts. This should be done alongside the 
ongoing promising efforts which countries, communities and the private sector are 
undertaking for our common good. 
2.2 Governance: needs and challenges
Lack of integration of biodiversity concerns into different policy areas is arguably the 
main challenge that we are faced with. Ironically, our knowledge and understanding 
servation and sustainable use of biological diversity or adapt for this purpose existing strategies, plans or 
programmes which shall reflect, inter alia, the measures set out in this Convention relevant to the Con-
tracting Party concerned; …’. Ibid. Art. 6(a).
8 Christian Prip and Tony Gross with Sam Johnston and Marjo Vierros, Biodiversity	Planning:	an	Assessment	
of	National	Biodiversity	Strategies	and	Action	Plans (UNU, 2010), available at <http://www.ias.unu.edu/
resource_centre/UNU-IAS_Biodiversity_Planning_NBSAPs_Assessment_final_web_Oct_2010.pdf> 
(visited 18 June 2012).
9 The study suggests that ‘second-generation NBSAPs are generally very different from first-generation ones 
in terms of more inclusive stakeholder involvement in their preparation, approval at a higher political 
level, focus on mainstreaming, alignment with other relevant plans and policies, inclusion of monitoring 
tools, and inclusion of strategies for communication and financing’. Ibid. at 97.
10 A general conclusion of the study is that the position as at 2010 was similar to that of earlier NBSAP 
reviews, being that ‘NBSAPs have not seriously affected the main drivers of biodiversity loss’. Ibid. at 96.
11 Eric Chivian and Aaron Bernstein (eds), How	Our	Health	Depends	on	Biodiversity	(UNEP, 2010), available 
at <http://chge.med.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/resources/182945%20HMS%20Biodiversity%20
booklet.pdf> (visited 18 June 2012), at 5.
12 See, generally, <http://www.uncsd2012.org/>.
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of biodiversity have never been greater than they are today;13 while, at the same time, 
neither have the pressures on biodiversity ever been greater. Loss of forest biodiver-
sity can reduce the resilience of forests and leave them increasingly vulnerable. Con-
servation of the biodiversity of forests, for instance, is fundamental to sustaining 
forests and people in a world that is adapting to climate change. Ecosystem-based 
approaches recognize the importance of biodiversity to different stakeholders; and 
also the need for broad stakeholder participation in decision-making in order to ar-
rive at more effective outcomes. 
New approaches to biodiversity conservation are promising, but they need to be 
matched by more effective governance and greater financial investments.14 Drawing 
from the information of the 2009 report Conservation	for	a	New	Era,15	plus the in-
formation from the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA),16 the Global Biodi-
versity Outlook 3 (GBO-3) report concludes that biodiversity loss ‘is likely to con-
tinue for the foreseeable future, and certainly beyond 2010’.17 Nevertheless, GBO-3 
recognizes potential success in biodiversity conservation, including that:
1) at national, regional and global levels, with appropriate responses, it is pos-
sible to achieve, by 2020, a positive outcome for halting the loss of 
biodiversity;18
2) the majority of the targets that the CBD has established as part of its frame-
work for assessing progress towards the 2010 target are achievable, provided 
that the necessary actions are taken;19 and
3) for the most part, the tools needed to achieve the 2010 target, including 
programmes of work, principles and guidelines, have already been devel-
oped.20
However, action to implement the Convention on Biological Diversity has not been 
taken on a sufficient scale to address the pressures on biodiversity in most places. 
There has been insufficient integration of biodiversity issues into broader policies, 
13 UNEP year BOOK 2011, ‘Emerging Issues in our Global Environment’ (UNEP, 2011), available at 
<http://www.unep.org/yearbook/2011/pdfs/UNEP_YEARBOOK_Fullreport.pdf> (visited 18 June 
2012), at vi.
14 Ibid. at vii.
15 Jeffrey A. McNeely and Susan A. Mainka, Conservation	for	a	New	Era	(IUCN, 2009).
16 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems	and	Human	Well-being:	Biodiversity	Synthesis, (World Re-
sources Institute, 2005).
17 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity,	Global	Biodiversity	Outlook	3 (2010), available at 
<http://www.unep.org/pdf/GBO3-en.pdf> (visited 18 June 2012).
18 Although the previous target was not achieved, it can be argued that it was not useless. In this respect, the 
‘existence of the 2010 biodiversity target helped to stimulate important action to safeguard biodiversity’ 
and many actions taken ‘in support of biodiversity loss had significant and measurable results in particu-
lar areas and amongst targeted species and ecosystems’. It can therefore be concluded that ‘[t]his suggests 
that with adequate resources and political will, the tools exist for loss of biodiversity to be reduced at 
wider scales’. Ibid. at 9.




strategies and programmes, and the underlying drivers of biodiversity loss have not 
been addressed significantly.21 
3 Enhancing cooperation and synergies
It is important, in planning measures for increasing cooperation and adopting syner-
gies, to cover the objectives of the CBD. This means that we need different measures 
to ensure coherence and coordination between conservation and sustainable use 
activities; as well as to take into consideration the broad definition of ‘biodiversity’22 
which can be challenging but is nevertheless important. 
It should be remembered that there is an inherent internal tension within plans to 
implement the CBD, which tension lies in the balance between central coordination, 
steering of activities and a more decentralized approach (bottom-up). 
Here the institutional framework of the biodiversity-related conventions and the lack 
of enforcement are important to note. We need to look at the reporting requirements 
as well as the monitoring and evaluation of data/baseline information at national and 
local levels, and ensure that the key actors and stakeholders, whoever these might be 
in particular circumstances, are involved.  
Experience from Finland in this respect, for instance, shows that the reporting format 
has changed substantially over the years. Furthermore, to help with the challenge of 
disseminating information about biodiversity so as to facilitate regional and local 
decision-making, Finland has prepared biodiversity assessment reports for national 
purposes,23 which has contributed to improving the relationship between science and 
policy. In this process, public participation has been encouraged, but it is still difficult 
to receive contributions because most people appear to consider reporting to be a 
burden. Another feature has been the general feeling that the reports are not fully 
utilized by MEA secretariats or by international organizations. The feedback loop 
should be carefully looked at: it is important to give feedback to those involved in 
the reporting exercise.  
A useful way forward could be that proposed in a recent UNEP summary report: 
that the reporting framework should be based more and more on thematic elements; 
21 CBD Secretariat, Global	Biodiversity	Outlook	3, supra note 17, at 9. 
22 In the CBD, biological diversity is defined as meaning ‘the variability among living organisms from all 
sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological com-
plexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems’. 
CBD, Art. 2.
23 Ilkka Heikkinen (ed), and Interministerial Group of Editors, Saving	Nature	for	People.	National	Strategy	
and	Action	Plan	for	Conservation	and	Sustainable	Use	of	Biodiversity	in	Finland	2006–2016 (Ministry of 
the Environment, 2007), available at <http://www.ymparisto.fi/download.asp?contentid=75624&lan=en> 
(visited 19 June 2012) or <http://www.environment.fi/default.asp?contentid=258249&lan=en&clan=en> 
(visited 10 December 2012).
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and that synergies between the biodiversity-related multilateral agreements should 
be strengthened when countries are revising their national biodiversity strategies and 
actions plans.24 Here also the streamlining and integrating of the national manage-
ment of biodiversity-related information is crucial. Information that underlies na-
tional reporting should be made better available and accessible through, for example, 
the existing clearing house mechanism and a centralized biodiversity database. This 
would overcome the challenge that scattered information sources provide for na-
tional focal points and those that compile national reports. This would make it pos-
sible to use the same information modules available for reports to different conven-
tions, thus avoiding non-consistency between information presented in different 
national reports.25
Taken altogether, this issue needs to be solved at all of the local, national and global 
levels. It is important to take national experiences into consideration when reporting 
formats and information-sharing, including databases, are designed. The time used 
for reporting should be part of implementation, and should not detract from it. It 
would be practical if the reporting could be undertaken on-line, where countries 
would have an opportunity to update an existing format – for instance, a clearing-
house mechanism (CHM) – whenever considerable changes are made at a national 
level.
4  Reporting frameworks
National reporting is a key obligation for the success of any multilateral environmen-
tal agreement. In some cases, it is the only obligation that Parties are obliged to ad-
here to. Article 26 of the CBD requires the Parties to present reports to the Confer-
ences of the Parties (COPs) on measures taken to implement the Convention. To 
date, Parties have been asked to report four times, while the fifth national reports are 
due in 2014. The important issue here is the follow-up of the 2010 target to halt the 
biodiversity loss, and the use and development of indicators for national purposes 
linked to the monitoring of global trends. 
Other biodiversity-related MEAs – the CITES,26 CMS27 and ITPGRFA28 – also re-
quest reports that may be considered at each Conference of the Parties. The Ramsar 
24 Promoting	Synergies	within	the	Cluster	of	Biodiversity-related	Multilateral	Environmental	Agreements	(UNEP 
World Conservation Monitoring Centre, 2012), available at <http://www.unep-wcmc.org/mediali-
brary/2012/04/27/ff1a00f0/MEA_synergies_summary_for_web_cover_27April2012.pdf> (visited 19 
June and 10 December 2012).
25 See ibid.
26 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Washington DC, 3 
March 1973, in force 1 July 1975, 993 United	Nations	Treaty	Series 243, <http://www.cites.org>.
27 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, Bonn, 23 June 1979, in force 1 
November 1983, 19 International	Legal	Materials (1980) 15, <http://www.cms.int>.
28 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, Rome, 3 November 2001, into 
force 29 June 2004, <http://www.planttreaty.org/>.
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Convention29 COP decided in 1984 that the Parties should prepare national reports 
for each COP, following a defined reporting format. The World Heritage Convention 
(WHC)30 reports to the General Conference of UNESCO. Additionally, the World 
Heritage Committee examines reports from regional and sub-regional levels; the 
practice being based on a six-year cycle.31
The development of outcome-oriented indicators32 has been a challenge due to a lack 
of baseline data in many countries. The importance of identifying the information 
needs of individual conventions needs to be taken into consideration when aligning 
conventions’ strategic plans and in developing joint biodiversity indicators. The man-
agement of information collection and joint information systems, for instance the 
InforMEA (UN information portal on MEAs),33 can also, if well-designed, provide 
new opportunities for easing up the procedures. A proposal could be made to har-
monize definitions and terminology employed by different biodiversity-related 
MEAs; and to consider both online submission of reports and testing of national 
approaches. At the global level, cooperation in key areas – for instance, agriculture, 
forests, protected areas and water – has been encouraging. 
Reporting rates vary between MEAs. In particular, the national reports to the Ram-
sar Convention, the WHC and CITES achieve very high rates; and rates for the 
other conventions are increasing. It has been found that regional workshops on re-
porting have helped to improve reporting rates within the CBD and WHC.
5 The Aichi Biodiversity Targets and opportunities for 
synergies
5.1 The CBD Strategic Plan and the Aichi targets
The vision behind the strategic plan for biodiversity 2011–2020, and the correspond-
ing Aichi biodiversity targets, states that ‘by 2050 biodiversity [ought to be] valued, 
conserved, restored and wisely used, maintaining ecosystem services, sustaining a 
healthy planet and delivering benefits essential for all people’.34 Parties agreed also to 
29 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, Ramsar, 2 February 1971, in force 21 December 
1975, 11 International Legal	Materials (1972), 963, <http://www.ramsar.org>.
30 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Paris, 16 November 
1972, in force 17 December 1975, 11 International	Legal	Materials (1972) 1358, <http://whc.unesco.
org>.
31 For more information, see Promoting	Synergies, supra note 24.
32 According to the UNEP-WCMC, biodiversity indicators ‘use quantitative data to measure aspects of 
biodiversity, ecosystem condition, services, and drivers of change, to help understand how biodiversity is 
changing over time and space, why it is changing, and what the consequences of the changes are for 
ecosystems, their services, and human well-being’. UNEP-WCMC, ‘Biodiversity Indicators’, available at 
<http://www.unep-wcmc.org/biodiversity-indicators_77.html> (visited 10 December 2012).
33 See <http://informea.org/>.
34 See CBD decision X/2, Annex.
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a shorter-term ambition of ‘tak[ing] effective and urgent action to halt the loss of 
biodiversity in order to ensure that by 2020 ecosystems are resilient and continue to 
provide essential services, thereby securing the planet’s variety of life, and contribut-
ing to human wellbeing, and poverty eradication’.35 To deliver on this ambition, 
parties agreed on a set of strategic goals and targets to drive action on biodiversity.
 
With the adoption of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity, the Conference of the Par-
ties to the CBD has reached out to other conventions, inviting them to contribute 
to the collaborative implementation of the Plan, stressing synergies with the na-
tional implementation of MEAs. The other biodiversity-related conventions have 
quickly begun to acknowledge the opportunities the Strategic Plan offers for enhanc-
ing collaboration and synergies. The Strategic Plan has also been taken up by the 
Environment Management Group36 and the UN General Assembly, giving support 
to the implementation of the Plan.37
Establishment of a joint capacity-building initiative under the Strategic Plan for 
Biodiversity has been emphasized and recognized as a key requirement for effective 
implementation of biodiversity-related MEAs. This issue and the preparation of a 
joint initiative will in the future be an important field of cooperation between the 
different entities. In addition, joint guidance for national communication and aware-
ness-raising would be of great value and provide an opportunity for realizing syner-
gies.
What we are faced with is that there is a continued failure to address biodiversity loss 
and the consequences of such loss, combined with related problems such as the lack 
of political support. The fact that the Global Environment Facility (GEF)38 functions 
as a financing mechanism for the CBD, but not for the other biodiversity-related 
multilateral environmental agreements, is a significant factor that will need to be 
tackled. Some useful progress in this regard was made during discussion of financial 
mechanisms (‘review of GEF-5 and needs for GEF-6’) at the Fourth Meeting of the 
Working Group on the Review of Implementation (CBD WGRI-4) in Montreal in 
May 2012.39
Research has suggested that the current level of funding for biodiversity and ecosys-
tem services is around USD 36–38-billion per annum – far more than had previ-
ously been estimated. However, around half of this money is currently being deliv-
ered domestically in China, the European Union and the United States. As the scale 
of ecosystem finance increases, however, a greater proportion of it needs to be deliv-
ered to developing countries where the majority of the world’s biodiversity exists – 
35 Ibid.
36 See <http://www.unemg.org/>.
37 Promoting	Synergies, supra note 24, at 13.
38 See <http://www.thegef.org>.
39 WGRI 4, Montreal, 7–11 May 2012, <http://www.cbd.int/wgri4/> (visited 10 December 2012).
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and where the impacts of biodiversity loss are most strongly felt. It has been sug-
gested that, with a multitude of policy options for biodiversity and ecosystem 
services, significant policy action finance could reach USD 70–160 billion annually 
by the year 2020.40 If coordination between agendas were able to implement or scale 
up new mechanisms and policy options, then conservative estimates indicate that 
they could generate between USD 5 and 26 billion per annum in biodiversity fi-
nance.41
 
5.2 Relevant areas for enhancing cooperation within a 
biodiversity cluster  
There are a number of areas in which it might be possible to enhance cooperation 
within a biodiversity-related MEA cluster. Some of these include, firstly, the identi-
fication and addressing of national needs with a view to enhancing the implementa-
tion of MEAs by parties. This should be at the core of any process which aims to 
enhance cooperation, coordination and synergies.42 Secondly, it can be argued that 
synergies should ‘start at home’ – meaning that national governments should coor-
dinate their own activities in order to develop coherent positions for negotiations 
and decision-making which take place under MEAs.43 
Thirdly, without a coordinated approach to enhancing synergies, there is a risk of 
initiatives competing and inefficient duplicative solutions resulting. An initiative for 
synergies could bring together and improve current initiatives; and could identify 
many unexplored areas for synergies in a step-by-step manner.44 Fourthly, efforts 
should focus, at least initially, on synergies and cooperation on issues of substance 
rather than on administrative matters. This is mainly because the conventions 
grouped in the biodiversity cluster are hosted by different organizations, are geo-
graphically dispersed and have different reporting lines. This contrasts markedly with 
the approach that has been taken in the synergies process for the chemicals and wastes 
conventions.45 
40 Parker and Cranford, The	Little	Biodiversity	Finance	Book, supra note 4, at 111.
41 Ibid. at 107.
42 Ministry of the Environment of Finland/Nordic Council of Ministers, ‘Report from a Nordic Symposium: 
“Synergies in the biodiversity cluster” held in Helsinki, Finland, 8 to 9 April 2010’, available at <http://
www.biodivcluster.fi/pdf/Synergies%20report%20final.pdf> (visited 10 December 2012), ‘Relevant ar-
eas for enhancing cooperation and coordination within a biodiversity cluster’, at 6, para. 13.
43 Ibid. at 6, para. 14.
44 Ibid. at 6, para. 16.
45 Ibid. at 6, para. 17. On the chemicals and wastes cluster, see Kerstin Stendahl, ‘Clustering of MEAs – Les-
sons Learned, Rio+20, and Beyond’, in Part II of the present Review; and Kerstin Stendahl, ‘Enhancing 
Cooperation and Coordination among the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions’ in Tuula Kolari 
and Ed Couzens (eds), International	Environmental	Law-making	and	Diplomacy	Review	2007 University 
of Joensuu – UNEP Course Series 7 (University of Joensuu, 2008) 127–141.
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Fifthly, a number of programmatic areas provide possible areas for joint action. These 
include the science-policy interface (for instance, the Intergovernmental Science – 
Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES)46); the harmoniza-
tion of reporting; the streamlining of meeting agendas; joint information manage-
ment and awareness-raising, which integrates TEMATEA47 with newer knowledge 
management initiatives; and capacity-building, compliance, funding and review 
mechanisms.48
In addition, national needs and assessment procedures require strengthening. Needs-
driven approaches for monitoring trends must be tailored for the biodiversity family 
as well as communicated more effectively to relevant decision-makers, both now and 
in the future.
6 Conclusions
Responses to the challenges of biodiversity loss and weakened ecosystem services at 
the international level need to be made through the biodiversity-related conventions. 
The real benefits of biodiversity, and the costs of its loss, need to become better re-
flected within the world’s economic systems and markets.
It would appear that success in this regard has to date been limited, and it needs to 
be asked what the challenges are and where opportunities might be. There is ongoing 
work from which lessons can be learned. Synergies are being, and some already have 
been, created amongst biodiversity-related multilateral environmental agreements, 
mostly in the areas of national reporting and information management. Current 
initiatives are, however, limited primarily to bilateral approaches and are steered 
through ad hoc processes. Significant challenges include coordinating the structure, 
timing and forms of decision-making within different MEAs. Also, there is the ‘hu-
man dimension’ which must be taken into consideration – this including factors such 
as lack of leadership, limited capacity, and weak administration at the national level. 
A thematic approach to synergies could also be undertaken. Under such an approach, 
a multilateral environmental agreement would be selected to act in cooperation with 
other instruments and agencies. The development of joint work programmes be-
tween MEAs could be an effective way of building strong links, promoting synergies 
and simplifying national obligations.
46 See <http://www.ipbes.net>. 
47 See <http://www.tematea.org> ; and see Ines Verleye and Jorge Ventocilla, ‘Biodiversity Conventions and 
the IEG Agenda – The Need for an Integrated Approach Both Bottom-up and Top-down: A Case Study 
of TEMATEA’ in Tuula Honkonen and Ed Couzens, International	Environmental	Law-making	and	Di-
plomacy	Review	2009 University of Eastern Finland – UNEP Course Series 9 (University of Eastern 
Finland, 2010) 89–99.
48 Ministry of the Environment of Finland/Nordic Council of Ministers, supra note 42, at 6, para. 18.
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It must be recognized that achieving effective cooperation is not easy, particularly 
because any process to enhance synergies amongst MEAs needs to be party-driven 
and can, therefore, only be pursued by parties to the MEAs, but acting with the sup-
port of MEA secretariats. Applying a step-by-step approach, whereby national needs 
are addressed in an efficient and coordinated manner, would therefore seem to be a 
useful way forward. 
More efficient synergies can certainly be achieved amongst the biodiversity-related 
MEAs. Ultimately, achieving this will require a multitude of factors – including 
improved education; significant political will; the willingness to learn from experi-
ence; and the finding of innovative diplomatic solutions. 
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1 Introduction: the origin of CITES
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora (CITES)2 could be considered as a ‘Stockholm’3 rather than a ‘Rio’4 convention 
because it stems from Recommendation 99.3 adopted by States at the 1972 United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) held in Stockholm. 
CITES can be said to have arisen directly from Recommendation 99.3 of the 
UNCHE ‘Action Plan for the Human Environment’, which reads as follows:
[i]t is recommended that a plenipotentiary conference be convened as soon as 
possible, under appropriate governmental or intergovernmental auspices, to pre-
pare and adopt a convention on export, import and transit of certain species of 
wild animals and plants.5
Even before this, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN)6 
had, at its General Assembly in Nairobi in 1963, called for the formation of an ‘in-
ternational convention on regulation of export, transit and import of rare or threat-
1 Chief, Legal Affairs and Trade Policy, Regulatory Services, CITES Secretariat; e-mail: Marceil.Yeater@
cites.org.
2 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Washington DC, 3 
March 1973, in force 1 July 1975, 993 United	Nations	Treaty	Series 243, <http://www.cites.org>.
3 Referring to the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE), held in Stockholm 
in 1972.
4 Referring to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), also known 
as the Earth Summit, held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.
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ened wildlife species or their skins and trophies’.7 The final text of CITES was con-
cluded on 3 March 1973 at the end of a plenipotentiary conference held in 
Washington, DC – which is why it is also known as the ‘Washington Convention’.
That CITES is a ‘Stockholm’ rather than a ‘Rio’ convention is significant as it means 
that the convention was adopted in the ‘cluster’ of biodiversity-related conventions 
of the early 1970s. Twenty years later a second ‘cluster’ was adopted in the early 
1990s. CITES is therefore an older convention which places more concrete, and 
arguably more demanding, obligations on States Parties than a number of more re-
cent conventions which are much better funded. Its provisions and compliance pro-
cedures8 seem to reflect a greater surrender of sovereignty to achieve international 
cooperation and effective implementation than is found in a number of more recent 
conventions. On the other hand, it can be said to lack some of the features of more 
recent conventions, such as provision of financial support for developing state Parties 
- a gap which is scheduled to be discussed at the next meeting of the Conference of 
the Parties to be held in Bangkok in March 2013.9 
CITES is an international convention that combines wildlife and trade themes with 
a legally binding instrument for achieving conservation and sustainable use objec-
tives. It has been suggested that what CITES will always be expected to do is more 
than merely reconcile the inherent difficulties in its two purposes.10 It is a convention 
that is generally viewed as effective, although not all of its ‘successes’ have been suf-
ficiently documented. There are also continuing challenges being faced by the Con-
vention, such as a recent spike in poaching and related illegal trade in elephant ivory 
and rhinoceros horn. What CITES will always need to do is reinvent itself continu-
ally to keep up with developments and changing mores.11 The Convention has a 
variety of mechanisms which provide it with the flexibility to adapt to new realities 
and remain relevant (for example, interpretive Resolutions of the Conference of the 
Parties, amendments to the Appendices and annotations, longstanding assistance and 
compliance programmes on national legislation and the review of significant trade 
in Appendix II species, decision-making by qualified majority voting and a compli-
ance scheme with ‘teeth’).
CITES entered into force on 1 July 1975 and is now one of six biodiversity-related 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) which are generally considered to be 
the most important operating at the global level; and whose executive heads comprise 
7 On the evolution and history of CITES generally, see Willem Wijnstekers, The	Evolution	of	CITES (CIC 
– International Council for Game and Wildlife Conservation’, 9th ed., 2011), available at <http://www.
cites.org/common/resources/Evolution_of_CITES_9.pdf> (visited 11 January 2013).
8 See CITES, ‘CITES compliance procedures’, Resolution Conf. 14.3 (2007).
9 See, for instance, CITES, ‘Access to Global Environment Facility Funding’, COP 16, available at<http://
www.cites.org/eng/cop/16/doc/E-CoP16-08-04>; and CITES, ‘Access to Other Sources of Funding’, 
COP 16, <http://www.cites.org/eng/cop/16/doc/E-CoP16-08-05> (both visited 26 December 2012). 
10 See, generally, Wijnstekers,	Evolution supra note 7.
11 See supra	note 7.
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the Liaison Group of Biodiversity-related Conventions (BLG).12 The five other agree-
ments are the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands,13 the World Heritage Convention 
(WHC),14 the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Ani-
mals (CMS),15 the Convention on Biological Diversity16 and the International Trea-
ty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture17 CITES currently has 177 
member Parties – the most recent to join being Bahrain, whose accession entered 
into force on 17 November 2012; and the Maldives, whose accession will enter into 
force on 12 March 2013.18
2 Framework for tracing trade
CITES uses a system of permits and certificates to regulate international trade in 
those animal and plant species which have been listed in one of three Appendices.19 
An appropriate permit or certificate accompanies CITES products, which makes 
their trade traceable. Such documents are similar in their format, languages and is-
suance or acceptance procedures.20 Import and export permits and re-export and 
introduction from the sea certificates (as well as other CITES documents) are issued 
by national Management Authorities. 
Approximately 34  000 animal and plant species are covered by the Convention, 
roughly 5  000 animal species and 29 000 plant species. ‘Specimens’ in trade include 
12 The Biodiversity Liaison Group (BLG) has been established between the heads of the secretariats of the 
six biodiversity-related conventions; and meets regularly to ‘explore opportunities for synergistic activities 
and increased coordination, and to exchange information’ – the mandate ‘for establishing the [BLG] was 
set out by the Parties to the CBD’. For more information on this Group see <http://www.cbd.int/blg>. 
13 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, Ramsar, 2 February 1971, in force 21 December 
1975, 11 International Legal	Materials (1972), 963, <http://www.ramsar.org>.
14 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Paris, 16 November 
1972, in force 17 December 1975, 11 International	Legal	Materials (1972) 1358, <http://whc.unesco.
org>.
15 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, Bonn, 23 June 1979, in force 1 
November 1983, 19 International	Legal	Materials (1980) 15, <http://www.cms.int>.
16 Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993, 31 Inter-
national	Legal	Materials (1992) 822, <http://www.biodiv.org>.
17 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, Rome, 3 November 2001, into 
force 29 June 2004, <http://www.planttreaty.org/>,
18 CITES, ‘List of Contracting Parties’, available at <http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/parties/chronolo.php> 
(visited 21 January 2013).
19 Appendix I lists species considered to be ‘threatened with extinction’ and the trade in specimens of which 
is permitted only in exceptional circumstances. Appendix II lists species ‘not necessarily threatened with 
extinction, but in which trade must be controlled in order to avoid utilization incompatible with their 
survival’. Appendix III lists species that ‘are protected in at least one country, which [country] has asked 
other CITES Parties for assistance in controlling the trade’. Appendix I and II species must be listed by 
approval of the Conference of the Parties; whereas Appendix III species may be listed unilaterally by the 
country concerned. See <http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/how.php> (visited 18 June 2012), at which site 
the relevant listing procedures are given.
20 See, for instance, the CITES ‘Standard permit/certificate form’, available at <http://www.cites.org/eng/
res/12/E12-03R15A2.pdf>. 
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live or dead animals and plants, as well as parts and derivatives of both.21 Such 
specimens may either be taken from the wild or produced in some way (for instance, 
in a nursery or captive breeding operation). CITES ‘trade’ consists of export, import, 
re-export and introduction from the sea (meaning transportation into a state of 
specimens of any species which were taken in the marine environment not under the 
jurisdiction of any state).22 The purpose of such trade may be either commercial or 
non-commercial.
The aim of regulation under the Convention is to ensure that trade is legal and sus-
tainable (as well as traceable). The term ‘legal’ in this sense means that the specimen 
was obtained in accordance with relevant national legislation. The term ‘sustainable’ 
means that trade in the specimen will not be detrimental to the survival of the species 
in the wild.
Approximately 97% of CITES-listed species (those listed in Appendices II and III) 
are not necessarily now threatened with extinction and may be commercially traded 
if their trade is legal, sustainable and traceable. Approximately 3% of CITES-listed 
species (Appendix I) are ‘threatened with extinction’ (i.e. are ‘endangered’) and wild-
taken specimens are generally prohibited from commercial trade.
3 Scope of CITES cooperation
The range of cooperative arrangements between CITES and other bodies is reflected, 
inter alia, by different memoranda of understanding (MOUs) published on the 
CITES website.23 These include various forms of agreement or MOUs entered into 
with multilateral environmental agreements; international governmental organiza-
tions, governments, non-governmental organizations, and universities, research cen-
tres and other entities. Some partnerships or resolutions date back to the early 1990s.
Cooperation between CITES and a number of conventions and organizations was 
specifically addressed at the 61st meeting of the Standing Committee of the Confer-
ence of the Parties to CITES (SC61, Geneva, August 2011), the interim policy body 
for the Convention. In its reports to SC61, the Convention Secretariat pointed out 
that increased coherence with other multilateral instruments and processes (Goal 3 
of the CITES Strategic Vision: 2008–201324) should help to achieve better financing 
21 Art. 1(b) of the Convention.
22 Art. 1(c) and (e).
23 See, for instance, ‘CITES, ‘Cooperation and partnerships’, available at <http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/
coop.php> (visited 20 November 2012).
24 Adopted at the 14th Conference of the Parties, The Hague, 3–15 June 2007, CoP14 Doc. 11, available 
at <http://www.cites.org/eng/cop/14/doc/E14-11.pdf> (visited 20 May 2012). According to the Strategic 
Vision, its two-fold purpose is to ‘improve the working of the Convention, so that international trade in 
wild fauna and flora is consistently conducted at sustainable levels’; and to ‘ensure that CITES policy 
developments are aligned with changes in international environmental priorities and take into account 
new international initiatives’. In order to achieve this purpose, ‘three broad goals, of equal priority, have 
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of CITES activities at the national and international levels (Goal 2) and accordingly 
more effective implementation of the Convention (Goal 1).25 According to the docu-
ment ‘Cooperation with organizations and multilateral environmental agreements’, 
prepared by the CITES Secretariat for COP 16 in March 2013,26 cooperation ‘clus-
ters’ for CITES include the following:27
• biodiversity: biodiversity-related and other conventions;
• enforcement: international organizations and agreements dealing with law en-
forcement (for instance, the Green Customs Initiative,28 the International Con-
sortium to Combat Wildlife Crime (ICCWC),29 whose members include the 
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL),30 CITES, the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,31 the World Customs Organization32 and 
the World Bank33, and regional law enforcement networks34);
• finance: international financial mechanisms and other related institutions;
• natural resources: international organizations and agreements dealing with natu-
ral resources (for instance, the United Nations Division on Ocean Affairs and the 
Law of the Sea,35 the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO),36 regional fishery management organizations,37 the International Tropical 
Timber Organization38);
• science: international environment and science organizations (for instance, 
been identified as the key components of the Strategic Vision’, these goals being: Goal 1:  ‘[e]nsure com-
pliance with and implementation and enforcement of the Convention’; Goal 2: ‘[s]ecure the financial 
basis for the Convention’; and Goal 3: ‘[e]nsure that CITES and other multilateral instruments and proc-
esses are coherent and mutually supportive’. See ibid. (visited 18 June 2012).
25 It was acknowledged, for instance, in a discussion item dealing with CITES’ relationship with the CBD, 
that ‘CITES could not operate in a vacuum and that cooperation at the national and international levels 
was not only crucial for the Convention’s successful implementation but could also help Parties access 
additional sources of funding’. CITES, ‘61st Meeting of the Standing Committee, 15–19 August 2011’, 
available at <http://www.cites.org/eng/com/sc/61/sum/E61-SumRec.pdf> (visited 20 November 2012).
26 CITES, ‘Cooperation with organizations and multilateral environmental agreements’, available at <http://
www.cites.org/eng/cop/16/doc/E-CoP16-13.pdf> (visited 21 January 2013).
27 It should be noted that the list has been revised from the clusters suggested by SC61 (which clusters were 







34 See, for examples, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Wildlife Enforcement Network (ASEAN-
WEN), <http://www.asean-wen.org>; the EU Enforcement Group, established by Council Regulation 
(EC) No. 338/97, <http://wwwec.europa.eu/environment/cites/eg_en.htm>; the Lusaka Agreement on 
Cooperative Enforcement Operations Directed at Illegal Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora’, <http://www.
lusakaagreement.org/>; and the South Asia Wildlife Enforcement Network (SA-WEN), <http://www.
traffic.org/home/2011/1/30/south-asia-wildlife-enforcement-network> (all visited 11 January 2013). 
35 See <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/index.htm>.
36 See <http://www.fao.org>.
37 According to the Food and Agricultures Organisation, there are currently 44 regional fishery bodies 
worldwide, and of these 20 are regional fisheries management organizations. See FAO, ‘Regional Fishery 
Bodies’, available at <http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/16800/en> (visited 20 November 2012). 
38 See <http://www.itto.int>.
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United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP),39 International Union for 
the Conservation of Nature (IUCN)40 and various non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs)); and
• trade and transport: international transport, trade and development organiza-
tions (for instance, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,41 
the World Trade Organization,42 the International Trade Centre,43 and the private 
sector).
4 Synergies and CITES
4.1 Introduction
It may be more appropriate to speak of ‘cooperation’ at the international level and 
‘synergy’ at the national level as the latter depends on the MEAs to which a State is 
party. CITES has placed emphasis on fostering country-driven, practical synergies. 
In this connection, CITES Parties are interested in learning more precisely what is 
working at the national level and what more could be done to build upon or to rep-
licate such activities and outcomes.
Effective synergy creation takes time and effort as well as a commitment to work 
collaboratively across ‘silos’, to make the best use of different mandates or expertise, 
and to share human and/or financial resources. Much cooperation and synergy crea-
tion takes place via informal rather than formal networks. For example, legal officers 
within various MEAs have long cooperated in an informal way and recently have 
expressed interest in having regular interaction on issues of common concern.
4.2 Administrative vis-à-vis substantive synergy
The cluster of chemical/waste conventions (i.e. the Basel,44 Rotterdam45 and Stock-
holm Conventions46)47 benefits from the co-location of several secretariats in Geneva. 






44 Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Basel, 
22 March 1989, in force 5 May 1992, 28 International	Legal	Materials (1989) 657, <http://www.basel.
int>.
45 Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides 
in International Trade, Rotterdam, 11 September, 1998, in force 24 February, 38 International	Legal	
Materials (1999) 1, <http://www.pic.int>.
46 Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, Stockholm, 22 May 2001, in force 17 May 2004, 40 In-
ternational	Legal	Materials (2001) 532, <http://www.pops.int>.
47 On the chemicals/waste cluster generally, Kerstin Stendahl, ‘Enhancing Cooperation and Coordination 
among the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions’, in Tuula Kolari and Ed Couzens (eds), Inter-
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synergy across the secretariats (for instance, common services for administration/fi-
nance, meeting organization and general legal advice, followed by a merger of the 
secretariats). More recently, the cluster has been working on ways to enhance sub-
stantive synergy as well.
The biodiversity cluster – which has secretariats in six different cities, five different 
countries and four different host organizations48 – has initially focused on enhancing 
substantive synergies. These efforts were given a major boost with the adoption in 
2010 of a Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020 and a set of outcome-oriented 
Aichi targets,49 the development of indicators for those targets and joint work on 
National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAPs).50 The CITES Secre-
tariat recently advised Parties that more guidance from them was needed, if they 
wanted the Secretariat to work on administrative synergy as well.51
4.3 Strategic plans, targets and indicators
The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity (including the Aichi targets) is a useful flexible 
framework that is relevant to all biodiversity-related conventions.52 It derives from a 
recommendation of the September 2010 retreat, held in Switzerland, of executive 
national	Environmental	Lawmaking	and	Diplomacy	Review	2007, University of Joensuu – UNEP Course 
Series 7 (University of Joensuu, 2008) 127–141; and Stendahl’s paper in Part II of the present Review.
48 These being, for the CBD: Montreal, Canada and UNEP; for CITES: Geneva, Switzerland and UNEP; 
for the CMS: Bonn, Germany and UNEP; for the ITPGRFA: Rome, Italy and the FAO; for Ramsar: 
Gland, Switzerland and the IUCN; and for the WHC: Paris, France and UNESCO.
49 ‘The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets’, CBD Decision X/2 
(2011). See, generally, CBD, ‘Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020, Including Aichi Biodiversity 
Targets’, available at <https://www.cbd.int/sp/>. The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity is intended to run for 
the decade from 2011 to 2020, and to be the ‘overarching framework on biodiversity, not only for the 
biodiversity-related conventions, but for the entire United Nations system’; and to include the Aichi 
Biodiversity Targets. Ibid. The Aichi Biodiversity Targets comprise 20 ‘targets’, grouped under five ‘Stra-
tegic Goal’ headings:
• Strategic Goal A: Address the underlying causes of biodiversity loss by mainstreaming biodi-
versity across government and society;
• Strategic Goal B: Reduce the direct pressures on biodiversity and promote sustainable use;
• Strategic Goal C: To improve the status of biodiversity by safeguarding ecosystems, species and 
genetic diversity;
• Strategic Goal D: Enhance the benefits to all from biodiversity and ecosystem services; and
• Strategic Goal E: Enhance implementation through participatory planning, knowledge man-
agement and capacity building.
 Ibid.
50 According to the CBD webpage, NBSAPs are the ‘principal instruments for implementing the Convention 
[on Biological Diversity] at the national level (Art. 6)’, with the Convention ‘requir[ing] countries to 
prepare a national biodiversity strategy (or equivalent instrument) and to ensure that this strategy is 
mainstreamed into the planning and activities of all those sectors whose activities can have an impact 
(positive and negative) on biodiversity’. See <http://www.cbd.int/nbsap/> (visited 18 June 2012).
51 See CITES, ‘Sixty-first meeting of the Standing Committee, Geneva, 15–19 August 2011 – Strategic 
matters: Cooperation with other organizations’, available at <http://www.cites.org/eng/com/sc/61/E61-
15-01.pdf> (visited 11 January 2013), para. 7.
52 See supra note 49.
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heads of biodiversity conventions; and was actively supported by CITES, CMS, 
Ramsar and WHC at CBD-COP10.53
Decision 15.10 of the CITES COP directs the Standing Committee54 to ‘review the 
adopted post-2010 biodiversity targets and, if necessary, to make adjustments to the	
CITES Strategic Vision: 2008–2013,55 as appropriate’.56 The CITES Standing Com-
mittee established a working group57 to assist it with the implementation of this 
decision.58 In addition, the Standing Committee Working Group on Special Report-
ing Requirements59 was mandated to develop draft guidance to Parties for reporting 
on the related targets and indicators. 
Effective implementation of CITES will be indispensable for meeting a variety of the 
Aichi targets, including those which address the causes of biodiversity loss/main-
streaming (Aichi targets 1, 2, 3 and 4);60 direct pressures upon and sustainable use 
53 A weblink to, and description of, the retreat can be found at CITES, ‘First High Level Retreat Among 
Secretariats of Biodiversity-Related Conventions’, 1 September 2010, available at <http://www.cites.org/
eng/news/SG/2010/sum_retreat100901.pdf>. The conclusions and recommendations emanating from 
the retreat included, in broad outline, that (a) a strategic plan 2011 to 2020 could serve as a useful frame-
work for the biodiversity-related conventions; that (c) revised and updated NBSAPs should cover the full 
range of activities needed to implement all of the biodiversity-related conventions; that (d) capacity-
building in support of the implementation of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity should be coordinated 
among the biodiversity-related conventions; and that (g) the participants agreed to work together in sup-
port of the UN Decade for Biodiversity. Ibid. (visited 20 September 2012).
54 According to the CITES homepage, the Standing Committee ‘provides policy guidance to the Secretari-
at concerning the implementation of the Convention and oversees the management of the Secretariat’s 
budget. Beyond these key roles, it coordinates and oversees, where required, the work of other committees 
and working groups; carries out tasks given to it by the Conference of the Parties; and drafts resolutions 
for consideration by the Conference of the Parties’. Its membership is reviewed at each COP, and repre-
sents each of the six major CITES geographical regions. CITES, ‘Standing Committee’, available at 
<http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/sc.php> (visited 20 November 2012).
55 See supra note 24.
56 CITES decision 15.10 ‘Post-2010 biodiversity targets’ (2010).
57 See CITES, ‘Fifteenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties, Doha (Qatar), 13–25 March 2010 – 
Strategic matters: Implementation of the Strategic Vision: 2008–2013’, available at <http://www.cites.
org/eng/cop/15/doc/E15-08.pdf> (visited 14 January 2013). 
58 See CITES, ‘Sixteenth meeting of the CoP, Bangkok, 3–14 March 2013 – Strategic matters: CITES 
Strategic Vision’, available at <http://www.cites.org/eng/cop/16/doc/E-CoP16-12.pdf> (visited 26 De-
cember 2012).
59 See CITES, ‘Sixty-second meeting of the Standing Committee Geneva (Switzerland), 23–27 July 2012 
– Interpretation and implementation of the Convention, Compliance and enforcement, National reports, 
Special reporting requirements, available at <http://www.cites.org/eng/com/SC/62/E62-24-02.pdf> (vis-
ited 14 January 2013).
60 Target 1 is that people will be ‘aware of the values of biodiversity and the steps they can take to conserve 
and use it sustainably’; target 2 is that ‘biodiversity values [will] have been integrated into national and 
local development and poverty reduction strategies and planning processes and [will be] being incorpo-
rated into national accounting, as appropriate, and reporting systems’; target 3 is that ‘[i]ncentives, includ-
ing subsidies, harmful to biodiversity [will be] eliminated, phased out or reformed in order to minimize 
or avoid negative impacts, and positive incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity 
[will be] developed and applied, consistent and in harmony with the Convention and other relevant in-
ternational obligations, taking into account national socio economic conditions’; and target 4 is that ‘[g]
overnments, business and stakeholders at all levels [will] have taken steps to achieve or have implemented 
plans for sustainable production and consumption and [will] have kept the impacts of use of natural re-
sources well within safe ecological limits’. All of these targets, under Strategic Goal A, are to have been 
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of biodiversity (Aichi targets 6, 7 and 9);61 status of biodiversity through species 
(Aichi target 12);62 and enhanced implementation via participatory planning, knowl-
edge management and capacity-building (Aichi targets 17, 18, 19 and 20).63 Fur-
thermore, national Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans are effective instruments 
to promote the implementation of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity and the Aichi 
targets, taking into account synergies among the biodiversity-related conventions in 
a manner consistent with their respective mandates.
In 2011, the CITES Secretariat prepared a Draft Guide for Parties on contributing 
to the development, review, updating and revision of NBSAPs.64 In addition, the 
CITES Secretariat has participated in regional NBSAP workshops for Southern 
Africa, West Asia and Pan-Europe.
Within the Convention on Biological Diversity, its COP-10 and COP-11 decisions 
related to NBSAPs, coupled with actions taken by other conventions and the funding 
available through the Global Environment Facility and bilateral or multilateral do-
achieved ‘by 2020, at the latest’. See	CBD, ‘Aichi Biodiversity Targets’, available at <http://http://www.
cbd.int/sp/targets/>. 
61 Target 6 is that ‘all fish and invertebrate stocks and aquatic plants [will be] managed and harvested sustain-
ably, legally and applying ecosystem based approaches, so that overfishing is avoided, recovery plans and 
measures are in place for all depleted species, fisheries have no significant adverse impacts on threatened 
species and vulnerable ecosystems and the impacts of fisheries on stocks, species and ecosystems are 
within safe ecological limits’; target 7 is that ‘areas under agriculture, aquaculture and forestry [will be] 
managed sustainably, ensuring conservation of biodiversity’; target 8 is that ‘pollution, including from 
excess nutrients, has been brought to levels that are not detrimental to ecosystem function and biodiver-
sity’; and ‘target 9 is that ‘invasive alien species and pathways [will be] identified and prioritized, priority 
species [will be] controlled or eradicated, and measures [will be] in place to manage pathways to prevent 
their introduction and establishment’. The intention is that these targets, under Strategic Goal B, will have 
been ‘achieved by 2020’.	Ibid.
62 Target 12, under Strategic Goal C, is that ‘by 2020 the extinction of known threatened species [will have] 
been prevented and their conservation status, particularly of those most in decline, [will have] been im-
proved and sustained’.	Ibid.
63 Target 17 is that by 2015 ‘each Party [will have] developed, [will have] adopted as a policy instrument, 
and [will have] commenced implementing an effective, participatory and updated national biodiversity 
strategy and action plan’; Target 18 is that by 2020 the ‘traditional knowledge, innovations and practices 
of indigenous and local communities relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, and 
their customary use of biological resources, [will be] respected, subject to national legislation and relevant 
international obligations, and fully integrated and reflected in the implementation of the Convention 
with the full and effective participation of indigenous and local communities, at all relevant levels’; Target 
19 is that, ‘by 2020, knowledge, the science base and technologies relating to biodiversity, its values, 
functioning, status and trends, and the consequences of its loss, [will be] improved, widely shared and 
transferred, and applied’; Target 20 is that, ‘by 2020, at the latest, the mobilization of financial resources 
for effectively implementing the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020 from all sources, and in ac-
cordance with the consolidated and agreed process in the Strategy for Resource Mobilization, should 
[have] increase[d] substantially from the current levels[; with this target being] subject to changes contin-
gent to resource needs assessments to be developed and reported by Parties’. Targets 17, 18, 19 and 20 are 
under Strategic Goal E. 	Ibid. See also CITES, ‘Sixty-Second meeting of the Standing Committee, Ge-
neva, 23–27 July 2012 – Strategic matters: Implementation of the CITES	Strategic	Vision:	2008-2013’, 
available at <http://www.cites.org/eng/com/SC/62/E62-13.pdf> (visited 26 December 2012).
64 CITES Notification to the Parties No. 2011/026 (2011) ‘CITES Parties and National Biodiversity Strat-
egies and Action Plans under the Convention on Biological Diversity – A Draft Guide’.
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nors, provide an unprecedented opportunity for more coherent and effective imple-
mentation of each country’s biodiversity commitments ‘on-the-ground’.
4.4 Cooperation mechanisms
The effectiveness of the Biodiversity Liaison Group, mentioned above,65 has been 
strengthened through the development and agreement by BLG members of modus	
operandi.66 Better links with national governments are also anticipated within the 
process.
The Environment Management Group (EMG),67 a coordination group for the UN 
system, and its Issue Management Group on Biodiversity68 produced and are now 
following up the 2010 EMG report ‘Advancing the Biodiversity Agenda: A UN 
System-wide Contribution’.69	This report describes the	contributions to biodiversity 
that are being made by various biodiversity-related conventions and policy sectors.70
Examples of practical cooperation within the biodiversity-related MEA cluster in-
clude the cooperation taking place among the Chairs of the Scientific Advisory Bod-
ies of the biodiversity-related conventions. There have been five meetings to date in 
this regard.71 Here mention could also be made of an arrangement whereby the 
CITES Secretariat gave its documentation officer for ‘loan’ to the CMS Secretariat 
to provide direct assistance with a COP meeting. There are plans for CMS to loan 
one of its staff to the CITES Secretariat for CoP16. Furthermore, Switzerland has 
funded the post of a Liaison Officer, reporting to both UNEP and the CBD, under 
the UNEP’s EMG secretariat in Geneva with a view to promoting the coordination 
of the secretariats of the biodiversity conventions for the implementation of the Aichi 
targets. 
65 See supra	note 12.
66 See CITES, ‘Modus Operandi for the Liaison Group of the Biodiversity-related Conventions’, available 
at <http://www.cites.org/eng/news/sundry/2011/201109-blg-modus-operandi-en.pdf> (visited 21 Janu-
ary 2013).
67 See <http://www.unemg.org/Home/tabid/1120/Default.aspx> (visited 7 June 2012).
68 See  <http://www.unemg.org/MeetingsDocuments/IssueManagementGroups/Biodiversity/tabid/1225/
Default.aspx> (visited 7 June 2012).
69 UNEP, Advancing the Biodiversity Agenda: A UN System-wide Contribution (UNEP, 2010), available 
at <http://www.unemg.org/Portals/27/Documents/IMG/Biodiversity/BIODIVERSITY_Agenda_Cor-
rections_finales_.pdf> (visited 7 June 2012).
70 A useful ‘mapping exercise’ which identifies the contribution that each United Nations agency and con-
vention can make to the different specific Targets is available at EMG, ‘Mapping: Contributions of the 
UN Agencies and Conventions to the Aichi Targets’, available at <http://www.unemg.org/>; link to CBD, 
‘Progress Report on the Contribution of the United Nations System to the Strategic Plan for Biodiver-
sity (2011–2020) prepared by the UN Environment Management Group (EMG)’, available at <http://
www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/cop/cop-11/information/cop-11-inf-05-en.pdf> (visited 21 January 2013).
71 See CITES, ‘Fifth Meeting of the Chairs of the Scientific Advisory Bodies of the Biodiversity-related 
Conventions (CSAB), Dublin, Ireland, 25 March 2012, hosted by CITES’, available at <http://www.cites.
org/eng/news/calendar/2012/CSAB5_agenda.pdf> (visited 20 November 2012).
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MEA focal points72 in UNEP regional offices, such as the Regional Office for Asia 
and the Pacific, and regional bodies like the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Envi-
ronment Programme73 offer other means for biodiversity-related conventions to co-
operate. For example, CITES, Ramsar and CMS have organized back-to-back train-
ing for the UNEP regional focal points for biodiversity-related MEAs.
Perhaps most importantly, states need to be actively supported in bringing together 
different convention focal points in the revision and implementation of their NBSAPs 
and in linking these plans to other processes such as the United Nations Develop-
ment Assistance Framework.74
4.5 Information and knowledge management
The MEA Information and Knowledge Management Initiative75 was established in 
2006 and currently includes 35 MEA secretariats (for global and regional conven-
tions), UNEP and other host organizations as partners. The Initiative can provide 
the foundation for coherent decision-making as well as other practical synergy. It 
may also be able to help governments or secretariats better deal with staff turnover. 
The initiative is increasing technical capacity at the secretariat level to develop inter-
operable systems; the first output is InforMEA,76 which is a service collating and 
making available MEA-related information (for instance, COP decisions, news, 
membership and reports). Other aspects of the Initiative concern online and stream-
lined reporting, and the possibility of direct data entries being made in order to 
obviate the need for classical reporting.
Within CITES, its work on and tools for electronic permitting will enhance the 
management of trade information. This could also assist the implementation of the 
Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing.77 These efforts have been country-
driven and have ensured coherence with United Nations and World Customs Or-
ganization (WCO)78 data models. In addition, it could be mentioned that CITES 
has launched a Virtual College79 on its website. The initiative could even lead to a 
broader ‘university’ amongst biodiversity-related conventions in the future.
The recently established Intergovernmental Science – Policy Platform on Biodiver-
sity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES)80 is expected to assist scientists and policy-
72 Meaning ‘Focal points for biodiversity-related MEAs’.
73 See <http://www.sprep.org/>.
74 See <http://www.undg.org/?P=232> (visited 7 June 2012).
75 See <http://www.cbd.int/mea/ikm/>.
76 See <http://informea.org/>.
77 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising 
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makers in the biodiversity field. The CITES Secretariat and chairs of its scientific 
bodies, together with other convention secretariats and chairs of scientific bodies, 
have actively participated in the discussions on and establishment of the Platform. 
Early in the process CITES formulated the following objectives for the work of the 
IPBES: 
• support and establish a regular process for seeking the views and understand-
ing the needs of biodiversity-related conventions;
• support access to reliable existing knowledge and generate knowledge on and 
facilitate regular assessments of the conservation and sustainable use of key 
species in ecosystems, including their economic valuation;
• [avoid] duplication of the work of existing MEAs; and 
• improve access to knowledge, document best practice in the use of science, 
provide capacity-building support to carry out applied science, and ensure 
that decision-makers and policy-makers benefit from capacity-building on 
how to obtain, interpret and use scientific advice.81
The CITES Standing Committee also agreed that the national Management Au-
thorities should be encouraged to coordinate and enhance information exchange 
with their competent national authority for IPBES.82
The Chairs of Scientific Advisory Bodies of the biodiversity-related conventions 
provided joint input to the April 2012 IPBES meeting. A joint statement was also 
prepared by the convention secretariats and chairs. Additional efforts of this kind will 
be made in the future. For example, the CITES Secretariat, along with other biodi-
versity-related convention secretariats, is planning to attend the first meeting of the 
Plenary for IPBES.
4.6 Outreach and education
The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity and its Aichi targets serve as a basis for the devel-
opment of communication tools capable of attracting the attention of and engaging 
stakeholders. In addition, the Biodiversity Liaison Group83 members have agreed on 
an outreach strategy for the UN Decade on Biodiversity 2011–2020.84 
81 UNEP Plenary meeting to determine modalities and institutional arrangements for an intergovernmental 
science-policy platform on biodiversity and ecosystem services, First session, Recommendations of the 
61st Standing Committee of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora on an Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Serv-
ices, Note by the secretariat, UN Doc. UNEP/IPBES.MI/1/INF/16 (2011), 2. See also CITES, ‘CoP16 
– Strategic matters: Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services’, 
available at <http://www.cites.org/eng/cop/16/doc/E-CoP16-17.pdf> (visited 26 December 2012).
82 See ‘Note by the secretariat’, ibid.
83 See, generally, CBD, ‘Liaison Group of Biodiversity-related Conventions’, available at <http://www.cbd.




In conjunction with the 61st CITES Standing Committee meeting, held in Geneva 
in August 2011, the Government of Switzerland, in partnership with the Japanese 
presidency of CBD COP-10, hosted the official launch of the UN Decade on Bio-
diversity for Europe with the participation of the secretariats of CBD, CITES and 
Ramsar.85
The Baeza Masters and Doctoral courses (in the Management of, Access to and 
Conservation of Species in Trade) offered by the International University of Anda-
lucia in Spain cover both CITES and CBD, as well as the economics of ecosystems 
and biodiversity.86 CITES supports these courses, for instance through scholarships 
funded by several CITES donor Parties and through the Secretariat providing re-
source persons.87
4.7 Conservation and sustainable use of species 
CITES and the Convention on Migratory Species have developed a revised joint 
work plan which includes activities on: harmonized taxonomy; coherence in CITES 
and CMS Appendices (there are apparent inconsistencies in the listing of 17 shared 
species); and coherent/mutually supportive implementation in respect of shared 
animal species such as elephants, gorillas, saiga antelope, and sharks.88
CITES cooperates with the CBD under the Global Strategy for Plant Conservation89 
and will, through ongoing fulfillment of its mandate, contribute to Aichi target 12 
(which is that ‘[b]y 2020 the extinction of known threatened species [will have] been 
prevented and their conservation status, particularly of those most in decline, [will 
have] been improved and sustained’), amongst others. A draft resolution on coop-
eration between CITES and the GSPC has been proposed by the CITES Plants 
Committee for consideration at COP16.90
Another example of practical cooperation in species conservation is the FAO/CITES 
workshop on the conservation and sustainable use of sharks, which was held in 
2010.91 Participants included the CMS Secretariat and experts from various govern-
ments, academia, the private sector and non-governmental organizations. 
85 See, generally, on the UN Decade on Biodiversity, <http://www.cbd.int/2011-2020/>.
86 For a description of these degree courses, see <http://www.unep.org/dec/onlinemanual/Enforcement/
InstitutionalFrameworks/TrainingActivities/Resource/tabid/1096/Default.aspx> (visited 19 June 2012). 
87 See, for instance, CITES, ‘Notification to the Parties: Master’s course on Management, Access and Con-
servation of Species in Trade: the International Framework’, 21 March 2012, available at <http://www.
cites.org/eng/notif/2012/E028.pdf> (visited 20 November 2012).
88 See CITES, ‘Report of the Sixty-second meeting of the Standing Committee, 23–27 July 2012, Strategic 
matters: Cooperation with other organizations: Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species, 
available at <http://www.cites.org/eng/com/SC/62/E62-14-03.pdf> (visited 20 November 2012). 
89 See CBD, ‘Updated Global Strategy for Plant Conservation 2011-2020’, <http://www.cbd.int/gspc/>.
90 See CITES, ‘Twentieth meeting of the Plants Committee, Dublin, 22–30 March 2012 – Global Strategy 
for Plant Conservation of the Convention on Biological Diversity (Decision 15.19): Report of the Work-
ing Group’, available at <http://www.cites.org/eng/com/pc/20/E20-13.pdf> (visited 26 December 2012).
91 See the Report of the FAO/CITES Workshop to Review the application and Effectiveness of Interna-
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Work is ongoing to strengthen links between listed species and protected areas (for 
instance, Ramsar sites, natural heritage sites, biosphere reserves, and migration 
corridors).92
4.8 Economics and trade
A number of activities have been identified that could be jointly undertaken in the 
area of trade.93 These include, for instance, requests for observer status in World Trade 
Organization (WTO)94 bodies, and preparation and distribution of capacity-build-
ing materials on biodiversity and trade.
CITES and CBD have collaborated for some time on the issue of economic incen-
tives. Moreover, CITES and other biodiversity-related conventions have contributed 
to important publications such as the Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity 
report95 and the Green Economy Report.96 
CITES (together with the International Plant Protection Convention,97 the World 
Organization for Animal Health (OIE),98 WTO, FAO, the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO)99 and others) is a member of the Inter-Agency Liaison Group 
on Invasive Alien Species (LG/IAS)100 established under the CBD. In 2012, the 
World Trade Organisation organized a seminar on International Trade and IAS, at 
which it was reported that ‘work on trade rules for protecting plants is starting to 
take biodiversity and the invasion of alien species into account more specifically’; and 
various recommendations were made, including that there ought to be ‘improved 
coordination between ministries and other agencies within countries, between coun-
tional Regulatory Measures for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Elasmobranchs, FAO Fisheries 
and Agriculture Report No. 984 (2012), available at <http://www.cites.org/common/com/AC/26/E26-
06i.pdf> (visited 8 June 2012).
92 See, for instance, CBD, ‘Programme of Work’, <http://www.cbd.int/protected/pow/learnmore/intro/>. 
At CBD COP 11, a side-event on strengthening such links was hosted by CITES, the CBD, the CMS 
and UNEP. See, for instance, CITES, CMS, UNEP & SCBD, ‘Reconnecting Species with Ecosystems: 
Why Species Matter’, 18 October 2012, available at CBD, ‘COP 11- Side Events and Parallel Meetings’, 
<http://webcast.cbdcop11india.in/?page_id=767> (visited 21 January 2013); and ENB/IISD, ‘COP 11 
Side Events Highlight Financing, Reporting, Ecological Networks and Flagship Species’, 19 October 
2012, available at <http://biodiversity-l.iisd.org/news/cop-11-side-events-highlight-financing-reporting-
ecological-networks-and-flagship-species/> (visited 21 January 2013).
93 See, for instance, CITES, ‘Workshop on economic incentives and trade policy’, Geneva 1–3 December 
2003, available at <http://www.cites.org/eng/prog/economics.php> (visited 21 January 2013). See, also, 
Wijnstekers Evolution	supra	note 7, ‘Ch. 23: Economic Incentives and Trade Policy’, 379–382.
94 See <http://www.wto.org>.
95 See TEEB, ‘The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity: Making Nature’s Values Visible’, available at 
<http://www.teebweb.org/>.  
96 UNEP, Green	Economy	Report.	Towards	a	Green	Economy:	Pathways	to	Sustainable	Development	and	Pov-
erty	Eradication (UNEP, 2011), available at <http://www.unep.org/greeneconomy/greeneconomyreport/
tabid/29846/default.aspx> (visited 8 June 2012).







tries and within regions – the agencies’ concerned have diverse responsibilities, from 
law enforcement, customs and trade to agriculture, fisheries, forestry and environ-
mental protection’.101
4.9 Millennium Development Goals, livelihoods and local communities
Some years ago, BLG members agreed on a joint statement about their contribution 
to the Millennium Development Goals102 specifically Goal 1 (poverty reduction) and 
Goal 7 (environmental sustainability).103
CITES, together with CBD, CMS, FAO and the UNEP-World Conservation Mon-
itoring Centre (WCMC),104 provided important technical support when the Govern-
ment of Austria and the European Commission organized a symposium on ‘[t]he 
relevance of community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) to the con-
servation and sustainable use of CITES-listed species in exporting countries’ in Vi-
enna in 2011. A publication has now been produced from the symposium.105 The 
publication contains 22 chapters under the headings, ‘introduction’, ‘global context’, 
‘community-based conservation case studies’, ‘working group reports’ and ‘conclu-
sion’ - according to the concluding chapter, a problem is that there is a lack of un-
derstanding of what CBNRM means, but ‘CBNRM is making an important contri-
bution to conservation efforts in many of the poorer parts of the world’.106 
Another innovative and useful meeting was that of the CBD Liaison Group on 
Bushmeat107 and the CITES Bushmeat Working Group (Central Africa) (CBWG),108 
which was jointly organized by the CBD and CITES Secretariats in Nairobi during 
June 2011 and which involved FAO and other relevant organizations.  The CBWG 
was established in April 2000 and comprises Central African Range States with their 
Wildlife Directors as Members. It has as its goals policy and legislation review, pub-
lic awareness, bushmeat monitoring and information management, wildlife author-
ity structure review, and wildlife management in logging concessions.  According to 
its Report, the meeting allowed the members of the Working Group to ‘harmonize 
101 See WTO, Defending biodiversity from ‘alien species’ — role of trade rules examined’, 12–13 July 2012, 
available at <http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news12_e/sps_18jul12_e.htm> (visited 20 November 
2012).
102 See <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/>. 
103 See CITES, ‘Liaison Group of the Biodiversity-Related Conventions, Fourth Meeting of the Liaison 
Group of the Biodiversity-related Conventions, Bonn, Germany, 4 October 2005 – Report’, available at 
<http://www.cites.org/common/disc/coop/BLG-4-rep-en.pdf> (visited 20 November 2012).
104 See <http://www.unep-wcmc.org/>.
105 Max Abensperg-Traun, Dilys Roe and Colman O’Criodain (eds), CITES	and	CBNRM:	Proceedings	of	an	
international	symposium	on	“The	relevance	of	CBNRM	to	the	conservation	and	sustainable	use	of	CITES-
listed	 species	 in	 exporting	 countries” (IUCN Species Survival Commission No. 46, 2011), available at 
<http://data.iucn.org/dbtw-wpd/edocs/SSC-OP-046.pdf> (visited 20 November 2012). 
106 Colman O’Criodain, ‘CITES and community-based conservation: Where we go from here?’, ibid, 135–
141 at 141.
107 See <http://www.cbd.int/doc/?meeting=LGBUSHMEAT-02> (visited 19 June 2012). 
108 See <http://www.bushmeat.org/about_bctf/engaging_with.../cites_summary> (visited 19 June 2012).
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their approach to the CITES bushmeat issue’; enabled ‘development partners to 
understand the need to support Parties in the search for sustainable solutions’; and 
resulted in the indigenous communities agreeing ‘to help CITES Management Au-
thorities identify the species most consumed as bushmeat by using their traditional 
knowledge’.109 There will be a report of the Central Africa Bushmeat Working Group 
at CITES COP 16 in March 2013.110
4.10 Compliance 
The Guide	to	CITES	compliance	procedures is contained in the Annex to Resolution 
Conf. 14.3 of the Conference of the Parties. The content of and experience gained 
with these procedures has been shared with other convention secretariats and par-
ticipants in compliance-related meetings. CITES and other conventions have also 
contributed to UNEP guidelines, manual and workshops on compliance with and 
enforcement of MEAs.111
In general, governments and secretariats have consulted each other in the develop-
ment of MEA compliance regimes, and they could use similar consultations to ad-
dress potential compliance problems that are identified. There is scope for the bio-
diversity-related conventions to increase their cooperation and synergy in this area. 
An important aspect in this regard is that the sharing of detailed information and 
experience makes the identification and resolution of specific compliance matters 
more precise and effective. For instance, recent CITES regional capacity-building 
workshops are aimed at doing what is needed to withdraw existing trade suspensions 
under the Convention or by the European Union. Importantly, UNEP regional focal 
points for biodiversity MEAs have participated in such workshops. According to 
UNEP, countries and national focal points ‘struggle to implement MEAs in a coor-
dinated manner’ and often, ‘instead of implementing MEAs through a thematic, 
clustered approach’, implement them ‘on an ad	hoc MEA-by-MEA basis’. UNEP’s 
project aims, through its regional focal points for biodiversity MEAs, to ‘assist coun-
tries to fill the implementation gap by providing technical and advisory services for 
synergistic implementation of MEAs’.112 
109 CITES, ‘Report of the Meeting of the Central Africa Bushmeat Working Group held on 10 June 2011 
in Nairobi, Kenya’, available at <http://www.cites.org/eng/com/sc/61/E61-42-A.pdf> (visited 23 Novem-
ber 2012).
110 See CITES, ‘COP 16: Provisional agenda and working documents’, agenda item 70: ‘Report of the Cen-
tral Africa Bushmeat Working Group’, and link to ‘Rapport du Groupe de Travail D’Afrique Centrale sur 
la Viande de Brousse a la 16ème Conference des Parties de la CITES (Thailande)’, not yet in translation, 
available at <http://www.cites.org/common/cop/16/doc/E-CoP16-70.pdf> (visited 21 January 2013). 
111 For more information about the work and publications of UNEP in this field, see <http://www.unep.org/
DEC/support/Cross_Cutting/Compliance_Enforcement.asp> (visited 8 June 2012).
112 UNEP DELC, ‘Implementation of Specific MEA Clusters’, http://www.unep.org/delc/Implementation-
ofspecificMEAclusters/tabid/101087/Default.aspx> (visited 24 November 2012).
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4.11 Legislation and law enforcement
There has been some, but not much, cooperation among biodiversity-related conven-
tions on national legislation.113
CITES has been developing a strengthened Regulatory Services team within the 
Secretariat. This has included the addition of a new Chief of Enforcement Support 
who has a background in policing, and experience with INTERPOL and wildlife; a 
new enforcement support officer who has a national police, intelligence analysis and 
environmental enforcement background; and an environmental prosecutor second-
ed by the Attorney General of Sao Paolo, Brazil.
The International Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime (ICCWC)114 is a ‘col-
laborative effort by five inter-governmental organizations working to bring coordi-
nated support to the national wildlife law enforcement agencies and to the sub-region-
al and regional networks’. The CITES Secretariat, INTERPOL,115 the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC),116 the World Bank117 and the World Customs 
Organisation (WCO)118 are the five organizations involved.119 The initiative continues 
to develop and there is growing interest by other organizations to work with ICCWC.
The Green Customs Initiative has been described as an ‘unprecedented partnership 
of international organizations cooperating to prevent the illegal trade in environmen-
tally-sensitive commodities and facilitation of the legal trade in these’; with its objec-
tive being to ‘enhance the capacity of customs and other relevant enforcement per-
sonnel to monitor and facilitate the legal trade and to detect and prevent illegal trade 
in environmentally-sensitive commodities covered by the relevant conventions and 
[MEAs]’.120 Its partners include the secretariats of certain MEAs (Basel, Cartagena, 
CITES, Montreal,121 Rotterdam, Stockholm), Interpol, the Organisation for the 
113 See, for instance, ibid., where it has been suggested that ‘[a]t the national level UNEP would assist coun-
tries to develop national approaches to synergistic implementation of MEAs, providing policy advice and 
technical assistance and training to national focal points’. Also, see Ramsar, ‘Options for enhanced coop-
eration among the biodiversity-related conventions’, available at <http://www.ramsar.org/cda/en/ramsar-
pubs-cop9-9th-meeting-of-the-17288/main/ramsar/1-30-169%5E17288_4000_0__> (visited 24 No-
vember 2012); and, generally, UNEP/WCMS/Ministry of Environment of Finland, ‘Promoting Synergies 
within the Cluster of Biodiversity-related Multilateral Environmental Agreements’, April 2012, <http://
www.unep-wcmc.org/medialibrary/2012/04/27/8b832e8c/Final_MEA_synergies_27April2012_cover.
pdf> (visited 24 November 2012). 
114 CITES, ‘Information Note: What is ICCWC?’, April 2011, available at <http://www.cites.org/eng/prog/





119 See UNEP/WCMS/Ministry of Environment of Finland, ‘Promoting Synergies’, supra note 113.
120 Green Customs, ‘About Green Customs’, <http://www.greencustoms.org/background/> (visited 24 No-
vember 2012).
121 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Montreal, 16 September 1987, in force 
1 January 1989, 26 International	Legal	Materials (1987) 154, <http://www.unep.org/ozone/>.
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Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,122 UNEP, the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC) and the World Customs Organization.123 CITES has ac-
tively contributed to the Green Customs Initiative through written and electronic 
capacity-building materials and participation in training workshops. In the latter, it 
has emphasized the enhancement of practical skills like species and product identi-
fication as distinguished from general awareness-raising.
5 Conclusion and future actions 
As has been suggested by the CITES Secretary-General,124 Global Biodiversity Out-
look 3 provided a stark reminder of the challenges that lie ahead in achieving the 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity The Secretary-General further sug-
gested that the ‘reality is that there is no one convention or organization that can 
alone address the challenges that lie ahead in achieving the conservation and sustain-
able use of biodiversity’ and that we therefore need ‘all hands on deck’.125
Within its very specific mandate, CITES intends to continue to play its part both 
jointly with other conventions and individually. For example, progress on the align-
ment of the CITES Strategic Vision: 2008–2013 with the Strategic Plan for Biodi-
versity 2011–2020 and its Aichi targets was reported to the 62nd meeting of the 
CITES Standing Committee in July 2012.126 The Report of the Committee will be 
put forward for consideration at the 16th meeting of the CITES COP (Bangkok, 
March 2013).127
The outcomes of the 2010 High-level Retreat mentioned above,128 the joint state-
ment of CITES, CMS, Ramsar and WHC at CBD COP-10129 and the outcomes of 
122 The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) – Chemical Weapons Convention, 
<http://www.opcw.org>.
123 Green Customs, ‘Green Customs Partners’, supra note 120.
124 John E. Scanlon, ‘CITES’ Contribution to the New Strategic Biodiversity Plan 2011-2020 and Aichi 




126 See CITES, ‘Sixty-second meeting of the Standing Committee, Geneva (Switzerland), 23–27 July 2012: 
Analysis of how EMG Member Goals, Objectives, Targets and/or Strategies Contribute to Achieving the 
Aichi Biodiversity Targets Established in the CBD Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020 (COP 
Decision X/2)’, available at <http://www.cites.org/eng/com/SC/62/Inf/E62i-04.pdf>  (visited 24 Novem-
ber 2012). (Note: ‘EMG’ refers to the Environment Management Group, a United Nations system-wide 
coordination body.)
127 See, for instance, CITES, ‘COP 16: Bangkok (Thailand), 3–14 March 2013: Provisional Agenda and 
Working Documents’, available at <http://www.cites.org/eng/cop/16/doc/index.php> (visited 24 Novem-
ber 2012).
128 See supra note 53.
129 ‘Statement to the High-Level Segment of CBD-COP 10 in Nagoya’, 28 October 2010, available at 
<http://www.ramsar.org/pdf/CBD-COP10-joint-statement-281010.pdf> (visited 24 November 2012).
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the Nagoya meeting130 reflect a new era of cooperation among the biodiversity-relat-
ed convention secretariats – one that fully respects the autonomy of each governing 
body and has its sights firmly fixed on more effective on-the-ground implementation 
of the conventions. The joint statement, which was delivered by the Secretary-Gen-
eral of CITES, was an intervention by the Executive Heads of the Secretariats of the: 
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance; Convention Concerning the 
Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage; Convention on Interna-
tional Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora; and the Convention 
on Migratory Species. The four conventions were described as each having ‘a very 
specific mandate’, but, ‘while [being] more targeted in scope than the CBD, [] 
contribut[ing] towards achieving the same objectives of supporting the conservation 
and sustainable use of biodiversity’.131 The conventions were further described in the 
joint statement as being ‘joined by a common objective of supporting the conserva-
tion and sustainable use of biodiversity, and by a collective desire to see more effective 
implementation of conventions at the country level’.132
With these and further synergies, the effectiveness of and coherence among the dif-
ferent conventions can be enhanced, and – with the different conventions playing 
different but cooperative roles within a network – the conservation and sustainable 
use of biological diversity worldwide will be more achievable.
130 See supra notes 49 and 50.
131 See supra note 124.










In previous years, a number of participants on the UNEP – University of Eastern 
Finland (UEF) Course on Multilateral Environmental Agreements requested, 
through evaluation submissions, an ‘introduction to negotiation’ session from which 
they could gain a general understanding of issues relating to multilateral negotiations 
and the related processes. This was regarded as an important way to improve the 
participants’ general understanding of the processes before getting into the details of 
the major negotiation simulation exercises, which are focused on the theme of each 
particular year’s Course. To address this need, the 2011 MEA Course programme 
envisaged a session on a ‘Negotiation Primer’ which included a presentation entitled 
‘Introduction to negotiations’ and a presentation on ‘MEA techniques’. These fo-
cused on the processes of MEA negotiations and the technicalities of negotiations. 
The issues covered by the two presentations included general introductory issues of 
negotiations and issues relating to the conduct of business in MEA meetings; draft-
ing issues; strategic issues; and process issues and violations.2 After the presentations 
the participants broke into three groups for the drafting exercise which is described 
below. 
2 The exercise
The purpose of the drafting exercise was to enable the participants to use the skills 
they had acquired during the introductory presentations to make interventions, sug-
1 Legal Officer, Division of Environmental Law and Conventions, UNEP; e-mail: Sylvia.Bankobeza@unep.
org.
2 See Sylvia Bankobeza, ‘Multilateral Environmental Diplomacy and Negotiations’ in Part I of the present 
Review.
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gest text, review and amend text, add new language, delete and ‘clean up’ brackets. 
In this context, each of the three drafting groups was given a sample decision and 
general ‘guidance information’ to guide its work. The decisions were retrieved, mod-
ified or crafted (either with brackets/blanks/optional words) from previous decisions 
of the Conferences of the Parties relating to MEA synergies: two were posited as be-
ing from the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)3 and the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)4 deci-
sions respectively, and the third was crafted as a UNEP Governing Council decision. 
The decisions are fictitious and made only for the purpose of conducting the drafting 
exercise. 
The drafting groups were constituted randomly by having participants call out num-
bers. The approach taken by each group was to give time to each participant within 
the group to review the sample decision. The next step was for each group to elect a 
Chair from amongst the group members who would invite parties initially to make 
their opening statements expressing opposition or support around square brackets; 
and/or expressing their intention to revise or delete text. The participants were ex-
pected to follow the rules of procedure when seeking permission to speak through 
the Chair. The Chair of each group was under instruction to assert him or herself as 
he or she exercised his or her authority according to the rules of procedure, in order 
to give an opportunity to various speakers within the group to express their views 
and proposals. 
The second round of interventions was particularly related to making amendments 
on the decisions of each group. As a result, parties in several groups made interven-
tions ultimately intended to clean up the texts. Every group was called upon to add 
two or more new paragraphs or texts. In this regard, participants had the liberty to 
suggest new text as long as they could justify this later when reporting back to the 
participants as a whole. 
Each group was given an opportunity to report back on their comments and/or 
amendments to the draft decision before all of the participants. In particular, they 
reported on how the group was organized in making interventions according to the 
rules of procedure; and how they used their skills in drafting to clean up the text. 
There was feedback given from the group, other groups, and overall feedback from 
the organizers for each of the group presentations. Since the decisions were fictitious, 
there were no right or wrong particular answers – all that was required was for a 
group to justify why it chose a particular formulation or text.
3 Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993, 31 Inter-
national	Legal	Materials (1992) 822, <http://www.biodiv.org>.
4 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Washington DC, 3 
March 1973, in force 1 July 1975, 993 United	Nations	Treaty	Series 243, <http://www.cites.org>.
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3 Sample decisions used in the groups
3.1 Sample decision 1




Agenda item 4.3 (b)  
DECISION ADOPTED BY THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES OF AN 
MEA AT ITS FIFTH MEETING
X/5. National reporting: review of experience and proposals for the fifth national 
report
The	Conference	of	the	Parties,
Re-emphasizing [recognising] that national reporting is the obligation for all Parties 
under Article 26 of the Convention, and that timely submission of national reports 
by all Parties is essential for reviewing the implementation of the Convention as re-
quired in Article 23,
1. Adopts the guidelines for the fifth national report as contained in the annex to 
this decision, noting that these may be supplemented by additional guidance 
from its eleventh meeting; 
2. Decides	[urge] that all Parties should [must] [shall] submit their fifth national 
report by 31 March 2014;
3. Encourages [recognizes that] all Parties to prioritize the preparation of their fifth 
national report to enable its submission by the deadline established in paragraph 
2 above, irrespective of the status of submission of reports requested at previous 
meetings of the Conference of the Parties; 
4. Requests [urges] those Parties that expect difficulty in meeting the deadline set 
in paragraph 2 above to initiate the preparation of the report as early as possible 
to ensure that the report will be submitted by the deadline;
5.	 Requests[decides]	the Global Environment Facility to provide adequate and time-
ly financial support for the preparation of the fifth and future national reports, 
and further requests the Global Environment Facility and its implementing agen-
cies to ensure that procedures are in place to ensure an early and expeditious 
disbursement of funds;
6. Invites	[calls	on]	other donors, Governments and multilateral and bilateral agen-
cies to provide financial and technical support to developing countries, in par-
ticular the least developed countries and small island developing States, as well 
as countries with economies in transition, for preparing their national reports;
7. Decides [requests] that the fifth national report should:
(a) Focus on the implementation of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020, 
and progress toward the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, using indicators where pos-
sible and feasible, including application, as appropriate, of global headline indi-
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cators contained in decision VIII/15 and additional indicators that may be 
adopted at its eleventh meeting for measuring progress towards the Aichi Bio-
diversity Targets;
(b)  Quantitative analysis and synthesis on the status of implementation of the Con-
vention in particular the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 and na-
tional biodiversity strategies and action plans; 
10. Decides that the fifth national report will use a narrative format where appropri-
ate, combined with use of suggested tools, including tables, charts and question-
naires for statistical analysis, and that the format for the fifth and sixth national 
reports should be consistent to allow for long-term tracking of progress towards 
the Aichi Biodiversity Targets;
11. Encourages [urges] Parties to continue to involve all relevant stakeholders, includ-
ing indigenous and local communities, in the process of national reporting, and 
to use the report as a tool for further planning and communication to the pub-
lic to mobilize additional support for and participation in activities related to 
implementation of the Convention;
12. Encourages [calls upon] Parties to increase synergies in national reporting under 
biodiversity-related conventions to ensure that national reports comprehen-
sively reflect the national situation and status of implementation, and to avoid 
unnecessary reporting burdens;
13. Requests [urges] the Executive Secretary to prepare a resource manual providing 
further suggestions for the preparation of the fifth national reports, drawing 
upon, inter	 alia,	 experience and examples from the fourth national reports, 
other relevant international work including the outcome of the ad hoc technical 
expert group on indicators. The resource manual should include suggestions for 
common formats, tables and charts to aid reporting. A first edition should be 
available before the end of 2011, and the manual should be maintained up to 
date in the light of new information that may become available. The manual 
should be made available in the six official United Nations languages.
3.2 Sample decision 2
CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES OF AN MEA 
Fifth meeting
London 18–29 October 2000
Agenda Item 4
DECISION ADOPTED BY THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO AN 
MEA at ITS FIFTH MEETING
X/8. United Nations Decade on Biodiversity 2011-2020
The	Conference	of	the	Parties, 




Emphasizing [calling for] the need to achieve the full implementation of the objec-
tives of this Convention and other biodiversity-related conventions, organizations 
and processes, 
Reaffirming the importance of raising public awareness on biodiversity related issues, 
Stressing the need to build on the momentum achieved by the celebration of the 
International Year of Biodiversity, 
1. Invites	 [calls	upon][encourages]	 the United Nations General Assembly to con-
sider declaring 2011-2020 the United Nations Decade on Biodiversity; 
2. Requests [calls	upon] [decides] the Executive Secretary, in cooperation with rele-
vant partners, in particular the secretariats of biodiversity-related conventions:
(a) To encourage full participation of Parties, and all relevant organizations and 
stakeholders in the United Nations Decade on Biodiversity and their support 
for implementation of the Convention and the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 
2011-2020;
(b) To take stock of progress in the implementation of the Strategic Plan, and re-
lated activities of Parties and stakeholders, with a view to including this informa-
tion in the regular reports of the Secretary-General to the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly on the implementation of the Convention;
3. Invites	 [urges]	 the Environment Management Group to facilitate cooperation 
and information exchange among its members in support of the Convention 
and its Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020.
3.3 Sample decision 3
Resolution Conf. 10.4 (Rev. CoP14)*
Cooperation and synergy with the Convention on Biological Diversity
WELCOMING decision III/21 of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention 
on Biological Diversity, which endorsed the Memorandum of Understanding be-
tween the CITES Secretariat and the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity;
EXPRESSING appreciation for the cooperation and cordial relationship that has 
been developed between the two Secretariats;
AWARE that decision III/21 of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on 
Biological Diverisity invites (calls upon) “the governing bodies of biological-diversi-
ty-related conventions to consider the possible contributions of those conventions 
to the implementation of the objectives of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
and to share experience with the Conference of the Parties on, inter alia, successful 
management practices”;
RECALLING that the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity has invited “contracting Parties to relevant biological-diversity-related con-
ventions to explore opportunities for accessing funding through the Global Environ-
ment Facility for relevant projects involving a number of countries, which fulfil the 
eligibility criteria and guidance provided by the Conference of the Parties to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity to the Global Environment Facility”;
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RECALLING also Chapter 38 of Agenda 21 and welcoming decision 19/9c of the 
Governing Council of UNEP which “recognizes the importance of the Programme’s 
role in promoting and supporting cooperation and coordination with and amongst 
environmental agreements and their secretariats” and “requests the Conference of the 
Parties of the relevant conventions to encourage their respective convention secre-
tariats to engage and continue to participate actively in the coordination process”;
NOTING the proposal to explore the revival of the Ecosystem Conservation Group, 
which would meet within the context of UNEP’s meetings on coordination of Sec-
retariats of environmental conventions;
RECOGNIZING that UNEP should undertake such tasks in full cooperation with 
the Conference of the Parties;
THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION
CALLS upon [requests][urges] the CITES Secretariat and the Secretariat of the Con-
vention on Biological Diversity to coordinate their programme activities particu-
larly through the UNEP coordination meetings;
SUGGESTS [calls	upon] that Parties, as appropriate to their national circumstances 
and to encourage synergy, take measures to achieve coordination and reduce duplica-
tion of activities between their national authorities for each Convention;
CALLS upon [urges] Parties to explore opportunities for obtaining funding through 
the Global Environment Facility for relevant projects, including multilateral projects, 
which fulfill the eligibility criteria and guidance provided by the Conference of the 
Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity to the Global Environment Facil-
ity;
RECOMMENDS [Requests] that the Secretariat investigate opportunities whereby 
CITES can become a partner in the implementation of appropriate provisions of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity; and
DIRECTS [Decides] the Chairman of the Standing Committee to transmit to the 
Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity this and other 
relevant Resolutions and Decisions adopted at the 10th and all future meetings of 
the Conference of the Parties.
3.4 Sample decision 4
UNEP Special Session of the Governing Council,
Item 4b
Decision adopted at the Special Session of the Governing Council, Global Ministe-
rial Forum of the Environment;
The	Governing	Council,
Acknowledging that Biodiversity is at the core of human existence; 
Recognizing that biodiversity is threatened by rapid global change and pressure from 
ecosystem degradation and change. 
Also	recognizing that the Biodiversity decade presents an opportunity to address bio-
diversity loss and to raise public awareness for achieving the 2020 biodiversity target; 
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Reinforcing [stressing] the importance of promoting actions at national, regional and 
international levels for achieving biodiversity targets.
Welcoming [takes	 note	 of] the adoption of an international regime on Access and 
Benefit Sharing in 2010;
Encourage, [calls	upon] UNEP to continue to play a leadership role in advancing 
programme activities for developing countries relating to biodiversity and enhancing 
the understanding of the economics of biodiversity and ecosystems services and its 
policy implications, through the initiative on The Economics of Ecosystems and 
Biodiversity. 
Decides to support the efforts of the Executive Director to encourage synergies among 
multilateral environmental agreements in order to improve on environmental gov-
ernance;
Requests [directs] [instructs] the Executive Director to report to the next Governing 
Council on the progress made in the coordination of programme activities of all 
partners in achieving environmental goals and objectives in the field of bio-diversity. 
3.5 Sample decision 5
UNEP Governing Council, Twenty Second Session;
Agenda item 4h
Decision adopted at the twenty second session of the Governing Council, Global 
Ministerial Forum of the Environment.
The	Governing	Council,
Recalling the Nusa Dua declaration adopted during the UNEP Special Session of the 
Governing Council in February 2010;
Recognizing [stressing] the importance of enhancing synergies among biodiversity 
related conventions without prejudice to their specific objectives;
Urges	[calls	upon][encourages] the Conferences of the Parties of biodiversity related 
Conventions to increase efforts towards co-operation taking into account relevant 
experiences from other MEAs;
Welcoming [taking	note	of] [endorsing] the efforts being made by various conventions 
to cooperate with one another during the International Year of Biodiversity,
Encourages [requests] [urges] Governments to provide the necessary support to the 
reforms of the international environmental governance system in relation to MEAs;
Requests [calls	upon]	[directs] [instructs] the Executive Director to continue exploring 
ways and means of streamlining the work of multilateral environmental agreements 
for the purpose of maximizing the use of resources provided.
Decides to mandate UNEP to undertake a study on the ongoing activities coordi-
nated by regional offices that enhance synergies of biodiversity related conventions, 
and to report on the results at the next session of the Governing Council.
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4 Evaluation
Towards the end of the MEA course the overall evaluation sought to obtain the views 
of the participants on whether the drafting exercise component had enhanced their 
expertise. The feedback was to a large extent positive, with most participants finding 
the drafting exercise useful; while others called for more time, emphasis and detail 
to be given to developing drafting skills. There were differences in the experiences of 
the participants in the drafting groups which was a concern for some experienced 
participants who, at times, found it difficult to learn from one another. A useful 
example of this is that at times many questions were raised in a group by less expe-
rienced participants trying to understand processes, such as the UNEP Governing 
Council and how it works, instead of focusing more on the content in drafting the 
decision. 
The drafting exercise was deliberately separated from the major negotiation simula-
tion exercises on the 2011 Course so that the two would not end up duplicating each 
other. In this regard, the aim of the drafting exercise was to prepare the participants 
to negotiate actively during the negotiation simulation exercise session; and to assist 
participants to think carefully about when to propose particular terms/texts or draft-
ing decisions in MEA meetings, knowing that there might well be implications to 
such words, phrases and texts. This was the objective rather than addressing the-
matic issues in detail during the drafting exercise. The issue of redundancy of the 
drafting exercise session because of its not being merged by the negotiation simula-
tion exercise session, which was raised by one participant as a possible concern, 
therefore does not arise. 
To conclude, two of the 21 feedback comments received from the participants in the 
drafting exercise component during the Course evaluation could be highlighted:  
I have learnt a lot on the process…..a lot in terms of language and the process of 
bringing together compromise text.
…While the exercise focused most on drafting in negotiations, the exercise has 
only been useful in terms of drafting documents for meetings. It has also helped 
in providing practical pointers to prepare on to negotiate well and make drafting 
as a strategic tool to advance positions.
These comments, and others not repeated here, clearly articulated the result of the 
drafting exercise component of the 2011 UNEP – UEF MEA Course and provide 
useful feedback toward improving this component of the MEA Course in the future. 
It is hoped also that this brief description of a relatively small exercise might have 
pedagogical value for teaching or working groups – or even individuals – trying to 
improve their understanding of international environmental law-making and diplo-
macy techniques. 
165
workshop on the strateGic plan 
For biodiversity 2011–2020 and the 
aichi tarGets and synerGies
Haruko	Okusu1
1 Introduction
This paper describes a group work exercise undertaken at the Eighth Annual Course 
on Multilateral Environmental Agreements, co-organized by the University of East-
ern Finland (UEF) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). The 
exercise was developed as an interactive skills development aspect within the Course’s 
special theme (‘synergies among biodiversity-related conventions’); and focused on 
considering how synergies might be operationalized by collaboration around the 
Aichi Biodiversity Targets, and the possible roles that different biodiversity-related 
conventions could play.
The Aichi Biodiversity Targets constitute the core element of the Strategic Plan for 
Biodiversity 2011–2020,2 established and adopted at the Tenth Meeting of the Con-
ference of the Parties of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)3 held in 
October 2010, in Nagoya, Aichi Prefecture, Japan. Subsequently, the United Nations 
General Assembly declared 2011–2020 as the International Decade on Biodiversity.4 
1 Biodiversity MEA Focal Point for Asia/Pacific, United Nations Environment Programme; e-mail: haruko.
okusu@unep.org.
2 ‘The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–202 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets’, decision X/2 (2010). 
See, in general, CBD, ‘Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020, Including Aichi Biodiversity Targets’, 
available at <https://www.cbd.int/sp/>. It is intended that the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity will run for 
the decade from 2011 to 2020, and will be the ‘overarching framework on biodiversity, not only for the 
biodiversity-related conventions, but for the entire United Nations system’ – and will include the Aichi 
Biodiversity Targets. Ibid.
3 Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993, 31 Inter-
national	Legal	Materials (1992) 822, <http://www.biodiv.org>.
4 ‘Convention on Biological Diversity’, UNGA Res. 61/161 (2011). See also, for instance, UN News 
Centre, ‘UN launches Decade on Biodiversity to stem loss of ecosystems’, available at <http://www.
un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=40766> (visited 15 June 2012).
166
Workshop on the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020 and  
the Aichi Targets and Synergies
The twenty Aichi Biodiversity Targets and the five Strategic Goals under which the 
targets are grouped5 are thus considered as an overarching framework on biodiver-
sity, not only for the biodiversity-related conventions but for the entire United Na-
tions System. The CBD describes the Aichi Targets as ‘an ambitious plan developed 
with the purpose of inspiring broad-based action in support of biodiversity over the 
next decade by all countries and stakeholders’.6 It calls on Parties to implement them 
by developing national targets using the Aichi Targets as a flexible framework, and 
integrate them into the development/revision of National Biodiversity Strategy and 
Action Plans (NBSAPs). 
Other biodiversity-related conventions, particularly the three other multilateral en-
vironmental agreements (MEAs) of focus during the Eighth UNEP – UEF Course 
(i.e. the Convention on Migratory Species (CMS),7 the Convention on Interna-
tional Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES),8 and the 
Ramsar Convention on Wetlands9) have acknowledged the need for increased col-
laboration. At the time of the UNEP – UEF Course, they had embarked on various 
efforts to facilitate countries in better integrating the issues under each Convention 
into their NBSAP work. For example, CITES and CMS had separately prepared a 
guiding document on the integration of their respective issues into National Biodi-
versity Strategies and Action Plans.
 
It is in this context that the group work exercise was undertaken, to move the discus-
sion forward on tools and methodologies that might help countries get a better idea 
of ways and means to create synergies among biodiversity-related MEAs through the 
use of the Biodiversity Strategic Plan 2011–20 and the Aichi Targets. 
2 Objectives
This group work exercise, which was the first group work in the agenda during the 
two-week course, was intended to act as an opportunity to review the biodiversity-
related MEAs under the focus of this course, recalling and consolidating the presen-
tations given on the subject area for the few preceding days. In particular, the session 
aimed to: 
5 For more on this, see the paper by Marceil Yeater in Part III of the present volume of the Review; espe-
cially at section 4.3 and footnotes 24, 49 and 60–63.
6 ‘Review of Progress in Implementation of the Strategic Plan For Biodiversity 2011–2020, Including the 
Establishment of National Targets and the Updating of National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans’, 
UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/WG-RI/4/2 (2012), 1.
7 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, Bonn, 23 June 1979, in force 1 
November 1983, 19 International	Legal	Materials (1980) 15, <http://www.cms.int>.
8 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Washington DC, 3 
March 1973, in force 1 July 1975, 993 United	Nations	Treaty	Series 243, <http://www.cites.org>.
9 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, Ramsar, 2 February 1971, in force 21 December 
1975, 11 International Legal	Materials (1972), 963, <http://www.ramsar.org>.
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1. review the key mandates and functions the biodiversity-related MEAs play 
in dealing with biodiversity;
2. consider what synergies might look like in practice by assigning possible 
role(s) that the MEAs might play in operationalizing each of the Aichi Tar-
gets;
3. discuss activities that countries might undertake in putting synergies into 
practice; and 
4. allow participants to interact, encouraging them to become comfortable 
discussing openly with each other in a cordial and collaborative atmosphere. 
The exercise aimed also to ‘test-run’ a possible real-world study to map out potential 
detailed roles of biodiversity-related MEAs for each of the 20 Aichi Targets. Such a 
resource-mapping exercise could produce useful guiding material for countries when 
they consider the information, tools, and expertise available for use in translating 
them into national targets, strategy and action plans.
 
3 Background documents
Three background documents were provided to the participants:
(1) Summary of priority linkages between biodiversity-related conventions and the 
Aichi Targets (Annex I to this paper). This document had been originally prepared 
by the author for the purpose of a regional workshop. It was a result of a survey 
conducted amongst biodiversity-related convention secretariats, who were asked to 
select those Aichi Targets with most relevance to their conventions, whether this 
relevance was philosophical, technical, or other. This document aimed to indicate 
which Aichi Targets have the greatest potential for synergies with each MEA, from 
the perspective of the convention secretariats. 
(2) CITES Draft Guide Contributing to the Development, Review, Updating and 
Revision of NBSAPs.10 This Guide was commissioned by the CITES Secretariat to 
‘gather pertinent information that may be required by the abovementioned target 
audience in making decisions on how to integrate CITES targets into the NBSAPs’. 
The target audience includes CITES Management, Scientific, and Enforcement Au-
thorities; competent authorities and scientific institutions of non-Parties; CBD Focal 
Points;11 and Global Environment Facility (GEF)12 Operational Focal Points.13
10 CITES, Contributing to the development, review, updating and revision of National Biodiversity Strate-
gies and Action Plans (NBSAPs): A Draft Guide for CITES Parties (2011), available at <http://www.cites.
org/eng/notif/2011/E026A.pdf> (visited 15 June 2012).
11 For more information, see <http://www.cbd.int/information/nfp.shtml> (visited 17 October 2012).
12 See <http://www.thegef.org/gef/>.
13 For more information, see http://www.thegef.org/gef/focal_points (visited 17 october 2012).
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(3) CMS Guidelines on the Integration of Migratory Species into National Biodi-
versity Strategies and Action Plans.14 This document was commissioned by the CMS 
Secretariat, with an aim to help CMS Parties to become better ‘involved and influ-
ence the coming processes of revising and updating NBSAPs’, as well as to raise 
awareness about ‘migratory species and their importance for biodiversity and ecosys-
tem functioning’ among non-Parties and other non-CMS stakeholders involved in 
the NBSAP processes. This is achieved by providing an overview of the linkages 
between the CBD and CMS in terms of legal obligations, measures and tools, as well 
as a case study of existing NBSAPs and their relevance with migratory species con-
cerns.
The two latter guides were provided as background reading for participants to learn 
in further detail about the two MEAs, and how the conventions see as their roles in 
the Aichi Targets and NBSAP revision process.
4 Introduction to the exercise
The participants were introduced to the group work exercise by first revisiting the 
Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–20 and the Aichi Targets; hopefully appreciating 
the central role these can play as part of the synergy process amongst biodiversity-
related MEAs. They were then asked to vote for one Target per Strategic Goal that 
they felt would be important for their respective countries. At this point, the par-
ticipants were not given explanations as to what the group exercise would entail. 
The voting process was open for a few hours for participants to revisit the Aichi 
Targets if necessary and consider their options. The voting results (see Figure 1 below) 
were then presented to the participants to show the five Aichi Targets selected for the 
group exercise. They were:
 
Strategic goal A. Address the underlying causes of biodiversity loss by main-
streaming biodiversity across government and society.
Target 1: By 2020, at the latest, people are aware of the values of biodiversity and 
the steps they can take to conserve and use it sustainably.
Strategic goal B. Reduce the direct pressures on biodiversity and promote sustain-
able use.
Target 7: By 2020 areas under agriculture, aquaculture and forestry are managed 
sustainably, ensuring conservation of biodiversity.
14 CMS Secretariat in collaboration with Christian Prip, Migratory Species & National Biodiversity Strate-
gies and Action Plans. Guidelines on National strategies and actions for conservation of Migratory Species 




Strategic goal C: Improve the status of biodiversity by safeguarding ecosystems, 
species and genetic diversity.
Target 11: By 2020, at least 17 per cent of terrestrial and inland water areas, and 
10 per cent of coastal and marine areas, especially areas of particular importance 
for biodiversity and ecosystem services, are conserved through effectively and 
equitably managed, ecologically representative and well connected systems of 
protected areas and other effective area-based conservation measures, and inte-
grated into the wider landscapes & seascapes.
Strategic goal D: Enhance the benefits to all from biodiversity and ecosystem 
services.
Target 14: By 2020, ecosystems that provide essential services, including services 
related to water, and contribute to health, livelihoods and well-being, are restored 
and safeguarded, taking into account the needs of women, indigenous and local 
communities, and the poor and vulnerable.
Strategic goal E. Enhance implementation through participatory planning, 
knowledge management and capacity building.
Target 20: By 2020, at the latest, the mobilization of financial resources for ef-
fectively implementing the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020 from all 
sources, and in accordance with the consolidated and agreed process in the Strat-
egy for Resource Mobilization, should increase substantially from the current 
levels. This target will be subject to changes contingent to resource needs assess-
ments to be developed and reported by Parties.
Figure	1.	Results	of	the	voting.
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5 Group work
After the five Aichi Targets were voted for, the participants, who had been carefully 
selected to ensure equal distribution of technical backgrounds and knowledge of 
MEAs, were split into five groups.15 Each group was given an Aichi Target and was 
asked to discuss and consider the items listed below to implement activities in line 
with the given Target.
In terms of discussions at the global/regional levels:
1. Which would be the MEA leading the discussions at the global level (CBD, 
CITES, CMS, or Ramsar)?
2. What other MEAs might participate in the global discussion, and what 
might the nature of their contribution be?
3. What other non-MEA partner(s) might there be; and what might be the 
nature of their contributions (for instance, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), private sector, Indigenous and Local Communities, academia, etc)?
At national level implementation:
1. List 1–5 specific actions to be undertaken at the national level; and
2. Indicate key steps and milestones for measuring those actions.
Participants were given two hours in which to discuss the above issues within their 
groups.
6 Outcome
The outcome of the five groups is summarized and attached as Annex II to this paper. 
The first group considered Target 1, and identified that the CBD would be a suitable 
leading MEA, considering the intended all-encompassing nature of the ‘mainstream-
ing biodiversity’ Target. Partners would include all biodiversity-related conventions, 
taking on various sectoral roles according to their mandates and comparative 
strengths; as well as a wider community of stakeholders spanning all areas of govern-
ment and society. Five specific actions were identified at the national level, these 
being outreach; resource mobilization/consolidation; enhanced stakeholder engage-
ment; incorporation of biodiversity in different government programmes; and devel-
opment of innovative economic tools (for instance, green taxation, eco-labeling, 
national accounting, and corporate social responsibility).
15 The grouping of participants was considered particularly important, as the course participants included a 
number of technical officers from line Ministries dealing with biodiversity-related MEAs who were con-
versant with these; as well as, on the other hand, postgraduate researchers who were relatively new to the 
MEAs and their workings. It was vital that each group had a few ‘experts’ amongst themselves so that the 
discussion would proceed smoothly, but without turning into ‘mini-negotiations’.
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The second group considered Target 7, which mainly deals with the sustainable 
management of agriculture, aquaculture and forestry. Because of the wider nature of 
this Target, the group suggested identifying the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO)16 as a leading agency, rather than a biodiversity-related MEA. Four out of the 
six biodiversity-related conventions were identified as partners – it was not certain 
why the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(ITPGRFA)17 was missing from this list, but it might be because it is not considered 
an MEA and was also not a principal discussion subject on the 2011 Course. The 
Desertification Convention (UNCCD)18 was identified as a sole partner agency to 
the Target. Four actions were identified at the national level, these being: develop-
ment of legislation; creation of an enabling environment; provision of extension and 
capacity-building for sustainable management practices, and livelihood support. 
The third group discussed Target 11, which concerns conservation through pro-
tected areas (and other effective measures). The group identified the CBD as the 
leading MEA, because of the target’s direct link to the three ‘pillars’ of the CBD, as 
well as the active work of the CBD in its Programme of Work on Protected Areas 
(POWPA).19 Many MEAs, both international and regional, were mentioned as po-
tential participating MEAs under this Target. Of the suggested partners, notable are 
the references to private landowners, indigenous and local communities, and biodi-
versity corridors initiatives – reflecting the fact that the success of this target is close-
ly linked to ownership of the area(s) concerned. Five main potential actions were 
identified at the national level, these being: identification of terrestrial and aquatic 
areas; prioritization of key areas; development of political measures; implementation 
of management plans; and mainstreaming of biodiversity and ecosystem services into 
wider landscape and seascapes.
The fourth group considered Target 14, which addresses ecosystem services and hu-
man well-being/livelihoods. The CBD was identified as the leading MEA, while the 
Ramsar Convention, the World Heritage Convention (WHC),20 and the ITPGRFA 
were identified as potential partner MEAs due to their direct links to natural and 
cultural values of ecosystems, ecotourism, and Access and Benefit-Sharing. Other 
partners included agencies with mandates that are more oriented towards poverty 
alleviation and livelihood improvement, such as the United Nations Development 
16 See <http://www.fao.org>.
17 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, Rome, 3 November 2001, into 
force 29 June 2004, <http://www.planttreaty.org/>.
18 UN Convention to Combat Desertification in Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and or Deserti-
fication, Particularly in Africa, Paris, 17 June 1994, in force 26 December 1996, 33 International	Legal	
Materials (1994) 1309, <http://www.unccd.int>.
19 For more information, see <http://www.cbd.int/protected/pow/learnmore/intro/> (visited 16 June 2012).
20 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Paris, 16 November 
1972, in force 17 December 1975, 11 International	Legal	Materials (1972) 1358, <http://whc.unesco.
org>.
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Programme (UNDP),21 the World Bank,22 the United Nations Educational, Scien-
tific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)23 and the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO),24 as well as bodies that concern women and 
Indigenous and Local Communities. Five potential actions were identified at the 
national level, these being: nomination of a national focal point; education and 
public awareness; establishment of a funding mechanism; community-based conser-
vation efforts; and establishment of a national biodiversity database. The actions 
seemed more general and process-oriented than the other targets, perhaps because 
the target was more difficult to tackle than the others.
The fifth group considered Target 20 – the ‘NBSAP resource mobilization’ Target. 
The group identified UNEP and the World Bank as the leading bodies, rather than 
choosing an MEA; perhaps because these agencies are considered to have more mech-
anisms for resource mobilization than do individual conventions, particular consid-
ering that they are both implementing agencies of the Global Environment Facility 
(GEF). The group decided not to name specific agencies or bodies as partners, but 
rather noted the conditions for which partners would be selected. It should be noted 
that ‘high level world leaders’ were identified as important partners that would bring 
the necessary public awareness and political will to mobilize resources. Five potential 
actions were suggested at the national level, these being: ‘scientific approach in taking 
action’; outreach to enhance public-private partnerships; development of clear na-
tional mandates and targets; public awareness; and the establishment of an independ-
ent national biodiversity fund.
7 Conclusion 
This group work exercise entailed the participants undertaking the challenging task 
of tackling individual Aichi Targets in detail, considering how they could be used as 
tools to enhance synergies amongst biodiversity-related conventions and the wider 
sustainable development landscape. The participants were faced with the task of 
gathering their freshly-acquired knowledge on biodiversity-related MEAs, as well as 
their general knowledge on existing UN agencies, NGOs, regional/sub-regional bod-
ies, sectoral bodies and interest groups, to come up with a suggested ‘roadmap’ for 
each Aichi Target at international (‘top-down’) and national (‘bottom-up’) levels. On 
the whole, considering that this was a rather novel attempt to duplicate an issue with 
which MEAs, agencies and countries are themselves wrestling with, the course par-
ticipants did an excellent job in identifying various linkages with partners, and na-
tional implications on policy, legal, administrative, financial, technical and scientific 







The exercise seemed to show that some Aichi Targets can be tackled in a more 
straight-forward fashion than others. For example, in respect of Targets 7 and 11 it 
seemed clear to the participants as to which partners and actions would be needed 
to achieve them, perhaps because they deal with more traditional values (conserva-
tion and food production) or familiar subject areas (protected areas management, 
agriculture/aquaculture/forestry) where the role of biodiversity is clear-cut. On the 
other hand, Target 14 located biodiversity within the much greater context of human 
well-being and livelihoods, which makes it harder to tackle in a technical manner.
The group exercise also highlighted the level of complexity that would involve op-
erationalizing these targets from the ‘synergies’ point of view. This group session 
might be considered as a rough, mock exercise of what country parties may them-
selves need to consider when they attempt to incorporate the Strategic Plan for Bio-
diversity 2011–2020 into their national biodiversity strategy and action plans, taking 
into consideration other national and international stakeholders that might need to 
be consulted in the process. The groups found that there are many stakeholders, 
outside of the immediate biodiversity-related conventions, potentially involved in 
realizing each of the Aichi Targets – in the actual process, even more possible stake-
holders with indirect connections to the Aichi Targets probably exist. 
In reality, the CBD Secretariat has developed a series of capacity-building modules 
intended to guide ‘CBD focal points, biodiversity managers and other national stake-
holders… to the process of preparing National Reports and a National Biodiversity 
Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP) and to making best use of the NBSAP once it 
has been prepared’,25 where it has been described as a ‘cyclical and adaptive process’ 
(see Figure 2 below). In the same module, the general steps required for the updating 
of NBSAPs are described (see Fig. 3). In Module 4, which describes how national 
biodiversity targets could be set in line with the Aichi Targets, the CBD stresses that 
the ‘establishment of national biodiversity targets will require the gathering and/or 
consultation of stakeholders and experts (presumably already identified in previous 
NBSAP processes) in order to draw on their expertise and experience, and impor-
tantly to ensure their buy-in to the targets set’.26
25 CBD Capacity Building Modules, available at <http://www.cbd.int/nbsap/training/> (visited 15 June 
2012).
26 CBD Capacity Building Module 4: Setting National Biodiversity Targets in line with the Framework of 
the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020, including Aichi Biodiversity Targets, version 2.1 (2011), 
available at <http://www.cbd.int/doc/training/nbsap/b4-train-national-targets-revised-en.pdf> (visited 17 
June 2012), 12.
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Figure	 2.	Basic	 Steps	 for	Biodiversity	Planning:	 recommended	 process	 for	 revising	 an	
NBSAP. 27
Figure	3.	Basic	Outline	of	the	typical	steps	for	updating	an	NBSAP. 28
27 Ibid. at 11.
28 CBD Capacity building module 2: The Biodiversity Planning Process: How to Prepare or Update a Na-
tional Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan, version 2.1 (2011), available at <http://www.cbd.int/doc/





Another example of a real-life national biodiversity target and NBSAP development 
process has been formulated by UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre (UN-
EP-WCMC)29 as part of their contribution to the Biodiversity Indicators Partnership.30 
Figure 4 provides the suggested steps, which show in even more detail the levels of 
consultation, information gathering and partnerships that would be required to de-





31 Figure used at the latest BIP/UNEP-WCMC regional training workshops on indicators use in NBSAPs. 
See <http://www.bipnational.net/> for more information on their work.
!
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Lastly, at the time of writing there is an ongoing exercise by the International Union 
for Conservation of Nature (IUCN)32 in cross-mapping the planning documents of 
CITES, CMS, Ramsar, ITPGRFA and WHC against each of the Aichi Targets. This 
was commissioned by the Chairs of the Scientific Advisory Bodies of the Biodiversi-
ty-related Conventions (CSAB)33 to map the biodiversity-related conventions to the 
Aichi Targets, and a draft version will be sent back to the governing bodies of each 
of the Conventions for their consideration. This exercise is considered to provide a 
‘useful analytical tool for existing issues’ within each of the Conventions in their at-
tempt to achieve greater synergy.34 The work of CSAB and its member Conventions 
in this regard should be followed with great interest.
32 See <http://www.iucn.org>.
33 Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Chairs of the Scientific Advisory Bodies of the Biodiversity-related 
Conventions (CSAB), UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/CSAB/4/2 (2011).




Aichi Targets and relevant biodiversity-related Multilateral Agreements:  
Compilation of views from MEA Secretariats (11 May 2011)
Target CMS CITES Ramsar ITPGRFA
Strategic goal A. Address the underlying causes of biodiversity loss by mainstreaming 
biodiversity across government and society
Target 1: By 2020, at the latest, people are aware of 
the values of biodiversity and the steps they can 
take to conserve and use it sustainably.
X X X
Target 2: By 2020, at the latest, biodiversity values 
have been integrated into national and local 
development and poverty reduction strategies and 
planning processes and are being incorporated into 
national accounting, as appropriate, and reporting 
systems. 
X X X X
Target 3: By 2020, at the latest, incentives, 
including subsidies, harmful to biodiversity are 
eliminated, phased out or reformed in order to 
minimize or avoid negative impacts, and positive 
incentives for the conservation and sustainable use 
of biodiversity are developed and applied, consistent 
and in harmony with the Convention and other 
relevant international obligations, taking into 
account national socio-economic conditions. 
X X X X
Target 4: By 2020, at the latest, Governments, 
business and stakeholders at all levels have taken 
steps to achieve or have implemented plans for 
sustainable production and consumption and have 
kept the impacts of use of natural resources well 
within safe ecological limits.
X X X
Strategic goal B. Reduce the direct pressures on biodiversity and promote sustainable 
use
Target 5: By 2020, the rate of loss of all natural 
habitats, including forests, is at least halved and 
where feasible brought close to zero, and 
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Target CMS CITES Ramsar ITPGRFA
Target 6: By 2020 all fish and invertebrate stocks 
and aquatic plants are managed and harvested 
sustainably, legally and applying ecosystem based 
approaches, so that overfishing is avoided, recovery 
plans and measures are in place for all depleted 
species, fisheries have no significant adverse impacts 
on threatened species and vulnerable ecosystems 
and the impacts of fisheries on stocks, species and 
ecosystems are within safe ecological limits.
X X X
Target 7: By 2020 areas under agriculture, 
aquaculture and forestry are managed sustainably, 
ensuring conservation of biodiversity.
X X X X
Target 8: By 2020, pollution, including from excess 
nutrients, has been brought to levels that are not 
detrimental to ecosystem function and biodiversity.
X X
Target 9: By 2020, invasive alien species and 
pathways are identified and prioritized, priority 
species are controlled or eradicated, and measures 
are in place to manage pathways to prevent their 
introduction and establishment.
X X X
Target 10: By 2015, the multiple anthropogenic 
pressures on coral reefs, and other vulnerable 
ecosystems impacted by climate change or ocean 
acidification are minimized, so as to maintain their 
integrity and functioning.
X X
Strategic goal C: Improve the status of biodiversity by safeguarding ecosystems, species 
and genetic diversity
Target 11: By 2020, at least 17 per cent of 
terrestrial and inland water areas, and 10 per cent of 
coastal and marine areas, especially areas of 
particular importance for biodiversity and 
ecosystem services, are conserved through effectively 
and equitably managed, ecologically representative 
and well connected systems of protected areas and 
other effective area-based conservation measures, 





Target CMS CITES Ramsar ITPGRFA
Target 12: By 2020 the extinction of known 
threatened species has been prevented and their 
conservation status, particularly of those most in 
decline, has been improved and sustained.
X X X X
Target 13: By 2020, the genetic diversity of 
cultivated plants and farmed and domesticated 
animals and of wild relatives, including other 
socio-economically as well as culturally valuable 
species, is maintained, and strategies have been 
developed and implemented for minimizing genetic 
erosion and safeguarding their genetic diversity.
X
Strategic goal D: Enhance the benefits to all from biodiversity and ecosystem services
Target 14: By 2020, ecosystems that provide 
essential services, including services related to water, 
and contribute to health, livelihoods and well-
being, are restored and safeguarded, taking into 
account the needs of women, indigenous and local 
communities, and the poor and vulnerable.
XXX
Target 15: By 2020, ecosystem resilience and the 
contribution of biodiversity to carbon stocks has 
been enhanced, through conservation and 
restoration, including restoration of at least 15 per 
cent of degraded ecosystems, thereby contributing 
to climate change mitigation and adaptation and to 
combating desertification.
X
Target 16: By 2015, the Nagoya Protocol on Access 
to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable 
Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization is 
in force and operational, consistent with national 
legislation.
X
Strategic goal E. Enhance implementation through participatory planning, knowledge 
management and capacity building
Target 17: By 2015 each Party has developed, 
adopted as a policy instrument, and has 
commenced implementing an effective, 
participatory and updated national biodiversity 
strategy and action plan.
X X
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Target CMS CITES Ramsar ITPGRFA
Target 18: By 2020, the traditional knowledge, 
innovations and practices of indigenous and local 
communities relevant for the conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity, and their customary 
use of biological resources, are respected, subject to 
national legislation and relevant international 
obligations, and fully integrated and reflected in the 
implementation of the Convention with the full 
and effective participation of indigenous and local 
communities, at all relevant levels.
X X X
Target 19: By 2020, knowledge, the science base 
and technologies relating to biodiversity, its values, 
functioning, status and trends, and the 
consequences of its loss, are improved, widely 
shared and transferred, and applied.
X X X X
Target 20: By 2020, at the latest, the mobilization 
of financial resources for effectively implementing 
the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 from 
all sources, and in accordance with the consolidated 
and agreed process in the Strategy for Resource 
Mobilization, should increase substantially from the 
current levels. This target will be subject to changes 
contingent to resource needs assessments to be 
developed and reported by Parties.
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the banGkok ad hoc Joint workinG 
Group: a multilateral simulation 
exercise oF an ad hoc Joint 





This paper sets out the elements and structure of a negotiation simulation exercise 
which took place during the University of Eastern Finland – UNEP Course on Mul-
tilateral Environmental Agreements, held from 8–13 September 2011. 
The scenario for the negotiation simulation focused on synergies among biodiversity-
related MEAs, and involved both substantive and structural/procedural issues. The 
exercise included negotiations in an Ad Hoc Joint Working Group (AHJWG) on the 
following four issues: 
1 The materials for this simulation exercise are for professional development purposes only. With the excep-
tion of the text of official documents of UNEP and UN bodies, these materials may not be used, repro-
duced, revised or translated in whole or in part, by any means, without written permission of the authors. 
They are not intended to represent any official policy, positions or views of any state, organization, legal 
entity or individual. Any views expressed in these materials are solely those of the authors.
2 Cam Carruthers is a former senior legal officer with the UN Climate Change Secretariat and a former 
Canadian delegate in various MEA fora; e-mail: cam.carruthers@sympatico.ca. Niko Urho is a senior 
officer in the Ministry of the Environment of Finland; e-mail: Niko.Urho@ymparisto.fi. Marko Berglund 
and Simone Schiele also contributed to these materials and, along with the authors, led the exercise. The 
former is a Chief Administrator, International Environmental Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Finland; 
and the latter was at the time a Fellow with the Ecologic Institute, Berlin.
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1. Joint programmatic activities.
2. Joint work plan for national implementation.
3. Joint review mechanism.
4. Establishment of a group on Rules of Procedure.
The first two issues have a substantive focus, whereas the last two issues have a struc-
tural/procedural emphasis. The issues cover a wide range of possible negotiation 
topics but represent only a fraction of areas where there are potential synergies among 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). The issues include some elements 
that derive from recent actual work on enhancing synergies among three conventions 
(PIC,3 POPs,4 Basel5) in the chemicals and wastes cluster,6 but which are considered 
applicable to the biodiversity conventions. The focus of this exercise, however, was 
on issues that had been identified by some Parties as having the greatest potential 
benefits among the biodiversity conventions.7 While the materials for the exercise 
were based largely on the assumption that there was a need to engage on issues re-
lated to synergies, the authors do not mean to suggest that the individual biodiver-
sity-related MEAs have not produced many positive results, nor to suggest that the 
solutions and way forward are clear: far from it!
The negotiation simulation scenario is hypothetical but is based on recent real-life 
discussions on enhancing synergies among key biodiversity-related conventions. The 
scenario was chosen because clustering MEAs to improve coordination and effi-
ciency is of current interest and is an area where progress has been made toward this 
goal. Many countries have voiced interest in pursuing further efforts in this area. A 
supplementary objective of this exercise was that it would produce discussion and 
results, including this paper, which could be of interest particularly for participants 
in the related meetings of the governing bodies of the biodiversity-related conven-
tions. The theme also provided an opportunity for participants to gain perspective 
on the complexity of international environmental law-making in the current inter-
national environmental governance (IEG) -system.
3 Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides 
in International Trade, Rotterdam, 11 September, 1998, in force 24 February, 38 International	Legal	
Materials (1999) 1, <http://www.pic.int>.
4 Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, Stockholm, 22 May 2001, in force 17 May 2004, 40 In-
ternational	Legal	Materials (2001) 532, <http://www.pops.int>.
5 Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Basel, 
22 March 1989, in force 5 May 1992, 28 International	Legal	Materials (1989) 657, <http://www.basel.
int>.
6 See Tuula Kolari and Ed Couzens (eds), International	Environmental	Lawmaking	and	Diplomacy	Review	
2007, University of Joensuu – UNEP Course Series 7 (University of Joensuu, 2008), which has chemicals 
and waste, including synergies issues, as its special theme. 
7 A Nordic Symposium ‘Synergies in the Biodiversity cluster’ held from 8–9 April 2010 concluded that 
focus should be primarily on enhancing synergies on issues of substance, rather than on administrative 
issues, because the secretariats are dispersed and administered by different organizations.
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This paper contains the general instructions and supporting material provided to 
participants. Individual instructions were also provided separately to each negotia-
tion simulation participant.
1.2 Importance of synergies in the MEA context
Environmental policy-making at the international, regional, and national levels has 
traditionally approached problems on a case-by-case basis, addressing individual 
environmental problems as they arise. This has led to there being a substantial 
number of MEAs: altogether there exist almost 500 MEAs, plus nearly 400 amend-
ments and close to 200 protocols, bringing the total number above 1000.8 While 
each agreement may, taken by itself, represent progress in addressing international 
environmental challenges, the larger number of agreements results in challenges re-
lated to coordination and efficiency – if not overlap and duplication.
As a result of ad hoc proliferation of MEAs, there is no overarching structure coor-
dinating their work.9 Instead, in line with the principles of international treaty law,10 
each MEA represents an independent regime to address a specific set of environmen-
tal issues. They all have different, albeit similar, objectives, scopes, subject matters, 
governing mechanisms, types of norms and methodological approaches, with all 
having been developed to meet particular needs. Consequently, the current system 
is characterized by inconsistencies in rules and norms, duplication of effort and con-
flicting agendas, a cluttered and overwhelmed meeting schedule, and solutions that 
lack coherence and efficiency. 
In 2008 the UN Joint Inspection Unit (JIU)11 concluded in a major review of the 
UN’s environmental governance system that ‘the current framework of internation-
al environmental governance is weakened by institutional fragmentation and spe-
cialization and lack of a holistic approach to environmental issues and sustainable 
development’.12 Indeed, the high degree of fragmentation and lack of coordination 
8 See Ronald B. Mitchell and the International Environmental Agreements (IEA) Database Project (2002–
2011), available at <http://iea.uoregon.edu/page.php?query=summarize_by_year&yearstart=1950&year
end=2010&inclusion=MEA> (visited 20 March 2012). As at August 2012 the total number suggested 
was over 1100. See <http://iea.uoregon.edu/page.php?file=home.htm&query=static> (visited 8 August 
2012).
9 Except for general international law which provides rules for handling conflicting norms, e.g. the lex	
specialis rule.
10 See the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna, 22 May 1969, in force 27 January 1980, 1155 
United	Nations	Treaty	Series 331), which reflects the commonly agreed legal principles of international 
treaty law. 
11 See, generally, <http://www.unjiu.org/>.
12 Tadanori Inomata, Management review of environmental governance within the United Nations System. 
Joint Inspection Unit, Doc. JIU/REP/2008/3 (2008), available at <http://www.unjiu.org/data/re-
ports/2008/en2008_3.pdf> (visited 20 March 2012). See also Tadanori Inomata, ‘Building Institutional 
and Managerial Foundations for Environmental Governance with the United Nations System – Towards 
a New Governance Structure for Environment Protection and Sustainable Development’, Tuula Honko-
nen and Ed Couzens (eds), International	Environmental	Law-making	and	Diplomacy	2009, University of 
Eastern Finland – UNEP Course Series 9 (University of Eastern Finland, 2010) 45–64.
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has led to reduced institutional performance to deal with environmental problems. 
The JIU has calculated that the administrative cost for the IEG-system is up to four 
times higher compared to other international governance areas.13 
Negotiations related to synergies may take place at the international, regional or 
national levels. At the international level, MEA secretariats play an important role in 
enhancing cooperation and coordination among MEAs. However, the legal author-
ity required for significant progress rests with the Parties to the conventions. This 
implies that a Party-driven synergies-process could achieve more profound results 
than limiting efforts to the secretariat level. A Party-driven process also allows for the 
addressing of structures and organizations to be based on national needs; and, there-
by, enables more focused identification of solutions for facilitating national imple-
mentation. The advantage of such an approach was clearly demonstrated by the re-
cent and on-going successful work on enhancing synergies among three conventions 
in the chemicals and waste cluster (PIC, POPs and Basel) (see further section 3.1.2). 
The biodiversity-related conventions could represent the next developmental step for 
clustering. 
1.3 Importance of procedures and rules of procedure in MEA negotiations
In MEAs, decision-making practices and rules of procedure are set up to govern 
activities in decision-making bodies, based on a provision in the MEA itself which 
usually stipulates that Parties are to agree on such rules. A conference or meeting of 
the Parties (COP, MOP) serving as the supreme decision-making body of the agree-
ment takes decisions to implement the agreement; and reviews and evaluates imple-
mentation of the agreement, including related decisions. 
Rules of procedure generally regulate the activities of decision-making bodies includ-
ing subjects such as agendas, conduct of business, decision-making, languages, mem-
bership, officers, rule amendments, and secretariat functions. Among other things, 
the rules reflect fundamental principles of transparency and procedural fairness, the 
latter of which is based largely on the principle of equality of sovereign states. An-
other principle reflected in the rules is that in international law, authority is ulti-
mately derived from states. While the fundamental principles are common, each set 
of rules is adapted to its specific context. A good knowledge of the rules of procedure 
of the forum a negotiator works in is invaluable. Knowing the rules means knowing 
what one can do to advance or protect one’s position, and how to do it.14  
However, all too often negotiators in multilateral environmental fora have only a 
limited awareness of the rules that define the arena in which they operate. The rules 
13 Ibid. at 11.
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and related issues may seem either mundane or arcane, and only incidental to the 
more compelling questions of substance. Negotiators are often more concerned with 
strategy or technical priorities. Some may not even be aware of the influence of the 
rules on the process, which can be subtle. Even when no reference is made to the 
rules they have a profound influence on outcomes. A key example is decision-mak-
ing: votes are generally avoided, but whether and how consensus is obtained on a 
given issue may depend to some degree on the understanding of how Parties would 
vote if they did vote. Negotiators who fail to understand the underlying dynamics 
on such issues can make serious strategic errors.
Indeed, ignorance of the rules can lead to major failures and frustrations with the 
process arising, especially since problems may be discovered only after key decisions 
have been taken. It is difficult, if not practically impossible, to undo multilateral 
process decisions once these have been taken. So, it is important to consider strategic 
issues about decision-making processes and relevant rules early on in any multilat-
eral endeavour. Once a process is underway, it may result in a proliferation of sub-
processes based on a set of interrelated decisions. While these processes are suscepti-
ble to congestion and inertia, it is also possible that they can move toward an 
unexpected direction or conclusion very quickly, with major outcomes in the bal-
ance. 
The simulation exercise was designed, in part, to open up certain procedural issues 
so that participants could strengthen their knowledge and understanding of the 
procedures and rules as tools for more effective and efficient negotiation of individ-
ual and common objectives. The idea was for participants to negotiate conceptual 
ownership of procedures while they negotiate practical textual solutions. The premise 
was that the procedures and rules constitute a code which reflects the values and 
interests of Parties and informs the way negotiators work together to take decisions. 
The rules frame what happens; who can make it happen; and when, where and how 
it might happen. The higher the level of common understanding and agreement of 
the rules in any given body, the more efficiently and effectively that body can operate 
and reach agreement to attain common objectives.
1.4 Simulation objectives
This negotiation simulation exercise was focused on the negotiation of issues related 
to synergies and procedures in a MEA context, in this case a hypothetical meeting 
of an Ad Hoc Joint Working Group (AHJWG) of six biodiversity related MEAs. The 
general objectives were to promote among participants, through simulation experi-
ence:
1) understanding of the challenges and opportunities related to synergies among 
MEAs, both in general and in a specific MEA context; 
192
The Bangkok Ad Hoc Joint Working Group: A Multilateral Simulation Exercise  
of an Ad Hoc Joint Working Group Meeting of the Biodiversity-related Conventions
2) understanding of the principles and practices of multilateral negotiation and 
appreciation of the value and role of the rules of procedure;
3) familiarity with specific substantive and drafting issues; and
4) discussion and appreciation of different perspectives on both MEA synergies and 
multilateral procedures.
Within the exercise, the specific objective of the AHJWG meeting was to produce 
agreement on four issues: i) joint programmatic activities, ii) a joint work plan for 
national implementation, iii) a joint review mechanism and iv) rules of procedure 
for the AHJWG.   
1.5 Scenario
The scenario was set as the first meeting of the Ad hoc Joint Working Group 
(AHJWG) on enhancing cooperation and coordination among the six biodiversity-
related conventions. The negotiation simulation scenario and the issues therein are 
hypothetical, but based on actual and recent discussions on enhancing synergies 
among the following six biodiversity-related conventions15: 
1) Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD);16
2) Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora (CITES);17
3) Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS);18
4) Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance (Ramsar);19
5) Convention Concerning the Conservation of the World Cultural and Natural 
Heritage (WHC);20 and
6) International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(ITPGRFA).21
15 These six listed conventions are generally referred as ‘the biodiversity-related conventions’, and have been 
proposed to be included in the biodiversity cluster. For further information, see Niko Urho: Possibilities	
of	Enhancing	Cooperation	and	Coordination	among	MEAs	in	the	Biodiversity	Cluster, TemaNord 2009:537, 
(Nordic Council of Ministers, 2009), available at <http://www.biodivcluster.fi/pdf/Possibilities%20
on%20enhaning%20cooperation.pdf> (visited 20 March 2012).
16 Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993, 31 Inter-
national	Legal	Materials (1992) 822, <http://www.biodiv.org>.
17 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Washington DC, 3 
March 1973, in force 1 July 1975, 993 United	Nations	Treaty	Series 243, <http://www.cites.org>.
18 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, Bonn, 23 June 1979, in force 1 
November 1983, 19 International	Legal	Materials (1980) 15, <http://www.cms.int>.
19 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat, Ramsar, 2 Febru-
ary 1971, in force 21 December 1975, 11 International Legal	Materials (1972), 963, <http://www.ramsar.
org>.
20 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Paris, 16 November 
1972, in force 17 December 1975, 11 International	Legal	Materials (1972) 1358, <http://whc.unesco.
org>.
21 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, Rome, 3 November 2001, into 
force 29 June 2004, <http://www.planttreaty.org/>.
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The premise of the scenario was that there was an agreement by the Parties of the six 
conventions to meet jointly three times to consider joint programmatic and proce-
dural issues. The exercise was to begin with the first meeting of the AHJWG and 
proceed to four drafting groups. It was assumed that, informally, the AHJWG Co-
Chairs had already identified four priorities that were different in kind, but suscep-
tible to be negotiated together as part of a ‘Strong-start package’ on synergies. 
The AHJWG had two Co-Chairs, four Vice-Chairs (representing the six MEAs) and 
one rapporteur. The two Co-Chairs were elected by Parties at the opening plenary: 
one representing a developing country and one a developed country. In addition, the 
drafting groups each had one facilitator and one rapporteur. The four Vice-Chairs 
served as facilitators. The elections took place in the initial plenary meeting (partici-
pants were encouraged to consult ahead of time).
Draft decisions and conclusions (see below) were provided, purportedly prepared by 
the Co-Chairs for the consideration of the Parties. The draft texts address issues of 
synergies in implementation, as well as procedural issues related to the joint opera-
tion of the Parties in the AHJWG. 
Each drafting group was asked to address at least the issue of the substance of the 
draft text before it, and possibly also the form (decision or conclusion). Four drafting 
groups were envisaged for issue clusters, as follows:
A) Joint activities (subsection 3.2.1).
B) Joint work plan for national implementation (subsection 3.2.2).
C) Joint review mechanism / joint advisory board (subsection 3.2.3). 
D) Establishment of a group on rules and procedure (subsection 3.2.4).
The main features of the terms of reference for the Ad Hoc Joint Working Group are 
listed below: 
1. The Ad Hoc Joint Working Group shall agree upon joint recommendations on 
enhanced cooperation and coordination among the six conventions at the ad-
ministrative and programmatic levels to be forwarded to the next meeting of the 
Conference of the Parties to each convention for adoption by the Parties.
2. Rules for participation in the Ad Hoc Joint Working Group are listed below: 
a) The Ad Hoc Joint Working Group shall consist of 30 representatives. Each 
convention shall nominate 5 representatives selected from amongst the Par-
ties to that convention to participate in meetings of the Ad Hoc Joint Work-
ing Group, giving due consideration to the five United Nations regions. 
b) Each convention shall be responsible for meeting the costs of participation 
of its representatives who are from developing countries and from countries 
with economies in transition.
3. The Ad Hoc Joint Working Group shall determine its own rules of procedure.
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1.6 Introduction to the exercise
Each participant was asked to play a specific role, representing either a Party or, de-
pending on the number of participants, a Secretariat official. Participants represent-
ing Parties were given a background focused on one particular Convention, but had 
to represent their national interests on all six agreements. Participants were encour-
aged to play their part in the overall scenario for the simulation, following both their 
general and individual instructions. Where possible, it was suggested that they make 
alliances and develop coordinated strategies to intervene in support of others, or to 
take the lead in other cases. Some roles, including the Co-Chairs, Vice-Chairs and 
the Secretariat officials, played a resource function and were to make themselves use-
ful to the process – while maintaining their neutrality. Those playing such roles were 
to serve all participants and work for a positive outcome in addition to their indi-
vidual instructions (Chairs and facilitators were encouraged to signal to the other 
Parties when they took up their partisan roles, e.g. by prefacing an intervention with 
the words: ‘I’m taking off my Chair’s hat . . . ’). 
Participants were asked to keep in mind their interests and positions with respect to 
all four issues, but to focus on the issue assigned to their drafting group. The groups 
were asked to narrow their focus as quickly as possible to identify issues to be ad-
dressed, and to dispose of issues expeditiously where possible. Participants were also 
asked to work hard to achieve their objectives. 
Participants were strongly urged to follow their instructions, and to elaborate interven-
tions with a compelling rationale to advance their positions, for example by drawing 
on context provided by their twin (see below for an explanation of ‘twinning’). Par-
ticipants were also encouraged to take the initiative and to be inventive, to intervene 
in drafting groups and in plenary even where they had no specific instructions on a 
particular issue. Participants representing Parties were strongly encouraged to seek sup-
port from other participants for, and identify opposition to, their positions, including 
positions discussed in drafting groups in which they did not participate. To this end, 
participants were asked to consider developing joint drafting proposals and making 
interventions on behalf of more than one Party, and it was suggested that they might 
wish to consider using regional and negotiation groups as a point of departure. Par-
ticipants were also asked to think about issues for discussion in the post-mortem fol-
lowing the exercise, including issues of both process and substance within the exercise, 
as well as issues relating to the structure and management of the exercise itself.
The simulation was designed to focus on both the negotiation process and relevant 
substantive issues, and it was designed to be difficult, with failure to reach agreement 
a real possibility. It was noted that, unavoidably, a random distribution of positions was 
likely to result in making some country Parties appear more or less constructive, and 
indeed for simulation purposes some positions were designed to cause difficulties. It 
was highlighted that the positions in individual instructions were developed and as-
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signed randomly, and that they were entirely hypothetical and not intended to reflect 
the specific positions of particular Parties, or the views of organizations or individuals. 
It was explained that individual delegates often face situations similar to this exercise, 
where they have little opportunity to prepare, but still need to define objectives and 
develop a strategy. It was suggested that informal diplomacy is where most progress 
toward agreement on concepts is made, while drafting group and plenary discussion 
is often required for agreement on specific texts. It was also noted that drafting often 
involves a fine balance between accommodation and clarity; that decision-making 
on final text in plenary may be pro forma, but that there can be surprises. It was 
particularly highlighted that decisions in the plenary are critical and can sometimes 
move very quickly, at times moving back and forth on an agenda, so that being pre-
pared with an effective intervention at any moment is essential.  
 
The importance of the roles of the two Co-Chairs, four Co-Chairs/drafting group 
facilitators and the Secretariat were also put forward for consideration, particularly 
with respect to setting up and managing the process – and managing time – to pro-
duce agreement. Those in these roles were encouraged to consult broadly, including 
among themselves but also with Party representatives (also noting that the simulation 
organizers might be able to provide advice acting as senior Secretariat officials). Fi-
nally, it was suggested that a key factor in success would be the thoughtful organiza-
tion of the work of the groups, including strategic management of how the smaller 
drafting groups and the plenary sessions function and were linked.  
2 Instructions
2.1 Individual instructions
The dynamic core of the simulation was provided in confidential individual instruc-
tions of 1–2 pages in length for each participant. They provided very brief positions 
and fall-back positions on each of the issues being negotiated, but in most cases with 
no rationale or strategy or at most a vague strategy. This forced each participant to 
deepen their understanding of the subject area and to develop an own strategy to 
support their argumentation. It was explained that in some cases the instructions 
might seem contradictory, which happens in real life. For the exercise, instructions 
were provided in a simplified form rather than that of official delegation instructions. 
In some cases, instructions stipulated that a position could not be abandoned for a 
fall-back without consulting a designated senior official in the state’s capital. For the 
purposes of the simulation the simulation coordinators served in that capacity. For 
further guidance in dealing with procedural and strategic issues, participants were 
referred to the MEA	Negotiators’	Handbook.22	
22 Cam Carruthers (ed.), Multilateral	Environmental	Agreement	Negotiator’s	Handbook,	University of Joensuu 
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2.2 General instructions
Participants were also given a list of roles and group memberships, as well as the fol-
lowing general instructions:
1) At a minimum, please review the general and individual instructions and the key 
simulation documents (subsection 3.1) as well as the rules of procedure for the 
MEA associated with your role. The remaining material is for reference/use as 
needed, but should not be overlooked.23
2) Each participant will be assigned a role as a representative of a Party, or as a Sec-
retariat official.24 Additional confidential individual instructions will be pro-
vided to each participant.
3) Participants	representing	Parties	have been sent with full credentials from their 
governments to participate in the meeting of the AHJWG, using their confiden-
tial individual instructions as a guide.25 Parties should	do	their	best	to	achieve	the	
objectives	 laid	 out	 in	 their	 instructions. They should develop a strategy and an 
integrated rationale to support their positions. Do not share your confidential 
individual instructions with other participants. Do not concede to a fall-back 
position without a serious effort to achieve your primary objective (and not on 
the first day!). If possible, consult with others before the session, to identify and 
coordinate with those who have similar instructions, and even prepare joint in-
terventions. You	should	build	alliances	and	try	 to	 support	anyone	with	a	 similar	
position	who	is	out-numbered.	You	should	try	to	identify	participants	with	opposing	
views,	and	influence	them	both	in	formal	negotiations,	as	well	as	in	informal	settings.	
At	any	time,	you	may	receive	 supplementary	instructions.	Participants should, of 
course, always be respectful of each other’s views and backgrounds. 
4) Participants playing the roles of Secretariat officials will support the Co-Chairs, 
Vice-Chairs and rapporteurs, and join specific drafting groups, in an advisory 
role only. Secretariat officials support the process and the Parties in any appropri-
ate manner. Secretariat officials support the drafting groups and work directly 
with the Co-Chairs, Vice-Chairs/facilitators and rapporteurs, and respond to 
requests from Parties.
5) The Simulation Coordinators may, as needed, play the role of a Senior UNEP 
official and/or one of the designated senior government officials in a state’s capi-
tal authorized to provide supplementary instructions to their delegations. The 
Simulation Coordinators will remain – as far as possible – outside of the simula-
– UNEP Course Series 5 (2nd ed., University of Joensuu, 2007). The Handbook is available in both 
English and French at <http://www.unep.org/dec/docs/MEAs_Negotiators_Handbook.pdf> and <http://
www.unep.org/dec/PDF/MEA_Negotiators_Handbook_French.pdf>.
23 See also ibid., in particular, sections 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.6, 2.4, 4.3 and 5.
24 There were no IGO or NGO roles in this exercise, their exclusion based largely on feed-back from par-
ticipants in other simulations who had indicated that they found such roles very limited.
25 Confidential individual instructions have been developed without reference to actual country positions, 
and it is not necessary for this simulation that participants attempt to follow positions in the real nego-
tiations.
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tion and should not be consulted unless necessary. Questions on procedure, etc. 
should a priori be addressed to the Co-Chairs, drafting group facilitators or 
Secretariat officials.
6) In the AHJWG plenary, the Co-Chairs sit at the head of the room, with the 
Secretariat officials beside them. Participants were provided with the opportu-
nity to select the appropriate Party ‘flag’, based either on the nationality of their 
twin, or if that is taken, then to choose another flag, after discussion with their 
twin. The term ‘flag’ refers to the nameplate provided for each Party (fold it twice, 
so the name is in the mid-panel). To speak, please raise your ‘flag’ and signal the 
Secretariat official keeping the speakers’ list. Secretariat Officials will have their 
own name plates.  
7) The AHJWG will begin work in plenary. As explained in subsection 1.5, the 
AHJWG will establish four drafting groups (Groups A–D). 
8) The first task for Parties is to elect two Co-chairs for the AHJWG and four Vice-
Chairs, one from each of the Conventions. The usual practice is that developing 
county Parties and developed country Parties are equally represented as Co-
Chairs. For this exercise, given the fact that no voting rules have been adopted 
under the AHJWG (see subsection 3.2), selection should be based on informal 
consultations, and decided by consensus.
9) When the AHJWG breaks into the four drafting groups, please join the group 
identified in your individual instructions. The groups will operate much like an 
informal drafting group (see the MEA	Negotiator’s	Handbook).
10) The four drafting groups must reach agreement on what to report back to the 
plenary. Each Vice-Chair will act as a facilitator in one of the drafting groups to 
manage the meeting. Each group will select a rapporteur to compile a report of 
the discussions (see the MEA	Negotiator’s	Handbook on drafting, especially on use 
of brackets).
11) Once elected, Co-Chairs and Vice-Chairs/facilitators must play their roles 
throughout the negotiation simulation exercise, and generally refrain from open-
ly taking positions, and only do so when explicitly indicating that they are ‘taking 
their Chair’s hat off’ or similar sentiment. 
12) Please use only the materials provided, as well as advice and information from 
other participants, and do not be distracted by internet resources or use any prec-
edent found there or elsewhere (even though this is often a good idea in real life!).	 
13) The exercise will take place over a two-day period. Participants are encouraged 
to consult informally before the exercise for nominations to the Co-Chair/Vice-
Chair positions and in the evening of the first day to form alliances and broker 
solutions (as often happens in real life).
2.3 Twinning 
Each participant was assigned a role as a representative of a Party or Secretariat par-
ticipant; and the former were eligible be chosen to play the role of Co-Chair, Vice-
Chair/facilitator or rapporteur (see above subsection 2.2). All participants also played 
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a role based on the personal background and experience of one or more co-partici-
pants with whom they had been ‘twinned’. Participants were encouraged to consult 
their ‘twin’ or twins, in order to draw on their actual perspectives, in order to de-
velop a rationale of their interventions and put their negotiation instructions in the 
context of the country they represented. 
As noted above, the positions of Parties in this exercise were not intended to reflect 
the actual positions of any State. Accordingly, participants were asked not to seek 
information or advice on actual positions or political views of governments, but 
rather to seek advice on and support for their hypothetical positions by drawing on 
any relevant environmental, social, cultural or economic information their twin 
could provide. Twinning was also intended to promote general understanding of how 
different perspectives might affect approaches to substantive and process issues – and 
to add some dramatic interest to the scenario. 
In addition, participants were encouraged to draw on a cultural reference, local say-
ing or an anecdote from their twin to illustrate a point related to the substance or 
process of the negotiations, as negotiators often do. Participants were asked always 
to be respectful of each other’s views and backgrounds. All participants were also 
provided with ‘flags’ or nameplates for use in the formal meeting. Participants in the 
role of government representatives were asked to select the flag of their ‘twin’ or if 
that flag had already been selected, the flag of a country from the same region or 
negotiating group. Individual instructions were developed without reference to ac-
tual country positions, and so it was not necessary for participants to attempt to 
follow such positions. It was suggested, however, that participants develop their 
positions and interventions with the interests of the regional group of their twin in 
mind.
Each participant was twinned with another participant whose background or experi-
ence was different from their own. Thus, as many developing country participants as 
possible were twinned with participants from a developed country, and vice versa. 
Each was then asked to take on the role of representing their twin’s Party, with their 
positions informed by the knowledge and perspective of their twin. As there were 
more developing country participants than developed country participants, some of 
the latter were twinned with each other. In such cases, each participant was from a 
different region, so that they had the opportunity to learn about another regional 
perspective. The instruction sets and roles were otherwise assigned randomly, except 
for minimal adjustments designed to promote regional, gender and sectoral balance 
in the exercise. Individual instructions were also provided to each participant in a 
numbered set of individual instructions. The positions reflected in these instructions 
were entirely random. No attempt was made to have instructions align with actual 
positions of Parties on the issues, and any linkages to actual positions were entirely 
by chance.  So, when providing advice and perspective to their twin, each participant 
was essentially asked to take the positions provided in the materials as given, and then 
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provide country specific information that could be used to support that position. In 
this way, participants might also gain an alternative (and random) perspective on 
their own national positions.
3 Key simulation and official documents
Participants were provided with a number of documents for the simulation, includ-
ing the following backgrounder, Co-Chairs’ texts; as well as actual official texts, in-
cluding selected and abridged rules of procedure for each of the six participating 
conventions (in particular, those which relate to participation, conduct of business, 
voting and language).26,27, 28, 29, 30, 31. 
3.1 Backgrounder 
The emergence of the six main biodiversity-related conventions is summarized below, 
after which clustering of biodiversity-related MEAs in discussed in the context of the 
IEG-process. Annex 1 provides more detailed information about the main charac-
teristics of the biodiversity-related MEAs. In addition, annex 2 provides further in-
formation about the governing bodies of the biodiversity-related MEAs.
26 Selected Rules of Procedure for the Convention on Biological Diversity, (Rules 6,7, 22, 29, 31, 33, 37, 
39, 40, 52), Annex to Decision I/1 ‘Rules of procedure for the Conference of the Parties’ (1994) and 
Decision V/20 ‘Operations of the Convention’ (2000), abridged for the exercise.
27 Selected Rules of Procedure for the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora (Rules 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12, 16, 17, 20, 21, 24, 26, 30), CITES	Rules	of	Procedure	of	the	
Conference	of	the	Parties, as amended at the 14th meeting, The Hague, 2007; and as abridged for the ex-
ercise.
28 Selected Provisional Rules of Procedure for the Convention on Migratory Species, (Rules 1, 2, 9, 14–17, 
19, 20, 23, 25); Provisional Rules of Procedure, 10th Meeting of the Conference of the Parties, Doc. 
UNEP/CMS/Conf.10.5 (2011), as abridged for this exercise.
29 Selected Provisional Rules of Procedure (6, 7, 26, 29–33, 37, 38, 40, 52, 53) for the Ramsar Convention 
on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar) Adopted by the 10th 
Meeting of the Conference of the Contracting Parties, Changwon, Republic of Korea, 29 October 2008, 
abridged for this exercise. See <http://www.ramsar.org/cda/en/ramsar-documents-cops-cop10-10th-meet-
ing-of-the-19392/main/ramsar/1-31-58-127%5E19392_4000_0__> (visited 26 October 2012).
30 Selected Rules of Procedure for the Convention Concerning the Conservation of the World Cultural and 
Natural Heritage (1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 12), adopted by the Second General Assembly of States Parties (Paris, 
24 November 1978) and amended at the Tenth General Assembly of States Parties (Paris, 2–3 November 
1995), Thirteenth General Assembly of States Parties (Paris, 30–31 October 2001), Fourteenth General 
Assembly of States Parties (Paris, 14–15 October 2003), Sixteenth General Assembly of States Parties 
(UNESCO, 24–25 October 2007) and Seventeenth General Assembly of States Parties (UNESCO, 
23–28 October 2009). Articles 13(6) and 13(7) concerning the voting papers have been aligned with Art. 
13(4), amended by the Tenth General Assembly of States Parties (2–3 November 1995), in accordance 
with the decision of the Bureau of the World Heritage Committee at its 23rd session (5–10 July 1999); 
abridged for this exercise.  See <http://whc.unesco.org/en/80/error=forgotlogin> (visited 26 October 
2012).
31 Selected Rules of Procedure for the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agri-
culture (4, 5, 7, 9, 11, 12), Doc. IT/GB-1/06/Report (2006), Appendix D, abridged for this exercise.
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3.1.1 The emergence of biodiversity regimes
The current global governance system for biodiversity has emerged during the past 
half century. Solutions to address biodiversity loss have been identified and developed 
in an ad hoc and incremental fashion as different aspects of the problem have come 
to light and opportunities for action have been identified. It has also been necessary 
to concentrate on specific issues (for instance, access and benefit-sharing of genetic 
resources) to keep the complexity of the negotiations manageable. As a result, there 
are today more than 150 global or regional multilateral environmental agreements 
that concern biodiversity at some level.32 The scope and coverage of related substan-
tive issues appears piecemeal and fragmented from a broader ecological or global 
perspective.
In the early 1960s, the degradation of wetlands became a matter of international 
concern, particularly where their roles as waterfowl habitat were concerned, and a 
series of negotiations were quickly initiated for the protection of these ecosystems. 
This process culminated in 1971 in Ramsar, Iran, with the adoption of the	Ramsar 
Convention on Wetlands that provides the framework for national action and inter-
national cooperation for the conservation and wise use of wetlands and their re-
sources. Over the years, the Convention has broadened its scope33 to cover all aspects 
of wetland and water resource conservation and wise use, including freshwater and 
saline inland waters and marine waters up to a depth of six metres.
Also in the 1960s global concern over international trade in wild species grew and 
governments embarked in long negotiations which resulted, in 1973, in Washington 
D.C., in the adoption of the	Convention on International Trade in Endangered Spe-
cies of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). The Convention aims to ensure that inter-
national trade in specimens of wild animals and plants does not threaten their sur-
vival. The Convention regulates international trade and lists species in three 
appendices that are subject to different degrees of regulation, largely depending on 
the perceived conservation status of the listed species in question. CITES is consid-
ered to be one of the most effective global environmental regimes, since non-com-
pliance may be addressed by trade suspensions.34 
At the end of the 1960s, proposals were made for addressing the conservation of 
nature and the preservation of cultural sites under a single convention. These propos-
als were presented to the 1972 Stockholm Conference35 and, eventually, a single text 
was agreed. In November 1972, the General Conference of the United Nations 
32 Markus Knigge, Johannes Herweg and David Huberman, Geographical	Aspects	of	International	Environ-
mental	Governance,	Illustrating	Decentralisation (Ecologic, Institute for International and Environmental 
Policy, 2005), available at <http://ecologic.eu/download/verschiedenes/2005/knigge_fragmentation.pdf> 
(visited 21 March 2012).
33 The words ‘especially as waterfowl habitat’ have been dropped from the Convention’s name.
34 Pamela S. Chasek, David L. Downie and Janet Welsh Brown, Global	Environmental	Politics,	Dilemmas	in	
World	Politics (4th ed., Westview Press, 2006).
35 United Nations Conference on Human Environment.
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Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) adopted the World 
Heritage Convention	(WHC) that aims to identify and conserve the world’s cul-
tural and natural heritage, by drawing up a list of sites whose outstanding values 
should be preserved for all humanity. 
In 1972, the particular need for the conservation of migratory species was acknowl-
edged in the Stockholm Conference. This resulted in several years of negotiations 
and, in 1979, the	Convention on Migratory Species (CMS) was adopted in Bonn, 
Germany, with the aim being to conserve terrestrial, marine and avian migratory 
species throughout their ranges. The Convention is considered unique in the sense 
that it operates like an umbrella convention, under which seven independent re-
gional agreements have been adopted.36 
In the 1980s, it became apparent that a more integrated approach to addressing bio-
diversity loss needed to be developed. A decision from UNEP’s Governing Council 
in 1987 started the negotiations for a new international biodiversity convention. 
Many hoped that that existing biodiversity-related MEAs would be merged as pro-
tocols under the new convention. However, it became quickly apparent that this 
would not be politically feasible. In May 1992, the Convention on Biological Diver-
sity (CBD) was adopted in Nairobi and opened for signature a month later in Rio 
de Janeiro. The objective of the Convention is the conservation and sustainable use 
of biodiversity, and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from ge-
netic resources. The agreement covers all ecosystems, species, and genetic resources. 
During the 1990s and the beginning of the 21st century, the emphasis of biodiver-
sity regime setting has shifted from ecosystems and species to genetic resources. In 
2000, the Conference of Parties (COP) to the CBD adopted the Cartagena Protocol 
on Biosafety37 that seeks to protect biological diversity from the potential risks posed 
by living modified organisms resulting from modern biotechnology. 
Access and benefit sharing of genetic resources is supported by two conventions that 
have been adopted in different political fora. In 2001, the International Treaty on 
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA) was adopted under 
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).38 The conven-
tion aims to ensure the conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources 
for food and agriculture and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out 
of their use, in harmony with the CBD. In 2010, the CBD COP-10 adopted the 
Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing (ABS)39	 that aims at sharing the 
36 Aðalheiður  Jóhannsdóttir, Ian Cresswell and Peter Bridgewater, ‘The Current Framework for Interna-
tional Governance of Biodiversity: Is It Doing More Harm Than Good?’ 19 Review	of	European	Com-
munity	and	International	Environmental	Law (2010) 139−149.
37 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, Montreal, 29 January 2000, in force 11 September 2003, 39 Interna-
tional	Legal	Materials (2000) 1027.
38 See <http://www.fao.org>.
39 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising 
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benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources in a fair and equitable way, 
including by appropriate access to genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of 
relevant technologies. These conventions are compatible in the sense that the ABS 
Protocol aims to cover all genetic resources of living organisms, except those crops 
and plants already covered by the ITPGRFA. 
3.1.2 International environmental governance and clustering of  
biodiversity-related MEAs 
The wide range of biodiversity-related MEAs has, undoubtedly, induced action that 
has resulted in positive outcomes. However, the latest international status reports 
confirm that the loss of biodiversity continues all over the globe.40 In 2005, the Mil-
lennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) estimated that the current species extinction 
rate is more than 1 000 times higher than background rates.41 The MA also showed 
that 60 per cent (16 out of 24) of the ecosystem services it assessed are either de-
graded or used unsustainably as a result of human activity. In 2010, the CBD Secre-
tariat’s Global Biodiversity Outlook 3 reiterated many of the findings of the MA and 
concluded that without urgent action ecosystems are approaching tipping points 
beyond which irreversible degradation will take place.42 
Consequently, it would seem that global biodiversity-related MEAs have failed to 
deliver their intended objectives. As noted above, some critics suggest that the lack 
of coordination and integration in MEAs has been an important factor that has 
hampered the development of international biodiversity law and its attendant gov-
ernance apparatus. However, due to the gravity of the biodiversity crisis, it is evident 
that biodiversity policies need to be further developed globally and implemented 
more efficiently at all levels. To this end, it will be important to tackle the current 
IEG-system which many commentators suggest has been characterized by fragmen-
tation and a lack of coherent and efficient solutions for dealing with environmental 
problems in general, and biodiversity loss and ecosystem degradation, in particular. 
The most recent discussions on enhancing international environmental governance 
have been underway for over a decade. Clustering of thematically or otherwise inter-
linked MEAs and promotion of synergies among them is one part of those discus-
sions. Broadly speaking, clustering refers to the combination, grouping, consolida-
tion, integration or merger of MEAs or parts thereof in order to improve IEG. 
Clustering provides opportunities for synergies, particularly within each cluster, 
where agreements have much in common in terms of issues to be addressed. 
from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Nagoya, 29 October 2010, <http://www.
cbd.int/abs/>.
40 For further discussion on this issue, see the paper by Erie Tamale in this Review.
41 Millennium	Ecosystem	Assessment. Ecosystems	 and	Human	Well-being:	Biodiversity	 Synthesis (World Re-
sources Institute, 2005), available at <http://www.maweb.org/documents/document.354.aspx.pdf> (vis-
ited 14 March 2012).
42 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Global	Biodiversity	Outlook	3 (CBD, 2010), avail-
able at <http://www.cbd.int/gbo3/> (visited 14 March 2012).
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In 2002, the UNEP Governing Council/Global Ministerial Environment Forum (GC/
GMEF)43 adopted the ‘Cartagena Package on International Environmental Govern-
ance’	 that recommends, inter alia, improving coordination and coherence among 
MEAs with comparable areas of focus.44 The process of international environmental 
governance was highlighted at the 2005 World Summit,45 where Heads of State adopt-
ed the World Summit Outcome Document,46	 in which they agreed to explore the 
possibility of creating a more coherent institutional framework, including a more in-
tegrated structure, for environmental activities in the United Nations system.47 
Subsequently, the UN Secretariat initiated the ‘Informal Consultative Process on the 
Institutional Framework for the United Nations’ Environmental Activities’, co-
chaired by Mexico and Switzerland.48 In 2007, the Co-chairs presented an ‘Options 
Paper’ that, inter alia, presents an option for the clustering of MEAs.49 The final stage 
involved drafting a resolution that was scheduled to be submitted for approval at the 
63rd session of the General Assembly in Autumn 2008. However, the views among 
governments were too divergent and the Co-Chairs decided not to file a resolution. 
In December 2008, the IEG process in New York came to a standstill and the Co-
Chairs of that process called for other processes to provide fresh ideas to the UN 
General Assembly (UNGA). In February 2009, the 25th meeting of the UNEP GC/
GMEF responded to the call and set up a Consultative Group of Ministers, or their 
High-level Representatives, on IEG.50 
As discussions on enhancing the IEG system have revolved between UNEP and 
UNGA during the past decade, there have also been some attempts actually to imple-
ment the decisions. In fact, significant progress on enhancing MEA synergies has 
been achieved among three conventions (Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm) in the 
chemicals and wastes cluster. The process started in 2006 with the establishment of 
an Ad Hoc Joint Working Group (AHJWG) among the three conventions. The 
group consisted of 45 members: 15 signatories from each of the three conventions. 
The AHJWG convened three times and agreed on recommendations that include 
concrete proposals for joint programmatic and administrative activities. These in-
clude, inter alia, harmonization of national reporting, developing joint capacity 
building activities, joint outreach and public awareness activities and establishing 
43 See <http://www.unep.org/gc/gcss-xii/>.
44 See UNEP/GCSS.VII/1, (para. 133), known as the ‘Cartagena package (<http://www.unep.org/GC/
GCSS-VII/default.asp> (visited 26 October 2012)).
45 The High-level Plenary Meeting of the 60th Session of the General Assembly, see <http://www.un.org/
summit2005/>.
46 ‘World Summit Outcome’, UNGA Res. 60/1 (2005).
47 Ibid. para. 169.
48 See <http://www.un.org/ga/president/60/summitfollowup/enviro.html> and <http://www.un.org/ga/
president/61/follow-up/environmentalgovernance.shtml> (both visited 26 October 2012).
49 International Consultative Process on the Institutional Framework for the United Nations’ Environmen-
tal Activities, Co-chairs’ Options Paper, 14 June 2007, available at <http://www.un.org/ga/president/61/
follow-up/environment/EG-OptionsPaper.PDF> (visited 20 March 2012).
50 See <http://www.unep.org/environmentalgovernance/Portals/8/documents/IEGEDBackgroundPaper-1.
pdf> (visited 26 October 2012).
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joint services and functions. The recommendations from the AHJWG were adopted 
in decisions by the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm COPs in 2008 and 2009.51 
Pursuant to those decisions and to seal the process at a high level, simultaneous ex-
traordinary meetings of the three COPs were held in February 2010 in Bali in con-
junction with the 11th special session of the UNEP GC/GEMF.52 
Also in February 2010, in discussions by ministers and heads of delegations at the 
11th special session of the UNEP GC/GMEF under the rubric of ‘International 
environmental governance and sustainable development’ (Theme I of the session), 
the synergies process among the chemical and wastes conventions was said to provide 
an important example of incremental reform. Lessons learned could be applied to 
processes under other conventions, in particular for those related to biodiversity. In 
the Nusa Dua Declaration,53 governments recognized ‘the importance of enhancing 
synergies between the biodiversity-related conventions, without prejudice to their 
specific objectives, and encourage the conferences of the parties to the biodiversity-
related multilateral environmental agreements to consider strengthening efforts in 
this regard, taking into account relevant experiences’.54 The COPs of the biodiversi-
ty-related conventions were invited to launch a synergies process, taking into account 
lessons learned from the chemicals and wastes synergies process. 
In April 2010, a Nordic symposium on synergies among biodiversity-related MEAs 
was organized in Helsinki, Finland.55 The symposium brought together 50 experts 
in biodiversity issues and international environmental governance. The six conven-
tions discussed above (CBD, CITES, CMS, Ramsar, WHC and ITPGRFA) were 
considered to form a manageable and coherent cluster. These six conventions are 
generally referred to as biodiversity-related conventions and they already cooperate 
at the secretariat level through the Biodiversity Liaison Group (BLG),56 established 
by the CBD in 2004. The group’s function is to ‘enhance coherence and cooperation 
in implementation’ and ‘to explore opportunities for synergistic activities and in-
creased coordination, and to exchange information’ among the heads of the same six 
biodiversity conventions. It was broadly understood that the Parties to these MEAs 
must address the lack of coherence among them, to which end a country-driven 
synergies process could be launched to consider joint issues. One of the main conclu-
sions of the symposium was that the focus should be primarily on enhancing syner-
gies on issues of substance, rather than on administrative issues, because the secre-
51 See reports on the meetings for the Stockholm Convention COP-2 (UN Doc. UNEP/POPS/COP.2/30 
(2006); SC-2/15: Synergies), Rotterdam Convention COP-2 (UN Doc. UNEP/FAO/RC/COP.2/19 
(2005); RC-2/6) and Basel Convention COP-8 (UNEP/CHW.8/16 (2006); VIII/8).
52 More information on synergies among the three conventions in the chemicals and waste cluster is avail-
able at <http://ahjwg.chem.unep.ch/> and <http://excops.unep.ch/>.
53 UN Doc. UNEP/GCSS.XI/L.6 (2010), available at <http://unep.org/gc/gcss-xi/Documents/Nusa_Dua_
Declaration_Bali_Feb2010.pdf> (visited 21 March 2012).
54 Ibid. para. 12. 
55 For further information, visit the symposium website at <http://www.biodivcluster.fi>.
56 See <http://www.cbd.int/blg/>.
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tariats are dispersed and administered by different organizations. The following 
programmatic areas were identified as possible areas for joint action:57 
• the science-policy interface, for instance an Intergovernmental Platform on Bio-
diversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES); 
• harmonization of reporting; 
• streamlining of meeting agendas; 
• joint information management and awareness raising; and
• capacity-building, compliance, funding and review mechanisms. 
The tenth meeting of the Conference of Parties of the CBD, in Nagoya, Japan, in 
October 2010, made significant decisions on enhancing cooperation with the other 
conventions and institutions. The new Strategic Plan 2011–2020 was adopted as the 
overarching framework of the biodiversity-related MEAs.58 To this end, the meetings 
of the governing bodies of the other biodiversity-related MEAs were invited to con-
sider appropriate contributions to the collaborative implementation of the Strategic 
Plan. In order to increase the involvement of Parties in the synergies work, the forth-
coming meeting of the Working Group on the Review of Implementation of the 
Convention (WGRI-4) was requested to determine the form and content of a proc-
ess to enhance synergies among the biodiversity-related conventions and Rio con-
ventions.59 
In December 2010, the UNGA noted ‘with appreciation the adoption … of the 
updated and revised Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020 and the Aichi Biodi-
versity Targets’ (paragraph 4); took note ‘of the ongoing work of… the Liaison Group 
of Biodiversity-related Conventions’: recognized ‘the importance of enhancing syner-
gies among the biodiversity-related conventions, without prejudice to their specific 
objectives’; and encouraged ‘the COPs to the biodiversity-related MEAs to consider 
strengthening efforts in this regard, taking into account relevant experiences and 
bearing in mind the respective independent legal status and mandates of these instru-
ments’ (paragraph 11).60
In February 2010, the UNEP’s GC/GMEF set up another Consultative Group of 
Ministers or High-level Representatives on International Environmental Governance 
to consider the broader reform of the IEG system, building on the set of options 
identified by the previous ministerial group, but remaining open to new ideas.61 The 
57 See para. 18 of the report of the symposium, available at <http://www.biodivcluster.fi/pdf/Synergies%20
report%20final.pdf> (visited 26 October 2012).
58 ‘The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets’, Decision X/2, in 
Report of the Tenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
Nagoya, Japan, 18–29 October 2010, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27* (2011).
59 Thematic Programmes of Work – Progress Report and Consideration of Proposals for Future Action, Note 
by the Executive Secretary, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/10/20 (2010). 
60 ‘Convention on Biological Diversity’, UNGA Res. 65/161 (2011).
61 See UNEP Governing Council decision 25/4 (‘the GC decision’, Annex 1). 
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Group held its second meeting in Helsinki in November 2010 and the meeting re-
sulted in the Nairobi-Helsinki Outcome that includes six system-wide responses to 
the current challenges of the IEG-system, including one on clustering of MEAs, as 
follows:62 
[t]o encourage synergies between compatible multilateral environmental agree-
ments and to identify guiding elements for realizing such synergies while respect-
ing the autonomy of the conferences of the parties. Such synergies should pro-
mote the joint delivery of common multilateral environmental agreement 
services with the aim of making them more efficient and cost-effective. They 
should be based on lessons learned and remain flexible and adaptive to the spe-
cific needs of multilateral environmental agreements. They should aim at reduc-
ing the administrative costs of secretariats to free up resources for the implemen-
tation of multilateral environmental agreements at the national level, including 
through capacity-building.  
The Consultative Group considered institutional forms that would best serve to 
implement the system-wide responses and came up with the following five options: 
(1) enhancing UNEP; (2) establishing a new umbrella organization for sustainable 
development; (3) establishing a specialized agency, such as a world environment 
organization; (4) reforming the United Nations Economic and Social Council and 
the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development; and (5) enhancing 
institutional reforms and streamlining present structures.63
In February 2011, the 26th meeting of UNEP’s GC/GMEF discussed the results of 
the final report and transmitted it to the 2nd meeting of the Preparatory Committee 
of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20-meeting)64 
and the 65th session of the UNGA to consider the options for broader reform of the 
IEG as part of strengthening the institutional framework for sustainable development. 
At the time of the conducting of the exercise, it was anticipated that the forthcoming 
United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development,65 which was held on 20–
22 June 2012 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, would provide an important venue with 
appropriate authority and vision to deal with the issue. As part of the discussions on 
enhancing sustainable development governance, it was envisaged that the meeting 
could provide a strong political signal to the governing bodies of the biodiversity-
related MEAs to initiate a clustering process. Hopefully then within five years, a more 
efficient and coherent system could be put in place so that halting biodiversity loss 
62 Available at <http://www.uncsd2012.org/rio20/content/documents/NairobiHelsinkifinaloutcome.pdf> 
(visited 21 March 2012).
63 Ibid. para. 7.
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and ecosystem degradation can become reality, not only on paper but also within 
nature.
3.2 Draft texts prepared by the Co-Chairs 
The Ad Hoc Joint Working Group recommends the following for adoption by the 
Governing bodies of the participating conventions.
3.2.1 Draft text on joint programmatic action (Group A) 
The	Conference	of	the	Parties,
1. Calls	 upon the United Nations Environment Programme and the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization; working together with other bodies 
of the United Nations, in particular the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme, secretariats of multilateral environmental agreements and other inter-
national bodies, in particular the International Union for Conservation of Na-
ture, to include programmatic cooperation of the participating conventions in 
their work programmes. 
2. Decides to strengthen capacity building and technical support to developing 
countries and countries with economies in transition for coherent national im-
plementation of the decision taken by the Governing bodies of the participating 
conventions.
3. Decides to promote joint programmatic action on cross-cutting issues, including 
in the area of reporting, information management, public awareness and out-
reach, and technology transfer and capacity-building, by building on existing 
initiatives, with a view to developing a coherent approach on these matters for 
facilitating coordinated implementation at the national, regional and interna-
tional levels. 
4.  Requests Parties to reflect the full range of measures to implement the six par-
ticipating conventions in a coherent and synergistic manner in the context of 
the revision of national biodiversity strategies and action plans. 
5.  Requests the scientific advisory bodies of the participating conventions to en-
hance cooperation and coordination, inter alia, with regard to work on cross-
cutting issues, such as climate change, development of biodiversity indicators, 
scientific criteria for the identification of ecologically or biologically significant 
areas in need of protection, as well as identify common scientific needs to be 
conveyed to the Intergovernmental science-policy Platform on Biodiversity and 
Ecosystem Services, in a manner consistent with their respective mandates, gov-
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ernance arrangements and agreed programmes of work and with a view to de-
veloping a coherent approach on these matters. 
6. Invites the Global Environment Facility to realign and adjust financing for the 
biodiversity related conventions in order to support synergistic implementation 
of the participating conventions, inter alia, by promoting cooperation at na-
tional and regional levels between focal points of the participating conventions. 
7. Decides to establish regional centres of expertise to support Parties in the na-
tional implementation of their commitments through regional delivery of tech-
nical assistance under the six conventions. 
8. Decides that the work carried out by the regional centres should promote coherent 
and mutually supportive implementation of the participating conventions by ap-
plying a holistic and integrated approach to conservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity, fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from their use and pre-
vention of illegal trade of species, with the ultimate aim for achieving sustainable 
development and securing human well-being, in a manner consistent with their 
respective mandates, governance arrangements and agreed programmes of work.
- - - - -
3.2.2 Draft text on joint work plan for national implementation (Group B) 
The	Conference	of	the	Parties,
1.  Adopts	a	joint work plan with the objectives to promote coherence and synergy 
in national planning for biodiversity, taking	into	account the updated Strategic 
Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020 that represents a useful flexible framework that 
is relevant to all biodiversity-related conventions. 
2.  Invites	Parties to consider the following elements of the joint work plan, in the 
context of the revision of national biodiversity strategies and action plans, based 
on national circumstances and priorities.
Element	1:	Improve	national	level	coordination	
Strengthen national level coordination between convention Focal Points, including rep-
resentatives of local and indigenous communities, and among relevant national agencies 
through the establishment of national committees for the implementation of the par-
ticipating conventions in all phases of planning. This national coordination can be ex-
tended to the regional level.  
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Element	2:	Application	of	the	ecosystem	approach	
Apply the ecosystem approach and other relevant tools66, taking into account traditional 
knowledge, and making use of the UNEP Issue-Based Modules, when planning mutu-
ally supportive activities among the participating MEAs. 
Element	3: Develop	joint	guidelines	
Develop and apply joint guidance/guidelines based on good practices. 
Element	4: Enhance	communication,	education	and	public	awareness 
Increase public awareness through coordinated information sharing, exchange of experi-
ence, analysis of case studies. 
Element	5: Strengthen	capacity	building	
Strengthen capacity building and technical support to developing countries and countries 
with economies in transition for coordinated national implementation.
Element	6: Enhance	integration of	biodiversity	to	other	sector´s	polices
Strengthen the integration of biodiversity through a coordinated effort into other sector´s 
policies; in particular, those relating to energy, agriculture, transport, urban construction, 
tourism and climate change.
- - - - -
3.2.3 Draft text on a joint review mechanism/advisory board (Group C)
The	Conference	of	the	Parties,
1. Decides that a joint advisory body of the participating conventions, to be known 
as the Joint Advisory Board, is hereby established.
2. Decides that the Joint Advisory Board shall consist of 5 members from each of 
the participating conventions chosen by the governing body of each with due 
regard for regional and gender balance.
3. Decides that the functions of the advisory board shall be:
(a) to review the implementation of the synergies decision;
(b) further to elaborate joint services and functions;
(c) to advise on joint activities in the field and their implementation in accord-
ance with the One UN initiative. 
66 For example, the Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines for the Sustainable Use of Biodiversity, UN Doc. 
UNEP/CBD/COP/VII/12 (2004) is relevant to all the biodiversity-related MEAs.
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4. Decides that the meetings of the Joint Advisory Board shall be serviced jointly 
by the secretariats of the participating conventions.
5. Decides that one Chairperson and one Co-Chairperson be elected from its mem-
bers by the expert group to preside over its work, and selected on a rotating 
basis from each of the participating Conventions.	
6. Decides that the Joint Advisory Board shall meet annually.
7. Decides	that the rules of procedure of the participating conventions shall apply 
to the expert group concurrently as far as possible, mutatis	mutandis. 
8. Invites Parties and others to make contributions through the special trust fund 
to ensure the participation of representatives of developing country Parties and 
Parties with economies in transition in to ensure their effective joint expert 
group.
- - - - -
3.2.4 Draft text on the establishment of group on rules of procedure (Group D)
The	Conference	of	the	Parties,
1. Calls	for continued improvement in cooperation and coordination between the 
participating Conventions.
2. Decides to establish a joint open-ended expert group on procedural matters for 
the participating Conventions. 
3.  Decides that the functions of the advisory body shall be to develop joint deci-
sion–making procedures and practices, and to provide advice on procedural 
matters for consideration by the governing body of each of the participating 
Conventions.
3. Decides that the joint open-ended group shall consist of members elected by the 
governing body of each of the participating Conventions, with due regard for 
regional and gender balance, and be comprised of 10 members to represent the 
perspective of each participating convention.
4.  Decides	that the rules of procedure of the participating conventions shall apply 
to the expert group concurrently as far as possible, mutatis	mutandis. 
5.  Decides that one Chairperson and one Co-Chairperson be elected from its mem-
bers by the expert group to preside over its work, and selected on a rotating 
basis from each of the participating Conventions.
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6. Invites Parties and others to make contributions through the special trust fund 
to ensure the participation of representatives of developing country Parties and 
Parties with economies in transition in to ensure their effective joint expert 
group.
- - - - -
3.3 Recent decisions on synergies among the biodiversity-related MEAs 
A summary of recent relevant decisions was also provided to participants, noting that 
the concept of synergies between MEAs had been discussed over several years by the 
biodiversity-related MEAs. It was also highlighted that the relevant governing bodies 
had, to various extents, called for synergies between these conventions. The most 
recent and key decisions and resolutions calling for synergies and collaboration with 
one or more of the conventions were listed for participants in table 1.
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Paragraph 5: ‘Urges	Parties to establish close collaboration at the national level 
between the focal points for the Convention on Biological Diversity and focal 
points for other relevant conventions, with a view to developing coherent and 
synergetic approaches across the conventions at national and (sub-)regional levels’. 
Paragraph 10: ‘Requests the Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group on Review of 
Implementation at its fourth meeting, in order to increase the involvement of 
Parties in the work of the Liaison Group of the Biodiversity-related Conventions 
and the Joint Liaison Group of the Rio Conventions, to determine the form and 
content of a process to enhance coordination, coherence and national level 
synergies among the biodiversity conventions’.
Paragraph 11: ‘Recognizing the importance of the coherent and synergistic 
implementation of the biodiversity-related conventions, requests the Executive 
Secretary to: (a) review and, where necessary, update working arrangements, such 
as the joint work plans, with the other biodiversity-related conventions; (b) 
consider ways to assist Parties to reflect the full range of activities of all 
biodiversity-related conventions in the context of the revision of national 






‘The Secretariat shall: … continue to collaborate with the secretariats of other 
conventions, UNEP and other bodies in order to facilitate the harmonization of 






‘CALLS upon the CITES Secretariat and the Secretariat of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity to coordinate their programme activities particularly through 
the UNEP coordination meetings; SUGGESTS that Parties, as appropriate to their 
national circumstances and to encourage synergy, take measures to achieve 
coordination and reduce duplication of activities between their national authorities 
for each Convention; CALLS upon Parties to explore opportunities for obtaining 
funding through the Global Environment Facility for relevant projects, including 
multilateral projects, which fulfil the eligibility criteria and guidance provided by 





Paragraph 2: ‘Reaffirms the interest and importance for CMS of continuing to 
develop effective and practical cooperation with other biodiversity instruments and 
international organisations’.
67 Table of decisions and resolutions is derived from a draft report: Peter Herkenrath, Promoting	Synergies	within	
the	Cluster	of	Biodiversity-related	Multilateral	Environmental	Agreements	(UNEP-WCMC, 4 August 2011). 
213




Paragraph 1: ‘Requests the Secretary to continue enhancing the collaboration with 
other international organizations, especially the Convention on Biological 
Diversity in regard to the conservation and sustainable use of agricultural 
biological diversity, access to plant genetic resources and benefit-sharing’.
Paragraph 6: ‘Requests the Secretariat to foster cooperation with other 
organizations and strengthen existing cooperative arrangements with a view to 
developing synergies and reducing inefficiencies in a manner consistent with their 





Paragraph 4: ‘Takes note of the Memorandum of Cooperation signed between the 
Secretary and the Executive Secretary of the Convention on Biological Diversity 
and commends the Secretary for the initiative, and requests the Secretary to 
explore with the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, practical 
means and activities to give effect to this cooperation, in particular through 
capacity building for access and benefit-sharing, as related to plant genetic 
resources for food and agriculture, including through the organization of 
workshops, seminars and other events, coordination of technical assistance as well 
as the exchange of information’;
Paragraph 6: ‘Requests the Secretary to strengthen collaboration with the 
Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity in the implementation of the 
Convention’s programme of work on agricultural biodiversity, sustainable use of 
biodiversity, biodiversity and climate change, as well as on the United Nations 
Decade on Biodiversity and the integration of biodiversity into poverty eradication 
and development, in harmony with the work of the Treaty’;
Paragraph 7: ‘Calls on Contracting Parties to ensure that any legislative, 
administrative or policy measures taken for the implementation of both the Treaty 
and the Convention on Biological Diversity (or its Nagoya Protocol), are 
consistent and mutually supportive’; 
Paragraph 8: ‘Requests the national focal points of the Treaty to enhance their 
collaboration and coordination with their counterpart national focal points for the 
Convention on Biological Diversity on all relevant processes, in particular on the 
Nagoya Protocol and the Strategic Plan’;
Paragraph 10: ‘Requests the Secretary to continue to foster collaboration with 
other treaty bodies, especially with the Convention on Biological Diversity in 
regard to the conservation and sustainable use of agricultural biological diversity, 
access to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture and benefit-sharing in the 
light of the adoption of the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and 
the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization, according 
to the respective mandates, governance structures and agreed programs’. 
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Paragraph 12: ‘Requests the Secretariat to continue to be fully involved in the work 
of the Biodiversity Liaison Group (BLG) established under the aegis of the CBD 






Paragraph 5: ‘The World Heritage Committee… welcomes the proposed Action 
Plan for 2012 … and encourages to reflect and to pursue the efforts to strengthen 
linkages between the World Heritage Convention and other relevant multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs)’.
Paragraph 8: ‘The World Heritage Convention… requests the World Heritage 
Centre to identify opportunities, of potential collaboration with the UNESCO 
Man and Biosphere Programme (MAB), United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP), the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and other MEAs, and 
taking into account the needs of Small Island Developing States (SIDS), in the 
form of pilot projects to address the relation between conservation and sustainable 
development at regional/ ecosystem scales ’. 
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4 Review of the exercise
The following is a brief summary of the proceedings and analysis based on observa-
tions made by the facilitators during the simulation as well as the ‘post-mortem’ 
conducted immediately following the simulation, written evaluations from partici-
pants, and notes from additional verbal feedback. 
There were 32 official participants in all, not including the four facilitators and the 
other resource people who supported or played various roles in respect of the simu-
lation.68 The participants were mainly from Ministries of Foreign Affairs or from 
ministries responsible for environmental matters of their respective countries. 
Academia and governmental and non-governmental organizations active in environ-
mental matters were also represented.
This was the fifth time that a simulation exercise based on the same organizational 
model has been run in a UEF/UNEP course and published in this Review. In each 
exercise, there has been a different substantive focus, while at the same time each has 
included key issues related to the rules of procedure. This is the second time that the 
exercise was set to run over two full days. The positive results achieved were largely the 
product of the creativity of the participants; while the facilitators, who controlled final 
instructions ‘from capitals’, only incrementally allowed increased room for agreement. 
The results were considered to be a success by the facilitators and by all of the par-
ticipants who provided feedback.69 In particular, one participant wrote ‘[ . . .] the 
simulation exercise helped us to learn firsthand what is expected in reality’. Another 
noted that it was ‘[v]ery helpful,’ but that it ‘[ . . .] would be good to receive per-
sonal feedback and also a little more support and advices during the exercise’. An-
other said that ‘[t]he simulation game let participants having a better understanding 
of their role with the opportunity to put into practice tactics and techniques dis-
cussed during the lectures and lessons’.
One comment suggested that ‘[i]f the Course contains several workshops or interac-
tive sessions, the “synergies” between the different workshops should be carefully 
balanced. For example, the negotiation workshop could be combined with the draft-
ing workshop’. 
In the debriefing session, one of the key areas of focus was the	first	objective	of	the	
simulation:	 the	understanding	 of	 the	 challenges	 and	 opportunities	 related	 to	 synergies	
68 There were 17 women and 15 men, from the following 26 countries: Cambodia, Colombia, Egypt, Fiji, 
Finland, Grenada, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kiribati, Kosovo, Malaysia, Micronesia, Namibia, Neth-
erlands, Philippines, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand and 
the USA.
69 The introduction to the exercise was rated at 4.6/5 by the participants in terms of relevance; and 4.3 in 
terms of quality. Participation in the exercise was rated at 4.8/5.
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among	MEAs,	both	in	general	and	in	a	specific	MEA	context. There was considerable 
positive feedback about the substantive support and information provided by facili-
tators. 
It was noted with some concern, however, and by some participants in particular, 
that the simulation had a bias towards support for a synergies agenda. It was noted 
that there was a divergence of views among Parties on the issues under discussion, 
and some suggested that more effort should have been given to a more appropriate 
balance of positions and draft outcomes. The simulation managers acknowledged the 
issue, while emphasizing that the simulation was intended to be a hypothetical situ-
ation, and by making the premise of the exercise suggest that new developments with 
respect to biodiversity were possible, the stakes of the negotiation simulation were 
higher, and the issues more compelling.
With respect to	 the	 second	objective:	understanding	of	 the	principles	and	practices	of	
multilateral	negotiation	and	appreciation	of	the	value	and	role	of	the	rules	of	procedure, 
it was emphasized by the simulation organizers that the goal of the exercise had not 
been that all groups would successfully achieve consensus on results. Rather, it was 
revealed that the objective had been to present participants with irresolvable or near-
ly irresolvable issues, so that there would be more than usual pressure on the rules 
and procedures of MEA negotiation, and, in turn, more pressure on participants to 
use – or even misuse – the rules. 
It was noted that a number of participants had specific instructions to be obstruction-
ist, and to use the rules of procedure aggressively. However, participants were con-
gratulated on their perseverance and creativity, as the outcome produced a higher 
than expected amount of agreed text, with only a few outstanding issues reflected in 
bracketed text. There was considerable discussion among participants, including 
several with considerable negotiation experience, about how best to negotiate with 
Parties who appear to be intransigent or unreasonable.
It should be emphasized that the simulation was designed to produce a situation 
where agreement was very difficult, if not even impossible; where participants would 
be confronted with results that would be untenable within the terms of their instruc-
tions; and where they would be forced to grapple with the constraints of the rules of 
procedure, as well as the frustrations of being unable to reach agreement. The under-
lying objective was to highlight the importance of knowing the rules of procedure in 
the very rare instances where participants could be involved in actual negotiations 
with such difficulties. It should be noted that this kind of situation does not reflect 
the reality for most negotiators in most MEA fora, most of the time. And in the end, 
participants overcame many of the numerous challenges in the scenario and were 
able to reach agreement on most of the necessary texts, with only a few issues remain-
ing for the final plenary.
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However, it needs to be understood that although such instances might be rare and 
therefore not reflect typical negotiations, the techniques conveyed through the exer-
cise remain both useful and valid. It is relatively common for a few Parties to have 
serious difficulties at some point in any MEA meeting, often having to consider the 
possibility of blocking consensus. In these situations, the importance of the rules of 
procedure increases, as Parties may seek procedural solutions. The assumption behind 
this objective is that many negotiators are ill-prepared to deal with such challenges. 
It should be noted that some instructions, and the roles of some groups, were some-
what exaggerated in order to give these participants stronger roles, and to contribute 
to the inter-locking sets of challenges confronting participants.
Most of the challenges facing participants were based on actual experience, all were 
based on real issues, and only a few of the instructions were somewhat unrealistic. 
One of the main concerns raised by participants was the lack of detailed explanations 
for positions, some of which contained internal contradictions. Apparent internal 
contradictions appear to be relatively common in MEA fora, and so were purpose-
fully included in the simulation. There may be room in the future to improve the 
way in which these contradictions are organized and presented.
With respect to procedural and strategic issues, both participants and facilitators 
offered their views and perspectives based on their experiences. Most of the questions 
involved subjective assessments of different kinds of negotiation tactics and strategies.
With respect to the third	objective:	 familiarity	with	specific	substantive	and	drafting	
issues, participants noted in particular that the divergence of positions and views 
forced them to consider the balance between clarity and ‘constructive ambiguity’ 
required to reach agreement, as well as a number of comments about the utility of 
the course sessions on negotiation and drafting techniques which preceded the simu-
lation, as well as the MEA Negotiators	Handbook.	
On	the	fourth	and	final	objective:	discussion	and	appreciation	of	different	perspectives	on	
both	MEA	synergies	and	multilateral	procedures, there were a wide range of views ex-
pressed about general synergies and MEA process issues, including prospects for 
future MEA negotiations in general, and biodiversity-related and synergies-related 
negotiations in particular. One participant noted a concern that ‘[t]he course did not 
address all aspects of diplomacy, only language used in the drafting and technical 
matters’.
On synergies in particular, written comments received from participants included 
that ‘[t]he course provided a lot of examples and experiences at programme activities 
level, but not much in institutional framework matters’; and ‘I got an insight in 
synergies which are available in biodiversity-related MEAs and on how I should work 
into synergy in national level’.
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The resource people noted with appreciation that all participants took the exercise 
seriously and the simulation, indeed, reflected real-life negotiations. Interestingly, a 
cultural negotiation difference among participants was noted, as some followed their 
positions assiduously, while others were more flexible to turn to their capitals for 
further instructions to overcome difficult situations. The resource people also noted 
with interest that the assigned convention affiliations of the different Party repre-
sentatives did not generate conflict along convention lines.
It was noted by the organizers that, in response to feedback from previous simulation 
exercises, participants were introduced to the exercise several days before it took 
place; they were not given detailed substantive background to their instructions; and 
nor were they provided with detailed rationales for the linkage – or lack of linkages 
– between their positions. Instead, participants were encouraged to develop their own 
rationales. Similarly, again in response to feedback from a previous simulation exer-
cise, there were no NGO or IGO roles. Some participants noted this absence, and it 
was discussed how the simulation might be adapted to bring in these perspectives. 
Specific comments were received which highlighted the importance of being con-
fronted with a demanding and frustrating situation, in that this helped the partici-
pants to recognize the importance of abstract-sounding rules. It was also apparent 
that the participants appreciated being ‘pushed’. While the objective of the simula-
tion was not to explore any MEA rules per se, some participants also indicated an 
interest in being provided with more background information. One particular con-
cern was that ‘[s]pecial instructions for junior participants with less experience would 
be desirable for the negotiation exercise (if possible)’.
Most participants indicated that the twinning of roles and the mutual mentoring 
between roles was a particularly useful way of exploring and learning about different 
perspectives; as well as of initiating further discussion on the issues, on regional and 
country-specific views. Twinning was also conducive to improving social interaction 
by enabling participants to get to know their fellow participants. In particular some 
noted that ‘role reversal’ was ‘a great opportunity’ to ‘wear another country’s shoes’.
However, several participants expressed some disappointment that they had not been 
able better to engage with their twins and draw out more relevant views and perspec-
tives, largely owing to the limited time frame of the exercise. Others suggested that 
the concepts could have been better explained, or that twinning could have been set 
up earlier in the course, or even before the course began. 
It was noted and recognized that advance reading of the simulation materials would 
be useful in this regard, and that the extended two-day format also helped to strength-
en the twinning aspect of the simulation. In general, there was strong support for the 
extended two-day format. 
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In this simulation, it was clear that those in Chairing roles were kept working hard 
on substantive and procedural issues, so that keeping track of the real and simulation 
names of all participants became a concern. Based on comments from previous 
simulations, the Chairs in this simulation were given greater flexibility to design the 
process and to respond to developments in the simulation. This was particularly 
challenging, and increased the intensity of the simulation. However, the Chairs were 
closely supported by participants in Secretariat roles, and effectively used their time 
between and during sessions to consult with each other. 
Participants agreed strongly that the simulation exercise achieved its objectives with 
respect to promoting engagement and familiarity with the principles of multilateral 
negotiation and related issues within the context of negotiation on rules of proce-
dure; and putting the rules and principles into practice, in a simulation context. 
Furthermore, the participants strongly agreed, above all, that the exercise met its 
objectives with respect to promoting discussion of the issues from different perspec-
tives. Many participants suggested that the exercise was one of the most useful com-
ponents on the agenda of the course programme.
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Presented in this paper is a description of a multilateral simulation exercise which 
was designed to foster negotiation skills by simulating the experience of debating and 
drafting legal text, in an unusually hostile atmosphere. The setting chosen was the 
International Whaling Commission (IWC);2 a body which is often depicted as strug-
gling to fulfill its mandate, given the bitter disputes3 which have characterized it for 
decades and which have concerned both substantive and procedural issues. 
It is the hope of the organizers of the University of Eastern Finland/UNEP Course 
on Multilateral Environmental Agreements that papers such as those presented in 
the present volume (and previous volumes) of the Review will have significant edu-
cational value. Much discussion, planning and research is required in the devising of, 
and preparing toward, the running of the Courses’ negotiation exercises. The papers 
1 Associate Professor, School of Law, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa; e-mail: couzense@
ukzn.ac.za or couzens.ed@gmail.com. The author attended the 59th, 63rd and 64th Annual Meetings of the 
IWC as a member of the South African delegation; and has completed a Doctoral thesis involving whaling 
issues. 
2 See <http://iwcoffice.org/>.
3 These disputes reach even to the very nature of the Convention itself, with some of its contracting govern-
ments denying that it is a multilateral agreement which is environmental in its nature; and others arguing 
that it is.
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which explain the exercises then provide, hopefully, not merely records of what hap-
pened; but also pedagogical tools which teachers and lecturers can make use of in 
years to come in the training of diplomats, negotiators and students in the field of 
international environmental law-making and diplomacy.
The intention was that the participants would, from the beginning of the actual 
negotiating, run the exercise themselves – under the direction of their Chair. Al-
though fictitious, the exercise was intended to have a realistic atmosphere – the posi-
tions which the participants adopted were intended generally to reflect positions 
which might be adopted by the country which they were representing. While point-
ers as to negotiating positions were given, participants were expected also to conduct 
their own research. 
Each participant was assigned a state (a ‘contracting government’ to the Interna-
tional Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW)4) to represent. Where 
possible, each participant was assigned to a state with a view unlike that of the state 
which the participant normally represents or resides in.5
The scenario presented concerned a resolution put forward by a contracting govern-
ment (Australia in the exercise). Each participant was given a copy of the proposed 
resolution – a document which was designed to be contentious and to contain nu-
merous provocative claims or proposals.6 The essential possibilities of the exercise 
were that the proposed resolution could be taken off the agenda; could be agreed 
upon by consensus; or could be voted on. If voted upon, as a resolution a simple 
majority would be required for adoption.
There were 29 participants, where there are 89 Contracting Governments to the 
ICRW. For the exercise, the 29 were allocated to pro- or anti-whaling positions in 
rough proportion to reality (in other words, a small majority of anti-whaling parties, 
with a number of possible swing states). It was intended that it would not be certain 
going into a vote that a majority would be obtained. 
While a successful vote would not have the effect either of creating formal synergis-
tic relationships with other Conventions, or amending the Schedule7 to bring new 
4 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Washington D.C., 2 December 1946, in force 
10 November 1948, 161 United	Nations	Treaty	Series 72.
5 There were 32 participants on the 2011 Course, from 26 countries: Cambodia; Colombia; Egypt; Fiji; 
Finland; Indonesia; Iran; Italy; Grenada; Japan; Kiribati; Kosovo; Malaysia; Micronesia; Namibia; The 
Netherlands; Philippines; Portugal; Russia; Singapore; South Africa; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Thai-
land; United States. Three participants did not take part in the exercise.
6 For instance, the preambular object and the word ‘environmental’.
7 See <http://www.iwcoffice.org/cache/downloads/6awoj71tmhkw8gwows440k8kc/schedule.pdf> (visited 
27 December 2012). The Schedule has been amended regularly and provides the means by which the 
contracting governments make changes to species listing, catch methods, catch quotas and other matters. 
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species under the IWC’s control, a resolution carries significant momentum with it 
and is thus of importance.8
The IWC is a forum in which there is often conflict in unexpected places, and argu-
ment is not always on substance. This negotiating exercise was intended to educate 
the Course participants on, firstly, issues of substance (increasing understanding of 
synergies between biodiversity-related multilateral environmental agreements 
(MEAs) by considering a situation in which certain parties are highly resistant to 
synergies); on, secondly, issues of negotiation and strategy (coalition building and 
winning support); on, thirdly, textual interpretation (increasing understanding of 
working with the language of MEAs); and, finally, on procedural understanding 
(simulating a meeting with Rules of Procedure and of Debate and, possibly, the 
conducting of a ballot).
2  The IWC and synergies with biodiversity-related 
conventions
At a time when the world’s states seem to be moving toward synergies and clusterings 
of international instruments,9 almost to a ‘biodiversity of conventions’, the ICRW is 
one which is generally left out of such thinking.10 It sometimes appears, even, that 
other MEAs simply defer to the International Whaling Commission and treat issues 
of whale conservation as ‘untouchable’. 
The Convention on Migratory Species, 1979,11 provides that: ‘[e]ach AGREEMENT 
should … f ) at a minimum, prohibit, in relation to a migratory species of the Order 
Cetacea, any taking that is not permitted for that migratory species under any other 
multilateral Agreement and provide for accession to the AGREEMENT by States 
that are not Range States of that migratory species’.12 The effect of this Article is that 
the Convention on Migratory Species (CMS) provides that its state parties should 
not depart from the line taken by the IWC in respect of species for which a zero 
quota is in place; and that, as with the ICRW, any state should be permitted to join 
(in the case of the CMS, any AGREEMENT).
8 Consider, for instance, the St Kitts and Nevis Declaration, adopted by the International Whaling Com-
mission in 2006 (Resolution 2006:1). This is the only Resolution in recent years to have been ‘won’ by 
the pro-whaling contracting governments to the IWC. It was successful by a majority of one vote; but in 
subsequent years the anti-whaling contracting governments have not, despite regaining the majority, 
sought to overturn the Resolution.
9 For examples, see other papers in this volume of the Review.
10 Ed Couzens, ‘How the Whale got its Impasse’ in Ed Couzens and Tuula Honkonen (eds),, International	
Environmental	Law-making	and	Diplomacy	Review	2008 (University of Joensuu-UNEP, 2009) 81–88.
11 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, Bonn, 23 June 1979, in force 1 
November 1983, 19 International	Legal	Materials (1980) 15, <http://www.cms.int>.
12 Art. V, ‘Guidelines for Agreements’, 4.
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According to the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Re-
sources (CCAMLR), 1980,13 ‘[n]othing in this Convention shall derogate from the 
rights and obligations of Contracting Parties under the International Convention for 
the Regulation of Whaling’.14 This could be seen as a rather astonishing abrogation 
of authority, from a convention which purports to take a holistic, ecosystem-based 
approach to the management of the Antarctic’s living resources. This wording is re-
peated in the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, 1991,15 
which provides that ‘[n]othing in this Annex shall derogate from the rights and ob-
ligations of Parties under the International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling’.16 
According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982:17 
[n]othing in this Part restricts the right of a coastal State or the competence of 
an international organization, as appropriate, to prohibit, limit or regulate the 
exploitation of marine mammals more strictly than provided for in this Part. 
States shall cooperate with a view to the conservation of marine mammals and 
in the case of cetaceans shall in particular work through the appropriate interna-
tional organizations for their conservation, management and study.18
While there have been suggestions made over the years that the reference to ‘organi-
zations’ in the plural leaves scope for more than one management body, the IWC is 
generally considered to be the only such management body of any significance.19
While there is no formal reference to the IWC in the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 1973,20 it has been recom-
mended by the Parties that ‘the Parties agree not to issue any import or export permit, 
or certificate for introduction from the sea, under this Convention for primarily 
commercial purposes for any specimen of a species or stock protected from com-
mercial whaling by the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling’.21 
13 Convention on Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, Canberra, 20 May 1980, in force 7 
April 1982, 19 International	Legal	Materials	(1980) 841.
14 Art. VI.
15 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Madrid, 4 October 1991, in force 14 
January 1998, 30 International	Legal	Materials	(1991) 1461.
16 Annex II: ‘Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora’; Art. 7, ‘Relationship with other Agreements out-
side the Antarctic Treaty System’, 1.
17 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, in 
force 16 November 1994, 21 International	Legal	Materials	(1982) 1261.
18 Art. 65, ‘Marine mammals’.
19 The North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO) agreement, signed in Nuuk, Greenland, 
on 9 April 1992, is a regional agreement (Faroe Islands, Greenland, Iceland and Norway) which has been 
touted as a possible alternative in respect of the area for which it has geographical scope. See, generally, 
<http://www.nammco.no>. 
20 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Washington DC, 3 
March 1973, in force 1 July 1975, 993 United	Nations	Treaty	Series 243.
21 Resolution Conf. 11.4 (Rev. CoP12) (2002), ‘Conservation of cetaceans, trade in cetacean specimens and 
the relationship with the International Whaling Commission’.
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The deferral to the authority of the IWC has not met with universal agreement, and 
was probably put forward in response to proposals put forward to CITES by Japan 
and Norway to downlist22 certain species of cetacean to allow international trade 
therein.23
There is also no formal reference to the IWC in the text of the 1992 Convention on 
Biological Diversity;24 but it is provided that ‘[e]ach Contracting Party shall, as far 
as possible and as appropriate, cooperate with other Contracting Parties, directly or, 
where appropriate, through competent international organizations, in respect of 
areas beyond national jurisdiction and on other matters of mutual interest, for the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity’.25 Further, it is provided that 
‘[t]he provisions of this Convention shall not affect the rights and obligations of any 
Contracting Party deriving from any existing international agreement except where 
the exercise of those rights and obligations would cause a serious damage or threat 
to biological diversity’.26 These Articles, especially the latter, imply again a deferral of 
authority. 
It seems, therefore, that there is at least a degree of careful avoidance of the whaling 
issue-area in recent multilateral environmental agreements. One possible reason for 
this is that states attach so much importance to whaling that they can only get agree-
ment elsewhere by excluding the issue-area. Another possible reason is that states are 
so worried by the possibility of contaminating newer treaties with the conflict that 
has marked the ICRW for decades that they prefer to exclude the issue-area.27 It is 
hard to see why, otherwise, it should be felt necessary that ICRW issues be expressly 
excluded from the ambits of newer conventions.
This does lead to a number of problematic issues arising. One noteworthy problem 
is that of certain cetacean species not being regulated. The Schedule to the ICRW 
contains a list of the cetacean species which fall under the management of the IWC.28 
The IWC has tended to view cetaceans as either ‘large’ or ‘small’ species, a distinction 
that frequently owes rather more to political considerations than biological creden-
tials29 and has a significant impact upon the application of relevant instruments to 
individual animals. Whereas ‘small cetaceans’ have also been the subject of recom-
22 From Appendix I, which prohibits all commercial trade, to Appendix II which allows for regulated com-
mercial trade.
23 See note 37 below
24 Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993, 31 Inter-
national	Legal	Materials (1992) 822.
25 Art. 5, ‘Cooperation’.
26 Art. 22, ‘Relationship with Other International Conventions’.
27 See supra note 10.
28 Available at <http://www.iwcoffice.org/commission/schedule.htm>.
29 On this, see Kieran Mulvaney and Bruce McKay, ‘Small Cetaceans: Status, Threats, and Management’ in 
William C. G. Burns and Alexander Gillespie, The	Future	of	Cetaceans	in	a	Changing	World (Transna-
tional Publishers, 2003), at 189–216; and Alexander Gillespie, ‘Small Cetaceans, International Law and 
the International Whaling Commission’ in William C. G. Burns and Alexander Gillespie, The	Future	of	
Cetaceans	in	a	Changing	World (Transnational Publishers, 2003), at 219. Mulvaney and McKay suggest 
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mendations included in Resolutions30 of the International Whaling Commission, 
only the larger species of cetacean are dealt with in the text of the Schedule to the 
treaty. The list can be amended, and has been from time to time. Initially, for in-
stance, the killer whale was not included in the species list. Since 1977, however, it 
expressly belongs to the list of cetaceans over which the IWC exercises jurisdiction, 
and the species is within the scope of the current moratorium (‘zero quota’) on com-
mercial whaling.31 At present, however, only 15 species are listed.32 Approximately 
70 species of cetacean33 are not regulated by the IWC, and this leaves something of 
a ‘regulatory vacuum’ – there is no legal instrument of global scope which covers 
these species.
On the issue of synergies, originally, strong consideration was apparently given to a 
close relationship with the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization 
(FAO)34 – with the ICRW even to be administered by the FAO.35 This did not hap-
pen and has since faded from the parties’ thinking. 
In 1976, the IWC offered to act as the official advisor to CITES on cetaceans; and, 
in 1978, requested that CITES ‘take all possible measures’ to support IWC restric-
tions.36 The two organizations have had, however, a somewhat fractious relationship. 
Parties to CITES have (1994, 1997, 2000, 2002, 2004) proposed the downlisting 
of certain species of minke whale from Appendix I to Appendix II so as to allow for 
regulated international trade in those species.37 None of these proposals achieved the 
two-thirds majority vote necessary for success, however.
that the species listed originally were ‘simply [] the species that were most likely to be targeted by the 
whaling industry of that time’; ibid. at 189–190.
30 See, for example, IWC Resolution 1994-2 (1994).
31 At the 29th meeting of the Commission in 1977, a definition of the species was included in the Schedule, 
which is an integral part of the Convention. Schedule, para. 1(B): ‘“killer whale” (Orcinus	orca) means 
any whale known as killer whale or orca’.
32 Under the heading ‘baleen whales’: blue whale; bowhead whale; Bryde’s whale; fin whale; gray whale; 
humpback whale; minke whale; pygmy right whale; right whale; sei whale. Under the heading ‘toothed 
whales’: beaked whale; bottlenose whale; killer whale; pilot whale; sperm whale. See ‘1. Interpretation’ in 
the Schedule to the ICRW.
33 The Scientific Committee of the IWC currently recognizes 86 species of cetacean – see <http://www.
iwcoffice.org/conservation/cetacea.htm> (visited 27 December 2012). However, while listed, the baiji (or 
Yangtze River dolphin) is probably extinct.
34 See, generally, <http://www.fao.org>. 
35 See, for instance, R. Michael M’Gonigle, ‘The “Economizing” of Ecology: Why Big, Rare Whales Still 
Die’, 9 Ecology	Law	Quarterly (1980) 119–237 at 133; and Patricia Birnie, International	Regulation	of	
Whaling:	 From	Conservation	 of	Whaling	 to	Conservation	 of	Whales	 and	Regulation	 of	Whale-Watching:	
Volume	I (Oceana, 1985) 182.
36 ‘Resolution to the CITES’, IWC Special Meeting (1978), available at <http://iwcoffice.org/meetings/
resolutions/IWCRES_1978_SM.pdf> (visited 27 December 2012).
37 For further comment on this see, for instance, Alexander Gillespie, ‘Forum Shopping in International 
Law: The IWC, CITES and the Management of Cetaceans’, 33 Ocean	Development	and	International	Law 
(2002) 17–56. See also Ed Couzens, Large	and	Grey:	Whales,	Elephants	and	International	Law	and	Politics 
(Doctoral Thesis, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2008) Chapter 6; available at	<researchspace.ukzn.ac.za/
xmlui/handle/10413/584> (visited 27 December 2012). 
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The IWC took a similar approach in 1980 to the (then proposed) CCAMLR, adopt-
ing a resolution on cooperation and coordination between the two conventions.38 At 
the IWC Meeting in 1982, Australia stated that it believed that ‘liaison and coop-
eration between the IWC and other organisations concerned either directly or indi-
rectly with whales is necessary for the long term conservation of whales’; and argued 
that this was particularly true of the IWC’s relationship with CCAMLR.39
The CMS has deferred to the IWC, but has also assisted to some extent in filling the 
‘regulatory vacuum’ in respect of certain species of ‘small cetacean’. The CMS and 
the IWC have a Memorandum of Understanding from 2000, designed to: 
[e]stablish a framework of information and consultation between UNEP/CMS 
and the IWC in the field of conserving migratory species and the world’s natural 
heritage, with a view to identifying synergies and ensuring effective cooperation 
in joint activities by the relevant international bodies established under both 
conventions and national institutions of their Contracting Parties.40
Further, two AGREEMENTS under the CMS deal with ‘small cetaceans’. These are 
the Agreement on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic, North-East 
Atlantic, Irish and North Seas (1991), also known as ASCOBANS;41 and the Agree-
ment on the Conservation of Cetaceans in the Black Sea Mediterranean Sea and Con-
tiguous Atlantic Area (1996, 2001), also known as ACCOBAMS.42
Finally as an example, the IWC has considered the CBD to be ‘relevant to whale 
conservation’ in terms of a ‘Proposed Consensus Decision to Improve the Conserva-
tion of Whales from the Chair and Vice-Chair of the Commission’.43 This was not 
adopted as a formal decision of the IWC, but support was given toward further co-
operation. 
While these moves are obviously to be welcomed, as examples of links being forged 
between the ICRW/IWC and other conventions, it is probably far too early to de-
scribe them as ‘synergies’. Rather, they can probably be said to represent initial co-
operative efforts. The confrontational nature of the IWC, and the level of contention 
38 IWC Resolution on ‘Cooperation and Coordination between the [IWC] and the Proposed Commission 
for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources’ (1980). 
39 Australia Commissioner, ‘IWC Report of the Plenary Sessions of the Thirty-Fourth Annual Meeting’, 
(IWC	Verbatim	Record, 1982) 181.
40 See <http://iwcoffice.org/_documents/commission/IWC61docs/OS-IGO.pdf> (visited 27 December 
2012).
41 Concluded in 1991; in force 1994; extended 2008. It has been ratified by Belgium; Denmark; Finland; 
France; Germany; Lithuania; The Netherlands; Poland; Sweden; and the United Kingdom. See, gener-
ally, <http://www.ascobans.org/the_agreement.html> (visited 27 December 2012).
42 Concluded in 1996; in force 2001. It has been ratified by Albania; Algeria; Bulgaria; Croatia; Cyprus; 
Egypt; France; Georgia; Greece; Italy; Lebanon; Libya; Malta; Monaco; Montenegro; Morocco; Portugal; 
Romania; Slovenia; Spain; Syria; Tunisia; and the Ukraine. See, generally, <http://www.accobams.org/
about> (visited 27 December 2012). 
43 Doc. IWC/62/7rev (2010).
230
A Strange Beast Swimming Upstream: The International Whaling Commission in the 
Context of Synergies between Biodiversity-related MEAs
within the organization,44 must make it difficult at the present time to conceive of 
formal synergistic arrangements. 
As such, this was selected as a useful issue-area on which to base a negotiation exercise 
for the 2011 Course on Multilateral Environmental Agreements – the special theme 
of which was ‘Synergies Amongst the Biodiversity-related Conventions’.45 
Nevertheless, it would be extremely unfair to the IWC not to note that it does have 
many ‘cooperative arrangements’ in place with other conventions and international 
organizations – with many of these links being forged through the IWC’s Secretari-
at and its Scientific Committee. In the ‘Chair’s Report’ for 2011, for instance, it is 
noted that such cooperative arrangements ‘have continued and been strengthened 
with a number of other Intergovernmental Organisations’.46 Examples given in the 
Chair’s Report are the Convention on Migratory Species (CMS); the International 
Council for the Exploration of the Seas (ICES);47 the Inter-American Tropical Tuna 
Commission (IATC);48 the Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation 
Programme (AIDCP);49 the International Commission for the Conservation of At-
lantic Tunas (ICCAT);50 the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources (CCAMLR); the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission 
(NAMMCO);51 the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN);52 
the North Pacific Marine Science Organisation (PICES);53 the Protocol on Specially 
Protected Areas and Wildlife (SPAW) of the Cartagena Convention for the Wider 
Caribbean;54 and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO).55
3 Instructions and materials
3.1  Role assignation
Each participant was assigned to represent a state (a contracting government to the 
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling). Where possible, each 
44 On the fact of such levels of hostility, and on the ICRW contracting governments’ efforts to broker com-
promise, see the ‘Future of the IWC’ process, available at <http://www.iwcoffice.org/future> (visited 27 
December 2012); and see below under section 9.5 of this paper. 
45 See <http://www.uef/unep/courses/2011>.
46 See ‘Chair’s Report of the 63rd Annual Meeting, St Helier, Jersey, 2011’, available at <http://www.iwcof-
fice.org/_documents/meetings/jersey/Chairs%20report%20IWC63.pdf> (visited 27 December 2012), 
35. 
47 See http://www.ices.dk/indexfla.asp (visited 27 December 2012).
48 See http://www.iattc.org/HomeENG.htm (visited 27 December 2012).





54 Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife (SPAW) in the Wider Caribbean Region, 
Kingston, 18 January 1990, in force 18 June 2000, <http://www.cep.unep.org/cartagena-convention/
spaw-protocol/overview-of-the-spaw-protocol>.
55 See <http://www.imo.org>. 
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participant was assigned to a state with an official view different to that of the state 
from which the participant came. 
Each participant was then given a brief indication of the ‘philosophy’ which would 
be expected to drive the position of the state which he or she was to represent.56 The 
states chosen were divided into three essential groups – ‘sustainable use group’ states;57 
‘like-minded group’ states;58 and ‘middle of the road’ states. The numbers of states 
which fell into each group were intended basically to reflect the comparative posi-
tions within the real IWC negotiations.59 The grouped states, with their instructions, 
were as follow:
3.1.1  ‘Sustainable use group’ states
Antigua and Barbuda
‘Sustainable Use Group’ member. Would be expected to align itself with Gre-
nada and St Kitts & Nevis; and might be inclined to take a pro-active position 
on Caribbean unity and the promotion of developing country interests. Would 
be expected to align itself with Japan’s position.
Cambodia
‘Sustainable Use Group’ member. Would be expected to align itself with Japan’s 
position.
Congo, Rep of the
‘Sustainable Use Group’ member. Would be expected to align itself with Guinea-
Bissau and Senegal; and might be inclined to take a pro-active position on Afri-
can unity and the promotion of developing country interests. Would be ex-
pected to align itself with Japan’s position.
Grenada
‘Sustainable Use Group’ member. Would be expected to align itself with Antigua 
& Barbuda and St Kitts & Nevis; and might be inclined to take a pro-active 
position on Caribbean unity and the promotion of developing country interests. 
Would be expected to align itself with Japan’s position.
56 These instructions could have been more extensive, so as to afford the participants more assistance; but 
their handing out was brought forward by several days and they had to be prepared quickly. It is likely 
that in any such participatory exercise there will always be similar adaptations that need to be handled.
57 With Iceland, Japan and Norway as its most prominent members, this is the group of contracting govern-
ments which consistently argues and votes in favour of a resumption of commercial whaling.
58 Although states such as Australia, Germany, New Zealand, and the UK are often described – on their own 
– as being the ‘Like-minded Group’, in fact it is a fairly large group of states basically including all of the 
EU states and others which consistently argue and vote against moves to resume commercial whaling.
59 This intention went somewhat awry just before the exercise began, as a number of Course participants 
unexpectedly did not, for various reasons, take part in the exercise. 
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Guinea-Bissau
‘Sustainable Use Group’ member. Would be expected to align itself with Rep. of 
Congo and Senegal; and might be inclined to take a pro-active position on Afri-
can unity and the promotion of developing country interests. Would be ex-
pected to align itself with Japan’s position.
Iceland
‘Sustainable Use Group’ member. European country, but not a European Union 
member. An active whaling country with commercial whaling conducted legally 
under a reservation held to the International Whaling Commission’s 1982 ‘mor-
atorium’ (zero quota) on commercial whaling. Recognized as a leader in the 
Sustainable Use Group. Would be expected to align itself more closely with Japan 
on trade issues and with Norway on conservation issues.
Japan
‘Sustainable Use Group’ member. An active whaling country, but not on a com-
mercial basis as country does not hold a reservation held to the International 
Whaling Commission’s 1982 ‘moratorium’ (zero quota) on commercial whaling. 
Whaling is, instead, conducted for research purposes under scientific permits 
issued through the national government. Generally regarded as the foremost 
proponent for resuming commercial whaling. Perceived by many to control, or 
at least to influence, the positions of many of the countries in the Sustainable 
Use Group.
Kiribati
‘Sustainable Use Group’ member. Would be expected to align itself with Palau 
and Tuvalu. Would be expected to align itself with Japan’s position. Might take 
opportunity to promote developing country interests.
Norway
‘Sustainable Use Group’ member. European country, but not a European Union 
member. An active whaling country with commercial whaling conducted legally 
under a reservation held to the International Whaling Commission’s 1982 ‘mor-
atorium’ (zero quota) on commercial whaling. Recognized as a leader in the 
Sustainable Use Group. Regards itself as an enlightened environmental country. 
Currently taking a slightly less active role in the IWC and downplaying the im-
portance of the whaling issue. 
Palau
‘Sustainable Use Group’ member. Would be expected to align itself with Kiriba-
ti and Tuvalu. Would be expected to align itself with Japan’s position. Might take 
opportunity to promote developing country interests. 
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St. Kitts and Nevis
‘Sustainable Use Group’ member. Would be expected to align itself with Antigua 
& Barbuda and Grenada; and might be inclined to take a pro-active position on 
African unity and the promotion of developing country interests. Would be ex-
pected to align itself with Japan’s position. Very proud of the St Kitts Declaration.
Senegal
‘Sustainable Use Group’ member. Would be expected to align itself with Rep. of 
Congo and Guinea-Bissau; and might be inclined to take a pro-active position 
on African unity and the promotion of developing country interests. Would be 
expected to align itself with Japan’s position.
Tuvalu
‘Sustainable Use Group’ member. Would be expected to align itself with Palau 
and Kiribati. Would be expected to align itself with Japan’s position. Might take 
opportunity to promote developing country interests.
3.1.2 ‘Like-minded group’ states
Argentina
‘Like-minded Group member’. ‘GRULAC member’. Currently taking a hard line 
in entrenching the GRULAC; and in favour of increased protection of whales. 
Would be expected to support the proposed Resolution.
Australia
‘Like-minded Group member’. The proposer of the Resolution and expected 
therefore to push hard for its adoption, either by consensus or through a vote.
Brazil
‘Like-minded Group member’. ‘GRULAC member’. Currently taking a hard line 
in entrenching the GRULAC; and in favour of increased protection of whales. 
Would be expected to support the proposed Resolution.
Chile
‘Like-minded Group member’. ‘GRULAC member’. Currently taking a hard line 
in entrenching the GRULAC; and in favour of increased protection of whales. 
Would be expected to support the proposed Resolution.
Colombia
‘Like-minded Group member’. ‘GRULAC member’. Currently taking a hard line 
in entrenching the GRULAC; and in favour of increased protection of whales. 
Would be expected to support the proposed Resolution.
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The Netherlands
‘Like-minded Group member’. European Union member. Firmly anti-whaling. 
Would be expected to hold a position common to the other EU countries.
South Africa
‘Like-minded Group member’. Would be expected to align itself with the anti-
whaling countries, but could decide to abstain in appropriate circumstances. Has 
a slightly difficult position, given that it is a ‘sustainable use-oriented’ country in 
areas other than whaling. The current CHAIR of the International Whaling 
Commission.
Spain
‘Like-minded Group member’. European Union member. Would be expected to 
hold a position common to the other EU countries.
Sweden
‘Like-minded Group member’. European Union member. Would be expected to 
hold a position common to the other EU countries, but to be understanding of 
other positions.
United Kingdom
‘Like-minded Group member’. European Union member. Would be expected to 
hold a position common to the other EU countries.
United States
‘Like-minded Group member’. The country is in a very difficult position as its 
status as an active whaling country (Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling, not com-
mercial whaling), with quotas which need renewing every five years, leaves it 
vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy. Would generally be expected to vote with the 
anti-whaling countries, but to take every opportunity to broker compromise and 
to encourage other countries to reach consensus.
3.1.3  ‘Middle of the road’ states
China, People’s Rep of
Generally very quiet on the whaling issue, trying to maintain neutrality. Ex-
pected either to support the anti-whaling position or to abstain, but might be 
persuaded to switch in exceptional circumstances. Does have a possible potential 
interest in resuming whaling, as a ‘fisheries-oriented’ country.
Denmark
European Union member. Generally an anti-whaling country, but in interna-
tional fora represents two self-governing ‘countries’ (the Faroes and Greenland) 
which are active whaling countries. On the whaling issue, has occasionally de-
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parted from the EU position and might be persuaded to do so again on an ap-
propriate issue. Departed from the EU position in 2006 to vote in favour of 
Resolution 2006-1, which Resolution was accepted by 33 votes to 32 with one 
abstention.
Korea, Rep of
Would generally be expected to align itself with the anti-whaling countries, but 
tries to stay neutral. 
 Does have a possible potential interest in resuming whaling, as a ‘fisheries-
oriented’ country.
Russian Federation
Holds a reservation to the commercial whaling moratorium, but has advised that 
it does not intend to resume commercial whaling. Would generally be expected 
to vote with the anti-whaling countries, but is unpredictable. Seems particularly 
concerned about the influence exerted by the European Union and 
Switzerland
European country, but not a European Union member. Would generally be ex-
pected to vote with the anti-whaling countries, and/or the EU, but might be 
persuaded to abstain in appropriate circumstances.
3.2  Preparatory documents
In preparation, each participant was given – several weeks before the 2011 Course 
began – the texts of a number of instruments. These were the International Conven-
tion for the Regulation of Whaling, of 1946;60 the Protocol thereto, of 1956;61 the 
Schedule thereto;62 the Rules of Procedure thereto;63 and the Rules of Debate there-
to.64 Each participant was instructed to be conversant with these texts by the time of 
the exercise. This was important,65 as the exercise was designed essentially to concern 
the creation of, and interpretation of, legal text. 
60 Available at <http://www.iwcoffice.org/commission/convention.htm> (visited 27 December 2012).
61 Available at ibid.
62 The Schedule to the ICRW contains amendments which the Contracting Governments have made to the 
operation of the Convention. The ability so to amend operating procedures arguably gives the Convention 
an inherent degree of flexibility; however, a 75 per cent majority is required to carry an amendment, if 
consensus is not reached.
63 Available at <http://www.iwcoffice.org/commission/procedure.htm> (visited 27 December 2012).
64 Available at ibid.
65 Although probably observed more in the breach! A constant topic of debate amongst the resource persons 
involved with the UEF/UNEP Course on Multilateral Environmental Agreements is how best to persuade 
participants to prepare adequately, given that most participants have busy careers. Probably the best that 
can be done is to encourage as much preparation as possible, but then to present a negotiation exercise 
which does not rely on this preparation and so will be enhanced by preparation but which will not run 
the risk of failing if the preparation is not adequate.
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As noted earlier, initial instructions were then given to the participants several days 
before the exercise took place.66 
Participants had the opportunity, using internet resources, to inform themselves as 
to their allocated country’s position in order to supplement their brief instructions. 
In addition, it was suggested to the participants that they could make the effort to 
inform themselves as to other countries’ positions; in order potentially to strengthen 
their negotiating positions. Participants were warned that if they did not fully inform 
themselves as to their own (allocated) countries’ positions, then they might find 
themselves embarrassed by other participants knowing more about the first partici-
pant’s (allocated) country.67 
A Chair was appointed. This office corresponded to the current (at the time of the 
exercise) Chair of the IWC – i.e. South Africa.68 It was thought advisable to select a 
fairly experienced participant for this role, as it a difficult position – being both of-
fice-bearer and simultaneously representing a state. The choice of Chair needed also, 
however, to take account of which participants had taken leadership roles in the first 
exercise held in the previous week of the Course.69
Participants were encouraged to form alliances – some of which suggested themselves 
naturally.70 Others arose which might not have been realistic had this been the real 
IWC. Participants ought to have recognized that they could get better results if 
united. Each participant was also given a mock Resolution, put forward by Aus-
tralia. 
It is important to note that within the IWC there is a significant difference between 
a proposed Schedule amendment and a Resolution, in that a Schedule amendment 
can be passed only with a three-quarters majority while a Resolution can be passed 
by a simple majority. This meant that there was a good chance, with appropriate 
alliance-building, that the Resolution would be passed.
The actual exercise, then, was for the participants to deal with the mock Resolution 
– and for them to choose to take it off the table; to drive it to a vote; to adopt it by 
66 The exercise took place on a single day, 15 September 2011.
67 Although these descriptions are in the main accurate for each state’s current stances in respect of IWC 
negotiations, and participants had the opportunity to bolster these instructions with internet-based re-
search on their allotted states, it does not ultimately matter – for purposes of the exercise – that the par-
ticipants had all of the details correct. The exercise was designed to teach negotiation skills, not knowledge. 
It is worth noting here that many of the participants in the 2011 exercise were from states which are not 
members of the IWC, and of which it would not be expected that there would be a high degree of knowl-
edge about the whaling debate.
68 The South African Commissioner to the IWC, Mr Herman Oosthuizen, acted as Interim Chair for 
IWC63 (2011) and until IWC64 (2012).
69 See Cam Carruthers and Niko Urho, ‘The Bangkok Ad Hoc Joint Working Group: A Multilateral Simu-
lation Exercise’, in Part IV of the present Review.
70 According to the brief position statements furnished to the participants. 
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consensus; or to amend it and to choose one of the above options in respect of the 
amended version. 
4 Exercise documentation
4.1  The proposed resolution
IWC64/PROP1
RESOLUTION PROPOSAL
PROPOSED BY AUSTRALIA; SUPPORTED BY ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, 
CHILE AND COLOMBIA
The Parties to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 1946:
RECALLING that the objective of the Convention is to provide for the proper conservation 
of whale stocks;
NOTING that the Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992, defines ‘biological diversity’ 
as meaning ‘the variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, 
terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they 
are part; this includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems’;
ACKNOWLEDGING	that the Convention on Migratory Species, 1979, provides in Article 
V, Guidelines for Agreements, that 4. [e]ach AGREEMENT should … f ) at a minimum, 
prohibit, in relation to a migratory species of the Order Cetacea, any taking that is not per-
mitted for that migratory species under any other multilateral Agreement and provide for 
accession to the AGREEMENT by States that are not Range States of that migratory species; 
ACKNOWLEDGING FURTHER that the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources, 1980, provides in Article VI that [n]othing in this Convention 
shall derogate from the rights and obligations of Contracting Parties under the Interna-
tional Convention for the Regulation of Whaling;
ACKNOWLEDGING FURTHER that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, 1982, provides in Article 65, Marine	mammals, that [n]othing in this Part restricts the 
right of a coastal State or the competence of an international organization, as appropriate, 
to prohibit, limit or regulate the exploitation of marine mammals more strictly than pro-
vided for in this Part. States shall cooperate with a view to the conservation of marine mam-
mals and in the case of cetaceans shall in particular work through the appropriate interna-
tional organizations for their conservation, management and study;
ACKNOWLEDGING FURTHER that the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the 
Antarctic Treaty, 1991, Annex II: Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora, provides in 
Article 7, Relationship	with	other	Agreements	outside	the	Antarctic	Treaty	System,	that	1.	[n]
othing in this Annex shall derogate from the rights and obligations of Parties under the In-
ternational Convention for the Regulation of Whaling;
ACKNOWLEDGING FURTHER that the Convention on International Trade in Endan-
gered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 1973, has RECOMMENDED in Resolution 
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Conf. 11.4 (Rev. CoP12), Conservation of cetaceans, trade in cetacean specimens and the 
relationship with the International Whaling Commission, that the Parties agree not to issue 
any import or export permit, or certificate for introduction from the sea, under this Conven-
tion for primarily commercial purposes for any specimen of a species or stock protected from 
commercial whaling by the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling;
ACKNOWLEDGING FURTHER that the Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992, pro-
vides in Article V, Cooperation, that [e]ach Contracting Party shall, as far as possible and as 
appropriate, cooperate with other Contracting Parties, directly or, where appropriate, through 
competent international organizations, in respect of areas beyond national jurisdiction and 
on other matters of mutual interest, for the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity;
NOTING that per the Schedule to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whal-
ing, 1946, as amended, sixteen species of cetacea, sub-divided into ten species of baleen 
whales and six species of toothed whales, are subjects of regulation by the International Whal-
ing Commission; 
NOTING FURTHER that the Scientific Committee of the International Whaling Commis-
sion currently recognises 86 species or sub-species of cetacea, and that a significant number 
of species or sub-species of cetacea are therefore not the subjects of regulation;  
RECOGNISING that it is undesirable for proper conservation of biological diversity for 
species of cetacea to be unregulated, or for certain species to be regulated while others are 
not; 
RECOGNISING FURTHER that it is undesirable for proper conservation of biological 
diversity for different species of cetacea to be, or potentially to be, regulated under different 
conventions; 
CONSIDERING that the present state of affairs is undesirable;
CONSIDERING FURTHER that greater cooperation with other Multilateral Environmen-
tal Agreements is desirable;
hereby INSTRUCT	 the Secretary of the International Whaling Commission to initiate 
formal contact with the Secretariats of the Convention on Migratory Species, the Convention 
on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, the Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, the Antarctic Treaty, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
of Wild Fauna and Flora, and the Convention on Biological Diversity, with a view to estab-
lishing formal, mutually supportive working relationships between the International Whal-
ing Commission and those Conventions, with the Secretary to report back at the 65th Meet-
ing of the International Whaling Commission on steps taken;
and hereby RESOLVE	that the Commission will work expeditiously to bring all species of 
cetacea under the management control of the International Whaling Commission by way of 
inclusion in the Schedule to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 




4.2  The St Kitts and Nevis Declaration, 2006
In order to assist the participants, particularly those from states not normally repre-
sented in the IWC, the St Kitts and Nevis Declaration of 2006 was supplied. It was 
intended that this would provide ‘ammunition’ for debate. The resolution is essen-
tially the only resolution ‘won’ by the pro-whaling (‘sustainable use’) contracting 
governments in the IWC in approximately thirty years; and it provides both a useful 
summary of the sustainable use approach to whaling and a critique of the majority 
position within the IWC. 
Resolution 2006-1 
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS DECLARATION 
EMPHASISING that the use of cetaceans in many parts of the world including the Carib-
bean, contributes to sustainable coastal communities, sustainable livelihoods, food security 
and poverty reduction and that placing the use of whales outside the context of the globally 
accepted norm of science-based management and rule-making for emotional reasons would 
set a bad precedent that risks our use of fisheries and other renewable resources; 
FURTHER EMPHASING that the use of marine resources as an integral part of develop-
ment options is critically important at this time for a number of countries experiencing the 
need to diversify their agriculture; 
UNDERSTANDING that the purpose of the 1946 International Convention for the Regu-
lation of Whaling (ICRW) is to ‘provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus 
make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry’ (quoted from the Preamble 
to the Convention) and that the International Whaling Commission (IWC) is therefore 
about managing whaling to ensure whale stocks are not over-harvested rather than protecting 
all whales irrespective of their abundance; 
NOTING that in 1982, the IWC adopted a moratorium on commercial whaling (paragraph 
10 e of the Schedule to the ICRW) without advice from the Commission’s Scientific Com-
mittee that such measure was required for conservation purposes; 
FURTHER NOTING that the moratorium which was clearly intended as a temporary 
measure is no longer necessary, that the Commission adopted a robust and risk-averse pro-
cedure (RMP) for calculating quotas for abundant stocks of baleen whales in 1994 and that 
the IWC’s own Scientific Committee has agreed that many species and stocks of whales are 
abundant and sustainable whaling is possible; 
CONCERNED that after 14 years of discussion and negotiation, the IWC has failed to 
complete and implement a management regime to regulate commercial whaling. 
ACCEPTING that scientific research has shown that whales consume huge quantities of fish 
making the issue a matter of food security for coastal nations and requiring that the issue of 
management of whale stocks must be considered in a broader context of ecosystem manage-
ment since eco-system management has now become an international standard. 
REJECTING as unacceptable that a number of international NGOs with self-interest cam-
paigns should use threats in an attempt to direct government policy on matters of sovereign 
rights related to the use of resources for food security and national development; 
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NOTING that the position of some members that are opposed to the resumption of com-
mercial whaling on a sustainable basis irrespective of the status of whale stocks is contrary to 
the object and purpose of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling; 
UNDERSTANDING that the IWC can be saved from collapse only by implementing con-
servation and management measures which will allow controlled and sustainable whaling 
which would not mean a return to historic over-harvesting and that continuing failure to do 
so serves neither the interests of whale conservation nor management; 
NOW THEREFORE: 
COMMISSIONERS express their concern that the IWC has failed to meet its obligations 
under the terms of the ICRW and, 
DECLARE our commitment to normalising the functions of the IWC based on the terms 
of the ICRW and other relevant international law, respect for cultural diversity and traditions 
of coastal peoples and the fundamental principles of sustainable use of resources, and the 
need for science-based policy and rulemaking that are accepted as the world standard for the 
management of marine resources.71
6 Expectations from the exercise
The intention was that the participants would, from the beginning of the actual 
negotiating, run the exercise themselves – under the direction of their Chair. The 
originator of this negotiation exercise played the role of the Secretary of the IWC – 
not involved in the negotiations, but sitting alongside the Chair and assisting with 
procedural issues. In addition, another senior resource person from the Course sat 
alongside, playing the role of the IWC Head of Science, to assist where necessary.
The exercise would then be followed by a lecture from the originator, including an 
assessment of the exercise, explanation of how the results of the exercise differed from 
or were similar to what would probably have happened in reality – given the history 
of the IWC. In this respect, issues of form and substance from the 63rd Meeting of 
the IWC, held in 2011, would be highlighted in order to put into context the expe-
rience which the participants would just have gained. 
7 Debate in plenary
7.1  The opening session
The Chair welcomed the plenary. Australia congratulated the Chair and then intro-
duced its proposal, briefly summarizing this by explaining that it had two objects – 
these being to synergize; and to bring all whale species under management. Aus-
tralia noted that whales are important ‘keystone’ species. Asked by the Chair 




whether it was proposing the adoption of its resolution by consensus, Australia said 
that it saw no reason why this should not happen as the proposal was ‘pretty straight-
forward’. Argentina congratulated the Chair, and then identified its position as being 
the same as Australia’s and argued that it is important to bring all species under pro-
tection and that it is necessary to synergize. The Chair then asked whether consensus 
could be achieved.
Russia congratulated and thanked the Chair, then advised that it had interest in the 
proposal but also concerns over its scope; and argued that the world is still working 
on getting to a situation where there will be safety of whale stocks and sustainable 
use thereof. Russia advised that it was hesitant to accept the draft resolution. 
Japan then greeted the plenary [in Japanese] and reminded it that Japan had organ-
ized the Nagoya meeting and that there can be no doubt as to the support which 
Japan gives to good governance of biodiversity. Japan then referred to the rights in-
digenous peoples held to have their cultural preferences recognized in management; 
stated that the importance ascribed to certain food stocks should not be forgotten; 
and explained that Japan has been transforming itself since the Fifteenth Century, as 
a sustainable society with a dense population. Japan argued that sustainable use is 
important and that we cannot just conserve; and explained that all it was asking for 
was respect for the way it used food. The draft resolution, said Japan, focuses solely 
on conservation; and, while Japan has nothing against synergies, the focus should 
not be on just one side. Japan concluded that the object of the Convention was ne-
glected here.
Norway congratulated Australia for trying to get the motion through as quickly as 
possible; but advised that before consensus was achieved it would like to bring to the 
Secretariat’s attention the Schedule, which makes it clear whaling is to be conducted 
sustainably. Norway explained that he, the Commissioner, could not see why at this 
late stage ‘we should turn around and say that this is wrong’; and concluded that the 
Australian motion to adopt the proposal without debate was premature and probably 
irregular. Antigua and Barbuda then pointed out that it supports sustainable use; that 
the vast majority of food available to it to use is marine; and that there must be re-
spect for cultural tradition. Iceland congratulated the Chair; then explained that it 
believes in the principle of sustainable use as key to sustainable development, that it 
had serious reservations over the Australian proposal to bring all cetaceans under 
management, and that it saw no reason to give support.
Australia then thanked the various speakers; and responded that while one of the core 
objectives of the Convention text is sustainable whaling, we cannot, however, forget 
conservation. The United States then congratulated the Acting Chair, gave the Chair 
its full support, and thanked Australia for its submission. The US explained that it 
recognizes that there is a clear relationship between conservation and orderly devel-
opment; and that while the US has a strong position in respect of conservation, it 
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also has a strong position on sustainable use in respect of Aboriginal Subsistence 
Whaling. On synergies, the US pointed out that not all IWC members are members 
of the conventions referred to by Australia and that this might be a barrier to conserv-
ing both the 15 species managed and also the other 70 species – to which the US 
wished to draw attention. The US pointed out that there is a shade of difference 
between ‘monitoring’ and ‘regulating’. The US stated that it wished to encourage 
debate; and that while it felt that taking over responsibility for the other species 
would encourage wise use of resources, it could still see problematic aspects – includ-
ing data and that there are other countries which are not members of the IWC. 
The United Kingdom then gave its full support to the proposal, explaining that the 
UK is strongly against whaling. ‘Sustainability’, said the UK, implies long-term viabil-
ity and extraction damages the whale watching industry – the only truly sustainable 
use. Norway then advised, on terminology, that ‘conservation’ now includes the ele-
ment of sustainable use; whereas 50 years ago it had meant ‘preservation’. Norway 
argued that this must be included, and that if the motion is for preservation then it 
must say so and that ‘if Australia thinks it includes sustainable use then it must say so 
and bring it in’. Norway explained that it cannot see the link between viewing whales 
and sustainable use – since, if sustainable, the viewing of whales will continue. ‘Let us 
not’, said Norway, ‘hide behind words to get motions through’. In response, the US 
argued that ‘conservation’ used to mean ‘preservation’ and now means ‘sustainable 
use’; and sought clarification on what Australia meant by ‘management control’. The 
ICRW, said the US, refers to ‘regulating’ – as opposed to ‘monitoring’. The US then 
asked about financial considerations and enforcement; pointing out that the CBD in 
part agrees with the IWC and calls for cooperation and that the Antarctic Protocol 
agrees with the IWC in synergizing and CITES supports – so that it may be possible 
to make progress if the proposition is modified. The US also referred to the role of the 
Scientific Committee and said that it is important to get updates. The Chair asked for 
text on the exact ideas the US proposed needed changing.
Brazil then stated that it had been watching with concern – and that it strongly sup-
ported Australia’s proposal. Kiribati then explained that, as a small country, it relies 
on marine resources, and that it supports the sustainable use of whales; and that it 
was glad that the US had raised the issue of members of other organizations. Kirib-
ati explained that it had not adopt either the CMS or CITES. Guineau-Bissau 
thanked Australia, but advised that it concurred fully with Iceland, Japan and Nor-
way – then advised that it was more than willing to work on improving the text. 
Senegal congratulated the Chair and thanked Thailand as host. Senegal then indi-
cated that it concurred with views that amendments to the Schedule should be held 
in abeyance pending advice from the Scientific Committee. Antigua and Barbuda 
highlighted the importance of sustainable use, especially for small countries in which 
it provided their major source of food. The Chair then quoted a proverb which holds 
that ‘a chattering bird builds no nest’.
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Norway suggested that a chattering bird has a nicely built nest; then gave support to 
the US and suggested that the revision should follow Resolution 2006-1 of the IWC 
(the St Kitts and Nevis Declaration). Australia then suggested, on the food issue, that 
whales are at the top of the food chain; and that a crash would mean the crash of 
ecosystems. South Korea then advised that it does not strongly support whaling, but 
that it recognizes the importance of whaling; and suggested that the ICRW is not 
about conservation as such, but is more about regulating whaling – regulating max-
imum sustainable yield (MSY). St Kitts and Nevis congratulated the Chair; then 
argued that many of its people depend heavily on whaling, and that a total ban would 
affect them. St Kitts and Nevis then gave its support to Japan, Iceland and Norway 
– and to what Korea had just said. Switzerland then stated that, as a great lake 
power, it was very interested in whaling; and that it felt that to take the right decision 
scientific information should be taken into account. Switzerland supported the US 
proposal on scientific data.
Spain congratulated the Chair; then suggested going back to the object of the 1946 
Convention – and stated that it believed that Australia had provided a means whereby 
the objective can effectively be met, and that Spain believed that Japan would be willing 
to look at that. Spain argued that there are ‘lots of grey areas in the data’, especially for 
the Pacific Ocean; and suggested that an informed decision was needed, with Spain 
being ‘scared that we might get into a stock collapse situation’. Australia then stated 
that although it, Australia, had contributed to the reduction of whale stocks, there were 
now other threats to be recognized – including climate change, entanglement, and 
habitat destruction. Australia then warned that although members might not be party 
to all other conventions, this should not be used as an excuse to avoid synergies.
Japan then quoted a saying which it said applied to Australia: ‘you can hear the ring-
ing of the bells, but you cannot see the bell tower’; and suggested that the IWC 
should be true to the 1946 Convention, the Preamble to which is ‘still true today’. 
Japan then suggested changing the word ‘conservation’ in the text to ‘sustainable use’. 
The Chair then reminded the parties to keep in mind that they were still awaiting 
the US proposal; and reminded the parties that the Scientific Committee does report 
extensively every year before the meeting.
Palau then indicated strong support for the Australian proposal, despite indicating 
that it supports Japan; and noted that whales are not the only source of food. Norway 
then proposed that new text be agreed to before going to any of the other multilat-
eral environmental agreements; and pointed out that the issue is sustainable use of 
whales. South Korea then suggested that the term ‘management control’ was unclear 
and that the term ‘regulation’ should be used instead. 
The Chair then suggested that an informal group be established to work on the pro-
posal, comprising Australia, Japan, South Korea and the US – the states which had 
proposed changes to the text.
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Senegal reiterated that the proposal should focus on the synergies aspect and the 
Schedule amendment should be held in abeyance. ‘All birds’, said Senegal, ‘will flock 
to a fruitful tree’. The Chair invited Senegal to be part of the informal group; and 
Senegal indicated that it would be ‘most willing’. The UK endorsed the Chair’s pro-
posal.
7.2  The second session and the proposed revisions to the text of the 
resolution
After a break, the Chair asked members to consider the revised text for five minutes 
before raising flags. The shaded text indicates the proposed additions which the par-
ties themselves had added, or which they indicated were in dispute.
IWC64/PROP1 (Revised)
RESOLUTION PROPOSAL
PROPOSED BY AUSTRALIA; SUPPORTED BY ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, 
CHILE AND COLOMBIA
The Parties to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 1946:
 
RECALLING that the objective of the Convention is to provide for the proper conservation 
of whale stocks  [and thus make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry- 
 Japan]; 
NOTING that the Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992, defines ‘biological diversity’ 
as meaning ‘the variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, 
terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they 
are part; this includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems’;
ACKNOWLEDGING	that the Convention on Migratory Species, 1979, provides in Article 
V, Guidelines for Agreements, that 4. [e]ach AGREEMENT should … f ) at a minimum, 
prohibit, in relation to a migratory species of the Order Cetacea, any taking that is not per-
mitted for that migratory species under any other multilateral Agreement and provide for 
accession to the AGREEMENT by States that are not Range States of that migratory species; 
ACKNOWLEDGING FURTHER that the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources, 1980, provides in Article VI that [n]othing in this Convention 
shall derogate from the rights and obligations of Contracting Parties under the Interna-
tional Convention for the Regulation of Whaling;
ACKNOWLEDGING FURTHER that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, 1982, provides in Article 65, Marine	mammals, that [n]othing in this Part restricts the 
right of a coastal State or the competence of an international organization, as appropriate, 
to prohibit, limit or regulate the exploitation of marine mammals more strictly than pro-
vided for in this Part. States shall cooperate with a view to the conservation of marine mam-
mals and in the case of cetaceans shall in particular work through the appropriate interna-
tional organizations for their conservation, management and study;
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ACKNOWLEDGING FURTHER that the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the 
Antarctic Treaty, 1991, Annex II: Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora, provides in 
Article 7, Relationship	with	other	Agreements	outside	the	Antarctic	Treaty	System,	that	1.	[n]
othing in this Annex shall derogate from the rights and obligations of Parties under the In-
ternational Convention for the Regulation of Whaling;
ACKNOWLEDGING FURTHER that the Convention on International Trade in Endan-
gered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 1973, has RECOMMENDED in Resolution 
Conf. 11.4 (Rev. CoP12), Conservation of cetaceans, trade in cetacean specimens and the 
relationship with the International Whaling Commission, that the Parties agree not to issue 
any import or export permit, or certificate for introduction from the sea, under this Conven-
tion for primarily commercial purposes for any specimen of a species or stock protected from 
commercial whaling by the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling;
ACKNOWLEDGING FURTHER that the Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992, pro-
vides in Article V, Cooperation, that [e]ach Contracting Party shall, as far as possible and as 
appropriate, cooperate with other Contracting Parties, directly or, where appropriate, through 
competent international organizations, in respect of areas beyond national jurisdiction and 
on other matters of mutual interest, for the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity;
NOTING that per the Schedule to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whal-
ing, 1946, as amended, sixteen species of cetacea, sub-divided into ten species of baleen 
whales and six species of toothed whales, are subjects of regulation by the International Whal-
ing Commission; 
NOTING FURTHER that the Scientific Committee of the International Whaling Commis-
sion currently recognises 86 species or sub-species of cetacea, and that a significant number 
of species or sub-species of cetacea are therefore not the subjects of regulation;  
RECOGNISING that it is undesirable for proper  [conservation – Australia][sustainable use-  
 Japan]  of biological diversity for species of cetacea to be unregulated, or for certain species 
to be regulated while others are not; 
RECOGNISING FURTHER that it is undesirable for proper conservation of biological 
diversity for different species of cetacea to be, or potentially to be, regulated under different 
conventions; 
[CONSIDERING that the present state of affairs is [undesirable – Australia][of great con-
cern – USA];]
CONSIDERING FURTHER that greater cooperation with other Multilateral Environmen-
tal Agreements is desirable;
hereby INSTRUCT	 the Secretary of the International Whaling Commission to initiate 
formal contact with the Secretariats of the Convention on Migratory Species, the Convention 
on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, the Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, the Antarctic Treaty, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
of Wild Fauna and Flora, and the Convention on Biological Diversity, with a view to estab-
lishing formal, mutually supportive working relationships between the International Whal-
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ing Commission and those Conventions, with the Secretary to report back at the 65th Meet-
ing of the International Whaling Commission on steps taken;
Option 1
[and hereby RESOLVE	that the Commission will work expeditiously [towards the possibility
of bringing – USA] [to bring – Australia] all species of cetacea under the [management control
- Australia][regulation - USA]  of the International Whaling Commission by way of inclu-
sion in the Schedule to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 1946, 
with a view to achieving this goal at the 65th Meeting of the International Whaling Commis-
sion. And the provisions of Resolution 1/2006.]
Option 2
[and hereby INSTRUCT the Scientific Committee to provide, as soon as possible, a com-
prehensive summary of all scientific findings on the current status of all species (including 
sub-species) of cetacean and provide informed guidance with respect to the inclusion of all 
species of cetecea in the Schedule with a view to promote cooperation with the above men-
tioned MEAs. – USA, Senegal, St Kitts, Antigua and Barbuda, Tuvalu and Kiribati]
Norway indicated that it was firmly of the belief that compromise could be achieved. 
The Chair then reminded the plenary of Rule E of the Rules of Procedure, which 
indicates that ‘[t]he Commission shall make every effort to reach its decisions by 
consensus’ before other proceeding further into the Rules if ‘all efforts to reach con-
sensus have been exhausted and no agreement reached’. Russia supported the US’s 
proposals, but proposed recalling the object of the Convention without specifying 
this. Asked by the Chair for clarification, Russia suggested that the preamble of the 
proposed resolution should include the words ‘Recalling the objects of the Conven-
tion’. Russia indicated that it could not accept Japan’s proposed amendment as there 
was no need to specify; and Russia indicated that from this point it was content to 
follow the US text.
Australia stated that the states in the informal working group had looked at the first 
paragraph, and that it was a direct copy and paste from the text. Japan was next in 
line to speak, but indicated that it would wait for Russia to respond. Russia sug-
gested that the preambular paragraph of the Convention was more comprehensive, 
and that there was therefore no reason to repeat it. Japan asked what convention 
Russia was describing. Russia responded that the preamble outlines well why we have 
the Convention. The Chair suggested using square brackets for the time being. Japan, 
however, suggested that, since logical explanations did not seem to satisfy Russia, the 
whole preamble could be included. Guinea-Bissau concurred with Japan.
Australia still maintained that the amended text reflected the two objectives of the 
Convention; which were, Australia felt, succinctly captured. Russia stated that there 
was no need to repeat, and asked ‘why should we repeat part of it?’. However, Russia 
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indicated that it could live with Australia’s proposal. The Chair thanked Russia, and 
the others, for their spirit of collaboration and compromise.
The US indicated that it had some concerns over the strength of the statement and 
that how the statement would affect the US had not yet been discussed. There are, 
said the US, positive and negative aspects; and that at this time the US was concerned 
about effects. The Chair asked if alternative text had been provided; but the US in-
dicated that although it had tried to bring this up in the working group, this had 
failed and so the US was bringing the issue up on the floor. 
Australia referred to an Aboriginal proverb which holds that ‘a crab does not teach its 
son to walk forwards’. Australia argued, on synergies, that the best first step would be 
to make the list more inclusive and that the last paragraph should therefore be more 
forceful. Australia then described a scenario of two whales of different species swim-
ming alongside each other, with one being protected and the other not – and argued 
that conservation imperatives should be kept in mind. Australia then indicated that in 
a spirit of compromise it would go ahead with the US’s last paragraph amendment. 
St Kitts and Nevis stated that it was proud of the 2006 St Kitts and Nevis Declaration, 
and that it supported the US on the last paragraph – pointing out that, per the fifth 
paragraph of the Declaration, the Scientific Committee had noted abundance. Sweden 
indicated that it supported Australia’s proposed resolution strongly as a measure to en-
sure the continued existence of cetaceans; and argued that regulating all species will 
ensure conservation. Senegal argued that comments as to abundance were not sup-
ported by the Scientific Committee; and reiterated that any amendment of the Schedule 
would require scientific evidence. Senegal then suggested deletion of the final paragraph 
and concentration on synergies. The Chair asked whether a draft could be provided, 
and Senegal suggested the inclusion of a paragraph instructing the Scientific Committee 
to report on whether including all species would be good. The US said that it firmly 
supported Senegal; and then asked how it would be possible to regulate 86 species, when 
15 are causing ‘so much excitement’. The Chair then adjourned the session. 
7.3  The third session
On resumption, the US stated that it considered the present state of affairs to be 
undesirable; and asked whether primary or secondary data was to be relied upon, 
indicating that the point is management. If secondary data can be relied upon, said 
the US, the current situation might not be undesirable; and if data was received 
through other bodies it might still help to achieve goals. 
St Kitts and Nevis then referred to a proverb that ‘one whale can feed 20 families’; 
and pointed out that the debate was also truly about livelihoods. Denmark then 
quoted a proverb that ‘a good plan today is better than a perfect plan tomorrow’; 
and, pointing out that it represented Greenland also, argued that bringing all species 
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of cetacean under management might not reflect cultures. Denmark iterated, how-
ever, that it was just making a comment. The Chair asked whether Denmark wished 
to join the working group; but Denmark said that the European Union had a spokes-
man – the UK. Guinea-Bissau asked whether it was possible for others to sit in on 
the working group; and the Chair confirmed that it was an open group. The US then 
asked for an adjournment for the working group to continue drafting. 
7.4  The fourth session
After the break the distributed proposed replacement text for the ultimate paragraph 
of the proposed resolution read as follows: 
… and hereby INSTRUCT the Scientific Committee to provide, as soon as possible, a 
comprehensive summary of all scientific findings on the current status of all species 
(including sub-species) of cetacean and provide informed guidance with respect to the 
inclusion of all species of cetacean in the Schedule with a view to promote cooperation 
with the above mentioned MEAs.
On resumption, Australia indicated that it would be open to adding the word ‘possibly’ 
to the phrase ‘… to bring in all …’; but that at the moment it could not agree to the 
US’s definitive text. The US stated that it was concerned about finances; and stated that 
it was important that the IWC be recognized, and that the move to the ultimate goal 
of including all species should be made cautiously and without presupposing the will-
ingness of other organizations. The US then pointed out that there is information about 
the 15 species in the Schedule, and suggested that before bringing in others the Com-
mission should look to see what kind of data and partnerships can be explored. Sweden 
agreed with Australia; but suggested that the word ‘possibly’ was a bit loose, and sug-
gesting discussing with Australia and deciding on a text. Norway then suggested adding 
to Option 1, at the end, the words ‘– and the provisions of Resolution 1 of 2006’.
Switzerland then said that it had concerns, and suggested reconfiguring the group. 
St Kitts and Nevis stated, however, that ‘in the spirit of compromise’ it was happy 
with the revised text. The Chair summarized by stating that there were two versions 
and that they were trying to reach a conversion text, as suggested by Switzerland, to 
choose between options. The US suggested that all parties with vested interests in 
change should be present.
Russia then suggested a postponement; with support from Switzerland, which said 
that it did not favour any voting but would prefer to postpone and await scientific 
results. Australia, however, implored that Switzerland not ask for a postponement; 
arguing that ‘as we speak, every minute we are losing more whales’, and asking 
whether we should ‘postpone until no more whales are left?’. Australia indicated that 
in the spirit of compromise it had decided to allow categorization of species; but then 
proposed, as there was no consensus, to go to a vote.
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Japan commented on a ‘remarkable alliance’ between Russia and Switzerland, de-
scribing it as ‘a first’! Japan described the proposed resolution as being extremely 
important; and said that in the end it might come to a vote. Japan then said that it 
could accept either Options 1 or 2, if a final paragraph were added: 
‘RESOLVES, upon receiving the requested information from the Scientific Committee, 
to pay due regard to its conclusions and lift the 1982 moratorium for any cetacean clas-
sified as meeting a sustained management stock level’. 
Iceland then indicated that it would support Option 2, with Japan’s addition. Nor-
way argued that there is no evidence to suggest that species are going extinct and 
need to be saved – characterizing this claim as an ‘attempt to hoodwink by the Sec-
retariat’.
The Chair then pointed out that the Options were those of the parties, not of the 
Secretariat. A point of order was raised, and the Chair ruled that the Secretariat had 
‘no part in this’. 
Sweden said that it agreed with Australia on continuing the discussion with no more 
delay. Grenada, however, argued that a proposal to adjourn the session takes prece-
dence; and indicated also its support for Japan. 
The Chair, however, pointed out that Russia and Switzerland’s proposal was ‘not to 
adopt’, rather than ‘to adjourn’. 
The US endorsed ‘all that Norway has said’; and argued that the ‘text was not yet 
ripe’. The US explained that it would like to support synergies, but would also like 
to take time; so asked again, as Senegal ‘had asked’ according to the US, whether the 
Commission could either consider only the synergies or defer the whole issue. Sen-
egal, Antigua and Barbuda and Guinea-Bissau indicated that they joined Japan, 
Iceland and Grenada in supporting Option 2 with the addition. The Netherlands, 
speaking for the EU, indicated that this could not be supported. 
Japan then raised a point of order on the basis that the EU is not a member of the 
Commission. The Chair queried whether what was meant was the EU, or the mem-
bers of the EU which were present. The Netherlands confirmed that what was meant 
were the members of the EU who were present.
Japan then raised a point of order on the basis that the Netherlands had spoken out 
of turn, but the Chair ruled that it was not in the Rules that a member could not 
speak twice. Norway then raised a point of order, which the Chair overruled. 
The UK then reiterated what the Netherlands had said; and referred to the pillar of 
sustainable development, before averring that ‘none of Japan’s research has been 
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published in official IWC Scientific Committee publications’. Colombia stated that 
there should be no delay and that it would support holding a vote. Argentina sup-
ported Australia and the UK. The US, however, expressed concern over ‘the direction 
taken’, pointing out that despite different versions there had not been forward move-
ment. Australia, said the US, needed to spend a little time speaking with other states, 
and suggested a workshop. The US iterated that it was interested in synergies; but 
that it felt it was not appropriate to move forward without knowing the answers to 
important questions such as financing. The US suggested decoupling issues.
The Commissioner for Japan then said that, while as a Buddhist he believed that one 
should let personal derision go, it should be noted that on the question of peer-re-
viewed articles he had counted 86 such articles. Kiribati then said that it wished to 
raise its voice against what European countries have said about small island develop-
ing states, and that the issue was about traditional usage. Switzerland then argued 
that consensus, which is so important, was far away; and asked the Chair to put the 
proposal aside. The Chair adjourned for a break.
7.5  The fifth session
On resumption, Australia indicated that consensus had been impossible to find. The 
Chair enquired as to whether Australia therefore wished to withdraw the proposal or 
to put it to a vote. Japan queried whether there was a rule allowing for a vote. The 
Chair indicated that discussions were only to be held to attempt to reach consensus. 
Japan then alleged that the Chair was ‘being prejudiced’. The Chair responded that 
before the adjournment it had been indicated that Australia would be seeking a vote. 
Switzerland reminded the Chair that amendments needed to be dealt with in se-
quence. The Chair referred to Rule E.2 of the Rules of Debate, which provides the 
procedure in respect of voting on motions and amendments. Japan alleged that the 
Chair was biased. The Chair ruled that the proceedings would continue. Japan then 
referred to Rule C2, which concerns the order of motions; but the Chair ruled that 
the matter was closed and that the vote should go ahead. Senegal then raised Rule 
E3(b) of the Rules of Procedure, which concerns the text of regulations proposed to 
amend the Schedule; and stated that it could not commit itself to changing the 
Schedule. The Chair, however, ruled that the words ‘with a view to’ did not constitute 
a commitment and overruled Senegal. The Chair then instructed the Secretariat to 
proceed to a vote.
Australia’s proposal was then put to the vote. Per normal IWC procedure, this was 
an open ballot with votes cast verbally, proceeding through the countries in alpha-
betical order. Votes in favour were received from Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, 
China, Colombia, Denmark, South Korea, The Netherlands, Palau, South Africa, 
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom – 14.72 Votes opposed were received from 
72 It was unexpected that Palau voted in favour. 
251
Ed Couzens
Antigua and Barbuda, Cambodia, Congo, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Iceland, Japan, 
Kiribati, Norway, Russia, St Kitts and Nevis, Senegal, Switzerland, Tuvalu and the 
United States – 15.73 Australia’s proposed resolution was therefore not adopted.
The exercise concluded at this point, to cheers from the Commissioners from the 
contracting governments which had voted against the proposed resolution.
8 Conclusion
In the end, the exercise yielded a result not out of kilter with what might have hap-
pened in real life;74 with arguments being raised over both procedure and substance, 
and much acrimony, confusion and frustration being evident. 
It appeared, from informal reactions afterward, that the exercise achieved its purpose. 
Participants considered international legal issues with which only a few were familiar; 
many successfully argued from positions which would not have reflected their coun-
tries’ usual positions;75 debate became vigorous; and the participants were required 
to engage with difficult questions, both of procedure and of substance, in the course 
of the exercise. Even more importantly, perhaps, the exercise gave many of the par-
ticipants a taste of international negotiation. 
Informal feedback after the exercise indicated further that participants had found the 
exercise valuable both as to substance and as to procedure. It was apparent, during 
the exercise, that many of the participants had made the effort to research their des-
ignated countries’ positions; and also those of other Contracting Governments. Most 
participants appeared to take the exercise seriously; which may reflect the fact that 
they were all selected for the Course initially as being persons either already involved 
in international environmental negotiation, or with the potential to become so in-
volved. 
Informal feedback also from resource persons on the Course, many of whom were 
experienced international negotiators, demonstrated also that the exercise had been 
successful. 
73 It was unexpected that the United States and Switzerland voted against. 
74 Although it needs to be conceded that the proposed resolution on which the exercise was based was not 
realistic, in the sense that it raised issues in an unsophisticated way, and was deliberately provocative.
75 See supra section 1 (‘Introduction’); and section 3.1 (‘Role assignation’).
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9  Procedural disputes in the IWC
Following the exercise, a lecture was presented on the ICRW and synergies with 
various biodiversity-related conventions;76 and also on how procedure and substance 
can overlap in international negotiations, through a discussion of the 63rd Annual 
Meeting of the IWC, which was held in Jersey in July 2011.
9.1 IWC 63, 2011
This meeting provided fascinating insight into how issues of substance and issues of 
procedure might overlap. In the view of the present writer, the meeting involved a 
‘battle’ for control of the IWC – with this battle being fought out not overtly on 
substantive issues, but through issues of procedure.
At IWC 63, the following four issues dominated debate:
1. The non-attendance of certain delegates due to their failure to obtain visas time-
ously from the UK to visit the States of Jersey.77
2. Whether a proposal properly submitted by a contracting government could at 
the meeting itself be submitted by a different party.
3. Whether to allow contracting governments to pay their compulsory annual sub-
scriptions by any means other than electronic bank transfer from a bank account 
held in the name of the contracting government.
4. How a quorum is constituted in the IWC.
9.2  Non-attendance of delegates due to failure to obtain visas to visit the 
States of Jersey
A number of contracting governments were affected by this, including the Russian 
and Senegalese delegates. There was no evidence that this was a deliberate ploy by 
the UK government to exclude certain delegations, despite this being at least insinu-
ated in plenary by some Commissioners. Ultimately, the issue was resolved through 
an investigation and report by the Secretariat; general discussion; an undertaking 
from the UK to work with the Secretariat to ensure that the situation did not again 
occur; and agreement by the Commission that the IWC Secretariat and the host 
country of annual meetings should take a number of steps, including provision of 
detailed information to members well in advance of the meeting to help visa acqui-
sition.78 
76 See supra, section 2 (‘Synergies amongst biodiversity-related conventions’) of the present paper. 
77 Jersey is a crown territory, although not a member of the European Union. Visa applications are handled 
by the United Kingdom.
78 See ‘Chair’s Report of the 63rd Annual Meeting, St Helier, Jersey, 2011’, available at <http://www.iwcof-




Although, obviously, the issue was potentially a serious one; it was arguably used 
more as a delaying/distracting tactic. If a vote had been held and delegates from 
contracting governments who would have wished to be there had been unable to be 
present because of a visa delay, the issue would have been serious. In the end, how-
ever, it petered out.
9.3 Whether a proposal properly submitted by a contracting government 
can at the meeting itself be submitted by a different party
According to the Rules of Procedure of the IWC, 
[n]o item of business which involves amendment of the Schedule to the Convention, or 
recommendations under Article VI of the Convention, or Resolutions of the Commis-
sion, shall be the subject of decisive action by the Commission unless the full draft text 
has been circulated to the Commissioners at least 60 days in advance of the meeting at 
which the matter is to be discussed.79
A proposal had been so put forward (‘circulated’) by the United Kingdom more than 
60 days before the 63rd Meeting. However, at the Meeting itself, the United King-
dom indicated that it would prefer not to put the proposal forward under its name. 
Instead, the proposal was to be put forward under the name of the European Un-
ion.80
Various other contracting governments objected, however; in particular Russia and 
St Kitts and Nevis. Objections included that a party which had not put forward the 
proposal originally could not at the Meeting itself become the proposer; and that the 
European Union was not a contracting government of the ICRW. After much debate, 
a compromise was reached and the proposed resolution81 was recorded as having been 
put forward under the heading ‘[s]ubmitted by the United Kingdom and Poland, 
Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Spain, France, Italy, Lux-
embourg, Hungary, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland and Sweden’.82 
9.4  Whether to allow contracting governments to pay their compulsory 
annual subscriptions by any means other than electronic bank transfer 
from a bank account held in the name of the contracting government
This proved to be the most contentious of all of the clauses in Resolution 2011-1, 
despite having been presented by the United Kingdom described as a ‘modest pro-
posal’. The United Kingdom expressed its surprise that the matter was controversial. 
79 ‘J. Schedule amendments and recommendations under Article VI and Resolutions’.
80 See ‘Chair’s Report of the 63rd Annual Meeting’, supra note 78, at 47.
81 Resolution 2011-1 ‘On Improving the Effectiveness of Operations within the International Whaling 
Commission’. 
82 See supra note 78.
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The United Kingdom argued that all it was trying to do was to modernize the IWC,83 
and obviate the need for the Secretariat to handle large sums of money in different 
countries. 
At the same time as the United Kingdom delegation inside the Meeting precinct was 
arguing this, however, media reports outside of the Meeting suggested that the object 
of the proposed resolution was nothing less than significant reform of the IWC – in 
particular, by preventing corrupt practices. Environmental journalist Richard Black, 
for instance, wrote that ‘reforms to prevent “votes for cash” allegations are set to top 
the agenda at this year’s international whaling commission (IWC) meeting in Jersey’ 
and that ‘the most eye-catching of the UK reform proposals is that governments 
should have to pay their membership subscriptions by bank transfer, creating an 
auditable trail’.84 The United Kingdom’s Environment Minister, Richard Benyon, 
was quoted as saying that ‘[the IWC] has been going since 1946, and it needs to 
modernise its procedures so it doesn’t leave itself open to the kinds of allegationsmade 
a year ago’.85 
Ultimately, the United Kingdom knew that it had a majority of contracting govern-
ments present which would support it, and that for the adoption of a proposal a 
simple majority was required.86 Their representatives indicated in plenary that adop-
tion of this particular clause of the proposed resolution was, for them, not nego-
tiable.87 
In the end, however, a compromise was reached after a small working group had 
negotiated. The final text read: 
E.2 Payment shall be in pounds sterling, drafts being made payable to the International 
Whaling Commission and shall be payable within 90 days of the said request from the 
Secretary or by the following 28 February, the “due date” whichever is the later. It shall 
be open to any Contracting Government to postpone the payment of any increased por-
tion of the amount which shall be payable in full by the following 31 August, which then 
becomes the “due date”. Payment shall be by bank transfer from an account belonging 
to the Contracting Government or to a state institution of that Government. 
83 The Preamble to the proposed resolution included the following words: ‘NOW THEREFORE THE 
COMMISSION: RESOLVES that Commission procedures should be brought into line with current 
international good practice so as to improve the effectiveness of the operations of the organisation; …’.
84 Richard Black ‘“Clean-up bid” tops agenda for whaling meeting’ BBC	News of 10 July 2011, available at 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-14079749> (visited 25 July 2012).
85 Ibid. The allegations were as to the alleged ‘purchasing’ of votes, which allegations have persisted for years 
in respect of the mainly developing country contracting governments which support Japan at the IWC. 
For a sober statistical analysis of the issue, see Jonathan R. Strand and John P. Tuman, ‘Foreign Aid and 
Voting Behaviour in an International Organization: The case of Japan and the International Whaling 
Commission’, Foreign	Policy	Analysis (2012) 1–22.
86 As opposed to a Schedule amendment, which requires a three-quarters majority.
87 See supra note 78, at 49.
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This was the text as the United Kingdom had proposed it and insisted it should be. 
The compromise came in in the adoption of a different, but related, clause:
E.5 For the purpose of application of Rule of Procedure E.2, payments of membership 
dues shall only count as having been received by the Commission when the funds have 
been credited to the Commission’s account unless the payment has been made and the 
Commission is satisfied that the delay in receipt is due to circumstances beyond the 
control of the Contracting Government.88 
9.5 How a quorum is constituted in the IWC
In order to understand how this issue arose, a few words of explanation of the IWC’s 
recent history are needed. Briefly, although the IWC has for many years been a by-
word for conflict, 2006 was the last year in which there was open conflict – and 2007 
was the last year in which any issue was voted upon.89 
Between 2008 and 2010, the parties engaged in a process termed the ‘Future of the 
IWC’,90 in which compromise was sought through the acceptance of a ‘package deal’ 
which would include compromise on issues such as Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling 
(ASW);91 Japanese Small Type Coastal Whaling (JSTCW);92 the lifting of the 1982 
‘moratorium’ on commercial whaling; the management of small cetaceans; and the 
creation of whale sanctuaries; amongst others. It was originally envisaged that the 
‘package deal’ would be adopted or rejected at IWC 62 in 2010; but at that meeting 
parties agreed that a further ‘period of reflection’ was required.
For approximately a decade (2001–2008), a regular proposal was put forward annu-
ally, by Argentina, Brazil and South Africa (range states), for the establishment of a 
whale sanctuary in the South Atlantic. In most of the years the proposal was put 
forward it was successfully voted for by a simple majority93 – the last year of voting 
being in 2007. The proposal was not, however, put forward in the years 2009–2010, 
as it was part of the proposed ‘package deal’. In 2011, Argentina and Brazil put a 
similar proposal forward once again (South Africa declining to support in the 
circumstances).94 Putting the proposal forward was controversial as it required sepa-
88 See supra note 78, at 49–57.
89 See, generally, ‘Meetings’, available at <http://www.iwcoffice.org/meetings/meetingsmain.htm> (visited 
27 December 2012), for documentation and records of all meetings since the year 2000.
90 See, generally, ‘Future of the IWC’, available at <http://iwcoffice.org/commission/future.htm> (visited 25 
July 2012), for the history of this process. See also, supra note 78, at 8–9.
91 A small number of communities in the state of Alaska, US; the Chukotka region of Russia; Greenland; 
and on the island of Bequi, St Vincent and the Grenadines, have traditionally been allocated by the IWC 
annual quotas of whales, for which there is no commercial whaling quota, for subsistence purposes. Au-
thority for this is derived from the Schedule to the ICRW.
92 Japan has four coastal communities (Abashiri, Ayukawa, Taiji and Wada,) which have traditionally en-
gaged in whaling – their whaling is not recognized by the IWC as being ‘aboriginal’ in nature and they 
are not allocated quotas of whales by the IWC. 
93 A three-quarters majority being required to establish the sanctuary by way of a Schedule amendment.
94 See supra note 78, at 3 and 30.
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rating the proposal from the ‘package deal’ which was part of the ‘Future of the IWC’ 
process. 
Since the late 1980s, Japan has regularly called for the IWC to consider the socio-
economic implications of Japanese small-type coastal whaling. Japan noted in 2011 
that, in previous years, it had requested a vote on its proposal for an interim relief 
catch allocation to relieve hardship; but advised that ‘in a spirit of co-operation’ it 
had not requested a vote during the discussions on the ‘Future of the IWC’ process. 
Japan advised that, although disappointed at the outcome of those discussions in 
2010, it ‘recognised the improved atmosphere of discussions that process had engen-
dered’. Finally, Japan advised that, ‘appreciative of the efforts for consensus that had 
already occurred in discussions, it again would refrain from asking for a vote this 
year’.95
Various parties expressed great reluctance to have the South Atlantic sanctuary pro-
posal voted upon, and requested that it be withdrawn. Argentina and Brazil, sup-
ported by other members of the Buenos Aires Group (Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Uruguay) insisted, however, upon 
their right to put a proposal forward and to insist upon a vote – several European 
Union countries gave strong support. Various parties characterized the insistence on 
putting the proposal to a vote as leading potentially to the ‘destruction’ of the IWC. 
The argument made in this regard was that putting the proposal to a vote might lead 
to other issues being put back on the agenda singly in future years (such as JSTCW) 
and to issues being linked politically (such as ASW and JSTCW).96 
The sustainable use group parties did not initially join the meeting; and, when they 
did, made no secret of their intention to leave the room en masse and break the 
quorum if a vote was insisted upon. After debate, Argentina and Brazil continued to 
insist upon a vote. The (Interim) Chair then instructed the Secretary to prepare for 
a vote. The sustainable use group parties then exited the room, leaving less than half 
of the Commission’s contracting governments represented. Various Buenos Aires 
group and European Union countries insisted, however, that the meeting remained 
quorate on the basis that it had been quorate at the beginning of the meeting. The 
(Interim) Chair then adjourned to a series of Private Commissioners’ Meetings where 
debate continued on the meaning of ‘quorate’.97
According to the IWC’s Rules of Procedure, ‘[a]ttendance by a majority of the mem-
bers of the Commission shall constitute a quorum’.98 The rule is stark – unfortu-
nately, it is this very simplicity which leaves it open to different interpretations. 
95 Ibid. at 3 and 33.
96 Ibid. at 30–32.
97 Ibid.
98 IWC ‘Rules of Procedure’, supra, note 63, at B.1(c).
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After nine hours of Private Commissioners’ Meetings on the final day of the Meeting, 
including numerous meetings of sub-groups, a compromise was reached. No resolu-
tion was taken, but certain wording was agreed to which would be included in the 
Chair’s Report of the Meeting.99
The following wording was agreed to: 
At IWC 63, the delegations of Argentina and Brazil presented a proposal for the establish-
ment of a South Atlantic Whale Sanctuary. The establishment of a sanctuary has been on 
the Commission’s agenda for many years. It would require a consensus decision or a 
three-quarters majority. The sponsors asked for consensus on the proposal. The debate 
showed that there was a majority of Commissioners in support of the proposal. Five 
countries spoke in opposition to the proposal and three said they were not in a position 
to join a consensus. Russia requested the sponsors to withdraw the proposal.
The delegation of Japan, on behalf of Cambodia, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, the Gambia, 
Iceland, Norway, Nauru, Mongolia, Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau, Grenada, Kiribati, Mo-
rocco, Korea, Ghana, Palau, Togo, Russian Federation, Tuvalu, St Kitts and Nevis and St 
Lucia, said they were not willing to participate in a vote on the proposal because they 
considered that reverting to voting could be harmful to the constructive dialogue and 
atmosphere in the Commission that have been achieved in recent years. The sponsors of 
the proposal made it clear that they wished the proposal to be put to the vote if consen-
sus was not possible. Many other speakers supported the right of sponsors of a proposal 
to have that proposal put to a vote if consensus could not be achieved.
The Chair ruled that consensus could not be achieved and asked the Secretary to prepare 
for a vote. At that point, Japan, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Ice-
land, Norway, Nauru, Mongolia, Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau, Grenada, Kiribati, Mo-
rocco, Korea, Ghana, Palau, Togo, Tuvalu, St Kitts and Nevis and St Lucia left the meet-
ing room. There were extensive informal consultations on the procedural situation facing 
the Commission. There was no agreement on how the quorum rule in the Commission’s 
Rules of Procedure applied to this situation or on how to resolve the procedural impasse 
facing the Commission.
The Commission decided to establish an intersessional Group to consider the interpreta-
tion of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure regarding the quorum necessary for a deci-
sion to be taken and, if appropriate, to present for the consideration of the Commission 
at IWC 64 a proposal to amend the Rules so as to clarify the matter. While recognizing 
the diversity of views in the Commission on the issue, the Commission recognizes the 
importance of a South Atlantic Whale Sanctuary to many member Governments. The 
Commission resolved:
99 See supra note 78, at 30–32.
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a)  to continue to discuss the establishment of a South Atlantic Whale Sanctuary as the 
first substantive agenda item at IWC 64;
b)  that, if consensus cannot be reached on the item, a decision will be taken in accord-
ance with the Commission’s Rules of Procedure.100
9.6  Conclusion 
To the casual onlooker, it might seems as though the 63rd Annual Meeting of the 
IWC became bogged down in procedural matters; and that the various parties in-
volved lost sight of the main goals of the Convention. This would be, it is submitted, 
too simplistic an explanation. While the bulk of the meeting did involve procedural 
matters or discussions as to form, and actual whale conservation or management 
issues were little discussed, the procedural issues were not unimportant. Strongly 
arguably, what was at stake was control of the international management body – the 
IWC. 
The 63rd Annual Meeting was important in this regard, but not the final word. A 
number of the issues were held over to be raised and debated again at the 64th An-
nual Meeting in 2012, and perhaps will be raised again even at future meetings. At 
the 64th Annual Meeting in Panama in 2012 the quorum issue was indeed raised 
and discussed; however, no resolution was reached, several votes were taken without 
quorum being in issue (including a vote on the South Atlantic Whale Sanctuary, 
which proposal was unsuccessful) and the matter was therefore left unresolved. What 
was important for purposes of the negotiation exercise discussed in this paper was to 
demonstrate to the Course participants that the exercise in which they had just en-
gaged had not been unrealistic, but was in fact reflective of real negotiations; and to 
persuade the Course participants of the importance of their understanding diplo-
matic techniques, and practices of procedure and debate.
10 Postscript: A proposed resolution in 2012
10.1  Introduction
Although the negotiation exercise described above was entirely fictional, in a strange 
case of ‘life imitating art’ a resolution was proposed at the real 64th annual meeting 
of the International Whaling Commission101 – which was held in June and July 2012, 
hosted in Panama City – which was remarkably similar to that in the exercise. The 
draft resolution was put forward by contracting government Monaco, and was titled 
‘Highly migratory cetaceans in the high seas’.102
100 Ibid.
101 See, generally, <http://www.iwcoffice.org/meeting2012> (visited 27 December 2012).
102 See Doc. 64/11rev2 (2012), available at <http://www.iwcoffice.org/index.php?cID=3022&cType=document> 
(visited 25 July 2012).
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The approach taken by Monaco in reality in 2012 was slightly different from that 
taken by Australia in the fictional world of the 2011 negotiating exercise in that, 
instead of directing the request for cooperation and discussion by another organiza-
tion to specific such organizations, the request was to have been made to the United 
Nations General Assembly itself. Beyond that, however, the thrust of the draft reso-
lution was essentially the same – to move the debate on so-called ‘small cetaceans’ 
beyond the confines of the IWC itself. The draft resolution was as contentious in the 
real context of the IWC as it was in the negotiating exercise – many contracting 
governments, particularly those regarded as being ‘pro-whaling’, apparently not wish-
ing to see such a move.103
10.2  The draft resolution
What follows here is the final text of the draft resolution which was put forward by 
Monaco, after having been amended in consultation with various other persons, and 
which was then considered in plenary by the contracting governments to the IWC.
Draft Resolution for IWC 64: Highly migratory cetaceans in the high seas
Submitted by Monaco
IWC/64/11 Rev2 Agenda item 20
1. Noting	that	the	overwhelming	majority	of	marine	cetacean	species	currently	recognized	by	
the	IWC	are	highly	migratory species and thus critically  dependent on international 
cooperation for their conservation and management; 
2.	 Noting	that Articles 65 and 120 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS) require States to cooperate with a view to the conservation of marine 
mammals and, in the case of cetaceans, to work through the appropriate international 
organizations for their conservation, management and study both within and beyond 
the exclusive economic zone; 
3.	 Concerned	that efforts by coastal and island States to protect these migratory species 
depend upon effective conservation efforts on the high seas; 
4.	 Recalling	that, due to a divergence of views among IWC Parties over the taxonomic 
coverage of the ICRW, only 38 highly migratory species of cetacean are included in the 
ICRW Schedule, without addition of any further species in the last 35 years; 
5.	 Regretting	that most countries engaged in whaling have a policy of not providing data 
to the IWC Scientific Committee on cetacean species which in their view are not cov-
ered by the ICRW; 
6. Expressing deep concern that current catches of cetaceans in the world’s oceans – with 
the single exception of those meeting aboriginal subsistence whaling quota – are taken 
without agreed limits; 
103 The contracting governments which objected most strongly in plenary to the adoption of the draft resolu-
tion being pro-whaling parties, such as Japan and St Kitts and Nevis. 
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 NOW therefore the Commission: 
7.  Calls	the	attention	of the international community to the circumstance that significant 
unregulated catches of highly migratory species of cetaceans continue to take place; 
8.   Invites	Contracting Parties to consider this issue in collaboration with the United Na-
tions General Assembly, with a view to contributing to the conservation efforts of the 
IWC.
10.3  Discussion of the document in plenary
Day 5, the final day of the 64th annual meeting, began with discussion of Monaco’s 
draft resolution. According to the IWC official press release for Day 5, ‘after an ex-
change of views, consensus could not be reached’ and Monaco indicated that it 
would continue to work on the issue ‘intersessionally’.104 The proposed resolution 
was therefore withdrawn before being put to a vote. 
What in fact appears to have happened was that, while Monaco was determined to 
see the document adopted, or at least voted upon, after fairly extensive discussion on 
both the penultimate and the final days of IWC 64, Monaco realized that there was 
not sufficient support from the floor for the resolution to be adopted and withdrew 
it.105 That the draft resolution was put forward in the first place, and was then dis-
cussed in plenary before being withdrawn late, indicates that it was taken seriously 
– at least by its proponent. It seems likely that the issue will appear on the agenda 
again in 2014 when the IWC next meets.106  
104 IWC 64, ‘Press release: Day 5’, available at <http://www.iwcoffice.org/iwc64press> (visited 25 July 2012). 
105 The present author attended IWC 64 as a member of the South African delegation.
106 The Commission decided at IWC 64 that meetings would in future be held bi-annually rather than an-
nually – as such, there will be no meeting of the Commission in 2013.

